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2003-2004 NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST
TO ESTATE PLANNERS
A.

INCOME TAX MATTERS
1.

Application of Cottage Savings to Trust Reformation. An issue that has become prominent in

the last several years is the income tax consequences of trust reformation and divisions. PLR 200231011 discusses
the issue in detail. The background was summarized in the ruling:
Section 1.1014-5(b) provides that in determining gain or loss from the sale or
other disposition after October 9, 1969, of a term interest in property (as defined
in § 1.1001-1(f)(2» the adjusted basis of which is determined pursuant, or by
reference, to § 1014 (relating to the basis of property acquired from a decedent)
or § 1015 (relating to the basis of property acquired by gift or by a transfer in
trust), that part of the adjusted uniform basis assignable under the rules of §
1014-5(a) to the interest sold or otherwise disposed of shall be disregarded to the
extent and in the manner provided by § 1001(e) and paragraph (f) of § 1.1001-1.

***
Section 1001 (e)(1) provides that in determining gain or loss from the sale or
disposition of a term interest in property, that portion of the adjusted basis of
such interest which is determined pursuant to §§ 1014, 1015, or 1041 (to the
extent that such adjusted basis is a portion of the entire adjusted basis of the
property) shall be disregarded. Under § 1001(e)(2), a "term interest in property"
includes an income interest in a trust. Section 1001(e)(3) provides that the
general rule of § 1001(e)(1) does not apply to a sale or other disposition which is
a part of a transaction in which the entire interest in property is transferred to
any person or persons.
Section 1.1001-1(a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that, except as
otherwise provided in subtitle A of the Code, the gain or loss realized from the
conversion of property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other
property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated as income or
as loss sustained.
Section 1.1001-1(f)(l) provides that for purposes of determining the gain or loss
from the sale or other disposition of a term interest in property, a taxpayer shall
not take into account that portion of the adjusted basis of such interest, which is
determined pursuant to § 1014 of the Code, to the extent that such adjusted basis
is a portion of the adjusted uniform basis of the entire property, as defined in §
1.1014-5.

***
An exchange of property results in the realization of gain or loss under § 1001 if
the properties exchanged are materially different. Cottage Savings Association
v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). Properties exchanged are materially
different if properties embody legal entitlements "different in kind or extent" or
if the properties confer "different rights and powers." Id. at 565. In Cottage
Savings, the Court held that mortgage loans made to different obligors and
secured by different homes did embody distinct legal entitlements, and that the
taxpayer realized losses when it exchanged interests in the loans. Id. at 566. In

defming what constitutes a "material difference" for purposes of § IOOI(a), the
Court stated that properties are "different" in the sense that is "material" to the
Code so long as their respective possessors enjoy legal entitlements that are
different in kind or extent. Id. at 564-65.
The application of § IOOI(a) to trust interests is illustrated by two cases. In
Evans v. Commissioner, 30 T.e. 798 (1958), the taxpayer exchanged her income
interest in a trust for an annuity, and the court concluded that this was a
realization event. Taxpayer's income interest had entitled her to dividends paid
by a corporation, the stock of which was owned by the trust. She transferred the
income interest to her husband, who agreed in exchange to pay her fixed sums
annually until her death.
A contrary result was reached in Silverstein v. United States, 419 F.2d 999 (7th
Cir. 1969). In that case, the taxpayer exchanged an interest in a trust for a right
to specified annual payments from the remainderman of the trust, and the court
held that taxpayer did not as a result dispose of her trust interest. After the
transaction, taxpayer was to receive the same annual payments from the
remainderman as she had been receiving from the trust. The court distinguished
the transaction from that found to be a realization event in Evans: "the amount
of Mrs. Evans' interest in the trust was not definitive. It varied with the dividend
return on the trust stock. She exchanged this 'uncertainty' for definitely
ascertained yearly payments from her husband." 419 F.2d. at 1003.
The facts of the ruling were that a trust that was to pay certain amounts to "grandson" for life and then
distribute the remainder to various charities was converted into a trust for grandson only with the charities being
paid offnow. The ruling described the trust:
BEFORE

Decedent died testate on Date 1, prior to 1985. Pursuant to the terms of
Decedent's will, a residuary testamentary trust (Trust), was established primarily
for the benefit of Decedent's grandson (Grandson). Under the terms of Trust,
Grandson was to receive S dollars each year during his life. Upon Grandson's
death, the corpus was to be distributed as follows: 1/3 to Charity 1; 1/3 to
Charity 2; 1/6 to Charity 3; and 1/6 to Charity 4. The terms of Trust provide that
no beneficiary could alienate or encumber his/her interest in the income or
principal and no beneficiary's interest was subject to claims of his/her creditors
prior to distribution. Trust was funded with stock of Corporation with an
approximate value of X dollars.
In Year 1, pursuant to a court order, the investments of Trust were restructured
and the dispositive provisions of Trust were modified to provide or annual
income distributions to Grandson in accordance with a Performance Chart. The
order required distributions to Grandson of an amount equal to the lesser of the
maximum income amount set forth in the Performance Chart or the actual net
income of Trust. Grandson was guaranteed a minimum income amount even if
actual Trust income was less than that minimum income amount. Thus, if
earnings of Trust are sufficient, Grandson would receive more than the
minimum stated amounts each accounting period. In addition, Charities 1, 2, 3
and 4 received a lump sum payment. Upon Grandson's death, the remaining
corpus was to be distributed to the Charity 1, Charity 2, Charity 3, and Charity 4
(or their successors) in the same proportion as set forth in Trust.
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AFTER
Under the terms of the proposed agreement, corpus of Trust in excess of Z
dollars will be distributed immediately to Charity 1, Charity 2, Charity 3, and
Charity 4 (or their successors) in the same proportion of their current remainder
interests in Trust. Upon distribution, the charities' interest in Trust will
terminate. The remaining assets of Trust will continue in trust for the benefit of
Grandson. Grandson will receive at least annually an amount equal to seven
percent of the net fair market value of the property held in Trust determined on a
specified date in each calendar year. In addition, the trustee may distribute
income or principal to provide adequately for the reasonable support of
Grandson. On Grandson's death, the remaining corpus will be distributed
pursuant to Grandson's exercise of a testamentary general power to appoint the
remaining corpus to anyone, including his estate or the creditors of his estate.
Any portion of the Trust not effectively appointed by the exercise this power
will be distributed to Grandson's surviving descendants free of trust.
The IRS determined that gain would be recognized:
The proposed trust modification in this case more closely resembles the situation
in Evans than that in Silverstein and should be considered a realization event.
Grandson currently is entitled to trust income, subject to a floor and a ceiling.
Under the proposed order, he would become entitled to annual payments of
seven percent of the fair market value of the trust property, with the trustee
having some discretion to make additional payments under certain
circumstances. Even assuming that the projected payments under the proposed
order approximate those that would be made under the current terms of the trust,
under the proposed order Grandson would lose the protection of the guaranteed
minimum annual payments required by the Performance Chart. He also would
not be limited by the Performance Chart's maximum annual payment ceilings.
Finally, payments would be determined without regard to trust income. In short,
Grandson's interest in the modified trust would entail legal entitlements
different from those he currently possesses. This conclusion is reinforced by
adding to the Taxpayer's current entitlement the general power of appointment
over any trust corpus, even though this was a necessary element in a favorable
GST conclusion set forth in issue # 3, below.
The trust at issue was apparently not a charitable remainder trust. FLIP charitable remainder trusts are now
authorized, and in the year 2000 a safe-harbor was created to convert some old charitable remainder trusts to FLIPs.
Is there a principled difference between those facts and these? The possibility of income recognition must be
considered in other situations; for example, where income and remainder beneficiaries, unable to agree on how a
trust may be administered, desire to terminate the trust in whole or part.
2.

Passive Activity Losses in Trusts. At issue - [mally! - in Mattie K. Carter, et al. v. United

States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1946, was whether a "trust" or a "trustee" must be active in order for a loss in the trust
to avoid being passive. The opinion recited the statute:
IRS could disallow the losses only if they represented a "passive activity loss"
within the meaning ofI.R.C. §469(a):
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(1) In general. - If for any taxable year the taxpayer is described in
paragraph (2), neither--

(A) the passive activity loss, nor
(B) the passive activity credit, for the taxable year shall be
allowed.
I.R.C. §469(a)(l). A "passive activity" is an activity "(A) which involves the
conduct of any trade or business, and (B) in which the taxpayer does not
materially participate." Id. §469(c)(l). IRS acknowledges that the ranch
operations constitute a business. The statute defines "taxpayer" as:
(2) Persons described. paragraph:

(A)
(B)
(C)

The following are described in this

any individual, estate, or trust,
any closely held C corporation, and
any personal service corporation.

***
In pertinent part, section 469(h) defines "material participation" by a taxpayer in
a business activity as follows:
(1) In general. - A taxpayer shall be treated as materially participating
in an activity only if the taxpayer is involved in the operations of the
activity on a basis which is -(A)
(B)
(C)

regular,
continuous, and
substantial.

I.R.C. §469(h)(l).
The facts before the court were simple:
Carter Trust is a testamentary trust established in 1956 under the Last Will and
Testament of Mattie K. Carter, deceased. Fortson has been the trustee of Carter
Trust since 1984, and manages its assets, including the Carter Ranch ("ranch"),
which has been operated by Carter Trust since 1956.1
The ranch covers some 15,000 acres, and is used for a cattle ranching operations
and for oil and gas interests. Fortson, Jr. Decl. -,r 2. In 1994, there were
approximately 4,700 head of cattle on the ranch; there were approximately 3,300
head of cattle on the ranch in 1995. Id. -,r-,r 9-10. At the relevant times, Carter
Trust employed a full-time ranch manager and other full- and part- time
employees who performed essentially all of the activities for the ranch. The
ranch manager in 1994 and 1995 was David Rohn ("Rohn"), who managed the
ranch's day-to-day operations, subject to Fortson's approval. Id. -,r 7. Rohn was
"charged with overall management of livestock production and the management
and conservation of pasture lands, as well as the supervision and direction of the
other employees of the Trust involved in the Ranch operations." Id. -,r 8.
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Fortson, as trustee of Carter Trust, dedicated a substantial amount of time and
attention to ranch activities:
4.
I was chosen to be Trustee because of my extensive business,
managerial, and fmancial experience. My duties include reviewing and
approving all financial and operating proposals for the Ranch and the Trust,
budget and budgeting for the Ranch, all investment decisions for the Trust, asset
acquisition and sales, supervising all employees and agents of the Trust and the
Trust's service providers, reviewing all financial information, and responsibility
for all banking relationships of the Trust. My duties and responsibilities as
Trustee routinely require a significant percentage of my time and attention, and I
maintain regular office hours during which I am consulted regarding any Trust
matter that arises.

7.
I have delegated certain aspects of the operation and management of
the Ranch. It was necessary for the Ranch to employ someone with extensive
experience in the management and operation of a large, active cattle ranch....
Now, the Trust employs a full-time ranch manager, who is responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the Ranch, subject to my approval

8.
I routinely discuss management issues pertaining to the Ranch with the
ranch manager. ...

12.
I have also delegated oversight responsibility for the Ranch to
Benjamin J. Fortson III. Mr. Fortson III is a beneficiary of the Trust and takes a
very active, hands-on role in supervising the Ranch manager and general Ranch
operations. He spent well in excess of 500 hours engaged in Ranch operations
and management at the Ranch in both tax years 1994 and 1995.
Id. ~~ 4, 7-8, 12. In this way, Fortson, Rohn, and other employees operated the
ranch on behalf of Carter Trust.
The opinion states the claims of the parties:
The question arises as to how to determine whether Carter Trust materially
participated in the ranch operations. IRS takes the position that the material
participation of a trust in a business should be made by reference only to the
trustee's activities. See, e.g., Br. to IRS Mot. at 8. Carter Trust counters that, as a
legal entity, it can "participate in an activity only through the actions of its
fiduciaries, employees, and agents," and that through such collective efforts, its
cattle ranching operations during 1994 and 1995 were regular, continuous, and
substantial. Am. Br. to Carter Trust Mot. at 17.
The Court concluded the trust must actively participate:
As discussed above, section 469 says that a trust is a taxpayer, I.R.C.
§469(a)(2)(A), and that a taxpayer is treated as materially participating in a
business if its activities in pursuit of that business are regular, continuous, and
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substantial, id. §469(h)(l). It is undisputed that Carter Trust, not Fortson, is the
taxpayer. Common sense dictates that the participation of Carter Trust in the
ranch operations should be scrutinized by reference to the trust itself, which
necessarily entails an assessment of the activities of those who labor on the
ranch, or otherwise in furtherance of the ranch business, on behalf of Carter
Trust. Cf. Fojtik v. First Nat'! Bank, 752 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. App. - Corpus
Christi 1988) (explaining that "the acts of a corporation's agents are deemed to
be acts of the corporation itself'), writ denied per curiam, 775 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.
1989).3
IRS' contention that Carter Trust's participation in the ranch operations should
be measured by reference to Fortson fmds no support within the plain meaning
of the statute. Such a contention is arbitrary, subverts common sense, and
attempts to create ambiguity where there is none. The court recognizes that IRS
has not issued regulations that address a trust's participation in a business, see,
e.g., Am. Br. to Carter Trust Mot. at 16-17, 20; Br. to IRS Mot. at 7, and that no
case law bears on the issue. However, the absence of regulations and case law
does not manufacture statutory ambiguity. The court has studied the snippet of
legislative history IRS supplied that purports to lend insight on how Congress
intended section 469 to apply to a trust's participation in a business.4
Nevertheless, the court only resorts to legislative history where the statutory
language is unclear, see Stockwell v. Comm'r, 736 F.2d 1051, 1053 (5th Cir.
1984), which, as noted above, is not the case here.
The court concludes that the material participation of Carter Trust in the ranch
operations should be determined by reference to the persons who conducted the
business of the ranch on Carter Trust's behalf, including Fortson. The summary
judgment evidence makes clear that the collective activities of those persons
with relation to the ranch operations during relevant times were regular,
continuous, and substantial so as to constitute material participation.
Alternatively, the court concludes that, based on the undisputed summary
judgment evidence, Fortson's activities with regard to the ranch operations,
standing alone, were regular, continuous, and substantial so as to constitute
material participation by him, as trustee, during relevant times. Consequently,
even if the court were to accept the legal standard articulated by IRS, through
counsel, during the April 3, 2003, telephone hearing, Carter Trust would prevail
under the summary judgment record.
The case is favorable for taxpayers on an issue that has been unresolved since the passive activity rules
were enacted.
3.

Interest Paid on Specific Bequest. On May 9, 1993, Marvin Schwan died, leaving a Will which

provided that each of his four children would receive $1,000,000 and set aside $1,500,000 to create a
grandchildren's trust. These legacies were paid on September 21, 1998. Applicable state law - South Dakota provided that legacies not paid within one year of a decedent's death accrued interest at a statutory rate until paid.
At issue in Mark D. Schwan. et.a!. v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 2d 887 (S.D. So. Div. 2003) was whether the
interest (accrued at 12%) was deductible by the estate for income tax purposes.
The court first looked to section 212. The opinion states:
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Here, the Plaintiffs claim that the interest expense incurred on the legacies was
ordinary and necessary to the administration of the estate. The Plaintiffs argue
that the payment of interest on deferred legacies is a relatively common
occurrence for an estate and thus constitutes an ordinary expense. The Plaintiffs
further contend that the expense was necessary because the estate was forced to
keep liquid assets and marketable securities in the estate to cover the umesolved
issues regarding estate tax liability and other litigation involving in estate assets,
namely the children's litigation discussed above. The Plaintiffs claim that
preserving estate assets was necessary for proper administration of the estate.
The Court finds the Plaintiffs argument unpersuasive. Under the facts presented,
it was unnecessary for the estate to incur the interest charges at issue. As stated
above, the terms of both the will and the trust directed that the estate taxes be
paid out of trust, not probate, assets. The trust would have had more than
sufficient assets to pay the liabilities of the estate if the trustees had not
transferred all of the Schwan stock to the Foundation seven months after Marvin
Schwan's death. The Plaintiff's contend that the transfer to the Foundation was
done in accordance with the redemption agreement which directed that such
securities be transferred to the Foundation "upon the death of Schwan." See
Redemption and Repurchase Agreement, Article I, paragraph 5. Again, the
Court cannot agree with the Plaintiffs' argument.
Under both Minnesota and South Dakota law, agreements that pertain to the
same transaction that the [sic] are executed within the same time frame and
involve the same parties are to be construed together. See Simitar Entertainment,
Inc. v. Silva Entertainment, 44 F.Supp.2d 986,994 (D. Minn. 1999); Anderson
v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. 1978); Janssen v. Tusha, 287 N.W.
501, 505 (S.D. 1939). Applying this principle to the will, trust agreement, and
redemption agreement leads to the inescapable conclusion that it was Marvin
Schwan's intent that the Foundation be funded only after the other obligations of
his estate had been satisfied. A general directive in the redemption agreement
stating that the stock was to be transferred to the Foundation "upon the death of
Schwan" cannot override the specific directives of the trust agreement and the
will which both directed that the trust pay the estate's liabilities, including estate
taxes. The trust agreement itself stated that trust assets should used to satisfy
legacies under the will in the event that the probate assets were insufficient,
indicating Schwan's intent that the gifts under the will be satisfied prior to the
trust assets being gifted to the Foundation. The trust agreement also directed that
all of the Schwan stock, except that which was used to satisfy a legacy, gift, or
obligation under the will, be gifted to the Foundation. This statement clearly
envisions that the obligations under the will would be satisfied prior to the
funding of the Foundation. Therefore, when reading the three documents
together, it is clear that Marvin Schwan's estate plan was drafted so that the
Foundation would be funded last, and those administering his estate chose to
frustrate that intent and fund the Foundation first.
Had the executors followed the dictates of Marvin Schwan's estate plan, they
could have satisfied the legacies on time and would not have incurred the
interest expense. At the time of his death, Marvin Schwan's probate estate
contained assets totaling $19,018,311.47. The legacies that the estate failed to
fully satisfy until 1998 totaled only $5.5 million. As the Defendant pointed out,
the executors made a $5.1 million estimated estate tax payment out of probate
assets although both the trust agreement and will directed that the estate taxes
were to be paid out of trust assets. If the Schwan stock had not been transferred
to the Foundation in contravention of Marvin Schwan's estate plan, the estate
would have had sufficient assets to pay the legacies on time without concern for
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covering the other liabilities of the estate. Therefore, it was not necessary for the
estate to incur interest expense on the legacies. Cf. Hibernia Bank v. United
States, 581 F.2d 741 (1978) (disallowing an administrative expense deduction
for federal estate tax purposes where the expense was unnecessary).
The court next examined, and rejected, the estate's section 163 argument:
Section 163(a) of the tax code provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a
deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
I.R.C. 163(a). This section, however, is limited by the language of Section
163(h)(1) which states that "no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for
personal interest paid or accrued during the taxable year." See I.R.C. 163(h)(1).
Subsection (h) of I.R.C. 163 defmes personal interest in all inclusive terms as
"any interest allowable as a deduction under this chapter other than - ..." and
goes on to list a few exceptions. See I.R.C. 163(h)(2). The exception at issue
here deals with the deductibility of investment interest See I.R.C. 163(h)(2)(B).
Subsection(d)(3)(A)of I.R.C. 163 defmes investment interest as "any interest
allowable as a deduction under this chapter . . . which is paid or accrued on
indebtedness properly allocable to property held for investment." Id.
The Plaintiffs contend that the interest paid on the deferred legacies is deductible
under I.R.c. Section 163 as investment interest. The Plaintiffs assert that absent
liquidating the investment assets of the estate, the legacies could not be satisfied.
Therefore, the executors chose to incur the interest expense under South Dakota
law on the deferred legacies rather than liquidate the income-producing assets of
the estate to satisfy the legacies. The Plaintiffs argue that since the interest
expense was incurred to maintain investment property, it is properly allocable to
property held for investment and qualifies as deductible investment interest. The
Court cannot agree.
As the Court has previously found, during the tax year in question, 1996, the
estate did not own any Schwan stock. Therefore, maintaining the Schwan stock
as an investment cannot serve as a reason for the estate to incur the interest
expense at issue. Absent the Schwan stock, however, the estate still had other
assets producing significant income. During the year in question, the probate
estate earned $480,717.59 in interest on municipal bonds, treasury bills and
notes, and a money market account. The probate estate also earned $106,391.04
in dividends on American Municipal Term stock. Therefore, the estate did earn
substantial income on investment, and at least part of that income was earned
because the executors chose not to pay the $5.5 million in legacies but rather
retain those assets in the estate. It would be absurd, however, to conclude that
such a scenario allowed for an interest expense deduction on the interest
incurred on the deferred legacies.
First, the legacies are not properly characterized as "indebtedness" in this
instance. The legacies do constitute obligations of the estate, but they were not
incurred by the estate as debts. They were not incurred by the execution in
managing and operating the estate nor were they debts of the testator. Rather,
they were created by the testator to devise his property upon his death.
Furthermore, the job of the executors of the estate was not to retain the estate
assets so that the assets would produce investment income, but rather to dispose
of the assets in accordance with the decedent's estate plan. Here, Marvin
Schwan will's directed that $1 million be paid to each of his four children and
$1.5 million be placed in to a trust for his grandchildren. Rather than comply
with his wishes, the executors of the estate held the property in the estate and
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incurred substantial interest expense at a rate of 12% to the legatees under South
Dakota law. Under these circumstances. the interest incurred on the deferred
legacies cannot be characterized as interest paid "on indebtedness properly
allocable to property held for investment."
Second, the Plaintiffs have made no effort to trace the interest expense at issue
to a debt which was created in connection with maintaining investment property.
Section 1.162-8T of the Treasury Regulations establishes the rules for allocating
interest expense among expenditures. The regulation Provides that "[i]n general,
interest expense on a debt is allocated in the same manner as the debt to which
such interest expense relates is allocated. Debt is allocated by tracing
disbursements of the debt proceeds to specific expenditures." See Treas. Reg. §
1.163-8T(a)(3). In the case of investment interest, the interest expense allocated
to an investment expenditure is treated as investment interest. See Treas. Reg. §
1.163(a)(4)(C). The regulation defines investment expenditure as "an
expenditure (other than passive activity expenditure) properly chargeable to
capital account with respect to property held for investment . . . or "an
expenditure in connection with the holding of such property." See Treas, Reg. §
1.163(b)(3). Here, there is no investment expenditure and no debt proceeds to
trace.
The legacies, upon which the interest at issue was incurred, did not arise in
connection with the acquisition or maintenance of property held for investment
purposes. This is not a situation in which the estate incurred a debt such as a
loan to maintain investment property already in the estate. Here, the purported
debt at issue was not incurred as an expenditure of the estate but rather was
created as on obligation of the estate by the testator in the form of a legacy. As
such it has no connection to property held for investment and a deduction under
I.R.C. § 163 is inappropriate.
Many state statutes provide that specific bequests bear interest if not paid when due, or if no due date is
provided, if not paid within one year after probate of the Will.
With respect to a spouse's elective share that is paid "late", Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-5, Example 7 states:
(i) Facts. Testator, who dies in 2000, is survived by a Spouse and three adult
children. Testator's will divides the residue of the estate equally among the
three children. The surviving spouse files an election under the applicable
state's elective share statute. Under this statute, a surviving spouse is entitled to
one-third of the decedent's estate after the payment of debts and expenses. The
statute also provides that the surviving spouse is not entitled to any of the
estate's income and does not participate in appreciation or depreciation of the
estate's assets. However, under the statute, the surviving spouse is entitled to
interest on the elective share from the date of the court order directing the
payment until the executor actually makes payment. During the estate's 2001
taxable year, the estate distributes to the surviving spouse $5,000,000 in partial
satisfaction of the elective share and pays $200,000 of interest on the delayed
payment of the elective share. During that year, the estate receives dividend
income of $3,000,000 and pays expenses of $60,000 that are deductible on the
estate's federal income tax return.

(ii) Conclusion. The estate has four separate shares consisting of the surviving
spouse's elective share and each of the three children's residuary bequests.
Because the surviving spouse is not entitled to any estate income under state
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law, none ofthe estate's gross income is allocated to the spouse's separate share
for purposes of determining that share's distributable net income. Therefore,
with respect to the $5,000,000 distribution, the estate is allowed no deduction
under section 661, and no amount is included in the spouse's gross income
under section 662. The $200,000 of interest paid to the spouse must be included
in the spouse's gross income under section 61. Because no distributions were
made to any other beneficiaries during the year, there is no need to compute the
distributable net income of the other three separate shares. Thus, the taxable
income of the estate for the 2000 taxable year is $2,939,400 ($3,000,000
(dividend income) minus $60,000 (expenses) and $600 (personal exemption».
The estate's $200,000 interest payment is a nondeductible personal interest
expense described in section 163(h).
4.

Tax-Free Division of Family Farm. In Rev. Rut. 2003-52, 2003-22 IRBI the IRS approved a

tax-free division of a farm corporation on the following facts:
Corporation X is a domestic corporation that has been engaged in the farming
business for more than five years. The stock of X is owned 25 percent each by
Father, age 68, Mother, age 67, Son, and Daughter. Although Father and Mother
participate in some major management decisions, most of the management and
all of the operational activities are performed by Son, Daughter, and several
farmhands. The farm operation consists of breeding and raising livestock and
growing grain.
Son and Daughter disagree over the appropriate future direction of X's farming
business. Son wishes to expand the livestock business, but Daughter is opposed
because this would require substantial borrowing by X. Daughter would prefer
to sell the livestock business and concentrate on the grain business. Despite the
disagreement, the two siblings have cooperated on the operation of the farm in
its historical manner without disruption. Nevertheless, it has prevented each
sibling from developing, as he or she sees fit, the business in which he or she is
most interested.
Having transferred most of the responsibility for running the farm to the
children, Father and Mother remain neutral on the disagreement between their
children. However, because of the disagreement, Father and Mother would
prefer to bequeath separate interests in the farm business to their children.
For reasons unrelated to X's farm business, Son and Daughter's husband dislike
each other. Although this has not impaired the farm's operation to date, Father
and Mother believe that requiring Son and Daughter to run a single business
together is likely to cause family discord over the long run.
To enable Son and Daughter each to devote his or her undivided attention to,
and apply a consistent business strategy to, the farming business in which he or
she is most interested, to further the estate planning goals of Father and Mother,
and to promote family harmony, X transfers the livestock business to newly
formed, wholly owned domestic corporation Y and distributes 50 percent of the
Y stock to Son in exchange for all of his stock in X. X distributes the remaining
Y stock equally to Father and Mother in exchange for half of their X stock.
Going forward, Daughter will manage and operate X and have no stock interest
in Y, and Son will manage and operate Y and have no stock interest in X. Father
and Mother will also amend their wills to provide that Son and Daughter will
inherit stock only in Y and X, respectively. After the distribution, Father and
Mother will still each own 25 percent of the outstanding stock of X and Y and
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will continue to participate in some major management decisions related to the
business of each corporation.
Apart from the issue of whether the business purpose requirement of
§1.355-2(b) is satisfied, the distribution meets all of the requirements of §§
368(a)(1)(D) and 355 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The ruling concludes:
The disagreement of Son and Daughter over the farm's future direction has
prevented each sibling from developing, as he or she sees fit, the business in
which he or she is most interested. The distribution will eliminate this
disagreement and allow each sibling to devote his or her undivided attention to,
and apply a consistent business strategy to, the farming business in which he or
she is most interested, with the expectation that each business will benefit.
Therefore, although the distribution is intended, in part, to further the personal
estate planning of Father and Mother and to promote family harmony, it is
motivated in substantial part by a real and substantial non-Federal tax purpose
that is germane to the business of X. Hence, the business purpose requirement of
§1.355-2(b) is satisfied.
5.

Investment Advice Fees. In J.H. Scott v. United States, 328 F. 3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003) the court

followed Mellon Bank, N.A., v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir.2001), and explicitly disagreed with the
Sixth Circuit's holding in O'Neill v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993), to subject a trust's deductions for
outside investment advice fees to the 2% limitation of section 67(a). The opinion states:
In reach our decision today, we find ourselves in agreement with the Federal
Circuit's reasoning in Mellon Bank, and we thus render a decision at odds with
the Sixth Circuit's holding in O'Neill. In O'Neill, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
"[w]here a trustee lacks experience in investment matters, professional
assistance may be warranted." 994 F.2d at 304. According to the court, without
investment advice, "the co-trustees would have put at risk the assets of the Trust.
Thus, the investment advisory fees were necessary to the continued growth of
the Trust and were caused by the fiduciary duties of the cotrustees." Id. In our
judgment, this analysis contains a fatal flaw. Of course, trustees often (and
perhaps must) seek outside investment advice. But the second requirement of §
67(e)(1) does not ask whether costs are commonly incurred in the administration
of trusts. Instead, it asks whether costs are commonly incurred outside the
administration of trusts. As the Federal Circuit decided in Mellon Bank,
investment-advice fees are commonly incurred outside the administration of
trusts, and they are therefore subject to the 2% floor established by § 67(a).
6.

Final Regulations; Section 643(b), Definition of Income. Final regulations have been issued

under section 643(b). T.D.9102. Generally they are effective for tax years ending after January 2, 2004. The basic
rule is contained in new § 1.643(b) - (1) which provides as follows:
For purposes of subparts A through D, part I, subchapter J, chapter 1 of the
Internal Revenue Code, "income," when not preceded by the words "taxable,"
"distributable net," "undistributed net," or "gross," means the amount of income
of an estate or trust for the taxable year determined under the terms of the
governing instrument and applicable local law. Trust provisions that depart
fundamentally from traditional principles of income and principal will generally
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not be recognized. For example, if a trust instrument directs that all the trust
income shall be paid to the income beneficiary but defines ordinary dividends
and interest as principal, the trust will not be considered one that under its
governing instrument is required to distribute all its income currently for
purposes of section 642(b) (relating to the personal exemption) and section 651
(relating to simple trusts). Thus, items such as dividends, interest, and rents are
generally allocated to income and proceeds from the sale or exchange of trust
assets are generally allocated to principal. However, an allocation of amounts
between income and principal pursuant to applicable local law will be respected
if local law provides for a reasonable apportionment between the income and
remainder beneficiaries of the total return of the trust for the year, including
ordinary and tax-exempt income, capital gains, and appreciation. For example, a
state statute providing that income is a unitrust amount of no less than 3% and
no more than 5% of the fair market value of the trust assets, whether determined
annually or averaged on a multiple year basis, is a reasonable apportionment of
the total return of the trust. Similarly, a state statute that permits the trustee to
make adjustments between income and principal to fulfill the trustee's duty of
impartiality between the income and remainder beneficiaries is generally a
reasonable apportionment of the total return of the trust. Generally, these
adjustments are permitted by state statutes when the trustee invests and manages
the trust assets under the state's prudent investor standard, the trust describes the
amount that mayor must be distributed to a beneficiary by referring to the trust's
income, and the trustee after applying the state statutory rules regarding the
allocation of receipts and disbursements to income and principal, is unable to
administer the trust impartially. Allocations pursuant to methods prescribed by
such state statutes for apportioning the total return of a trust between income and
principal will be respected regardless of whether the trust provides that the
income must be distributed to one or more beneficiaries or may be accumulated
in whole or in part, and regardless of which alternate permitted method is
actually used, provided the trust complies with all requirements of the state
statute for switching methods. A switch between methods of determining trust
income authorized by state statute will not constitute a recognition event for
purposes of section 100 I and will not result in a taxable gift from the trust's
grantor or any of the trust's beneficiaries. A switch to a method not specifically
authorized by state statute, but valid under state law (including a switch via
judicial decision or a binding non-judicial settlement) may constitute a
recognition event to the trust or its beneficiaries for purposes of section 100 I
and may result in taxable gifts from the trust's grantor and beneficiaries, based
on the relevant facts and circumstances. In addition, an allocation to income of
all or a part of the gains from the sale or exchange of trust assets will generally
be respected if the allocation is made either pursuant to the terms of the
governing instrument and applicable local law, or pursuant to a reasonable and
impartial exercise of a discretionary power granted to the fiduciary by applicable
local law or by the governing instrument, if not prohibited by applicable local
law.
Thus, there must be a state statute allowing for a unitrust distribution or an allocation of capital gains to
income. The Summary of Comments and Explanation of Revisions states as follows on this point:
Some commentators suggested that, even in those states that have not enacted
legislation specifically authorizing powers to adjust or a unitrust defmition of
income, trust instruments containing such provision should be respected as
defming income for purposes of section 643(b). Under a unitrust or power to
adjust, items traditionally allocable to principal (such as gains from the sale or
exchange of trust assets) may, under certain circumstances, be allocated to
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income, and items traditionally allocable to income (such as dividends, interest,
and rents) may, under certain circumstances, be allocated to principal. The
proposed regulations already recognize that gains from the sale or exchange of
trust assets may, under certain circumstances, be allocated to income under the
terms of the governing instrument. However, § 1.643(b)-1 has always provided
that the allocation to principal, under the terms of the governing instrument, of
items that traditionally would be allocable to income will not be respected for
purposes of section 643(b), and this position is maintained in the final
regulations. Accordingly, the IRS and the Treasury Department believe that an
allocation to principal of traditional income items should be respected for
Federal tax purposes only if applicable state law has specifically authorized such
an allocation in certain limited circumstances, such as when necessary to ensure
impartiality regarding a trust investing for total return. Under the regulations, a
state statute specifically authorizing certain unitrust payments in satisfaction of
an income interest or certain powers to adjust would satisfy that requirement.
Further, the IRS and the Treasury Department acknowledge that other actions
may constitute applicable state law, such as a decision by the highest court of
the state announcing a general principle or rule of law that would apply to all
trusts administered under the laws of that state. However, a court order
applicable only to the trust before the court would not constitute applicable state
law for this purpose.
These provisions affect the marital and charitable deduction, and GST grandfathering. The Summary and
Explanation states:
The proposed regulations provide that a spouse will be treated as entitled to
receive all net income from a trust, as required for the trust to qualify for the gift
and estate tax marital deductions under § 20.2056(b)-5(a)(l) of the Estate Tax
Regulations and § 25.2523(e)-I(f)(l) of the Gift Tax Regulations, if the trust is
administered under applicable state law that provides for a reasonable
apportionment between the income and remainder beneficiaries of the total
return of the trust and that meets the requirements of § 1.643(b)-1. Thus, a
spouse who, as the income beneficiary, is entitled in accordance with the state
statute and the governing instrument to a unitrust amount of no less than 3% and
no more than 5% would be entitled to all the income from the trust for purposes
of qualifying the trust for the marital deduction.
Several commentators suggested that a trust that provides for a unitrust payment
to the spouse should satisfy the income standard even in states that have not
enacted legislation defining income as a unitrust amount or providing that a right
to income may be satisfied by such a payment. The income distribution
requirement that must be satisfied for a trust to qualify for the gift and estate tax
marital deductions ensures that the spouse receives what is traditionally
considered to be income from the assets held in trust. As previously discussed,
the IRS and the Treasury Department believe that only if applicable state law
has authorized a departure from traditional concepts of income and principal
should such a departure be respected for Federal tax purposes. A state statute
specifically authorizing certain unitrust amounts in satisfaction of an income
interest or certain powers to adjust in conformance with the provisions of §
1.643(b)-1 would meet this standard. However, in the absence of a state statute,
or, for example, a decision of the highest court of the state applicable to all trusts
administered under that state's law, the applicable state law requirement will not
be satisfied.
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It has also been suggested that, in some circumstances, the proposed regulations
would allow the spouse to receive less than all the traditional trust income, and
therefore would conflict with the section 2056 statutory requirement that the
spouse receive all trust income. For example, a spouse who, in accordance with
the state statute, receives a 4% unitrust amount would receive less than all the
traditional income generated by the trust, if the trust's total dividends, interest,
rents, etc. for the year exceed 4%. However, that spouse would receive more
than the amount of traditional income earned by the trust in any year that the
trust's total dividends, interest, rents, etc. do not exceed 4%. The regulations are
intended to strike a reasonable balance between the marital deduction statutory
requirements and the many state statutes intended to facilitate the investment of
trust assets while ensuring equitable treatment for the income and remainder
beneficiaries. Indeed, Congress contemplated that, in appropriate circumstances,
an annuity could be treated as satisfying the statutory income distribution
requirement. The flush language following section 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) specifically
authorizes regulations that treat an annuity "in a manner similar to an income
interest in property." The IRS and Treasury Department believe that these
regulations implement this statutory authorization in a reasonable manner by
recognizing allocations under state statutes that provide for a reasonable
apportionment of the total return of the trust.
Trusts Exempt From Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
The proposed regulations expand the rules concerning changes that may be
made to trusts that are exempt from the generation-skipping transfer tax because
they were irrevocable on September 25, 1985, without causing the loss of the
trusts' exempt status. If such an exempt trust is administered in conformance
with applicable state law that permits a unitrust amount to be paid to the income
beneficiary or permits adjustments between income and principal to ensure
impartiality, and that meets the requirements of § 1.643(b)-I, its exempt status
will not be affected.
One commentator requested that the final regulations also provide that
administration of an exempt trust as described in these regulations will not cause
any trust beneficiary to be treated as making a gift and will not result in any
taxable exchange by the trust or any of its beneficiaries. Another commentator
requested that the final regulations clarify that changing the situs of a trust from
a state with only a traditional defmition of income to a state that permits
unitrusts or powers to adjust will not affect the exempt status of the trust.
Examples 11 and 12 have been revised to address these and similar concerns.
The same conclusions apply to a change of situs in the opposite direction, from a
state that permits unitrusts or the power to adjust to a state that has only the
traditional definition of income.
The ability to change situs is of particular benefit. The fmal regulations also deal with allocations of capital
gains to DNI and contain many examples. New section § 1.643(a) - 3 reads as follows:
Capital gains and losses.
(a) In general. Except as provided in § 1.643(a)-6 and paragraph (b) of this
section, gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets are ordinarily excluded
from distributable net income and are not ordinarily considered as paid, credited,
or required to be distributed to any beneficiary.
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(b) Capital gains included in distributable net income. Gains from the sale or
exchange of capital assets are included in distributable net income to the extent
they are, pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local
law, or pursuant to a reasonable and impartial exercise of discretion by the
fiduciary (in accordance with a power granted to the fiduciary by applicable
local law or by the governing instrument if not prohibited by applicable local
law) -(1) Allocated to income (but if income under the state statute is defined as, or
consists of, a unitrust amount, a discretionary power to allocate gains to income
must also be exercised consistently and the amount so allocated may not be
greater than the excess of the unitrust amount over the amount of distributable
net income determined without regard to this subparagraph § 1.643(a)-3(b));
(2) Allocated to corpus but treated consistently by the fiduciary on the trust's
books, records, and tax returns as part of a distribution to a beneficiary; or
(3) Allocated to corpus but actually distributed to the beneficiary or utilized by
the fiduciary in determining the amount that is distributed or required to be
distributed to a beneficiary.
(c) Charitable contributions included in distributable net income. If capital gains
are paid, permanently set aside, or to be used for the purposes specified in
section 642(c), so that a charitable deduction is allowed under that section in
respect of the gains, they must be included in the computation of distributable
net income.
(d) Capital losses. Losses from the sale or exchange of capital assets shall first
be netted at the trust level against any gains from the sale or exchange of capital
assets, except for a capital gain that is utilized under paragraph (b)(3) of this
section in determining the amount that is distributed or required to be distributed
to a particular beneficiary. See § 1.642(h)-1 with respect to capital loss
carryovers in the year of final termination of an estate or trust.
(e) Examples. The following examples illustrate the rules of this section:
Example 1. Under the terms of Trust's governing instrument, all income is to be
paid to A for life. Trustee is given discretionary powers to invade principal for
A's benefit and to deem discretionary distributions to be made from capital gains
realized during the year. During Trust's first taxable year, Trust has $5,000 of
dividend income and $10,000 of capital gain from the sale of securities.
Pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law,
Trustee allocates the $10,000 capital gain to principal. During the year, Trustee
distributes to A $5,000, representing A's right to trust income. In addition,
Trustee distributes to A $12,000, pursuant to the discretionary power to
distribute principal. Trustee does not exercise the discretionary power to deem
the discretionary distributions of principal as being paid from capital gains
realized during the year. Therefore, the capital gains realized during the year are
not included in distributable net income and the $10,000 of capital gain is taxed
to the trust. In future years, Trustee must treat all discretionary distributions as
not being made from any realized capital gains.
Example 2. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that Trustee intends
to follow a regular practice of treating discretionary distributions of principal as
being paid first from any net capital gains realized by Trust during the year.
Trustee evidences this treatment by including the $10,000 capital gain in
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distributable net income on Trust's federal income tax return so that it is taxed to
A. This treatment of the capital gains is a reasonable exercise of Trustee's

discretion. In future years Trustee must treat all discretionary distributions as
being made fIrst from any realized capital gains.
Example 3. The facts are the same as in Example I, except that Trustee intends
to follow a regular practice of treating discretionary distributions of principal as
being paid from any net capital gains realized by Trust during the year from the
sale of certain specifIed assets or a particular class of investments. This
treatment of capital gains is a reasonable exercise of Trustee's discretion.
Example 4. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that pursuant to the
terms of the governing instrument (in a provision not prohibited by applicable
local law), capital gains realized by Trust are allocated to income. Because the
capital gains are allocated to income pursuant to the terms of the governing
instrument, the $10,000 capital gain is included in Trust's distributable net
income for the taxable year.
Example 5. The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that Trustee decides
that discretionary distributions will be made only to the extent Trust has realized
capital gains during the year and thus the discretionary distribution to A is
$10,000, rather than $12,000. Because Trustee will use the amount of any
realized capital gain to determine the amount of the discretionary distribution to
the benefIciary, the $10,000 capital gain is included in Trust's distributable net
income for the taxable year.
Example 6. Trust's assets consist of Blackacre and other property. Under the
terms of Trust's governing instrument, Trustee is directed to hold Blackacre for
ten years and then sell it and distribute all the sales proceeds to A. Because
Trustee uses the amount of the sales proceeds that includes any realized capital
gain to determine the amount required to be distributed to A, any capital gain
realized from the sale of Blackacre is included in Trust's distributable net
income for the taxable year.
Example 7. Under the terms of Trust's governing instrument, all income is to be
paid to A during the Trust's term. When A reaches 35, Trust is to terminate and
all the principal is to be distributed to A. Because all the assets of the trust,
including all capital gains, will be actually distributed to the benefIciary at the
termination of Trust, all capital gains realized in the year of termination are
included in distributable net income. See §1.641(b)-3 for the determination of
the year of [mal termination and the taxability of capital gains realized after the
terminating event and before [mal distribution.
Example 8. The facts are the same as Example 7, except Trustee is directed to
pay B $10,000 before distributing the remainder of Trust assets to A. Because
the distribution to B is a gift of a specifIc sum of money within the meaning of
section 663(a)(1), none of Trust's distributable net income that includes all ofthe
capital gains realized during the year of termination is allocated to B's
distribution.
Example 9. The facts are the same as Example 7, except Trustee is directed to
distribute one-half of the principal to A when A reaches 35 and the balance to A
when A reaches 45. Trust assets consist entirely of stock in corporation M with a
fair market value of $1,000,000 and an adjusted basis of $300,000. When A
reaches 35, Trustee sells one-half of the stock and distributes the sales proceeds
to A. All the sales proceeds, including all the capital gain attributable to that
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sale, are actually distributed to A and therefore all the capital gain is included in
distributable net income.
Example 10. The facts are the same as Example 9, except when A reaches 35,
Trustee sells all the stock and distributes one-half of the sales proceeds to A. If
authorized by the governing instrument and applicable state statute, Trustee may
determine to what extent the capital gain is distributed to A. The $500,000
distribution to A may be treated as including a minimum of $200,000 of capital
gain (and all of the principal amount of $300,000) and a maximum of $500,000
of the capital gain (with no principal). Trustee evidences the treatment by
including the appropriate amount of capital gain in distributable net income on
Trust's federal income tax return. If Trustee is not authorized by the governing
instrument and applicable state statutes to determine to what extent the capital
gain is distributed to A, one-half of the capital gain attributable to the sale is
included in distributable net income.
Example 11. The applicable state statute provides that a trustee may make an
election to pay an income beneficiary an amount equal to four percent of the fair
market value of the trust assets, as determined at the beginning of each taxable
year, in full satisfaction of that beneficiary's right to income. State statute also
provides that this unitrust amount shall be considered paid first from ordinary
and tax-exempt income, then from net short-term capital gain, then from net
long-term capital gain, and finally from return of principal. Trust's governing
instrument provides that A is to receive each year income as defined under state
statute. Trustee makes the unitrust election under state statute. At the beginning
of the taxable year, Trust assets are valued at $500,000. During the year, Trust
receives $5,000 of dividend income and realizes $80,000 of net long-term gain
from the sale of capital assets. Trustee distributes to A $20,000 (4% of
$500,000) in satisfaction of A's right to income. Net long-term capital gain in
the amount of$15,000 is allocated to income pursuant to the ordering rule of the
state statute and is included in distributable net income for the taxable year.
Example 12. The facts are the same as in Example 11, except that neither state
statute nor Trust's governing instrument has an ordering rule for the character of
the unitrust amount, but leaves such a decision to the discretion of Trustee.
Trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating principal, other than
capital gain, as distributed to the beneficiary to the extent that the unitrust
amount exceeds Trust's ordinary and tax- exempt income. Trustee evidences this
treatment by not including any capital gains in distributable net income on
Trust's Federal income tax return so that the entire $80,000 capital gain is taxed
to Trust. This treatment of the capital gains is a reasonable exercise of Trustee's
discretion. In future years Trustee must consistently follow this treatment of not
allocating realized capital gains to income.
Example 13. The facts are the same as in Example 11, except that neither state
statutes nor Trust's governing instrument has an ordering rule for the character
of the unitrust amount, but leaves such a decision to the discretion of Trustee.
Trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating net capital gains as
distributed to the beneficiary to the extent the unitrust amount exceeds Trust's
ordinary and tax-exempt income. Trustee evidences this treatment by including
$15,000 of the capital gain in distributable net income on Trust's Federal income
tax return. This treatment of the capital gains is a reasonable exercise of
Trustee's discretion. In future years Trustee must consistently treat realized
capital gain, if any, as distributed to the beneficiary to the extent that the unitrust
amount exceeds ordinary and tax-exempt income.
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Example 14. Trustee is a corporate fiduciary that administers numerous trusts.
State statutes provide that a trustee may make an election to distribute to an
income beneficiary an amount equal to four percent of the annual fair market
value of the trust assets in full satisfaction of that beneficiary's right to income.
Neither state statutes nor the governing instruments of any of the trusts
administered by Trustee has an ordering rule for the character of the unitrust
amount, but leaves such a decision to the discretion of Trustee. With respect to
some trusts, Trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating principal,
other than capital gain, as distributed to the beneficiary to the extent that the
unitrust amount exceeds the trust's ordinary and tax-exempt income. Trustee will
evidence this treatment by not including any capital gains in distributable net
income on the Federal income tax returns for those trusts. With respect to other
trusts, Trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating any net capital
gains as distributed to the beneficiary to the extent the unitrust amount exceeds
the trust's ordinary and tax-exempt income. Trustee will evidence this treatment
by including net capital gains in distributable net income on the Federal income
tax returns filed for these trusts. Trustee's decision with respect to each trust is a
reasonable exercise of Trustee's discretion and, in future years, Trustee must
treat the capital gains realized by each trust consistently with the treatment by
that trust in prior years.
The fmal example (Ex. 14) is useful for corporate trustees which wish to have multiple "regular" practices.
Some issues are not covered. The Summary and Explanation notes:
One commentator requested examples of the effect on DNI of capital gains from
a passthrough entity and income from a passthrough entity that is more or less
than the trust accounting income from that entity. These issues are beyond the
scope of this project.
The final regulations also deal with pooled income funds and charitable remainder trusts. Treasury and the
IRS seem concerned that the difference between a net income CRT and a standard CRT not be obviated by trustee
allocations to income. With respect to that issue, the Summary and Explanation states:
Several commentators were concerned about the requirement in the proposed
regulations that net income CRUTs under sections 664(d)(2) and 664(d)(3)
contain their own defmition of income if applicable state law provides that
income is a unitrust amount. The purpose of this proposed requirement was to
avert potential problems with qualification of a net income CRUT in a state that
defines income as a unitrust amount. Some commentators pointed out that state
statutes provide alternative defmitions of income and all that should be
necessary is that the trust use a definition of income, whether contained in the
terms of the governing instrument or applicable local law, that is not a unitrust
amount. Therefore, the requirement that the trust contain its own definition of
income has been eliminatedfrom the final regulations.
Several commentators were concerned about the provision in the proposed
regulations that the allocation of post-contribution capital gain to income, if
permitted under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law,
may not be discretionary with the trustee. Some suggested eliminating the
prohibition on discretionary powers held by the trustee. Some suggested that a
discretionary power should be permitted if held by an independent trustee. Some
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requested clarification that this prohibition does not apply to a trustee's power to
allocate receipts to income or principal pursuant to state law.
The provision in the proposed regulations has no effect on the determination of
trust accounting income under applicable state law that grants the trustee a
power to reasonably apportion the total return of the trust. The provision is
directed at discretion given the trustee under the terms of the governing
instrument to allocate capital gains to income in some years and not others.
Allowing the trustee this type of discretion is inconsistent with the requirements
for net income CRUTs as explained in the legislative history. The settlor has the
option of providing in the trust that the trustee is to distribute the lesser of the
stated percentage payout or trust income. However, this option must be adopted
in the trust instrument and not left to the discretion of the trustee. See H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 91-782, at 296 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 644, 655. A power to
allocate capital gains to income in some years and not others in the trustee's sole
discretion is similar to having the discretionary ability to payout either the trust
income or the stated percentage payout each year, regardless of their relative
values. Thus, the final regulations continue to provide that, for CRUTs, postcontribution capital gains may be included in the definition of income under the
terms ofthe governing instrument or applicable local law, but not pursuant to a
trustee's discretionary power granted by the trust instrument, rather than by
state statute, to allocate capital gains to income.
[Italics added.]
7.

FDIC Insurance. Effective April 1, 2004, the FDIC insurance rules for "living trust" accounts

were liberalized. Under the new rules, the FDIC will provide insurance coverage of up to $100,000 per "qualified
beneficiary" of the trust, even if the trust contains conditions on when the beneficiaries will receive the trust funds.
A qualified beneficiary is the grantor's spouse, children, grandchildren, parents, and siblings.
8.

Sale of Lottery Winnings. The sale of lottery winnings creates ordinary income not capital gain.

United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004). In Alden L. Clapton v. Commissioner, T.C. memo 200495, several lottery participants formed a trust to receive any winnings; after a win, the taxpayer sold his trust interest,
rather than the winnings. The Tax Court determined that was a distinction without a difference.
9.

Deferral of Gain Recognition Denied After Sale to ESOP. Section 1042 allows gain from the

sale of company stock to an ESOP to be deferred if the proceeds are reinvested in marketable securities, but an
election must be made on the income tax return for the year of the sale.

In Estate of John W. Clause v.

Commissioner, 122 T.C. No. 5 (2004), the taxpayer did not make a timely election and the court refused a
"substantial compliance" defense.
B.
CHARITABLE AND TAX-EXEMPT MATTERS - Sections 170,642,664,501,509,2055,2522, and
4940-4947
1.

Making Changes to a Charitable Remainder Trust. In PLR 200127023 the Service explained

the income tax consequences of the early termination ofa CRT, and determined there was no self-dealing. The trust
was for a 20 year term and the donor/unitrust recipient ("A"), trustee, and charitable beneficiary each agreed to
terminate the trust and divide the trust assets actuarially. The ruling states:
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Accordingly, we conclude as follows: A is selling A's interest in Trust to the
remaindennan. Provided that the money and other property received by A are
distributed to A in accordance with A's interest in Trust, the amount A will
realize from the sale of A's interest in Trust is the amount of money and the fair
market value ofthe property received by A.
Pursuant to section 1001(e)(1), the portion of the adjusted unifonn basis
assigned to A's interest in Trust is disregarded. The exception contained in
section 1001(e)(3) is not applicable, because the entire interest in Trust's assets
is not being sold, or otherwise disposed of, to a third party. Accordingly, for
purposes of this transaction, A has no basis in A's interest in Trust. Therefore,
the amount of gain A must recognize under section 1001(c) is the amount A
realized from the disposition of A's interest in Trust. The gain realized by A
from the disposition of A's interest will be long tenn capital gain.
We further conclude that no act of self-dealing, as defined in section 4941 (d)(1)
will result from the tennination of Trust and the distribution of the assets of
Trust to A and the charity.
The above conclusions are based on the assumptions that the proposed
tennination of Trust is not prohibited by state law; that the proposed tennination
will be made pursuant to a court order resulting from a proceeding to which the
state attorney general is a party; and that the amounts distributed to A are
detennined and distributed pursuant to the valuation rules set forth in section
7520. This ruling is also contingent on the fact that any distribution of assets in
kind is made in a pro rata manner.
PLR 200208039 allowed tennination of a net income CRUT where the donor had died and a child of the
donor was the only remaining unitrust beneficiary. The CRUT was invested for total return and had typically paid
out less than 3% of net fair market value. The remaindennen consented. Could the CRUT have been tenninated if
anyone had the power to change the charitable remainderman?
If a charitable remainder trust is to be partially tenninated and a portion of the trust distributed to charity,
the unitrust recipient may be entitled to an income tax deduction so long as the transaction is not deemed to be an
end-run around the split-interest rules. See, e.g., 200140027.
In PLR 200301020 the IRS allowed a joint and survivor CRT to be divided as part of a divorce settlement.
The original trust provided for unitrust payments to the spouse jointly and then to the survivor, the survivor could
alter the identity of the charitable remaindennen, and the spouses were co-trustees. One of the new trusts would be
first for husband, then wife, with husband as trustee, wife as successor, and with husband having the power to alter
the charitable remaindennen. The second trust would have wife in the lead position, but otherwise would be
identical to the first trust. The ruling conflnns that no gain would be recognized on the division, that there is no selfdealing, and that the new trusts qualify under section 664. Also, the trust could pay the legal fees for the division.
PLR 200219012 allowed the recission ofa CRT where the donors had been misled, had obtained no benefit
from the charitable gift, filed amended income tax returns, and had a court approve the recission. The ruling states:
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In the instant case, based on the representations made and statements contained
in the pleadings submitted to the court, the Donors were misinformed regarding
the operation of Charitable Trust as drafted and the requirement that the unitrust
amount became payable immediately upon execution of Charitable Trust. In
view of the nature of the assets transferred to Charitable Trust (non-income
producing stock) and Donor's understanding that no unitrust payment would be
made until the stock was sold, it appears that the scrivener intended to draft and
the Donors intended to execute a charitable remainder trust described in §§
664(d)(3), rather than one described in §§ 664(d)(2). Further, Donors were
incorrectly informed regarding the tax consequences if Charitable Trust
distributed assets in kind in satisfaction of the unitrust amount.
As noted above, in an attempt to reverse the income tax charitable deductions
claimed by the Donors on the original income tax returns, Donors filed amended
income tax returns on Date 6 and paid the additional tax due. However, also as
noted above, because the period of limitations on assessment for Donors'
income tax return filed on Date 2 has expired, the Donors made a statutory
overpayment for the year in which Charitable Trust was created and funded and
the Donors may make a claim for a refund of the additional tax paid for that
year. The remaining assets of Charitable Trust were returned to Donors pursuant
to the court order issued on Date 5. Traditionally, the tax benefit rule requires
taxpayers to recognize income when the taxpayers "recover" an item or amount
deducted in a previous tax year. Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460
U.S. 370 (1983). The rule is also applicable in cases involving charitable
deductions and provides that if a taxpayer receives a deduction for a charitable
contribution in one taxable year and recoups that donation in a later year, the
value of the contribution, up to the amount of the charitable contribution
previously taken, is treated as income in the year in which it was recouped.
Rosen v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1980), anfrg 71 T.e. 226
(1978). It is irrelevant that the deduction taken in the prior year may have been
improper or that the period of limitations on assessment has expired for the year
in which the deduction was claimed. Unvert v. Commissioner, 656 F.2d 483 (9th
Cir. 1981). Thus, the amount of the charitable deduction, $B, claimed by Donors
on their income tax return filed on Date 2, for the present value of the remainder
interest in the stock of Corporation transferred to Charitable Trust, will be
includible in the Donors income for the year in which the remaining assets of
Charitable Trust were returned to the Donors. Donors have represented that they
will timely file an amended United States Individual Income Tax Return, Form
1040X, for that year reporting the value of the stock up to $B, the value of the
contribution claimed by Donors on their income tax return filed on Date 2.
However, the amended income tax return filed for the year following the year of
the transfer, in which the excess charitable deduction was claimed and the
additional tax was paid, was filed within three years after Date 3, the date ofthe
original return. Thus, the additional tax was paid for that year, which negated the
charitable deduction claimed in that year for the transfer to Charitable Trust and,
as to that year, the parties are in the same position that they would have been in
if Charitable Trust had never been created.
Because of the application of the tax benefit rule for the year in which the
transfer was made to Charitable Trust, the filing of the amended tax income
return and payment of additional tax for the year following the transfer to
Charitable Trust and the fact that Charitable Trust had no income, either
ordinary or capital gains, and the Corporation paid no dividends from Date 1
until the date of the court order granting rescission, all parties are in the same
position that they would have been in if Charitable Trust had never been created.
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Further, the court order rescinding Charitable Trust is consistent with applicable
state law.
Accordingly, we conclude that the rescission will be recognized for federal tax
purposes as effective as ofthe date Charitable Trust was created.
In PLR 200251010 the donors intended to create a CRUT but their attorney drafted a CRAT instead. The
synopsis received by the client had the correct unitrust payment schedule - quarterly - instead of annual annuity
payments as set forth in the document. Upon discovery by the tax preparer a judicial reformation was undertaken.
The IRS approved the trust as reformed, retroactive to the funding of the trust (assets had been sold). Similarly, in
PLR 200244011 the IRS allowed a NIMCRUT to be reformed judicially to create a CRUT. The grantor was a cotrustee; the grantor and other trustee each stated they believed the grantor's attorney had created a CRUT and would
not have "signed" otherwise. The trust had been administered as a CRUT. In PLR 200338006 the donor had
intended to create a standard CRUT but what was drafted was a net income with makeup CRUT (NIMCRUT). The
error was discovered in a later year. Judicial reformation was effective for income tax purposes because the donor
had received no extra income tax benefit from the error and the trust had been administered as a standard CRUT,
2.

Meaning of "Qualified Appreciated Stock" Contribution to a Private Foundation. Section

170(e) allows only an income tax deduction for basis when making contributions to a private foundation. Section
170(e)(5) contains an exception which allows a fair market value deduction for "qualified appreciated stock" which
the statute states is any corporate stock:
(i)
for which (as of the date of the contribution) market quotations are
readily available on an established securities market, and
(ii)

which is capital gain property (as defined in subsection (b)(l)(C)(iv)).

At issue in John C. Todd, et ux. v. Commissioner, 118 T.e. No. 19 (2002), was whether certain securities
were publicly traded. The opinion discussed the securities:
Bancom and the Bank
On the transfer date, Bancorp was a bank holding company, owning all of the
issued and outstanding shares of stock of Union Colony Bank, Greeley,
Colorado, a state-chartered Colorado bank (the bank). On that date, shares of
Bancorp were not listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange, or any city or any regional stock exchange, nor were the shares
regularly traded in the national or any regional over-the-counter (OTC) market
for which published quotations are available. The shares were not shares of an
open-end investment company (commonly know as a mutual fund), as provided
in section 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(A)(3), Income Tax Regs.
Procedure for Purchase or Sale of Shares of Bancorp
Before and throughout 1994, the procedure for someone wishing to purchase or
sell shares of Bancorp was to contact an officer of the bank or a local
stockbroker specializing in the shares of Bancorp. The bank or broker would try
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to match a potential seller with a potential buyer. That could prove difficult,
since Bancorp shares were not frequently sold. The bank maintained a numerical
list, by certificate number, of all share transactions (the bank's list). The bank's
list showed the date, seller, buyer, number of shares, share cost (if available),
and certificate number. Gill & Associates, Inc. (Gill & Associates), a member of
the National Association of Securities Dealers since 1984, acted as a placement
agent or "matchmaker" for certain of the sales of the shares. As a matchmaker,
Gill & Associates maintained a list of individuals wishing to purchase shares
and contacted these individuals when approached by others interested in selling
shares. In order to quote a price to an interested purchaser, a representative from
Gill & Associates would call the bank to obtain the net asset value on the books
of the corporation. Gill & Associates believed the book value was a fair value
for the stock of Bancorp, and it used the book value to compute what it believed
was a fair price for a share of Bancorp. Gill & Associates did not have access to
the bank's list. Although Gill & Associates could readily quote to an interested
buyer what it believed to be a fair price for Bancorp shares, Bancorp shares were
not necessarily then available for sale. If no shares were available, Gill &
Associates would put the interested person's name on a list and contact that
person when shares became available. On six to eight occasions during the 10year period from 1984 through 1994, when Bancorp shares became available for
sale, Gill & Associates would place an advertisement, for a brief period, in the
local newspaper. Gill & Associates charged a fee of 25 cents for each share
placed, and acted as placement agent as an accommodation to the bank, to
encourage its business relationship with the bank.
On December 1, 1994, eight individuals, including petitiOner, owned or
controlled 50.5 percent of the issued and outstanding shares of Bancorp.
Petitioner owned or controlled 7 percent of those shares.
The court concluded that a market maker did not make the stock publicly-traded:
2.

Market Quotations Requirement

In general, if a charitable contribution is made in property other than money, the
amount of the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of
the contribution. Sec. 1.170A-l(c)(I), Income Tax Regs. Fair market value is the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. Sec. 1.170A- l(c)(2), Income Tax
Regs. The fair market value of a share of stock or a security is not necessarily
equal to its market quotation. See sec. 1.170A-13(c)(7)(xi)(D), Income Tax
Regs. Nevertheless, we assume that Congress believed that the existence of
readily available market quotations would substantially assist in, if not
determine, fair market valuation (and discourage overvaluation). We do not
agree with petitioners that the market quotations requirement was met because
Bancorp shares were occasionally traded by Gill & Associates, who could
provide a suggested share price based on the net asset value of the bank. Such
share price did not necessarily reflect a price that any willing buyer or seller had
accepted or would accept. Gill & Associates charged a flat fee of 25 cents for
each share traded, and acted as a placement agent as an accommodation to the
bank, to encourage its business relationship with the bank. We do not accept Gill
& Associates' procedures for quoting prices as a reliable proxy for fair market
valuation. The intendment of the market quotations requirement would not be
served by accepting procedures such as those followed by Gill & Associates
with respect to Bancorp shares as satisfying the requirement.
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3.

Section 1.170A-l3(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs.

Section 1.170A-l3(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., describes circumstances in
which the market quotations requirement is met for purposes of exempting
contributions of certain publicly traded securities from the substantiation
requirements. See sec. 1.170A-l3(c)(l)(i), Income Tax Regs. Section 1.170Al3(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., does not purport to be applicable to the
interpretation of the term "qualified appreciated stock". Nevertheless, given our
conclusion as to the consistent meaning of the market quotations requirement,
we believe that section 1.170A- l3(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs., also
describes circumstances in which the market quotations requirement is met for
the purpose of determining whether the shares constituted qualified appreciated
stock.
In the petition, petitioners aver that the market quotations requirement was
satisfied by virtue of the Bancorp shares' satisfying either subdivision (1) or (2)
of section 1.170A- l3(c)(7)(xi)(A), Income Tax Regs. During the trial of this
case, however, petitioners conceded that, on the transfer date, the Bancorp
shares did not satisfy any of the subdivisions of section 1.170A- l3(c)(7)(xi)(A),
Income Tax Regs. Petitioners rely on their plain language reading of the market
quotations requirement and argue that the regulation is invalid because
inconsistent with that reading. Since we reject petitioners' plain language
reading, we reject petitioners' argument based on that reading, that the
regulation is invalid.
Petitioners have failed to satisfy the market quotations requirement for purposes
of determining whether the shares were (1) publicly traded so as to be exempt
from the substantiation requirements and (2) qualified appreciated stock.
In PLRs 200322005 and 200322018 the IRS determined that American Depository Shares (ADS) are
qualified appreciated stock under section 170(e)(5). The rulings state:
We further conclude that Company 1 ADSs are stock for purposes of §
170(e)(5). An ADS is issued by a u.S. depository bank and represents an
interest in the underlying ordinary shares of a non-U.S. company. An ADS is
evidenced by an American Depository Receipt (an ADR). An ADR is a
negotiable receipt issued in certificate form representing an ADS. The holder of
an ADR is entitled to demand delivery of the underlying shares. Each Company
1 ADS represents one ordinary share of Company 1. The Company 1 ADSs are
the equivalent of an ADR pursuant to the Merger agreement, which states that
direct holders of Company 1 ADSs whose ownership is registered on the books
of the depository are Company 1 ADR holders. The Service has interpreted
ADRs to be treated as shares of stock for various tax purposes, such as the
foreign tax credit, Rev. Rul. 65- 218, 1965-2 C.B. 566, and the interest
equalization tax, Rev. Rul. 72-271, 1972-1 c.B. 369. Therefore, for purposes of
§ 170(e)(5), Company 1 ADSs are stock for which market quotations are readily
available on an established securities market.
The Taxpayers represent that the Taxpayers have taken steps to ensure that the
Donees will be able to sell the contributed ADSs in compliance with Rule 145.
The Taxpayers also represent that the aggregate contributions of the Donees will
be limited such that the total number of Company 1 ADSs contributed by the
Taxpayers to the Donees (including any ADSs already held by the Donees) will
be substantially less than 1% of the shares outstanding of Company 1 as shown
by the most recent report or statement published by Company 1. The taxpayers
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also represent that contributions will be made to the Donees only at such times
when, to the best of their knowledge, there will not be any proposed
recapitalization, tender or exchange offer, stock repurchase program or similar
plan that would have the effect of substantially reducing the number of
outstanding shares of Company 1 within the 3-month period following the
contribution. The Taxpayers represent that the Taxpayers will, prior to the
proposed contribution, provide a statement to the Donees that the requirements
of Rule 145 are met for all transfers of the Company 1 ADSs by the Taxpayers
and that the Taxpayers will not take any steps that will prevent the Donees from
making transfers of Company 1 ADSs free of any Rule 145 resale restrictions.
The Taxpayers also represent that, under the Governance Agreement, the Family
Shareholders may contribute Company 1 ADSs to the Donees without restriction
and that such contributed Company 1 ADSs may be sold by the Donees without
restriction.
3.

Assignment of Income Issues ("Palmer Problems"). In PLR 200230004 husband and wife

proposed to transfer 495 of 500 shares of a C corporation to a charitable remainder unitrust and asked whether the
redemption by the corporation would be self-dealing. The ruling determined it would not be self-dealing because
there is an exception to the self-dealing rules:
Section 53.4941(d)-3(d)(l) of the foundation regulations provides that, in
general, under section 4941(d)(2)(F), any transaction between a private
foundation and a corporation which is a disqualified person will not be an act of
self-dealing if such transaction is engaged in pursuant to a liquidation, merger,
redemption, recapitalization, or other corporate adjustment, organization, or
reorganization, so long as all the securities of the same class as that held (prior
to such transaction) by the foundation are subject to the same terms and such
terms provide for receipt by the foundation of no less than fair market value. For
purposes of this paragraph, all of the securities are not subject to the same terms
unless, pursuant to such transaction, the corporation makes a bona fide offer on
a uniform basis to the foundation and every other person who holds such
securities.
The taxpayers also asked whether the C corporation dividends would be unrelated taxable income and the
answer was no, even though the corporation would be a controlled corporation, because dividends are excepted:
Section 512(b)(I3)(A) of the Code provides that notwithstanding section
512(b)(l), (2), and (3), an organization (controlling organization) receiving a
specified payment from another entity which it controls (controlled entity), shall
include such payment as an item of gross income derived from an unrelated
trade or business to the extent such payment reduces the net unrelated income of
the controlled entity (or increases any net unrelated loss of the controlled entity).
There shall be allowed all deductions of the controlling organization directly
connected with amounts treated as derived from an unrelated trade or business
under the preceding sentence.
Section 512(b)(l3)(C) of the Code provides that the term "specified payment"
means any interest, annuity, royalty, or rent.
Section 512(b)(I3)(D)(i) of the Code provides, in part, that the term "control"
means in the case of a corporation, ownership (by vote or value) of more than 50
percent of the stock of such corporation, and in any other case (other than a
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corporation or a partnership) ownership of more than 50 percent of the
beneficial interests in the entity.
The modifications contained in section 512(b) of the Code, in effect, constitute
an exception to the general rule by excluding from the computation of unrelated
business taxable income items such as dividends, interest, annuities, royalties,
and rents. If these modifications, which are provided in section 512(b)(1), (2),
and (3), are considered an exception to the general rule of taxing the unrelated
business income of exempt organizations, then section 512(b)(13) may be
considered an exception to the exception. Under section 512(b)(13), the
exclusion of interest, annuities, royalties, and rents provided by section
512(b)(1), (2), and (3) does not apply where such amounts are derived from
"controlled organizations."
The exception to the modifications contained in section 512(b) of the Code is
not applicable in this case. Although Trust, which holds the majority of X stock,
is a "controlling organization" within the meaning of section 512(b)(13), the
income earned by X while part of its stock is owned by Trust will not constitute
UBTI to Trust. The distributions to Trust from X while Trust owns part of its
stock are dividends. The receipt of dividends is not taxable to Trust, because
section 512(b)(1) excludes dividends from the UBTI, and the rules of section
512(b)(13) do not apply to the payment of dividends.
Therefore, the income earned by X while part of its stock is owned by Trust will
not constitute unrelated business taxable income to Trust. In addition,
distributions to Trust from X while Trust owns part of its stock will constitute
dividends that are excluded from unrelated business income under section
512(b)(1) of the Code, so long as they are not interest, annuities, royalties, and
rents derived from the controlled corporation.
Finally, the taxpayers asked whether the redemption would be treated as an assignment of income. The
ruling states:
This request involves Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974), affd. on
other grounds, 523 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1975), acq., 1978-1 C.B. 2. In the Palmer
case, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer's gift of stock in a closely held
corporation to a private foundation, followed by a redemption, was not to be
recharacterized as a sale or redemption between the taxpayer and the corporation
followed by a gift of the redemption proceeds to the foundation, even though the
taxpayer held voting control over both the corporation and the foundation. The
Tax Court based its opinion, in part, on the fact that the foundation was not
legally obligated to redeem the stock at the time it received title to the shares.
In Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, the Internal Revenue Service announced
that it will treat the proceeds of a redemption of stock under facts similar to
those in the Palmer case as income to the donor only if the donee is legally
bound or can be compelled by the corporation to surrender the shares for
redemption.
In the present case, at the time X shares are transferred to Trust, X will be under
no legal obligation to redeem the contributed stock. There is no agreement
among the parties under which X would be obligated to redeem, or Trust would
be obligated to surrender for redemption, the stock. Trust is not legally obligated
to accept any offer of redemption made by X. Accordingly, any redemption by
X of the stock contributed by Grantors to Trust will be respected.
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Based on the representations submitted and information described above, we
conclude that a purchase by X of the stock transferred by Grantors to Trust will
be treated as a redemption of the stock from Trust, and will not be treated as a
redemption of stock from Grantors or a distribution by X to Grantors. Therefore,
the sale or redemption by Trust of its X stock will not result in the capital gain in
such sale or the redemption price being attributed for tax purposes to Grantors.
Among the representations made - whether required or given voluntarily - was:
In addition, A, as president and sole shareholder of X and grantor and co-trustee
of Trust, represents the following:
I, A, grantor and co-trustee of Trust, hereby represent that neither I nor
(1)
any family member of me will acquire, offer to acquire, or become obligated to
acquire shares of X stock from Trust earlier than at least one year after the date
of any transfer of shares of X stock to Trust.
(2)
I, A, President and sole shareholder of X, hereby represent that X will
not redeem, offer to redeem, or become obligated to redeem shares of X stock
from Trust earlier than at least one year after the date of any transfer of shares of
X stock to Trust, directly or indirectly, by the grantor of Trust or a family
member of the grantor.
I, A, President and sole shareholder of X, and grantor and co-trustee of
(3)
Trust, hereby represent that neither X nor I am aware of any plan or intention of
Trust to transfer any corporate stock, or to have any person acquire any
corporate stock from Trust.
The application of Revenue Ruling 78-197 arose in Gerald A. Rauenhorst. et ux. v. Commissioner, 119

T.e. No.9 (2002).

Arbeit (a partnership) owned warrants enabling it to purchase NMG stock. On September 28,

1993, WCP (a corporation) offered to purchase all NMG stock. On November 9, 1993 the partnership assigned
come warrants to four charities. On November 19 sold its remaining warrant to WCP, and the charities sold their
warrants to WCP. On November 22, 1993, WCP and NMG agreed on a sale of all the NMG stock.
The government argued that the bright-line rule of Rev. Rul. 78-197 was not controlling. The Opinion
states:
Respondent argues that petitioners are not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law and that genuine issues of material fact remain for trial. Respondent argues
that the question whether the donees were bound or could be legally compelled
to surrender their NMG warrants is not "the critical issue" to be resolved and,
accordingly, neither Carrington v. Commissioner, supra, nor Rev. Rul. 78-197,
supra, controls this case. It is respondent's position that "the critical issue" in
this case is "a factual one": whether petitioners' rights to receive the proceeds of
the stock transaction involving WCP "ripened to a practical certainty" at the
time of the assignments. Respondent relies on Ferguson v. Commissioner, 174
F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1999), Jones v. United States, supra, Kinsey v.
Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973), affg. 58 T.C. 259 (1972),
Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972), and Estate of
Applestein v. Commissioner, supra.
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Respondent purports to distinguish both Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra,
on the facts of the case and the ruling. To that end, he contends that Carrington
and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, are not inconsistent with the cases he relies upon
above. Respondent claims that in this case, and the cases upon which he relies,
there was a pending "global" transaction for the purchase and sale of all the
stock of a corporation at the time of the gift or transfer at issue. He then
surmises that because Carrington and Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, did not involve a
pending "global" transaction, the legal principles of those authorities do not
apply. Instead, he argues that we must apply the principles of the cases he relies
upon, and, accordingly, we must conduct a detailed factual inquiry for purposes
of determining whether the sale of the stock warrants had ripened to a practical
certainty at the time ofthe assignments.
We cannot agree that respondent has effectively distinguished Carrington and
Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, on their facts. First, neither this Court nor the Courts of
Appeals have adopted respondent's theory of a pending "global" transaction as a
means of distinguishing cases such as Carrington and Palmer v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 684 (1974). Indeed, the case law in this area applies essentially the same
anticipatory assignment of income principles to cases of a "global" nature as
those applicable to cases of a "nonglobal" nature. See, e.g., Greene v. United
States, supra at 581. We can only interpret respondent's use of the phrase
"pending global transaction" as simply a restatement of the principles contained
in the cases upon which he relies. Thus, we cannot agree that respondent's
reliance on a pending global transaction distinguishes either Carrington, Rev.
Rul. 78-197, supra, or other cases upon which petitioners rely. With that being
said and leaving Carrington and those other cases aside at this point, the
bright-line test of Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra, which focuses solely on the donee's
control over the contributed property, stands in stark contrast to the legal test
and the cases upon which respondent relies and which consider the donee's
control to be only a factor.
The Court took a dim view of the government's urging that Rev. Rul. 78-197 be ignored:
While this Court may not be bound by the Commissioner's revenue rulings, and
in the appropriate case we could disregard a ruling or rulings as inconsistent
with our interpretation of the law, see Stark v. Commissioner, 86 T.e. 243, 251
(1986), in this case it is respondent who argues against the principles stated in
his ruling and in favor of our previous pronouncements on this issue. The
Commissioner's revenue ruling has been in existence for nearly 25 years, and it
has not been revoked or modified. No doubt taxpayers have referred to that
ruling in planning their charitable contributions, and, indeed, petitioners submit
that they relied upon that ruling in planning the charitable contributions at issue.
Under the circumstances of this case, we treat the Commissioner's position in
Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, as a concession. Accordingly, our decision is
limited to the question whether the charitable donees were legally obligated or
could be compelled to sell the stock warrants at the time of the assignments.
On the facts, the court found in favor of the taxpayer:
Petitioners argue that as of November 12, 1993, the date the warrants were
transferred on the books of NMG, the donees had not entered into any
agreement to sell the warrants and could not be compelled by any legal means to
transfer the warrants. Accordingly, they contend that, as a matter of law, there
was not an assignment of income. Petitioners submitted affidavits from
representatives of the donees in support of their motion for partial summary
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judgment. Each of those affidavits outlines the events which preceded the
assignments, each states that the stock warrants were received on November 12,
1993, and each also states that, as of that date, the donees had not entered into
agreements to sell the stock warrants.
Respondent questioned the reliability of those affidavits, and he contended that
the affidavits were deficient in that they failed to state the personal involvement
of the representatives with respect to petitioners' contributions. He also asserted
that the testimony of those affiants is "unknown", and he questioned whether
they were involved in any negotiations or discussions with NMG, WCP, or
Arbeit regarding WCP's proposed acquisition of NMG stock and warrants.
Respondent also questioned the affiants' competency "to opine upon, or reach
any conclusion as to, what constitutes a binding agreement or whether their
respective organizations had indeed entered binding agreements in connection
with the transactions at issue." We do not share respondent's reservations with
respect to the affidavits, and we fmd those affidavits credible.
First, in response to respondent's allegations, petitioners submitted additional
affidavits from each of the affiants. Each of those affidavits states: (l) The
affiants were personally involved with respect to petitioners' contributions; (2)
before the donees' execution of the warrant purchase and sale agreement, there
were no agreements amongst the donees, Arbeit, Mr. Rauenhorst, or any other
person or entity regarding the sale of the warrants; and (3) through November
12, 1993, there were no negotiations or communications between the donees and
NMG or parties representing NMG, except for the letters from NMG's legal
counsel requesting that the donees sign an Additional Party Signature Page.
Second, respondent relies on nonspecific allegations of an informal agreement
or understanding between the donees and NMG, WCP, Mr. Rauenhorst, and/or
Arbeit. Summary assertions and conclusory allegations are simply not enough
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. [citations omitted]
Respondent alleges no facts or evidence to substantiate his position, and he has
submitted no affidavits in response to the affidavits that petitioners submitted.
Instead, he points out that the record lacks information regarding any
discussions, deliberations, or negotiations which may have taken place between
the donees and the other parties. Respondent has had ample opportunity to
investigate the facts surrounding these transactions, and it is clear that
respondent could have requested additional information from the individuals
involved. See Rule 121(e). He has requested neither additional discovery nor a
continuance for purposes of additional discovery. He has not demonstrated to
our satisfaction that the only available method for opposing the statements in the
affidavits is through cross- examination at trial. Further, it is insufficient for the
opposing party to argue in the abstract that the legal theory involved in the case
encompasses factual questions. Hibernia Natl. Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94,98
(5th Cir. 1993); Daniels v. Commissioner, supra. Since petitioners have offered
affidavits directly supporting their position on a material issue of fact, and since
respondent has failed to counter those affidavits with anything other than
unsupported allegations, respondent cannot avoid summary judgment on this
issue. See Greene v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 1165, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
affd. 13 F.3d 577 (2d Cir. 1994). Thus, we fmd that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the donees entered into a legally binding
agreement to sell their stock warrants before, or at the time of, the assignments
by petitioners.
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Footnote 14 states:
The record indicates that no agreement was entered into by the donees before
Nov. 19, 1993, the date they signed the warrant purchase and sale agreement.
On Nov. 16, 1993, NMG's legal counsel sent letters to each of the donees
enclosing a warrant purchase and sale agreement. Those letters state that
pursuant to the warrant purchase and sale agreement, the donees would agree to
sell their reissued warrants to WCP and ''to abstain from either exercising its
Warrant or selling or otherwise transferring it to any other party through Dec.
31, 1993." Certainly, the formality of having the donees enter into the warrant
purchase and sale agreements suggests that they had not entered into any
binding agreements before Nov. 19, 1993.
Subsequent to the decision, the goverrunent has reiterated its intention, generally, to follow its own rulings
in litigation.
In PLR 200321010 a retired officer of a corporation intended to give shares of the corporation to a CRUT.
The corporation had the right to purchase the stock if it so desired, and the agreement also bound the trust:
X proposes to establish a CRUT (as defined in § 664 of the Internal Revenue
Code). Upon establishment of the CRUT, X will notify Company ofX's intent
to transfer a portion of X's Company stock purchased under the Plan to the
CRUT, thereby triggering Company's option to purchase the stock for the
formula price set forth in the stock restriction agreements applicable to such
stock. Taxpayer represents that Company will likely decline to purchase the
stock for the formula price set forth in the stock restriction agreements and thus
X will be free to transfer the stock to the CRUT. The stock transferred to the
CRUT will continue to be subject to the terms of the stock restriction
agreements under the Plan in accordance with the terms of the stock restriction
agreements. Therefore, if the trustee of the CRUT wishes to sell or otherwise
dispose of the stock, Company will have a right to purchase the stock for the
formula price set forth in the stock restriction agreements. The trustee will notify
Company that the CRUT wishes to sell Company stock prior to any proposed
sale or disposition. X represents that Company has always exercised its option
under the stock restriction agreements in the past for the formula price set forth
therein.
The ruling described the "bright-line" test of Palmer, citing Rauenhorst:
The Service has acquiesced in the Palmer decision. See 1978-1 C.B. 2. In Rev.
Rul. 78-197, 1978-1 C.B. 83, the Service concluded that it will treat the
proceeds of a redemption of stock under facts similar to those in Palmer as
income to the donor only if the donee is legally bound or can be compelled by
the corporation to surrender the shares for redemption. The Tax Court has
characterized the "legally bound" standard in Rev. Rul. 78-197 as a "bright line"
test for determining if a contribution of stock to a charity followed by a
redemption of that stock from that charity should be respected in form or
recharacterized as a redemption of the stock from the donor followed by a
contribution of the proceeds by the donor to the charity. See generally,
Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. No.9 (October 7, 2002).
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Thus, the ruling concludes:
Consequently, the test for purposes of this ruling request, is whether the CRUT
will be legally bound or can be compelled by Company to surrender the stock
for redemption at the time of the donation. Here, X proposes to transfer the
Company stock to the CRUT. Under the restrictions contained in each year's
stock restriction agreement, the CRUT must ftrst offer the stock to Company at a
set formula price should the CRUT propose to dispose of the shares. This
provision amounts to a right of ftrst refusal. However, it does not mean that the
CRUT is legally bound or can be compelled by Company to surrender the stock
to Company at the time of the donation. The information submitted contains no
indication that the CRUT will be legally bound, or could be compelled by
Company, to redeem or sell the gifted stock. That all or a portion of the gifted
stock was subject to restrictions upon transfer to a third party by X, and thus by
the CRUT following the transfer, does not give Company the ability to compel
its redemption or sale from the CRUT. The CRUT is free to retain title to and
ownership of the stock indeftnitely.
Because the CRUT is not legally bound and cannot be compelled by Company
to redeem or sell the stock, we conclude that the transfer of the Company stock
by X to the CRUT, followed by any subsequent redemption of the stock by
Company, will not be recharacterized for federal income tax purposes as a
redemption of the stock by Company from X followed by a contribution of the
redemption proceeds to the CRUT. See Palmer v. Commissioner, supra, and
Rev. Rul. 78-197, supra. The same principles apply if the stock is sold by the
CRUT rather than redeemed by Company. Thus, provided there is no
prearranged sale contract whereby the CRUT is legally bound to sell the stock
upon the contribution, we conclude that any subsequent sale will not be
recharacterized for federal income tax purposes as a sale of the stock by X,
followed by a contribution of the sale proceeds to the CRUT. Accordingly, any
redemption proceeds or sales proceeds received by the CRUT for the stock will
not be treated as taxable income received by X.
4.

Sample Charitable Trust Forms. Rev. Procs. 2003-53 through 2003-60 provide various sample

charitable remainder annuity trust forms, including one-life, two-life, and term of years inter vivos and testamentary
trusts. The sample forms are unsurprising but are much better, with many more options and annotations, than the
1989 and 1990 forms. Unitrust forms may be issued by the end of June, 2004.
5.

Final Boeshore Regulations. The IRS has issued fmal regulations eliminating the requirement

that a charitable interest cannot be preceded in point of time by a noncharitable interest that is in the form of an
annuity or unitrust interest. T.D. 9068, IRB 2003-37 at 538. The fmal regulations conform to Boeshore, 78 T.C.
523 (1982).
6.

Charitable Remainder Trust Ordering Rules. On November 20, 2003, proposed regulations

were issued dealing with the character of distributions from charitable remainder trusts effective for tax years ending
after November 20, 2003. REG - 110896 - 98. Income would be categorized as ordinary income, capital gains or
other income, and within categories items of income would be treated as being distributed beginning with items
subject to the highest federal income tax rate, interest ahead of dividends, for instance. The regulations also contain
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the rules set forth in Notice 97-59, 1997-2 CB 309 for netting gains and losses (effective for tax year ending on or
after December 31, 1998).

Charitable Crummey Trust. Suppose a gift is made to a trust and a charity may withdraw the

7.

contribution within 30 days of the gift. Will the donor receive a gift tax charitable deduction or may the gift qualify
for the annual exclusion? Such was the issue presented in TAM 200341002. Specifically withdrawal rights were
held 20% by Child A, 20% by Child A's spouse, 20% by Child B, 25% by Charity 1, and 5% each by Charities 2,3
and 4. The trust assets were insurance premiums (cash) and policies. Trustee could distribute income and principal
for the health, education, maintenance and support of the beneficiaries so long as a reserve existed to satisfy any
withdrawal rights.
The TAM states:
In this case, under the terms of Trust, an interest in property passed for both
charitable and private purposes. Because Trust did not satisfy the requirements
of § 2522(c), a charitable deduction is not allowable with respect to any transfer
to Trust. This is the case, notwithstanding the withdrawal powers held by the
charities with respect to contributions to Trust. First, there is no statutory or
regulatory exception that alleviates the need to comply with the requirements of
§ 2522(c) and the applicable regulations merely because charity has a power to
withdraw a portion of each contribution to the trust. Further, as discussed below,
under the facts presented, we do not believe that the charities' withdrawal
powers were viable powers. However, even assuming there was no impediment
to the exercise of these powers, under the provisions of Trust, each charity's
right to withdraw a respective portion of a transfer expired 30 days after the
charity received the corresponding Notification Letter. Once this withdrawal
period terminated, the charity's right to receive any portion of the transfer as a
result of the withdrawal power terminated, and the transfers remained in Trust
subject to invasion for the benefit of the individual beneficiaries. Thus, the
situation presented here is analogous to a transfer subject to a condition or
power described in § 25.2522(c)-3(b)(2).
With respect to the second question, the TAM states:
Under the terms of Trust, each charity could withdraw a percentage of each
contribution, if a written request was delivered to Trustee during the 30-day
notice period. If the withdrawal right was not exercised, the amount subject to
withdrawal was to be held in the trust subject to distribution, at the trustee's
discretion, to Child A, Child A's Spouse, and Child B, for the beneficiary's
education, health, maintenance, and support during Decedent's life. Thus, the
Trustee could disperse all of the Trust property among the individuals and
terminate Trust before Decedent's death, leaving nothing remaining for the
charities at Decedent's death. Moreover, because the standard for invasion
(education, health, maintenance and support) was ascertainable, the individual
beneficiaries possessed an enforceable right to distributions that a beneficiary
could enforce in the appropriate State court. II The Law of Trusts, supra at §
128.4. Thus, any amounts the charities failed to withdraw could have been
distributed to the individual beneficiaries during Decedent's life.
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Similarly, under the terms of Trust, Trustee could lend the Trust property to
other trusts created by Decedent and his family members. Similar in effect to
Trustee's distribution power, this power could be exercised by Trustee, before
Decedent's death, to transfer the Trust property to the other family trusts under
circumstances that could jeopardize the value of the Trust principal and the
charities' remainder interest. Consequently, if a withdrawal right was not
exercised, the forfeited amount would become Trust property and be thereby
exposed to dissipation for the private interests of Decedent's family.
It is clear that the charitable remainder trust, pursuant to which property has
been transferred in trust for the lifetime benefit of an individual or individuals
with the remainder passing to charity, is a common estate planning vehicle. Prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the enactment of §§ 664, 2055(e)(2), and
2522(c), it was common that the trust corpus was subject to invasion for the
benefit of the income beneficiary. Charities' interests in these trusts as
remainder beneficiaries, or even as potential discretionary distributees during the
income beneficiaries' lifetime, presented no legal issues to the charities.
However, the charities' withdrawal rights in this case present a different
situation. Here, Trust purportedly gave the charities the option of either
withdrawing the funds from each contribution, or allowing the funds to remain
in the trust subject to distribution to Decedent's relatives for private
noncharitable purposes with the possibility of the charities receiving a
distribution on Decedent's death. In view ofthe strict prohibition on the use ofa
charity's property for private purposes and the fiduciary obligations imposed on
a charity and its directors, it is doubtful that any officer or director of a charity
could properly participate in this kind of gamble, where funds charity
purportedly controls are to be set aside for private utilization until some future
date.
Thus, we believe that there was a legal impediment prohibiting these withdrawal
powers from ever becoming effective. Indeed, as noted above, the charities, in
the aggregate, were granted 44 separate withdrawal rights, none of which were
ever exercised. Further, as discussed above, in some cases, the Notification
Letter was sent to the charities before the transfer was made, such that the
withdrawal period expired before the date of the transfer. In other cases, the
Notification letter did not accurately describe the amount subject to withdrawal
or was undated, so it was unclear when the withdrawal period commenced. The
failure to make any of the withdrawals coupled with the haphazard execution of
the notification procedure, without any adverse comment from the charities,
evidence that at least the charities' understood that they were legally precluded
from actively participating in this withdrawal arrangement that allowed funds to
enure for private purposes.
[Italics added.]
Essentially the IRS' reasoning was that (1) the fact a charity did not exercise a withdrawal right meant (2)
there was no withdrawal right. Such reasoning may be criticized. Suppose the trust were primarily for charitable
purposes or entirely for charitable purposes but did not qualify as a charitable remainder trust. Would the annual
exclusion have been available even ifthe charities did not withdraw?

8.

Conservation Easement and Partnership Pass-Through Deductions.

Rev. Rul 2003-123,

2003-50 IRB at 1200, provides a trust that puts a conservation easement on trust property will not receive an income
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tax deduction for the value of the easement. Section 642(c) allows a trust to deduct from taxable income amounts
paid from gross income for charitable purposes pursuant to the terms of the trust instrument. Because a conservation
easement is not paid from the income there is no charitable contribution.
A similar issue was addressed in Rev. Rul. 2004-05, 2004-3 IRB 295. A trust does not authorize charitable
contributions but directs all income to be distributed to A for life, reminder to B. The trust (called TR) owns an
interest in a partnership, PRS, which makes charitable contributions.
The ruling states:
For a trust to claim a charitable deduction under § 642(c) for amounts of gross
income that it contributes for charitable purposes, the governing instrument of
the trust must give the trustee the authority to make charitable contributions.
This requirement is an essential element to qualify the trust to claim a deduction
for a charitable contribution made directly by the trust. In the case of a trust's
investment in a partnership, the partnership may make a charitable contribution
from the partnership's gross income, and that income is never available to the
trust. For federal tax purposes, however, the trust must take into account its
distributive share of the partnership's income, gain, loss, deductions (including
charitable contributions), and credits. Under these circumstances, a trust's
deduction for its distributive share of a charitable contribution made by a
partnership will not be disallowed under § 642(c) merely because the trust's
governing instrument does not authorize the trustee to make charitable
contributions. See Estate of Bluestein v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 770 (1950),
acq., 1951-1 C.B. 1, and Estate of Lowenstein v. Commissioner 12 T.e. 694
(1949), acq. 1949-2 C.B. 2, aff'd sub nom, First National Bank of Mobile v.
Commissioner, 183 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1950), reaching similar conclusions under
the statutory predecessor to § 642(c).
In the present situation, PRSs charitable contribution is made from PRSs gross
income. TR is allowed a charitable deduction for its distributive share of this
contribution, even though TR's governing instrument does not authorize the
trustee to make charitable contributions. Because none of TR:s income for the
taxable year would be considered "unrelated business income" for purposes of §
681(a), the amount of the charitable deduction is not limited under § 681. TR is a
complex trust for the taxable year because it is allowed a charitable deduction
under § 642(c) for that year.
The same result would apply if TR were always a complex trust because it was
not required to distribute all its income currently.
The Revenue Ruling does not discuss how the trust came to own the partnership interest. If the trustee and
beneficiaries of a trust wanted the trust to have a charitable deduction could the trust invest in a partnership which
would make charitable contributions? If that were a breach of trust, does the breach have income tax consequences?
Does it matter if the partnership's charitable contribution is "income" or "principal?"

9.

Improper Operation Dooms eRAT. Estate of Melvine B. Atkinson v. Commissioner, 309 F.3d

1290 (11th Cir. 2002). In August, 1991 Melvine B. Atkinson gave $4,000,000 of stock to a charitable remainder
annuity trust which would pay her $200,000 for life then $200,000 among four beneficiaries for their lives, and then

A-34

the remaining trust assets would pass to charity.

The four successor annuitants were obligated to pay Ms.

Atkinson's estate taxes on account ofthe CRAT.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed certain other facts:
The Tax Court found that no annuity payments were ever actually made to
Atkinson from the assets of the annuity trust. The estate continues to claim that
checks were sent to Atkinson, but that Atkinson saw no need to cash them
because her material needs were amply met by non-trust assets. However, this
claim is undercut by the fact that the estate produced no copies of these checks
or the cover letters that supposedly accompanied the checks to Atkinson, nor did
the annuity trust's ledger reflect any outgoing annuity payments to Atkinson
during her lifetime.
Upon Atkinson's death, the non-charitable beneficiaries next in line to the
annuity trust's assets were compelled to make an election. Either they could
accept the annuity and pay their share of Atkinson's estate taxes according to the
terms of the annuity trust, or they could refuse Atkinson's gift. None of these
non-charitable beneficiaries elected to accept the annuity under the terms of the
trust. One potential beneficiary, Atkinson's caretaker Mary Birchfield, citing a
putative inter vivos promise by Atkinson that Birchfield would not be held liable
for any estate taxes resulting from her annuity from the trust, instigated litigation
against the estate. Eventually, the trustee paid a settlement of $667,000 to
Birchfield in satisfaction of all her claims against the estate and also resumed
annuity payments to Birchfield in the amount set by the trust, which payments
continued until Birchfield's death in 1997. Birchfield never paid her share of the
estate taxes due on the money she received.
Before the settlement of Birchfield's claim, the estate was required to file its
federal estate tax return. The taxable gross estate, according to the executor,
consisted of Atkinson's annuity rights under the trust ($366,334.92) as well as
the date-of-death value of both the annuity and administrative trusts ($4,284,308
and $1,484,854, respectively). The estate claimed a charitable deduction in the
amount of$3,894,535, representing the present value of the remainder interest in
the annuity trust as of the date of Atkinson's death, measured under the
assumption that Birchfield, whose claim against the estate had not been settled
at that time, would prevail on that claim and be entitled to an annuity from the
trust for the balance of her lifetime and, correlatively, that the charities would
not take their remainder interest in the trust until Birchfield's death.
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") selected the estate's tax return for audit,
and found that the estate was not entitled to take any charitable deduction
because the annuity trust failed to comply with certain statutory procedures
applicable to the deductibility of charitable remainders. With the disallowance
of the charitable deduction, the IRS determined that the estate owed $2,654,976
in taxes. Because the administrative trust and the balance of other estate assets
would not be sufficient to satisfy this tax liability, it became apparent that the
remaining amount due would be paid by the annuity trust. The estate challenged
the IRS's decision in the United States Tax Court, which agreed with the IRS
that a charitable deduction was not appropriate. See Atkinson v. Comm'r, 115
T.C. 26, 32 (2000).
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The court found that failure to comply with the CRAT requirements was fatal:
The documents that establish the Atkinson annuity trust track the CRAT
requirements to the letter. However, the Atkinson annuity trust failed to comply
with the CRAT rules throughout its existence. Yearly annuity payments to
Atkinson were not made during her lifetime. Accordingly, since the CRAT
regulations were not scrupulously followed through the life of the trust, a
charitable deduction is not appropriate.
The estate complains that this stringent focus on the CRAT rules amount to a
denial of a substantial charitable deduction because of what amounts to a "foot
fault," or a minor mistake. However, the scheme established by Congress is
specifically designed to combat the problems associated with the donation of
charitable remainders. In exchange for the significant benefits of allowing a
present charitable deduction, even when the actual charitable donation is not to
occur until the remainder interest in the property becomes possessory, and in
allowing the assets of the trust to grow tax-free, the Code requires adherence to
the CRAT rules. It is not sufficient to establish a trust under the CRAT rules,
then completely ignore the rules during the trust's administration, thereby
defeating the policy interests advanced by Congress in enacting the rules
themselves. Despite the certain charitable donation in this case, the
countervailing Congressional concerns surrounding the deductibility of
charitable remainders in general counsel strict adherence to the Code, and,
barring such adherence, mandate a complete denial of the charitable deduction.

10.

Bequest of Art. PLR 200418002 deals with a bequest of art to a museum will qualify for a

section 2055 charitable deduction. The bequest would be subject to extensive requirements of the museum. The
ruling summarizes the agreement:
The Taxpayers entered into an Agreement on Date 1 with Foundation and the
Trustees of Museum concerning the Taxpayers' donation of the Collection either
during the lifetime of either or both of them or upon the death of the survivor of
them (Donation). The Agreement was later amended on Date 2 and Date 3.
Section I.A of the Agreement provides that in the event the Taxpayers elect, in
their sole discretion, to make the Donation, the Trustees of Museum shall accept
the Collection on behalf of the Museum, and the Trustees shall display and
maintain the Collection in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth
herein. Immediately upon the occurrence of the Donation, title to the Collection
shall vest in the Trustees, for the benefit of Museum, and at all times thereafter
the Trustees shall be and remain solely responsible for the custody, control,
management, exhibition, conservation of and curatorial services for, the
Collection in accordance with the terms of this Agreement. Trustees
acknowledge and agree that nothing contained in this Agreement shall be
deemed to obligate the Taxpayers to make the Donation.
Section 2.A (i) provides that the intention of the parties is that each work of art
comprising the Collection shall at all times be located, housed and permanently
displayed, in perpetuity, at either the Museum or Donors' Gallery. The Museum
shall at all times utilize the Donors' Gallery to its capacity for the exhibition of
works of art from the Collection, or the exhibition of works of art by artists
whose works comprise part of the Collection which are either part of the
Museum's collection, or on loan to the Museum, or exhibited in connection with
special temporary exhibitions. At all times, a minimum number of works of art
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from the entire Collection shall be housed and pennanently displayed, in
perpetuity, at the Museum. The minimum number is defined as a number not
less than the total number of gifts of works of art made by the Taxpayers prior to
the Donation, excluding works on paper. In accordance with the provisions of
the Agreement, if after utilizing the Donors' Gallery to its capacity and adhering
to the provisions of paragraph 2.A.(i) in the Agreement with respect to the
Minimum Number, there remain works of art in the Collection not on display,
the Museum will use its best efforts to exhibit such works of art at the Museum.
Section 2.A (ii) provides that all works of art on paper comprising part of the
Collection shall at all times be located, housed and/or displayed at the Donors'
Gallery, consistent with generally accepted conservation guidelines in effect
from time to time. Such works of art on paper shall be subject to temporary
relocation to the Museum for the sole purpose of exhibiting such works of art on
paper at the Museum, or in connection with research.
Section 2.B provides that upon the Donation, the Trustees of Museum shall
promptly cause all works of art in the Collection to be included within the
Museum's blanket insurance policy, which insures the Museum's entire
collection from time to time. The proceeds of any such insurance shall, at the
option of the Trustees, be used either for the restoration of the damaged work, or
the purchase of a replacement work of art by any of the artists whose works of
art comprise the Collection.
Section 2.C provides that the Museum will provide all conservation and
curatorial services for each work of art in the Collection, wherever located, in
the same manner as is provided for the Museum's permanent collection, at the
sole cost and expense of Museum. The conservation and curatorial services for
the Collection shall include, but shall not be limited to, all cleaning, framing,
hanging, handling, restoration, transportation, and insurance. In the event that
any work of art in the Collection requires restoration, the Museum shall select a
restorer who is an expert in the school of art and/or artist of the work involved,
whether or not that restorer is employed by Museum.
Section 2.D provides that all of the works in the Collection which are displayed
at the Museum will be displayed in galleries which have been decorated,
equipped, and maintained in a manner which, in the professional judgment of
the Director or Chief Curator of Museum, will enhance the aesthetic appeal of
the works in the Collection, will provide for the comfortable enjoyment of the
Collection by the public, and will be comparable in quality and aesthetic appeal
to the pennanent collection currently displayed at the Museum. The Museum
will be solely responsible for all reasonable costs and expenses relating to the
decoration, equipping and maintenance of the galleries at the Museum in which
the Collection is displayed, which will include the responsibility for all lighting,
air conditioning and humidity controls, cleaning, installation, security systems,
security, seating and floor coverings in the galleries. In addition, the galleries in
which the Collection is displayed shall be in locations which are at all times
during Museum hours easily accessible to the public.
Section 2.E provides that the Museum shall be responsible for all conservation
and curatorial services for each work of art from the Collection located at the
Donors' Gallery, including all cleaning, framing, hanging, handling, restoration,
transportation, and insurance, and all costs and expenses related thereto. The
Trustees shall select an administrator of the Donor's Gallery who shall
coordinate the respective duties and activities of the Trustees and the Board, and
act as liaison between them. The Trustees shall have the right to change the
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Administrator from time to time in their sole discretion. The Administrator shall
be responsible for the administration and operation of the Donors' Gallery and
the Taxpayers' residence, including, but not limited to, all lighting, air
conditioning and humidity controls, cleaning (other that the works of art in the
Collection), security systems, security, seating and floor coverings; and all of the
expenses in connection with the foregoing, including the salary of the
Administrator, shall be borne by the Foundation.
Section 2.F provides that each work of art in the Collection, as well as the entire
Collection, wherever located, will at all times be attributed, clearly and visibly,
as part of the Collection.
Section 2.G provides that the Trustees of Museum shall not, at any time, sell,
trade, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or permit the sale, trade, transfer or other
disposition of, all or any of the works ofart in the Collection. In the event of any
attempted sale, trade, transfer or disposition of any work of art in the Collection
in violation of the terms of this Agreement, the ownership of that work of art
shall immediately and automatically vest in the Foundation, without any action
on the part of the Foundation.
Section 2.H provides that subject to the provisions of paragraph 2.A hereof, the
Trustees shall not, at any time, store, loan or relocate, or permit the storage,
lending or relocation, of any of the works of art in the Collection (other than the
relocation of works of art in the Collection between the Donors' Gallery and the
Museum), except under special circumstances approved by the Museum's senior
staff Member(s) of Period art, such as a major retrospective or in order to
enhance the reputation of a particular artist or artists in connection with an
exhibition of the works of such artist or artists.
Section 2.1 provides that the Trustees agree to display works of art at the Donors'
Gallery at all times of sufficient quantity, quality and variety so as to establish
the high standards established by Taxpayers. Accordingly, in the event that the
Trustees remove any works of art which are part of the Collection from the
Donors' Gallery for the purpose of exhibiting such works of art at the Museum,
or for any reason permitted under the provisions of this Agreement, the Trustees
shall, in place of the works of art so removed, exhibit works of art which are not
part of the Collection, provided that such works of art are by artists whose works
of art are part of the Collection.
Section 2.J provides that the Museum will promote the use of Donors' Gallery so
as to make the public aware of the quality of the Collection and the setting in
which the Collection is displayed, all to the end that the Collection shall become
open and accessible to, and stimulate the interest of, the general public.
Section 3 provides that prior to or simultaneously with the Donation, the
Taxpayers will contribute to the Foundation the Donors' Gallery, the Taxpayers'
residence, and funds to generate an income stream which will, in the opinion of
the Taxpayers, be sufficient to operate the Foundation, operate and maintain the
Donors' Gallery and the Taxpayers' residence, and otherwise comply with the
Foundation's other obligations under this Agreement.
Section 6 provides that in the event that Museum defaults in its obligations, the
Foundation shall have the option, upon written notice to the Trustees, to
terminate the Agreement, and/or to exercise any other remedies available to
them at law or in equity. Upon term~ation of the Agreement, the ownership of
all of the works of art comprising the Collection which have been given or
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donated to the Trustees for the benefit of Museum shall immediately revert to
the Foundation.
Section 7.A provides that the Foundation shall operate the Donors' Gallery for a
minimum of ten years from the date of the Donation. At any time after the
expiration of such ten year period, the Foundation shall have the right to
terminate this Agreement, upon thirty days written notice to the Trustees, in the
event that: (i) the Collection is on permanent display at the Museum; (ii) in the
opinion of the Foundation, it is not economically feasible to continue to operate
and maintain the Donors' Gallery and the Taxpayers' residence; or (iii) in the
opinion of the Foundation, the continued operation of the Donors' Gallery and
the Taxpayers' residence is not consistent with the intent of the Taxpayers.
Section 7.B provides that in the event that the Foundation elects to terminate this
Agreement in accordance with the provisions set forth in Paragraph A, the
Trustees shall promptly cause any portion of the Collection remaining at the
Donors' Gallery to be delivered to the Museum, which delivery shall be fully
insured, all at the cost and expense of the Museum. After termination of this
Agreement, neither the Trustees nor the Museum shall have any claim to any
assets of the Foundation.
Section 7.C provides that in the event that the Foundation terminates this
Agreement in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph A above, or in the
event that the Foundation has not terminated this Agreement and there is a
material diminution of the gallery space at the Donors' Gallery for other than a
temporary period of time, the Trustees shall thereafter use their best efforts to
locate, house and display the entire Collection at the Museum in accordance
with the provisions of Paragraph 2.A.
The ruling concludes favorably:
In the present case, under the terms of both Husband's and Wife's will, the works
of art comprising the Collection will pass to the Museum upon the death of the
survivor of the Taxpayers. Museum is an organization described in section
501(c)(3). If the Museum does not accept the Collection, then the Collection will
pass to the Foundation, an organization described in section 501(c)(3). Under
the Agreement, Museum may not sell any of the Collection and may loan art in
the Collection under specially defined circumstances. Further, under the
Agreement, if Museum defaults on its obligation, .the Collection reverts to the
Foundation. Under no circumstances will the Collection revert to the Taxpayers
or inure to the benefit of other private individuals. Accordingly, based upon the
facts submitted and the representations made, we conclude that:
1. The value of the proposed bequest upon the death of the survivor of
Taxpayers to the Museum (or if the Museum refuses to accept the
contribution, to the Foundation), of the Taxpayer's interest in the works
of art comprising the Collection, subject to the conditions of the
Agreement, will be deductible from the Taxpayer's gross estate under
section 2055.
2. The amount of the deduction under section 2055 for the proposed
bequest, upon the death of the survivor of the Taxpayers, to the
Museum (or if the Museum refuses to accept the contribution, to the
Foundation), of the Taxpayer's interest in the works of art comprising
the Collection, will be equal to the full fair market value of the
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Taxpayer's interest in the works of art comprIsmg the Collection
includible in the Taxpayer's gross estate under sections 2031 and 2033.
C.

SECTION 408 1.

IRAs AND RETIREMENT PLANS

IRA Paid to Revocable Trust. PLR 200317043 is one of a series of rulings dealing with a

common planning technique:
Taxpayer A, whose date of birth was Date 1, 1942, died on Date 2, 2002, at age
60. As of his date of death, Taxpayer A was the owner of IRA X maintained
with Company M.
On Date 4, 1999, Taxpayer A signed and adopted Trust T for the benefit of his
three children, Taxpayer B, Taxpayer D, and Taxpayer E. Taxpayer B's date of
birth was Date 3, 1972. Taxpayer B is older than either Taxpayer D or Taxpayer
E. Taxpayer C is the Trustee of Trust T.
Taxpayer B was alive as of the date of this ruling request.
The provisions of Trust T provide, in relevant part, that Trust T is intended to be
the beneficiary of an individual retirement arrangement (IRA) maintained by
Taxpayer A. The terms of Trust T further provide, that upon the death of the
Trustor, the Trustee shall divide the trust estate into equal shares, one (1) for
Taxpayer B if he is then living. Each share shall constitute a separate trust and
shall be held and administered as such. The terms of Trust T also provide that
the Trust T trustee is required to maintain separate accounts on a pro rata basis
in accordance with Proposed Treasury Regulation 1.401(a)(9)- 1, Q&A H-2(b),
for the separate beneficiaries of Trust T. Finally, the terms of Trust T provide
that its Trustee shall withdraw from the beneficiary's share of any IRA and
distribute to the beneficiary such beneficiary's share of the minimum
distribution required to be distributed annually from the IRA.
On Date 5, 1999, Taxpayer A signed a beneficiary designation with respect to
his IRA X pursuant to which IRA X was to be distributed to the trustee of Trust
T at the death of Taxpayer A. Said beneficiary designation provides, in relevant
part, that Trust T is to be divided into equal accounts for three beneficiaries
named therein. Taxpayer B is one of the three named beneficiaries. The
beneficiary designation also provides that the Trust T trustee may establish
separate IRAs in the name of Taxpayer A for the benefit of the three
above-referenced named beneficiaries. In effect, the trustee of Trust Twas
authorized to establish a separate IRA for the benefit of Taxpayer B.
Your authorized representative has asserted that Trust T and the separate trusts
created under its terms are valid under the laws of State N. He has also asserted
that Trust T and the separate trusts created under its terms became irrevocable
upon the death of Taxpayer A. Company M was provided with a copy of Trust T
and of the related beneficiary designation prior to the death of Taxpayer A.
Your authorized representative has provided the Service with documentation
which indicates that, prior to Date 6, 2002, IRA X was subdivided into three
IRAs after the death of Taxpayer A. Each posthumously created IRA is titled in
the name of Taxpayer A (Deceased) for the benefit of a distinct individual.
Thus, one IRA (IRA W) is titled Taxpayer A (Deceased) for the benefit of the
Trust for Taxpayer B. IRA W has an Account Number which is different from
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the Account Numbers assigned to the IRAs maintained for the benefit of
Taxpayer A's other two children.
Additionally, documentation provided by your authorized representative
indicates that the trust created for the benefit of Taxpayer B under the terms of
Trust T has a Taxpayer Identification Number which is different from the
Taxpayer Identification Numbers assigned to the trusts created for the benefit of
Taxpayer A's other children.
Your authorized representative has asserted on your behalf that the one-third of
IRA X which became IRA W after IRA X was subdivided is payable to the
subtrust created under the terms of Trust T for the benefit of Taxpayer B. Your
authorized representative asserts that distributions from IRA W have not been
made, are not being made, and will not be paid to Trust T.
At issue was whether the division created separate trusts for purposes of calculating the required minimum
distribution rules. The ruling reviews the final regulation:
§ 1.401(a)(9)-8 of the "Final" Regulations, Q&A-2(a) provides the "separate
account" rules with respect to defined contribution plans. A "separate account"
is an account under which the beneficiary or beneficiaries differ from the
beneficiary or beneficiaries of the other accounts. In general, if separate
accounts are set up, for years subsequent to the calendar year containing the date
on which the separate accounts were established, or the date of death if later, a
separate account under a plan is not aggregated with the other separate accounts
under the plan in order to determine whether the distributions from such separate
account satisfy the requirements of Code § 401(a)(9). Instead, the rules in Code
§ 401(a)(9) apply separately to each separate account under the plan.
§ 1.401(a)(9)-8 of the "Final" Regulations, Q&A-3, provides that a separate
account is a separate portion of an employee's benefit which reflects the
separate interest of an employee's beneficiary under the plan as of the
employee's death for which separate accounting is maintained. The separate
accounting must allocate all post-death investment gains and losses,
contributions and forfeitures, for the period prior to the establishment of the
separate accounts on a pro-rata basis in a consistent and reasonable manner
among the separate accounts.
§ 1.401(a)(9)-4 of the "Final" Regulations, Q&A-5(c), provides, in relevant part,
that the separate account rules under A-2 of § 1.401(a)(9)-8 are not available to
beneficiaries of a trust with respect to the trust's interest in the employee's
benefit.

***
As noted above, if distributions are made to a trust, even if the trust is a
"see-through" trust within the meaning of Q&A-5 of § 1.401(a)(9)-4 of the
"Final" Regulations, the separate account rules of A-2 of § 1.401(a)(9)-8 of the
"Final Regulations" are not available to the beneficiaries of the trust. Thus, in
general, each beneficiary of a trust must receive minimum required distributions
over the life expectancy of the eldest beneficiary.
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The issue raised in this ruling request is whether the general rule, above, applies
where IRA distributions are made directly to a subtrust created under the terms
ofa trust.
In this case, distributions from IRA W, which was created for and is being
maintained for the benefit of Taxpayer B, are being made directly to the subtrust
created under the terms of Trust T for Taxpayer B's benefit and are not being
paid to Trust T. Taxpayer B is the only beneficiary of the subtrust created for his
benefit. However, the facts presented in this case indicate that the subtrust for
the benefit of Taxpayer B was created by the trustee of Trust T pursuant to the
terms of Trust T. Furthermore, as noted above, the terms of Trust T provide that
the trustee thereof is charged with the responsibility of creating separate
accounts.
Although neither the Code nor the "Final" Regulations promulgated under Code
§ 401(a)(9) preclude the posthumous division of IRA X into three IRAs,
including IRA W, the "Final" Regulations do preclude "separate account"
treatment for Code § 401 (a)(9) purposes where amounts pass through a trust. In
this case, amounts pass through a trust. Thus, even though IRA X has been
divided into three IRAs, including IRA W, the life expectancy of the eldest
beneficiary of all of the IRAs, not merely IRA W, is the life expectancy to be
used to determine the Code § 401(a)(9) payout period for distributions from IRA
W. TP B is said eldest beneficiary.
The rulings substantially limit the usefulness of having IRAs or plan benefits paid to a client's revocable
trust, especially where the difference in ages among beneficiaries is substantial. The rulings arise from a change
made in the section 409 final regulations; the proposed regulations would have allowed a favorable result for
taxpayer.
In PLR 200349009 the decedent's daughter were the sole beneficiary of the decedent's trust which was the
designated beneficiary of the IRA. The daughter divided the IRA into two shares, one for each, as a "trustee to
trustee" transfer.
2.

Roth IRA Roll-Over. The IRS applied the same rollover rules to ROTH IRAs as to traditional

IRAs in PLR 200424011. The facts were:
Trust W is a joint revocable trust created by Taxpayers A and B as joint Settlors
and Trustees on Date 1, Year 1. Your authorized representative asserts that Trust
W is valid under the laws of State E. Item C, paragraph 1, of Trust W provides
that upon the death of the first Settlor to die, and after payment of debts and
funeral expenses, the surviving Settlor/Trustee is to divide Trust W into two
separate and continuing trusts, Subtrust A and Subtrust B. Item C, paragraph 1,
grants Taxpayer B the authority to select the assets with which to fund each
subtrust. Item C, paragraph 2, of Trust W provides that Subtrust A is to be
funded with the first $ * * * of assets, and Subtrust B is to be funded with the
next $* * * of trust assets. Any assets in excess of$* * * are to be allocated to
Subtrust A. Item G of Trust W provides, in relevant part, that Subtrust B became
irrevocable at the death of Taxpayer A.
Item C, paragraph 3, of Trust W provides that Subtrust A shall be considered the
sole and separate property of Taxpayer B and shall be administered as she
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directs. Taxpayer B is the sole trustee of Subtrust A who retains the right to
revoke Subtrust A.
Item F of Trust W designated Taxpayer B and her son, Taxpayer C, as the cotrustees of Subtrust B. Pursuant to Item C, paragraph 4(a), of Trust W, Taxpayer
B is entitled to receive all of the income from Subtrust B. Item C, paragraph
4(b), of Trust W, provides that Taxpayer B is entitled to receive principal from
Subtrust B only in cases of dire need after taking into account the assets in
Subtrust A and all other sources of income or assets. Item C, paragraph 4(c), of
Trust W provides that, upon the death of Taxpayer B, the assets remaining in
Subtrust B are to be distributed to the issue of the Settlors.
As surviving Settlor and Trustee of Trust W, Taxpayer B is authorized to
allocate Roth IRA X to Subtrust A. Taxpayer B intends to do so. Once so
allocated, Taxpayer B will distribute outright and free of trust said Roth IRA X
to herself as beneficiary of Subtrust A. Within 60 days of the date Roth IRA X is
paid to Taxpayer B as trustee of Trust W for the purpose of being allocated to
Subtrust A and paid to Taxpayer B, Taxpayer B will roll over said Roth IRA X
proceeds into another Roth IRA set up and maintained in her, Taxpayer B's,
name.
The ruling concluded:
In this case, Taxpayer B, the surviving spouse of Taxpayer A, who owned Roth
IRA X at his death, is the sole trustee of Trust W, the named beneficiary of Roth
IRA X. As sole Trust W trustee, Taxpayer B will allocate Roth IRA X to
Subtrust A created under the terms of Trust W. Once allocated to Subtrust A,
Taxpayer B, as beneficiary thereof, will request that Roth IRA X be paid or
distributed to her pursuant to the language of Trust W which provides that
Taxpayer B may administer Subtrust A as she directs. After receiving Roth IRA
X, Taxpayer B will contribute said Roth IRA X to another Roth IRA set up and
maintained in her name.
Since every action to be taken with respect to Roth IRA X from it's being
distributed to the trustee of Trust W to it's being rolled over into another Roth
IRA will be taken by Taxpayer B, the Service will not apply the general rule, set
forth above. Thus, with respect to your first two ruling requests, the Service
concludes as follows:
1. that Roth IRA X is not an inherited IRA as that term is defmed in
Code section 408(d)(3)(C)(i) with respect to Taxpayer B; and
2. that Taxpayer B will be treated as the payee or distributee of Roth
IRA X and, * * * as such, is eligible to roll over the proceeds of Roth
IRA X set up and maintained in her, Taxpayer B's, name as long as said
rollover occurs no later that the 60th day from the date said distribution
is received by Taxpayer B as the trustee of Trust W.
With respect to your third ruling request, Code section 4973(a) imposes a 6
percent excise tax on the amount of excess contributions to (1) an IRA within
the meaning of Code section 408(a), (2) an Archer MSA within the meaning of
Code section 220(d), (3) an individual retirement annuity within the meaning of
section 408(b), or a custodial account described in Code section 403(b)(7)(A),
(4) a Coverdell account as described in Code section 530, or (5) a health savings
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account within the meaning of Code section 223(d). Code section 4973(a) does
not reference Roth IRAs described in Code section 408A.
However, Code section 4973(f) defmes "excess contributions" as said term
relates to Roth IRAs. In relevant part, Code section 4973(f)(1) provides that an
"excess contribution" to a Roth IRA does not include a qualified rollover
contribution described in Code section 408A(e).
As noted above, Code section 408A(e), in relevant part, defmes the term
"qualified rollover contribution".
In response to your first and second ruling requests, we have concluded that you,
Taxpayer B, may accomplish a rollover of Roth IRA X into a Roth IRA set up
and maintained in your name. Such a rollover will comply with the requirements
of Code section 408(d)(3).
Thus, with respect to your third ruling request, we conclude as follows:
3. that no portion of the proceeds distributed from Roth IRA X and
timely rolled over into another Roth IRA set up and maintained in
Taxpayer B's name will be subject to the tax on excess contributions
imposed by Code section 4973.
D.

SECTIONS 671-678 - GRANTOR TRUST RULES
1.

Non-Grantor, Non-Gift Trust Created.

PLR 200148028 is very helpful.

established a trust that is not a grantor trust but gifts to which are incomplete. The facts were:
Grantor proposes to establish an irrevocable Trust which will be funded by
intervivos and testamentary transfers. The Trust provides for one trustee
(Trustee) and two members of a Distribution Committee. Article 1.1 provides
that during the lifetime of the Grantor ("Initial Term"), the Trustee shall have no
power or authority to make any distribution of net income or principal of the
trust estate, to, or for the benefit of, any trust beneficiary at any time when any
person is serving as a member of the Distribution Committee unless the
distribution is made at the direction of the Distribution Committee. Distributions
may be made to the Grantor, the Grantor's Spouse or any of the descendants of
the Grantor's parents.
Article 3.6 provides that the initial members of the Distribution Committee shall
be the two eldest adult and competent persons eligible to receive distributions
out of the Trust estate (other than the Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). At all
times during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall be comprised
of two persons, then eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate (other
than the Grantor or the Grantor's spouse). During the Initial Term, the
Distribution Committee shall direct the Trustee with regard to (i) all
discretionary distributions from the Trust estate to beneficiaries, and (ii) certain
of the Trustee's powers. The Trustee is authorized and directed to follow the
direction of the Distribution Committee. All rights and powers conferred on the
Distribution Committee shall be exercisable only by unanimous action of all
members of the Distribution Committee except that any member of the
Distribution Committee acting alone may direct the Trustee to make one or more
distributions upon obtaining the Grantor's prior written consent to each such
distribution and filing such consent with the Trustee.
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The taxpayer

The Trust lasts during the lifetime of the Grantor. Under Article 1.2, upon the
death of the Grantor, income and principal of the Trust estate, as it is then
constituted shall be transferred, conveyed and paid over to such person or
persons then eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate, other than
the Grantor, as the Grantor appoints by the Grantor's will. To the extent all, or
any portion of the income and principal of the Trust estate is not so effectively
appointed, such income and principal shall be divided into a sufficient number
of equal shares so that there shall be set aside one such share for each child of
the Grantor who is then living, and one such share for the collective descendants
who are then living of any child of the Grantor who is not then living. From
each such share so set aside for the collective descendants who are then living of
any child of the Grantor who is not then living there shall be set aside per
stirpital parts for such descendants. If no descendant of the Grantor is living at
the death of the Grantor, the income and principal of the Trust, to the extent not
effectively appointed, shall be distributed, free from Trust, to the then living
descendants per stirpes, of the Grantor's parents.
Article 1.3 provides that the Grantor may, at any time during the Grantor's life
release the Grantor's right to receive discretionary distributions of income and
principal from the trust estate, the right to consent to distributions as described
in Article 3.6, and/or the power of appointment described in Article 1.2, and
may limit the persons or entities in whose favor the power of appointment
described in Article 1.2 may be exercised. Article 1.3 further provides that
notwithstanding any of the foregoing or any other provision of this Agreement,
the Grantor shall have no power or authority to change the class of persons
eligible to receive distributions during the Initial Term (except to cause the
Grantor personally to be excluded from the class by releasing the Grantor's own
right to be eligible to receive such distributions.)
With respect to why the trust would not be a grantor trust the ruling states:
Because of the discretion of the Distribution Committee, acting together, or
singly with the consent of the Grantor, to make distributions from income and/or
corpus to one or more of the beneficiaries which includes the members of the
Distribution Committee, the members of the Distribution Committee have a
substantial beneficial interest in both the income and corpus portions of the
Trust. Any distribution that the Grantor wishes to make from assets contributed
to the Trust by that Grantor, could be made only if one of the members of the
Distribution Committee agrees. Since each of the two Distribution Committee
members is a potential recipient of Trust distributions, a consent to a distribution
could adversely affect that individual's beneficial interest in the Trust. Thus,
with respect to the Grantor, both of the members of the Distribution Committee
are adverse parties within the meaning of section 672(a).
The requirement in Article 3.6 that the initial members, and any current or
successor member of the Distribution Committee shall be the two eldest adult
and competent persons eligible to receive distributions out of the Trust estate
and that at all times during the Grantor's life, the Distribution Committee shall
be comprised of two persons, then eligible to receive distributions out of Trust
estate, ensures that the Grantor will not be able to act independently of an
adverse party. The restrictions on the powers of the Trustee preclude the Trustee
from independently controlling distributions or making loans without the
consent of an adverse party.
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The Grantor does not have a reversionary interest in excess of five percent in
any portion of the Trust. Accordingly, section 673 does not apply to treat
Grantor as owner of any portion of the Trust. Because control over the beneficial
enjoyment of, and any distributions of, income and corpus is exercisable by the
Grantor, only with the consent of a Distribution Committee member, who is an
adverse party, Grantor will not be treated as the owner of any portion of the
Trust under section 674 or section 677. The Trust agreement does not authorize
any of the circumstances that cause administrative controls to be considered
exercisable primarily for the benefit of the grantor under section 675. Section
676 does not apply to Grantor because Grantor cannot revest title in the Grantor
in any portion of the Trust. Section 678 is not applicable since none of the
trustees and no other person will have a power exercisable solely by that person
to vest the corpus or income of the Trust in that person.
The existence of the grantor's special testamentary power of appointment prevented the gift from being
complete until such time as distributions were made from the trust to someone other than the grantor.
In PLR 200247013 the taxpayer was arguably more aggressive.

The class of beneficiaries was the

descendants of the Taxpayer's parents, and two of the taxpayers siblings were the Distribution Committee.
This kind of trust will help grantors avoid state capital gains taxes on sales of assets.
E.

SECTION 1361 - S CORPORATIONS
1.

ESBT Regulations.

The IRS issued proposed regulations on December 28, 2000.

REG-

251701-96. The most important issues covered are which trusts are ESBTs and what is the income tax treatment of
an ESBT with both S corporation stock and other assets. The regulations were finalized on July 17, 2003. T.D.
9078. The Final Regulations are substantially similar to the proposed regulations. The Supplementary Information
to the proposed regulations provided:
1.

Beneficiary

The proposed regulations provide guidance as to who is an ESBT beneficiary.
Generally, a beneficiary includes any person who has a present, remainder, or
reversionary interest in the trust other than a remote, contingent interest. If an
ESBT makes distributions to another trust (the distributee trust), the distributee
trust is not treated as a beneficiary of the ESBT. However, the beneficiaries of
the distributee trust will be counted as beneficiaries of the ESBT. Persons whose
future beneficial interest is so remote as to be negligible are not beneficiaries.
Generally, when the probability that a person will receive any distribution from
the trust is less than 5 percent, at a particular time, that person's interest would
be so remote as to be negligible. Finally, the term beneficiary does not include a
person in whose favor a power of appointment may be exercised until the power
is actually exercised.
This provision is helpful because most trusts have alternate beneficiaries.
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2.

Interests Acquired by Purchase

The proposed regulations provide guidance regarding the prohibition on
acquiring an interest in an ESBT by purchase. The proposed regulations provide
that the prohibition applies if any portion of a beneficiary's basis in the
beneficiary's interest is determined under section 1012. Thus, a part-gift, partsale of a beneficial interest will terminate the trust's status as an ESBT.
Beneficiaries may not purchase interests in the trust, but the ESBT itself is
allowed to purchase S corporation stock.
3.

Grantor Trusts

The proposed regulations provide that a trust, all or a portion of which is treated
as owned by an individual under subpart E, part I, subchapter J, chapter I of the
Internal Revenue Code (Code) (a grantor trust), may elect to be an ESBT. The
Treasury Department and the IRS believe that Congress did not intend to
preclude this type of trust, which is a common family estate planning tool, from
electing ESBT status. The proposed regulations provide rules for the treatment
of grantor trusts electing ESBT status.
This provision is important because it allows trusts with multiple grantors to qualify as ESBTs.
4.

Potential Current Beneficiaries

The proposed regulations provide that the term potential current beneficiary
means, with respect to any period, any person who at any time during such
period is entitled to, or at the discretion of any person may receive, a distribution
from the principal or income of the trust. In general, a person who may receive a
distribution from the ESBT under a currently exercisable power of appointment
is a potential current beneficiary. In addition, in the case of an ESBT that is a
grantor trust, the proposed regulations provide that the deemed owner of the
grantor trust is also to be treated as a potential current beneficiary.
Under the defmitions set forth in the proposed regulations, a potential current
beneficiary is not necessarily a beneficiary of the trust and vice versa. For
example, a person in whose favor property could currently be appointed, but to
whom no such appointment has been made, is a potential current beneficiary,
but not a beneficiary. Conversely, a person who is a non-contingent remainder
beneficiary of a non-grantor trust is a beneficiary, but not a potential current
beneficiary.
The proposed regulations provide special rules if current distributions can be
made to a distributee trust. If the distributee trust does not qualify to be a
shareholder of an S corporation under section 136I(c)(2)(A), then the trust is
considered the potential current beneficiary and thus a shareholder. In that case,
the corporation's S election terminates because the corporation has an ineligible
shareholder. For this purpose, a trust is deemed to qualify to be a shareholder of
an S corporation under section 1361 (c)(2)(A) if it would be eligible to make a
QSST or ESBT election if it owned S corporation stock.
If the distributee trust does qualify to be a shareholder of an S corporation under
section 1361(c)(2)(A), in general, the potential current beneficiaries of the
distributing ESBT will include the potential current beneficiaries of the
distributee trust. However, if the distributee trust is a former grantor trust prior
to the owner's death (that is, a trust described in section 136l(c)(2)(A)(ii», or is
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a trust receiving a distribution of S stock from a decedent's estate (that is, a trust
described in section 1361(c)(2)(A)(iii», the estate of the decedent is treated as
the only potential current beneficiary of the trust In no case will the same person
be counted twice when determining the number of S corporation shareholders.
5.

ESBT Election

Notice 97-12 (1997-1 C.B. 385) provides the procedures for making the ESBT
election. Under that notice, the ESBT election is required to contain certain
information and representations, and is required to be filed with the service
center where the S corporation files its income tax returns. These proposed
regulations, when finalized, will modify and replace the rules in Notice 97-12.
Under the proposed regulations, the trustee of an ESBT makes a single ESBT
election by filing a statement with the service center where the ESBT files its
Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts. This procedure will
be more convenient for taxpayers than the procedures of Notice 97-12 if the
ESBT holds stock in more than one S corporation. No trust documents are
required to be attached to the election statement.
The proposed regulations provide that if a trust satisfies the ESBT requirements
and makes an ESBT election, the trust will be treated as an ESBT for federal
income tax purposes as of the effective date of the ESBT election. These
effective dates generally follow the rules of section 1.1361-1G)(6)(iii) for
qualified subchapter S trust (QSST) elections. Protective ESBT elections, which
are intended to become effective only if the trust fails to satisfy the requirements
for a trust described in section 1361(c)(2)(A)(i) through (iv), are prohibited.
Unlike a protective QSST election, a protective ESBT election could result in a
change in the incidence of taxation from the owner of the trust to the trust itself.
If a trust fails to qualify as an eligible S corporation shareholder under section
1361(c)(2), and consequently the S corporation election is ineffective or
terminated, relief may be available under section l362(f) for an inadvertent
ineffective S corporation election or an inadvertent S corporation termination.
6.

Conversions ofQSSTs and ESBTs

Rev. Proc. 98-23 (1998-1 C.B. 662) provides procedures for the conversion of a
QSST to an ESBT and an ESBT to a QSST. The proposed regulations, when
finalized, will modify and replace the procedures of Rev. Proc. 98-23 and
provide rules with respect to these conversions.
The conversion procedure provided in the proposed regulations differs from that
provided in Rev. Proc. 98-23, in that the election must be filed with the service
center where the trust files its income tax return, as well as with the service
center where the S corporation files its income tax return. The election must be
filed in both service centers if the service center for the trust is different from the
service center for the S corporation because QSST elections are filed with the
service center where the S corporation files its income tax return and ESBT
elections will be filed where the trust files its income tax return under the new
procedures set forth in these proposed regulations, when finalized. The IRS and
the Treasury Department specifically request comments on whether the rules for
filing QSST elections similarly should be changed to permit the filing of a
QSST election with the service center where the trust files its return rather than
with the service center for the S corporation(s).
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7.

Consent to the S Corporation Election

Notice 97-12 provides that, for purposes of the ESBT's consent to the S
corporation election under section 1362(a), only the trustee needs to consent to
the S corporation election because the ESBT is taxed on the S corporation's
income and the trustee makes the ESBT election. These proposed regulations,
when finalized, will modify and replace the rules in Notice 97-12.
Under the proposed regulations, if the ESBT is also a grantor trust, the deemed
owner must also consent to the S corporation election because such owner will
be taxed on all or a portion of the S corporation's income. If there is more than
one trustee, the trustee or trustees with authority to legally bind the trust must
consent to the S corporation election.
8.

ESBT Taxation

The proposed regulations provide that, for federal income tax purposes, an
ESBT consists of an S portion, a non-S portion, and in some instances a grantor
portion. The items of income, deduction, and credit attributable to any portion of
the ESBT treated as owned by a person under the grantor trust rules of subpart
E, including S corporation stock and other property (the grantor portion), are
taken into account on that individual's tax return pursuant to the normal rules
applicable to grantor trusts. Other items of income, deduction, and credit are,
pursuant to these proposed regulations, attributed to either the S portion, which
includes the S corporation stock, or the non-S portion, which includes all other
assets of the trust. The S portion is subject to tax under the special rules of
section 641 (c), while the non-S portion is subject to the normal trust taxation
rules of subparts A through D of subchapter J.
The proposed regulations provide that if an otherwise allowable deduction of the
S portion is attributable to a charitable contribution paid by the S corporation,
the contribution will be deemed to be paid by the S portion pursuant to the terms
of the trust's governing instrument within the meaning of section 642(c)(I). The
other requirements of section 642(c)(1) must also be met for the contribution to
be deductible by the S portion, and the deduction is limited to the amount of the
gross income of the S portion. If a payment is made to a charitable organization
by the ESBT pursuant to the terms of its governing instrument, such payment is
deductible, subject to the provisions of section 642(c)(1), to the extent it is paid
from the gross income of the non-S portion of the trust. Thus, if the ESBT
contributes S corporation stock to a charitable organization, no deduction is
allowed under section 642(c)(1) because the contribution is not paid out of the
gross income of the non-S portion.
The proposed regulations provide guidance regarding the treatment of proceeds
received by an ESBT from the sale of S corporation stock when income from the
sale is reported on the installment method under section 453. The income
recognized with respect to the installment proceeds is taken into account by the
S portion. The interest on the installment obligation is taken into account by the
non-S portion.
The proposed regulations provide that if a trust holds S corporation stock and is
already an eligible S corporation shareholder and the trust makes an ESBT
election during the trust's taxable year, the electing trust will be treated as a
separate taxpayer for purposes of allocating S corporation items under section
1377(a)(l). However, the ESBT election does not result in the prior trust being
treated as terminating its entire interest in its S corporation stock for purposes of
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section 1.1377-1 (b), unless the prior trust is one described in section
1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) or (iii). Therefore, the S corporation is generally not permitted
to make the election to terminate the taxable year under section 1377(a)(2). The
trust will be treated as a single taxpayer for purposes of determining the taxation
of distributions from the trust. Thus, distributions made after the effective date
of the ESBT election may still carry out distributable net income of the trust
earned during the taxable year before the effective date of the ESBT election.
The proposed regulations provide that for purposes of determining whether the
exception to estimated taxes under section 6654(d)(I)(B) applies, the trust will
not be considered a different taxpayer as a result of the ESBT election.
Therefore, if the ESBT makes estimated tax payments equal to 100 percent of
the prior year's tax liability, no penalties will apply.
The proposed regulations provide that interest expenses paid on loans used to
purchase the S corporation stock must be allocated to the S portion of the ESBT
but are not deductible by the S portion because they are not administrative
expenses.
9.

ESBT Terminations

The proposed regulations provide that generally a trustee must seek the consent
of the Commissioner to revoke its ESBT election by obtaining a private letter
ruling. However, the Commissioner's consent is granted for revocations that
occur on the conversion of an ESBT to a QSST under the procedures set forth in
the proposed regulations.
The proposed regulations provide that if an ESBT fails to meet the definitional
requirements of an ESBT under section 1361(e), the trust's ESBT status
terminates immediately upon such failure to qualify. However, if an ESBT
acquires an ineligible potential current beneficiary, the ESBT has 60 days in
which to dispose of all of its S corporation stock to prevent termination of the S
corporation election. If the S corporation stock is not disposed of within the 60day period, then the S corporation election will terminate as of the first day that
the ineligible person became a potential current beneficiary.
Finally, the proposed regulations provide that an ESBT election generally is
terminated if the ESBT fails to hold any S corporation stock. However, a trust
will continue to be treated as an ESBT if it is reporting income from the sale of
S corporation stock under the installment method of section 453.
The effective date is July 17,2003.
Two changes in the final regulations are worth noting, as summarized in the Summary of Contents and
Explanation of Provisions:
The fmal regulations clarify that if a former qualified subpart E trust or a
testamentary trust continues to won stock of an S corporation after the 2-year
period and is not otherwise a qualified subpart E trust, an electing QSST, or an
ESBT, the trust is not a permitted shareholder. Additionally, the final
regulations clarify that a QSST or an ESBT election may be made for a former
qualified subpart E trust or a testamentary trust that qualifies as a QSST or an
ESBT.
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Another commentator suggested that after August 5, 1997, the effective date of
section 645, a testamentary trust should also include a trust that receives S
corporation stock from a qualified revocable trust (QRT) for which an election
under section 645 has been made (an electing trust). Under section 645, an
electing trust is treated and taxed as part of the decedent's estate (and not as a
separate trust) for purposes of subtitle A of the Code for all taxable years of the
estate during the section 645 election period. The section 645 election period
begins on the date of the decedent's death and generally terminates on the day
before the applicable date described in section 645(b)(2). Section 1.645-I(h)(l)
provides that on the close of the last day of the election period the share
comprising the electing trust is deemed to be distributed to a new trust.
Thus, according to the commentator, the final regulations should clarify that
testamentary trusts include trusts to which S corporation stock is transferred
pursuant to the terms of the electing trust during the section 645 election period
as well as new trusts to which S corporation stock is deemed to be distributed at
the end of the section 645 election period. The commentator noted that the
purpose of section 645 is to create parity between electing trusts and wills. In
furtherance of this purpose, the commentator reasoned that if an electing trust
transfers or is deemed to distribute S corporation stock to a new trust, the new
trust should be a permitted shareholder for the 2-year period beginning on the
day the stock is transferred or deemed distributed to the new trust. The [mal
regulations adopt the commentator's suggestion to clarify that a testamentary
trust also includes a trust that receives S corporation stock from an electing trust.
2.

Life Tenant as Qualified Shareholder. PLR 200404033 allowed a life estate to qualify as a

Qualified Subchapter S Trust. The life tenant received all the income annually, could sell the shares and reinvest the
proceeds, and could not dispose of the shares in a manner to defeat the remainderman's interest.
3.

Voting and Non-Voting Shares as One-Class of Stock. PLR 200407006 confirms that voting

and non-voting shares are one class of stock for S corporation purposes.
F.

SECTIONS 2031 and 2512 1.

VALVATION

Relevance of Post-Death Events, and Importance of Competent Appraisers.

The case of

Estate of Alice Friedlander Kaufman v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1999-119, illustrates the importance of having a
competent and credible appraiser. At issue was the value of almost 20% of the stock in a closely-held company,
Seminole Manufacturing Co., a maker of uniforms. The taxpayer contended that the value of the shares was $29.77
based on sales two months after the valuation date of two blocks, one of 4.7% and another of 3.25%, sold to other
family members. The court found that those sales were not truly at arm's length because the sellers were not
reasonably informed about the facts relating to the stocks' value before they sold.
The estate had engaged an expert as had the IRS. However, the IRS' expert's report used the wrong
valuation date and made other mistakes and thus was held irrelevant other than as a rebuttal to the taxpayer's expert.
The court found that the taxpayer's expert was unpersuasive, and the taxpayer's expert testimony was
unsupported by the record, so that the court gave no weight to the taxpayer's expert and accepted the IRS
determination of the stock which was $56.50 per share. The case contains a lengthy discussion of the inadequacy of
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the taxpayer's expert, ranging from confusion about the expert's assumptions, to mistakes in the interpretation of
valuation methods. The case should be reviewed by any expert preparing valuation opinions.
However, on the substance, the Ninth Circuit reversed in James J. Morrissey, et.a!. v. Commissioner, 87
AFTR2d ~2001-643 (2001). The Court held that the post-death sales were reliable:
In 1993, A. Max Weitzenhoffer, Jr. (Weitzenhoffer) asked Merrill Lynch to

appraise the value of a minority interest. The Merrill Lynch fmal report was
delivered to him on July 5, 1994. However, on March 29, 1994 Merrill Lynch
wrote Weitzenhoffer giving its formal opinion that the fair market value of a
minority interest was $29.77 per share.
On the basis of this report Weitzenhoffer advised two shareholders that Merrill
Lynch set the value at $29.70 per share, and each sold to him at this price.
Edmund Hoffman sold him his 10,000 shares on May 12, 1994; Jacquelyne
Weitzenhoffer Branch sold him her 6,960 shares on June 16, 1994. Each seller
subsequently testified before the Tax Court that the price was fair and that the
sale had been under no compulsion.
The Estate filed an estate tax return valuing the stock at $29.77 per share. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed the stock at $70.79 per share and
asserted a deficiency based on this amount.

******
No good reason existed to reject the sales by Branch and Hoffman as evidence
of the fair market value of Seminole stock on April 14, 1994. The sales took
place close to the valuation date. The sellers were under no compulsion to sell.
There was no reason for them to doubt Weitzenhoffer's report of the Merrill
Lynch valuation. That the fmal report was delivered only in July did not
undercut the weight of the formal opinion letter written in March. The sellers
had no obligation to hire another investment firm to duplicate Merrill Lynch's
work.
The Commissioner tries to make something out of the family connections of the
sellers with the buyers. They were not especially close. Hoffman had an uncle
related by marriage to Weitzenhoffer's uncle; there is no English word to name
this relationship. Branch was Weitzenhoffer's first cousin. Each seller testified
that there was no intention to make a gift to Weitzenhoffer.
The Commissioner notes that Hoffman was a very successful businessman, so
that the Seminole stock may not have meant much to him. People don't get to be
very successful in business by treating valuable property carelessly. To be sure,
there was a seven cents spread between Merrill Lynch's price and
Weitzenhoffer's offer; the resulting difference of $700 and $487.20 were in
context de minimis.
The Commissioner also notes that Branch had a misimpression that Seminole
still owned a losing facility that it had, in fact, already sold. Nonetheless Branch
was rightly aware that a substantial loss had occurred due to this facility in 1991
when no dividends had been paid. Both sellers were aware that dividends had,
even in prosperous years, been meager.

A-52

Similar issues arose in Estate of Elizabeth P. O'Neal, et. al. v. United States, 81 F.Supp.2d 1205 (N.D. Ala.
1999), aff'd in part, vacated in part by 258 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2001), decided on remand at 228 F.Supp.2d 1290
(N.D.Ala.2002). The District Court stated the issue as follows:
The central issue in this case involves the estate tax deduction by the Estate of
Elizabeth P. O'Neal, deceased, ("Mrs. O'Neal's Estate") under 26 U.S.C. §
2053(a)(3) for claims against Mrs. O'Neal's Estate resulting from transferee gift
tax and generation-skipping transfer tax liabilities asserted against the children
and grandchildren of Elizabeth P. O'Neal ("Mrs. O'Neal") as donees of certain
gifts made by Mrs. O'Neal. The Court of Appeals held that for purposes of the
deduction, the claims are to be valued as of the date of Mrs. O'Neal's death
without regarded to events occurring after her death and remanded this issue
with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to value the claims giving
rise to the deduction as of the date of Mrs. O'Neal's death, 258 F.3d at 1266,
1275.
The court summarized the holding of the Eleventh Circuit:
The appeal by Mrs. O'Neal's Estate was based, inter alia, upon its contention
that this Court should have considered only pre-death events in determining the
amount of the deduction and the deduction should be in the amount demanded
by the IRS.7 In opposing the arguments presented by Mrs. O'Neal's Estate on
appeal, the government argued that the amount of the deduction should be based
upon the post-death settlement.
The Court of Appeals rejected the government's argument and held that the
deduction to be taken by Mrs. O'Neal's Estate for the children's and
grandchildren's claims against Mrs. O'Neal's Estate is the value of such claims
as of the date of Mrs. O'Neal's death, determined without consideration of
post-death events. 258 F.3d at 1275. The Court of Appeals plainly held that Mrs.
O'Neal's Estate is entitled to a deduction in some amount (clearly not zero). Id.
at 1271 n.20. The Court of Appeals also stated, however, that the value of the
deduction is not necessarily the amount that was demanded by the IRS. Id. at
1275.
The Court of Appeals then remanded the valuation issue with instructions to
hold an evidentiary bearing to value the claims giving rise to the deduction at the
date of death. Id. at 1276. Events that occurred after Mrs. O'Neal's death that
alter value were to be disregarded. The mandate of the Court of Appeals
included the following:
On remand, the district court is instructed neither to admit nor consider
evidence of post-death occurrences when determining the date of death
value of the Section 2053(a)(3) deduction. [Citation to Estate of Smith
v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515, 526 (5th Cir. 1999).] It will be
incumbent on each party to supply the district court with relevant
evidence of pre-death facts and occurrences supporting the
date-of-death value of the deductions as advocated by that party. Id.
The district court will then, by using informed judgment,
reasonableness and common sense, weighing all relevant facts and
evaluating their aggregate significance, determine a sound valuation.
See Revenue Ruling, 1959-1 C.B. 237, Rev. Rul. 59-60 (1959).
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The District Court was frustrated by the government's lack of expert testimony. The opinion states:
The government chose not to offer an expert to assist the Court. Instead, the
government sought to establish a timeline of events by cross-examining Mr.
Aughtry and the taxpayer's experts, and offering the testimony of Mr. Breen,
Mrs. O'Neal's accountant, the IRS estate tax attorney who conducted the tax
audit, and an IRS employee who participated in the engagement of Mr. Kaye.
However, the government offered no evidence which would transform the
timeline of events into admissible evidence of value, which is the question that
the Court of Appeals placed before this Court. What this Court needed from the
government, and did not receive, was evidence to assist this Court in
determining the value of the claims as of Mrs. O'Neal's date of death. [footnote
omitted]
In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999), the Fifth
Circuit offered the following guidance regarding the type of evidence that assists
a court in establishing the date-of-death value of claims against an estate:
The actual value of Exxon's claim prior to either settlement or entry of
a judgment is inherently imprecise, yet "even a disputed claim may
have a value to which lawyers who settle cases every day may well
testify, fully as measurable as the possible future amounts that may
eventually accrue on an uncontested claim." [Footnote citing Gowetz v.
Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874,876 (1st Cir. 1963)]
In fact, when addressing situations that are the obverse of the one in the
instant case, i.e., when the decedent-estate taxpayer is a plaintiff rather
than a defendant in a pending lawsuit, the Commissioner has
considered himself capable of determining the value of a pending
lawsuit in exact dollars and cents, even when the claim has not been
reduced to judgment. [Footnote citing Estate of Davis v.
Commissioner, 65 T.e.M. (CCH) 2365 (1993)] Furthermore, courts
have consistently held that "inexactitude is often a by-product in
estimating claims or assets without an established market and provides
no excuse for failing to value the claims . . . in the light of the
vicissitudes attending their recovery." [Footnote citing Estate of CUITV
v. Commissioner, 74 T.e. (CCH) 540, 551 (1980)]
Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 525 (emphasis in original).
The taxpayer offered two experts whom the court found helpful:
As previously stated, Mrs. O'Neal's Estate offered the reports and testimony of
two experts, both of whom currently practice as attorneys and one of whom is
also a recently retired Federal District Judge. Tax cases valuing legal claims
often use attorneys and retired judges as expert witnesses, See, e.g., Estate of
Smith v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 915-916 (2001) (IRS used
testimony of a lawyer who had settled and mediated numerous cases involving
similar disputes to value claim against estate); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner,
65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2365, 2366 (1993) (lawsuit included as asset in estate valued
by attorney with experience evaluating lawsuits); Estate of Lennon v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 326, 328 (I991) (retired judge who practiced
appellate law following retirement from the bench testified as to value of lawsuit
on appeal at death). Indeed, both the First Circuit in Gowetz v. Commissioner,
320 F.2d 874 (Ist Cir. 1963), and the Fifth Circuit in Estate of Smith held that
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"lawyers who settle cases every day" can testify as to the value of disputed
claims. Gowetz, 320 F.2d at 876; Estate of Smith, 198 F.3d at 525.
Both experts testified as to the date-of-death value of the claims against Mrs.
O'Neal based upon the likely outcome of the transferee tax litigation given the
facts known as of Mrs. O'Neal's death.lO Each expert then discounted that
value to reflect contingencies related to restitution litigation between Mrs.
O'Neal or her estate as donor and her children and grandchildren as donees.
Neither expert considered or relied upon events, facts or occurrences after Mrs.
O'Neal's death on July 23, 1994.
The court concluded:
In remanding this case, the Court of Appeals instructed this Court to determine a
sound valuation "using informed judgment, reasonableness and common sense,
weighing all relevant facts and evaluating their aggregate significance." 258
F.3d at 1275. Like both [the taxpayer's experts] Judge Pointer and Mr.
Apolinsky, informed judgment, reasonableness and common sense tell this
Court that, when faced with potential transferee liability in excess of
$16,000,000.00 as of the date of Mrs. O'Neal's death, the value of the children's
and grandchildren's restitution claims on that date was at least as great as the
$5,835,000.00 value determined by Judge Pointer.
With respect to the opinions of both expert witnesses, the Court concludes that
Judge Pointer's opinion is more persuasive. Since the issue before the Court
involves determinations of the likely outcome of litigation in the Tax Court and
litigation of a claim for restitution, the Court places great weight on the
experience of Judge Pointer who spent twenty-nine and one-half years on the
federal bench resolving cases, many of which were of a similar nature.
Moreover, having reviewed the exhibits offered into evidence and having heard
the testimony of the witnesses, particularly the testimony of the lead attorneys
for the parties in the Tax Court Cases, the Court has reached the same
conclusion as Judge Pointer. The value of the children's and grandchildren's
claims as of Mrs. O'Neal's date of death is $5,835,000.00.
While the value of the claims is $5,835,000,00, the amount of the deduction
under 26 U.S.c. § 2053(a)(3) is less. 26 U.S.c. § 2053(c)(2) disallows a
deduction for amounts described in 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a) to the extent that the
amounts exceed the value as of the decedent's death of the property subject to
claims (except to the extent that the deductions represent amounts paid before
the date for filing the estate tax return). In this case, the value of Mrs. O'Neal's
property that was subject to claims as of the date of her death was
$5,303,744.00, and the amount of the deductions under 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)
cannot exceed this amount.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the value of the children's and grandchildren's claims as of
Mrs. O'Neal's date of death was $5,835,000.00. The Court further fmds that the
amount of the deduction allowed to Mrs. O'Neal's Estate for the children's and
grandchildren's claims is limited by 26 U.S.C. § 2053(c)(2) to $5,303,744.00.
Since the deduction for the children's and grandchildren's claims reduces the
taxable estate to zero, the Court finds that the full amount of the estate taxes paid
by Mrs. O'Neal's Estate, together with interest as provided by law, is due to be
refunded.
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After the remand, the government argued so persistently for the value of the deduction to be zero that the
District Court awarded attorneys fees against the government 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-7214 (2002):
In spite of the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement that "the estate is entitled to a
deduction with respect to claims against the estate by the nine heirs for
reimbursement of their transferee gift tax liability on the 1987 gifts of stock by
Mrs. O'Neal," O'Neal at 1271, the defendant has repeatedly argued that the
value of that deduction was zero. On March 14, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for partial summary judgment, requesting this court order that the
defendant was foreclosed from arguing that the value of the claims of the donees
was zero. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (doc. 81), at ~ 2. This
court ordered that ''the defendant may not allege that the estate of Mrs. O'Neal
is not entitled to any deduction for the value of the claims of the donees." Order
of April2, 2002 (doc. 87), at 2.
On April 3, 2002, the defendant filed a motion requesting this court hold the
motion for partial summary judgment in abeyance pending discovery on the
issue of "the value, ifany, of the donees' claims as of July 23, 1994" (doc. 89).
The court found this motion to be moot on April 4, 2002 (doc. 95). On April 11,
2002, the defendant filed a motion asking this court to reconsider its granting of
the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (doc. 93). The court denied
that motion, stating its April 2, 2002 Order merely required the parties to
comply with the instructions from the Eleventh Circuit regarding the issues on
remand. Court Order of April 11, 2002 (doc. 94), at 2. The court, by footnote,
stated:
"the court notes that the plaintiffs filed that motion [for partial
summary judgment] due to a concern that the defendant would argue
that the plaintiffs were estopped from claiming the estate was entitled
to any deduction. As the Eleventh Circuit stated that 'there is no dispute
that the estate is entitled to a deduction ... ' this court will not allow the
defendant to argue otherwise, whether before, during, or after discovery
is completed."
Order of April 11, 2002, at n.l. In its trial brief, the defendant again argued that,
because the court could not consider post-death events, the value of the
deduction for the donees' claims would be zero. Trial brief of defendant United
States (doc. 121), at 14-15. The defendant then argues in that brief that
"[e]xcepting (sic), arguendo, that the plaintiffs' reading of Smith is correct, the
valuations performed by the plaintiffs' (sic) indicate that the deduction for the
donees' claims as of July 23, 1994 is zero (citation omitted). . . . As a
consequence, no deduction for the donees' claims can be permitted under Treas.
Reg. § 20.2053- l(b)(3)." Trial brief of defendant United States, at 19-20. In its
conclusion, the United States argued, "Applying a strict interpretation of the
Eleventh Circuit's Opinion in this case, the amount of the deduction for the
donees' claims as of July 23, 1994 is zero because no cause of action had
accrued at the time of Mrs. O'Neal's death." Id. at 24-25.
At the evidentiary hearing, which commenced June 6, 2002, the court stated it
was "concerned about ... the government's argument that the plaintiffs are
entitled to zero deduction, because I think the Eleventh Circuit closed that out."
See Tab 11 to plaintiffs' evidentiary submission (doc. 126). The government
responded:
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Let me explain. . . . This is the way we're interpreting. We're not
saying that that restitution claim would not be entitled to a deduction
(sic). What we are saying is is [sic] the value would be zero, because
the Eleventh Circuit said, what you will go back and do, is you will
value the deduction.
It's the same thing as if, on July 23rd, 1994 you were valuing stock and
it was determined to be worthless.... But we're not saying that there's
- there is a difference between they are not entitled to a deduction we're not saying that, Your Honor. What we're saying is is [sic] the
value as of July 23rd, 1994, based on those facts, you have to assign it
as I we're using zero as, in effect, worthless.
Id. This court has repeatedly found this position of the United States to be
irreconcilable with the Eleventh Circuit's finding that "that there is no dispute
that the estate is entitled to a deduction with respect to claims against the estate
by the nine heirs for reimbursement of their transferee gift tax liability on the
1987 gifts of stock by Mrs. O'Nea1." O'Neal, supra, at 1271. As such, the court
finds that the government "should have known that [its] position was invalid"
from the time this case was remanded by the Eleventh Circuit. See Cervin, 111
F.3d at 1262; see also In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (lith Cir. 1994).
Having considered the foregoing, the court is of the opinion the plaintiffs are
entitled to recover reasonable litigation costs, including attorney fees, solely for
costs and fees incurred after July 26, 2001.
On October 8, 2003 Estate of Kirkman O'Neal v.United States, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
was decided, dealing with Mr. O'Neal's estate. That decision was different from the earlier ones because, the
opinion states, the applicable facts were different. The opinion states:
The court starts with a consideration of the possible application of the holdings
of O'Neal v. United States, 258 F.3d 1265 (lith Cir. 2001) (O'Neal/) to the
facts of this case. It should first be noted that the primary holding of O'Neal I is
that "the value of the deduction claimed by the estate for claims against the
estate under Section 2053(a)(3) must be valued as of the date of the decedent's
death. All events occurring after the decedent's death that alter the value must be
disregarded." (Emphasis added; citations omitted). !d. at 1276.
The facts of O'Neal I are obviously distinguishable from those here for a number
of reasons. First, the plaintiff(s) are not the same. Further, there are the
following distinctions: (l) Mr. O'Neal died on August 7, 1988 after his gift tax
return was filed on April 15, 1988. Mrs. O'Neal died on July 23, 1994 after her
gift tax return was filed on April 15, 1988. (2) As of the date of Mrs. O'Neal's
death, the statute of limitations for assessing and collecting any unpaid gift taxes
from her estate had run. This was not true as to Mr. O'Neal's gift taxes and his
estate. (3) As of Mrs. O'Neal's death, the IRS had begun an examination of Mrs.
O'Neal's gift tax return and had proposed to assess transferee liability against her
donees. This was not true as to Mr. O'Nea1. (4) As of the date of Mrs. O'Neal's
death, further appraisals of her stock had been made and her donees had begun
to contest proposed transferee liability. This was not true as to Mr. O'Nea1. (5)
The donees early on asserted alleged "restitution" claims against the estate of
Mrs. O'Nea1. The claims against Mr. O'Neal's estate were not filed by donees
until June 24, 1992, over forty-six months after Letters Testamentary were
issued by the Probate Court with regard to his estate. 27
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***
Again, the primary holding of O'Neal I is the method prescribed for determining
value. It does not address the issue of post-death events as to any issue other
than valuation. Unlike the position of the Government in this case, it did not
dispute in O'Neal I that the estate there was entitled to a deduction with respect
to donees' claims. Id. at 1271. The parties have not cited any cases, one way or
the other, which discuss whether post-death events may be considered in
determining whether a deduction of any amount may be claimed by an estate as
opposed to a consideration of the value ofa deduction which can be claimed.
There is an obvious distinction between a determination of the valuation of a
deductible amount and the determination of whether any amount is deductible.
Before the question of valuation is determined, the court must fIrst decide if
there can be a deduction. See Estate of Hagmann, etc. v. Comrn'r, 60 T.C. 465
(1973), affd, 492 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1974). While O'Neal I apparently makes it
clear that the court should not consider post- death events in making valuations,
it does not address the issue of whether post-death events may be otherwise
considered with regard to deductibility. Compare Commr v. Shively's Estate,
276 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1960).
Issues In This Case
The present legal issues, based upon apparently undisputed facts, which this
court is to decide are the following:
(1) Is the $700,000.00 paid on Mrs. O'Neal's gift taxes from an estimated
income taxes amount remitted by Mr. O'Neal from his separate bank account
due to be added to Mr. O'Neal's estate?
(2) Is any amount deductible from Mr. O'Neal's estate for donees' claims against
Mr. O'Neal's estate?
(3) Is Mr. O'Neal's estate due to be increased due to a reduction in his state
income tax deduction for 1988?
(4) May Mr. O'Neal's estate presently deduct unpaid gift taxes, although not
collectible, on additional gift taxes due based on his 1987 gifts?
The court will address each of these issues.
$700,000.00 Payment
The parties agree that if Mr. O'Neal had directly paid from his separate funds the
$700,000.00 on Mrs. O'Neal's gift taxes, the $700,000.00 would be due to be
added to Mr. O'Neal's estate. The only purported substantive argument that the
plaintiffs make to oppose the Government's position is their citation to IRS
Regulation § 60 15(b)-1(b). See Treas. Reg. §1.6015(b)-I(b). This court rejects
that argument ofthe plaintiffs.
There is no dispute that Mr. O'Neal paid $1,437,000.00 from his separate funds
on December 29, 1987 toward tax estimate(s) on behalf of Mr. O'Neal and Mrs.
O'Neal. After the tax estimate was paid the O'Neals determined that the estimate
was overstated and requested that the IRS apply $737,000.00 to Mr. O'Neal's
gift taxes and $700,000.00 to Mrs. O'Neal's gift taxes. This court concludes that
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this resulted, in substance, to a payment by Mr. O'Neal of $700,000.00 of Mrs.
O'Neal's gift taxes from his separate funds. This court further concludes that said
§ 1.6015(b)-I(b) has no application to the payment. It is clear that the section
pertains to the allocation of payments to the separate income tax returns of
spouses. It is not necessary for the court to determine whether some amount
would be due to be added to Mr. O'Neal's estate if a proportionate amount of the
estimate had been allocated to Mrs. O'Neal's separate income tax liability. Here,
it is clear that it was paid on her separate gift tax obligation and that the original
source was Mr. O'Neal's separate funds. The court concludes that the
$700,000.00 is due to be added to Mr. O'Neal's estate. The court's conclusion in
this regard also determines the issue of state income tax liability which this court
declares in favor of the Government.
Deduction of Donees' Claims
The Government makes several substantive arguments in opposition to the right
ofMr. O'Neal's estate to deduct any amounts for the claims of the donees. These
arguments include: (1) Any purported claims at the date of Mr. O'Neal's death
were so vague, uncertain, and speculative as to be non-deductible. (2) The value
of the claims as of the date of Mr. O'Neal's death would be zero because of one
of either of two facts: Using the same hypotheticals as proposed by the
plaintiffs, (a) the estate's probate assets would be exhausted by primary federal
gift tax claims having priority over all other claims, leaving no assets to pay
donee claims, or (b) the additional gift tax asserted on Mr. O'Neal's gifts would
be fully satisfied out of the estate's probate assets, so that no transferee liability
would be imposed on the donees and, thus, they would have no deductible
claims. (3) The Government further argues, even assuming that the donees'
claims have a value greater than zero, that any purported tax benefit to the estate
would be zero because, under 26 U.S.C. § 2035(b), the amount of any such
deduction would be offset by a corresponding increase in Mr. O'Neal's gross
estate.

***
The court has previously summarized the parties' positions with regard to the
donee liability deductions and will not totally repeat them here. The court will
refer to some of those positions in reaching its own conclusions. The court will
discuss the arguments in order.
(1) This court does not reach the issue of whether the claims are so vague,
uncertain and speculative as to not allow a deduction of donee claims. The court
does note that the plaintiffs' reliance on O'Neal I is not likely appropriate since it
related only to the date of valuation determination if a deduction is allowable.
The allowance of the deduction was not an issue in O'Neal I. Although this
court does not reach the issue of whether the claims of the donees at the time of
death were too speculative or uncertain to be deductible, it calls attention to the
case of Frank Armstrong, Jr. Trust ex reI. v. United States, 132 F. Supp 2d 421
(W.D. Va. 2001), atrd, 277 F.3d 490 (4th Cir. 2002). Further, while this court
does not specifically decide the issue of whether the donees' claims are
speculative and uncertain, it does note the following factors, some intermingled
with issues which this court does decide, which could reasonably lead, on some
later de novo review, to alternative reason(s) for granting summary judgment as
to the donees' claims.

First, the hypotheticals of the plaintiffs' experts may be so speculative as to
either be inadmissible or, at best, too uncertain to support donee claims
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deductions. Second, there is the uncertainty of whether any claims would have
ever been made against the donees by the Government since the gift tax claims
could have been made against the donor, the primary obligor, or his estate.
Third, the timing of the donees' filing of their claims with the Probate Court may
make them generally uncertain. Fourth, the above- referenced Sachs-type issue
may render the donees' claims uncertain and speculative. Fifth, there are the
uncertainties, if not absolute bars, raised by the attorneys for Mr. O'Neal's estate
and/or the attorneys for the donees in their letter dated November 26, 1991.
Sixth, Treasury Regulation § 20-2053-4 (1958) provides that claims are
deductible only to the extent that they represent "personal obligations of the
decedent existing at the time of his death." It may not be clear that the donees'
claims against Mr. O'Neal existed at the time of his death. Finally, but perhaps
not completely, the uncertainty of calculating the claims may make them
uncertain.
In a letter dated November 26, 1991, the attorneys for the plaintiffs and/or the
donees stated, "The reasons why the donees are not liable for an additional gift
tax on the 1987 gifts of O'Neal Steel, Inc. stock by Elizabeth O'Neal and
Kirkman O'Neal are too numerous for us to fully cover in this letter." The
attorneys then stated: "[T]he prior discussion of § 2504(c) reveals that there is
no transferee liability on any donee...." The attorneys added that "[ § 2504(c)]
clearly establishes that any taxes on these gifts must be determined based on the
values of those gifts reported in the gift tax returns filed with the government.
The gift taxes on these amounts were timely paid, therefore no deficiency or
liability could exist." These statements at least suggest uncertainty as to whether
there were certain, non-speculative donee claims at the time of Mr. O'Neal's'
death. Further, the continued disparities in appraisals suggest not only different
valuations, but also uncertainties.
(2) The court agrees with the Government's second argument as addressed
above. It should be considered axiomatic that if the Government, as asserted in
the plaintiffs' hypotheticals, was likely to redetermine gift tax liability, it was
also similarly likely to assert a primary claim against Mr. O'Neal's estate which
would either exhaust the estate or cause the gift tax liability to be collected from
the estate so as to eliminate donee liability.
The plaintiffs in a "now you see it, now you don't" argument assert that there
was a 90-100% chance of an audit leading to a gift tax liability of Mr. O'Neal's
estate of several million dollars. On the other hand, the plaintiffs would
apparently have the court determine that the IRS would not have pursued the
primary liability ofMr. O'Neal's estate, but would have relied solely on pursuing
the donees. In an extension of this "now you see it, and now you don't"
argument, the plaintiffs further suggest that, even now, Mr. O'Neal's estate
should be reduced by the amount of the hypothetical gift tax claim which it
acknowledges would not be collectible. The court concludes that the amount of
any alleged donee liability deduction would be zero. In so determining, the court
is not determining value,just that there could be no value.
(3) The court agrees with the logic and reasoning of Sachs and accepts the
Government's 26 U.S.C. § 2035(b) argument as an alternative reason for
disallowing the donee deductions. The plaintiffs argue that Sachs is not
applicable here because it involved a "net gift." The Eighth Circuit in Sachs
agreed with the Tax Court "that the donor of a net gift uses the donee as a
conduit for the payment of his tax liability, and '[a]s donor of a net gift, he may
be deemed to have paid the tax by ordering the donee to pay it over... .' 88 T.C.
at 778." There is no apparent substantive difference in gift tax liability (except in
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amount) being directly imposed by the donor and the gift tax liability being
imposed by law as the result of the donor's failure to pay the gift tax. Arguably,
the latter situation would create even a more logical reason to apply Sachs since
the donor has caused his primary liability to be imposed on the donee.
Summary
In O'Neal I, the court advised the trial court to use common sense. In a
somewhat different context, this court has attempted to use common sense,
logic, and controlling law to the extent that it can be determined. The court
ultimately concludes that: (1) The subject $700,000.00 paid on Mrs. O'Neal's
gift tax is due to be added to Mr. O'Neal's gross estate; (2) The state income tax
liability on Mr. O'Neal's estate tax return is due to be adjusted as argued by the
Government; and (3) Mr. O'Neal's estate will not be allowed deductions for any
of the asserted donee gift tax claims.
In FSA 200217022 the Service determined that an estate may deduct the entire amount it paid to settle a
wrongful death action. The Service stated:
With respect to whether post-death events may be considered in determining the
amount of a deduction under §§ 2053(a)(3), the Eleventh Circuit noted recently
in Estate of O'Neal v. Commissioner, 258 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2001), that
this area of law is generally governed by "two distinct and irreconcilable lines of
cases" namely, the cases that follow Ithaca Trust, and the cases that follow
Jacobs. The Commissioner's published position is that post-death events are
controlling in determining the amount that may be deducted as a claim against
the estate whether or not the claim is contested or contingent. Revenue Ruling
77-274 states that where the right to claim an amount is not fixed by the
deadline for filing the estate tax return, the taxpayer can protect his right to
claim the deduction by filing a protective claim on Form 843. Rev. Ru1. 77-274,
1977-2 C.B. 326. The Service has also ruled that regardless of the nature of the
claim, no deduction will be allowed for claims against the estate which have not
been paid or will not be paid because the creditor waives payment, fails to file
his claim within the prescribed time limit and under the conditions prescribed by
applicable local law, or otherwise fails to enforce payment. See Rev. Ru1. 60247, 1960-2 C.B. 272 (denying a deduction for an otherwise valid claim which
became void and uncollectible after the date of death by virtue of
noncompliance with a state statute of limitations on filing probate claims). See
also Rev. Ru1. 75-24,1975 C.B. 306, and Rev. Ru1. 75-177,1975-1 C.B. 307.
Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have either held or noted that where
the claim is contested, contingent, or unenforceable on the date of death, post
death events are considered in determining the allowable deduction. Propstra v.
United States, 680 F.2d 1248, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The law is clear that postdeath events are relevant when computing the deduction to be taken for disputed
or contingent claims."), Gowetz v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1963),
in Taylor v. Commissioner, 39 T.e. 371 (1962) (denying a deduction for a
contested claim for a marital settlement rendered unenforceable by a spouse's
remarriage); Estate of Van Home v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 728, 734 (1982),
aff'd, 720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980 (1984) (noting
in dicta that post-death events are relevant in cases where the claims are
potential, unmatured, contingent, or contested at the date of death); Estate of
Courtney v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 317 (1974) (denying a deduction for
mortgages that were never presented to the estate); Estate of Cafaro v.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-348 (limiting deductions for contested
business debts existing at the date of death to amounts actually paid).
The Ninth Circuit decision in Propstra involved lien claims against an estate that
had been compromised for a lesser amount. Although the government argued to
the contrary, the court found that at the date of death, the estate had no colorable
defense to the claims, and the claimant did not have the ability to compromise
the claim. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1254. The court, citing Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2053l(b)(3), stated that the preliminary determination to be made was the nature of
lien claims against the estate. Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1253. The court then held
that "as a matter of law, when claims are for sums certain and are legally
enforceable as of the date of death, post-death events are not relevant in
computing the permissible deduction." Propstra, 680 F.2d at 1254. However, the
court noted in dicta that "[t]he law is clear that post-death events are relevant
when computing the deduction to be taken for disputed and contingent claims."
!d. at 1253. Based upon the facts, the court determined that the lien claims were
certain and enforceable at the time of death, and therefore the post-death
compromise of the claim could not be considered in determining the amount of
the deduction.
Estate of Van Home involved an undisputed spousal support obligation
calculated by using actuarial tables. The obligation was terminated after four
monthly payments when the recipient died. In Van Home the Ninth Circuit
makes clear that its holding is limited to "certain and enforceable" claims. The
government argued that the spousal support obligations were not a "sum certain"
and therefore should not be governed by the rule enunciated in Propstra. The
court disagreed and held that, "legally enforceable claims valued by reference to
an actuarial table meet the test of certainty for estate tax purposes." Van Home,
nOF.2dat 1117.
In the present case, appeal will lie to the Ninth Circuit. The claims filed by Wife,
Daughter and Son with the executor of Decedent's estate were denied by the
estate. In addition, the estate actively contested the subsequent litigation. The
estate appears to have had affirmative defenses to the suit filed by Family. We
believe that, based upon the Ninth Circuit's dicta in Propstra and Van Horne,
the Ninth Circuit would hold in this case that post-death events are relevant in
computing the permissible §§ 2053(a)(3) deduction because the claims in this
case were disputed and contingent. Based upon published Service position and
the Ninth Circuit's guidance in this area, the estate's deduction should be limited
to the amounts eventually paid in settlement of the claims. The estate,
accordingly, may deduct $w as a claim against the estate under §§ 2053(a)(3).
2.

Closely-Held Company Stock. At issue in Okerlund v. United States, 53 Fed.C!. 341 (2002) was

the lack of marketability discount, and the value of non-voting stock. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc. (SSE) was
capitalized with 99.98% non-voting stock and 0.2% voting stock.

Mr. Schwan, founder and CEO, died

unexpectedly on May 9, 1993 and about two-thirds of the SSE's stock went to a foundation. 16.69% of the voting
stock was held in a great-great grandchildren's trust (3G Trust) as well. Various gifts were made in 1992 and 1994:
Marvin Schwan's four children and three of their spouses, Lorrie
Schwan-Okerlund (Lorrie) and her husband Jeffrey Okerlund (Jeffrey), David J.
Schwan (David) and his wife Diane (Diane), Paul M. Schwan (Paul) and his
wife Christine H.M. Weigel-Schwan (Christine), and Mark D. Schwan (Mark)
established separate trusts on December 31, 1992 for the primary benefit of their
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respective children. Plaintiffs Lorrie, David and Paul each transferred as gifts
50,000 shares of nonvoting stock to their respective trusts, splitting their gifts
with their spouses pursuant to § 2513 Mark, electing not to split his gift,
transferred only 25,000 shares of SSE which were previously distributed to the
Schwan children by Marvin Schwan's previously established trusts. Plaintiffs
obtained a valuation of the SSE stock from Business Valuation Consultants
(Gray) in June 1993. Based on Gray's per share value of $24.03, each plaintiff
filed a gift tax return which reported a gift of $600,750, a unified credit of
$192,800, a Generation-Skipping Tax (GST) exemption of $600,750, and a tax
of$277.
In 1996, Willamette Management Associates (Willamette) provided plaintiffs
with a lower value for SSE minority shares in connection with federal district
court litigation involving a dispute between the Schwan children and SSE over
the redemption of stock after Marvin Schwan's death in 1993. The matter was
ultimately settled, and the nonvoting stock sold back to SSE at a value of$26.00
per share in 1997. The Willamette appraisal reported a value of$17.40 per share
for the valuation date of December 31, 1992. As a result of this reduced
appraisal from $24.03 to $17.40 per share, in July 1996, the plaintiffs filed for a
Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement with the IRS, seeking restoration
of their respective unified credits in the amount of $59, 100, a restoration of their
respective GST exemptions in the amount of $165,760 each, and a gift tax
refund of $277.

***
In January 1994, Lorrie, Mark, David and Paul each transferred $650,000 in
cash to the Marvin M. Schwan 1992 Grandchildren's Irrevocable Trust.
Accordingly, in April 1995, each plaintiff filed with the IRS a gift tax return
reporting the $650,000 cash transfers. Lorrie, David and Paul consented to split
their gifts with their spouses pursuant to § 2513. As a result, Lorrie, Jeffrey,
David, Diane, Paul and Christine each reported GST exemptions in the amount
of $325,000 for their 1994 gifts and $600,750 for their prior 1992 gifts. Each of
their taxable gifts for 1994 and prior periods totaled $925,750.
In December 1994, Lorrie also transferred 1,000 shares of nonvoting SSE stock
to two separate trusts established for her children. Lorrie and Jeffrey reported
the value of the 2,000 shares of nonvoting capital stock as $12.51 per share and
a tax liability of $123,765. In October 1995, Lorrie and Jeffrey each submitted
another gift tax return which added the $12,510 gift, representing the 1,000
share transfer in 1994, for a total taxable gift of$938,260.
In July 1996, plaintiffs filed claims for refund with respect to their 1994 gift tax
returns, based on the adjustments reported in their 1992 claims for refund.
Specifically, the 1994 refund claims stated that the 1992 transfers of SSE
nonvoting stock were overvalued by $165,750 per transfer, based on the 1992
Willamette appraisal of$17.40 per share, resulting in a reduction from $925,750
to $760,000 in the total individual taxable gifts for 1992. The 1994 claims for
refund reflected a revised gift tax liability of $59,400. Accordingly, each
plaintiff's claim sought a gift tax refund of$64,365.
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Dr. Pratt (and Willamette) was the taxpayer's expert and Dr. Spiro (and AVG) was the government's
expert. With respect to the lack of marketability, the opinion states:
Both experts relied on two sources of empirical data for aid in quantifying the
discount for lack of marketability: (1) discounts on sales of restricted shares of
publicly traded companies; and (2) discounts on private transactions prior to
initial public offerings (IPO's). Based on these studies, and an examination of
the perceived risks facing a potential investor in SSE stock, Dr. Pratt concluded
that a 45 percent discount for lack of marketability was appropriate, and Dr.
Spiro concluded that a 30 percent discount was justified.
Dr. Pratt's expert reports contain a far more detailed analysis of the empirical
studies of trading prices of restricted shares and pre-initial public offering
transactions than the AVG Report. The eight independent studies of restricted
stock transactions reviewed in the Willamette Reports reported average
discounts ranging from 25 to 45 percent. According to Dr. Pratt. the two most
important factors in determining the size of the discount were the amount of
dividends paid (more dividends are associated with a lower discount for lack of
marketability) and the perceived holding period (the longer the holding period
the greater the discount for lack of marketability). (Tr. at 71-72.) The second
major line of studies, involving pre-IPO transactions, observed discounts
averaging approximately 45 to 47 percent.18 (Tr. at 74.) Unlike the AVG
Report, the Willamette Report considered the pre-IPO studies more relevant for
the purpose of determining the appropriate discount for lack of marketability.
According to Dr. Pratt, the discounts observed in restricted stock studies reflect
the existence of a public market for the stock once the temporary restrictions
lapse. For a variety of reasons, including an increasing number of transactions
under Rule 144(a), which relaxes some of the restrictions, thus making the
restricted securities more marketable, purchasers of restricted stock "generally
expect to be able to resell the stock in the public market in the foreseeable
future." (1. Ex. 508, at 78.) Pre-IPO discounts, on the other hand, are based on
purely private transactions before a company enters the public market, a
situation more comparable to closely held companies such as SSE. (Tr. at 205.)
A total discount that "is only slightly above the averages of the discounts
observed in the pre-IPO transactions" is appropriate, according to Dr. Pratt,
because SSE stock, unlike the stock observed in the pre-IPO studies, had no
prospect of an initial public offering (Tr. at 74, 205.)
The AVG Report's discussion of lack of marketability discounts relies on a
smaller number of studies of restricted stock and pre-IPO transaction prices. The
restricted stock studies cited in the AVG Report revealed discounts ranging from
10 to 90 percent, with an average discount of at least 35 percent (Def's Ex.
1003, at 62- 63.), while the pre-IPO study cited reported mean and median
discounts of 45 percent. The AVG Report concluded that the discount rate
observed by the major pre-IPO study cited may be overstated because it reflects
factors not reflected in insider transaction prices. For example, "a company's
value may increase significantly leading up to the stock offering, due to the
greater growth prospects typically associated with access to public capital as
well as the prevailing market demand for public offerings." (Def. 's Ex. 1603, at
63.) This argument supports a higher discount for marketability for SSE stock
than that observed in the pre-IPO study for the reason articulated by Dr. Pratt
with respect to restricted stock studies. There is no public market for SSE Stock,
and the company does not contemplate entering the public market in the future.

A-64

t

Chief among the factors weighing in favor of a higher than average discount
rate, in Dr. Pratt's view, are shareholder risks in the form of restrictive stock
transfer provisions, and the provisions of Marvin Schwan's estate plan. The
company by-laws contain a restrictive stock transfer provision in the form of a
ninety day right-of-fIrst-refusal, which Dr. Pratt viewed as a deterrent to
investment and Dr. Spiro dismissed as a "red herring" because he believed it
would not impede long-term investment. (Tr. at 318.)
Two restrictions triggered by Marvin Schwan's death would, according to Dr.
Pratt, have a far greater impact on investment in SSE. First, the 3G Trust would
severely impinge upon SSE stock liquidity because the 3G Trust held the
controlling share of SSE voting stock for three generations, amounting to almost
200 years in perpetuity. Second, Marvin Schwan's estate plan required the
implementation of an agreement between the company and the Foundation
whereby the Foundation received 5.076 shares of voting common stock and
25,910,000 shares of non-voting common stock owned by the Marvin Schwan
Revocable Trust. SSE was then required to redeem the stock from the
Foundation. The redemption agreement, once triggered by Marvin Schwan's
death and the implementation of his estate plan, would increase the company's
indebtedness by approximately $869 million, thereby rendering the company
highly leveraged and hindering its ability to grow through acquisitions. Dr. Pratt
opined that the ninety day right of fIrst refusal and the 200-year holding period
imposed by the 3G Trust would make SSE stock unattractive to investors (Tr. at
49,87).
Based on his discussions with SSE management, Dr. Pratt identifIed additional
shareholder risks affecting the discount for lack of marketability. First and
foremost, with one exception, SSE had never paid dividends to shareholders and
had no intention of paying dividends in the foreseeable future, thereby closing
off one means of obtaining a return on an investment. Members of management
communicated to Dr. Pratt that SSE would remain a closely-held company and
had no intention of either pursuing a third party sale or public offering, in
accordance with the express wishes of Marvin Schwan. Dr. Pratt's interviews
further revealed that the shareholders did not have easy access to company
information because SSE management did not readily provide an annual report
to the shareholders. Based on these factors, Dr. Pratt's determined that there was
no real market for SSE's stock.
Dr. Spiro also identifIed specifIc factors influencing the applicable liquidity
discount, which reflects the inability to convert the fair market value of an
investment to its cash equivalent value.20 According to the AVG Report, the
factors suggesting a liquidity discount at the low end of the applicable range
included SSE's high profItability and strong sales and earnings growth and the
company's competitive position and favorable economic outlook. Recognizing
that highly competitive nature of the food industry, the AVG Report
nevertheless considered SSE's unique distribution system an advantage, and
believed that SSE was well-positioned as an established leading supplier of
prepared foods for future growth. (Def.'s Ex. 1003, at 54.)
Balanced against these advantages, the AVG Report identifIed three major
factors that would make investment in SSE relatively unattractive to an investor,
and thus increase the applicable liquidity discount: 1] the lack of dividend
payment history, 2] SSE's relative lack of management depth and dependence
on Marvin Schwan, and 3] the company's right offrrst refusal with regard to the
purchase of SSE shares. Unlike Dr. Pratt, who found the restrictive stock
transfer provision a very signifIcant deterrent to an investor, Dr. Spiro concluded
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that the 90 day right of ftrst refusal period should "only cause a minor increase
in the applicable liquidity discount" because "a potential investor would
consider an equity interest in SSE to be a long-term investment."21 (Defs Ex.
1003, at 55.)
Dr. Spiro attached minimal if any signiftcance to the redemption agreement on
the ground that it was not in effect as of December 31, 1992. Instead of viewing
the 3G Trust as a major deterrent to investment, Dr. Spiro hypothesized that
shareholders of SSE stock would not tolerate the tying up of a controlling
majority of voting shares for three generations. Dr. Spiro opined that later
generations are often "no longer interested in the company," but are "interested
in receiving the rewards;" therefore, the trustees of the 3G Trust would "have an
obligation to serve their interests" that might force Schwan to either " merge
with another company or go public" to create liquid assets for the 3G
beneftciaries. (Tr. at 331.) Consequently, Dr. Spiro concluded that the 3G Trust
was not a relevant factor affecting SSE's marketability.
The Court ftnds Dr. Pratt's analysis of the appropriate discount for lack of
marketability more persuasive than that of the government's expert. First, Dr.
Spiro's speculation about the pressure to go public created by the 3G Trust may
not be considered under the objective standard applicable to valuation of closely
held stock. _The court is precluded from considering imaginary scenarios as to
"who a purchaser might be, how long the purchaser would be willing to wait
without any return on his investment, and what combinations the purchaser
might be able to effect with [] children or grandchildren and what improvements
in management of a highly successful company an outsider purchaser might
suggest." Estate of Simplot v. Comm'r 249 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2001). Dr.
Spiro's imaginary scenario, however plausible, may not be considered in valuing
what a hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller would pay for closely held
stock. Second, the factors identifted in the AVG Report that weigh against a
high liquidity discount relating to company performance and competitiveness
were already taken into account in determining the appropriate pricing multiples
under the market approach. Thus, the re-emphasis of these factors in the
liquidity discount analysis may result in overstatement. Finally, the Court ftnds
Dr. Pratt's analysis of the relevant empirical studies and shareholder risks more
persuasive than the AVG report's rather truncated analysis. In particular, the
Court is persuaded that the Marvin Schwan estate plan provisions would deter
investment to a greater extent than Dr. Spiro suggests.
However, rather than accepting Dr. Pratt's estimate of 45 percent, the Court
holds that a 40 percent discount for lack of marketability is warranted for the
December 31, 1992 valuation date. The Court agrees that the company's
dividend payment history, restrictive stock transfer provision, the 3G Trust and
the redemption agreement constitute signiftcant deterrents to investment because
of the restraints they impose on short or long term returns. However, in 1992 the
estate plan provisions, although in place, had neither been triggered nor
anticipated in the immediate future. In other words, they were prospective
concerns rather than actual concerns as of the 1992 valuation date. It is
well-established that" valuation of the stock must be made as of the relevant
dates without regard to events occurring subsequent to the crucial dates." Bader
v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 833, 840 (S.D. 111. 1959); accord Hermes
Consol., Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 398, 415, n. 28 (1988), Ferns v. United
States, 223 Ct. Cl. 488, 620 F.2d 255, 264 n. 6 (1980), Central Trust Co. v.
United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 504, 305 F.2d 393, 403 (1962).22 In 1992, the major
shareholder risks identifted in the Willamette Report, and in Dr. Pratt's
testimony, were in place, but had not yet been triggered by Marvin Schwan's
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death. The difference between potential versus actual deterrents to investment
supports a 5 percent disparity between the appropriate discount for lack of
marketability in 1992 (40 percent) and in 1994 (45 percent).
The court also allowed a discount for a lack of voting rights:
The Court accepts the shared view of the experts that a 5 percent discount for
lack of voting rights is justified. A prospective buyer usually will pay a premium
for shares with voting power or seek a discount for nonvoting shares. Wallace v.
United States, 566 F. Supp. 904, 917 (D. Mass. 1981) (voting shares appraised
at a 5 percent premium over nonvoting shares). SSE's capital structure reflects a
great disparity between the number of voting and nonvoting shares (7,610 voting
to 38,550,000) issued by the company. Where there is a skewed distribution
between the two classes of stock, the voting shares are at a premium. Based on
their review of empirical studies, and other relevant literature, which observed
lack of voting rights discounts ranging from 4 to 5.44 percent (in Dr. Spiro's
report) and from 3 to 10 percent (in Dr. Pratt's report), both experts applied a 5
percent discount, which the Court adopts as well-founded.
In Johann T. Hess v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-251, the Tax Court allowed a 15% minority interest,
and 25% lack of marketability, discount when valuing a 10% interest in a C corporation involved in manufacturing.
In Estate of Mildred Green v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-348, the Court valued 5% of a C corporation bank,
which was the fifth largest block of stock, allowing a 17% minority interest discount and 35% lack of marketability
discount.
The Federal Circuit has affirmed the Court of Federal Claims in Okerlund v. United States, 365 F.3d 1044
(C.A. Fed. 2004). The opinion states:
The Plaintiffs contend that the Court of Federal Claims' failure to consider SSE's
actual earnings results in 1993 and 1994 in assessing the 1992 valuation is a
legal error subject to de novo review, while the Court of Federal Claims'
underassessment of the significance of one particular risk factor -- the potential
triggering of the Redemption Agreement -- is a clearly erroneous factual
determination.

***
The Plaintiffs did not point to a single case suggesting that the failure to
consider subsequent events constitutes legal error. Furthermore, and contrary to
the Plaintiffs' contention, the relationship between Dr. Spiro's projections
[taxpayer's expert] and SSE's actual performance supports the reasonableness of
those projections. Dr. Spiro's projections of both revenues and gross profits were
off by about 5% for 1993 and by less than 10% for 1994. Given the number of
exogenous low-probability high-risk events that intervened, Dr. Spiro's
projections appear to have been highly reliable and based upon reasonable
assumptions. The closest that the Plaintiffs come to precedent supporting their
assertion that the Court of Federal Claims was required to consider ex post
information lies in our rejection of the Claims Court's proposed bright-line test
excluding ex post information. Krapf, 977 F.2d at 1459. In Krapf,
[t]he Claims Court [had] ruled that the valuation of closely held stock
must generally be made without reference to events which occur after
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the date of the donation. As "exceptions" to this general "rule," the
Claims Court further stated that post-donation data may be used in
valuation only where: (1) no material change of circumstances or
conditions in the corporation has occurred between the time of donation
and the time of the post-donation evidence, or (2) the post-donation
changes could have been foreseen at the time of the donation.
Id. at 1458. On appeal, we declined to
adopt the Claims Court view that there is an exclusionary rule with two
exceptions respecting admissibility of evidence of post-donation data
and events. The question respecting such evidence may involve its
relevancy, i.e., its admissibility, but more usually the question is the
evidence's probative value. The post-transaction evidence must always
be proffered, of course, in support of rmding the value of the stock on
the donative date. Evidence of post-transaction events mayor may not
be relevant depending on what events are sought to be proved. Where
there was a series of arms length sales at the same price before and
after the donation, such evidence might well give rise to an inference
that the gift had the same value and, thus, would be admissible. Such a
situation would likely fit into the second "exception" noted by the
Claims Court, but we conclude that the "rule" of exclusion is simply the
usual rule of relevancy. Further, even if relevant, the evidence may
have little probative value. On the other hand, evidence of a post- gift
sale price may give rise to an inference of the stock's earlier value, in
light of other circumstantial evidence.
rd. at 1459. The valuation ofa closely held company is an inexact science (some
might sayan art), and relevant probative evidence should never be ignored. It
would be absurd to rule an arms- length stock sale made moments after a gift of
that same stock inadmissible as post-valuation date data -- as we noted in Krapf,
id. The key to the use of any data in a valuation remains that all evidence must
be proffered in support of finding the value of the stock on the donative date. Id.
The present matter could hardly differ more from the circumstances that we
anticipated in Krapf. Here, a number of exogenous shocks befell SSE shortly
after the December 31, 1992 valuation date. Dr. Pratt's 1992 Willamette report
correctly identified both the reliance on a key executive and the possibility of
contamination as risk factors relevant to valuation. All of the proffered
valuations incorporate them accordingly: the selection of guideline companies
implies that SSE's risk of contamination was about the same as that of its
competitors, and the discount attributed to the small management team
incorporated the risk to SSE oflosing part of that team.
Had SSE gone public or engaged in a number of arms-length transactions
between the valuation date and the occurrence of these exogenous events, the
prices of those transactions might have been deemed relevant and probative -- at
least as sanity checks on the assumptions underlying the valuation models. But
the occurrence of intervening events, or for that matter of even less probable
unforeseen events, reduces the probative value of subsequent transactions. Even
an arms-length sale of SSE made after Marvin's death would have represented a
valuation of a company that differed in a significant manner from the one valued
on December 31, 1992.
Our holding in Krapf was correct. Valuation must always be made as of the
donative date relying primarily on ex ante information; ex post data should be
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used sparingly. As with all evidentiary submissions, however, the critical
question is relevance. The closer the profile of the later-date company to that of
the valuation-date company, the more likely ex post data are to be relevant
(though even in some cases, they may not be). The greater the significance of
exogenous or unforeseen events occurring between the valuation date and the
date of the proffered evidence, the less likely ex post evidence is to be relevant-even as a sanity check on the assumptions underlying a valuation model. Krapf
provides no support for the Plaintiffs' assertion that the Court of Federal Claims
erred in excluding SSE's 1993 and 1994 performance from its 1992 valuation.
At issue in Estate of Helen A. Deputy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-176, was the value of 99% of a
family owned corporation, Godfrey Conveyor Co., Inc., owned by a family partnership. The Tax Court accepted the
opinion of the government expert (Mr. Burns) that the income approach was the best valuation approach for a
"long-established, financially successful, closely-held operating company that has shown consistent profit and
growth."
With respect to discounts, the opinion states:
Respondent's expert, Mr. Bums, concluded that no minority discount should be
used to compute decedent's interest in the property. He reached that conclusion
on the basis of his expedient logic that the exclusive use of capitalized earnings
and the income method in the valuation would result in treating all interests in
the entity equally. In other words, he concluded that minority interests would
receive the same percentage return on their investment as a majority interest.
Mr. Bums did, however, employ a 25-percent marketability discount. To
compute the discounted value, Mr. Burns began with his $30,740,869 income
method valuation of Godfrey and calculated that a 19.99-percent interest
resulted in an undiscounted value of $6,145,100. After applying a 25-percent
marketability discount of $1,536,275, he arrived at his discounted fair market
value of$4,608,825.
Mr. Bums relied on two different studies that surveyed restricted stock
transactions of otherwise publicly traded stock. Based on those studies and his
analysis, Mr. Burns concluded that a 25-percent marketability discount was
appropriate for the 19.99- percent interest in Godfrey. One study, which was
conducted by FAIR MARKET VALUE Opinions, Inc., surveyed restricted stock
transactions from 1979 through 1992 and resulted in a mean discount of 23
percent. A second study, conducted by Management Planning, Inc. (MPI), with
respect to restricted stock transactions occurring from 1980 through 1995,
resulted in an average discount of 19.4 percent for companies with revenues
ranging from $50 million to $100 million. In the MPI study, the share prices
paid in private placements of restricted stock were compared with the same
company's freely traded market price. After considering those studies, Mr.
Burns arrived at a 25- percent discount to account for "the fact that an interest in
Godfrey * * * would likely not be able to be sold immediately."
The estate's expert, Mr. Dorman, reached the conclusion that the 19.99-percent
interest in Godfrey should be discounted by 44 percent to account for the
minority interest and marketability limitations. He calculated a discounted value
of $1,941,000 by dividing his $17,341,379 adjusted net asset value by 938 (the
number of Godfrey shares outstanding) to arrive at an $18,488-per-share value.
He then multiplied the per-share value by 187.5 (the number of shares being
valued) to arrive at an undiscounted value of $3,466,427. By applying the
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44-percent discount ($1,525,228) for lack of marketability and the minority
interest, Mr. Dorman arrived at a discounted value of $1,941,199, which he
rounded to $1,941,000.
Mr. Dorman's combined 44-percent minority interest and lack of marketability
discount was derived by use of a matrix table devised by his company. The table
is divided into six rating factors, which Mr. Dorman believes "replicate an
investor's decision process." The table has values (amounts of percentage
discount) assigned to each of five categories (descending from good to poor) for
each of the six factors. The matrix also has built-in indexing to place more
emphasis on some categories over others. For purposes of our analysis and
clarification, we replicate the table used by Mr. Dorman with the final column
showing the percentage discount he assigned with respect to the 19.99-percent
interest in Godfrey:

***
The first category of the matrix rates the subject's financial information
availability and reliability with a range from one discount point for the best to
five discount points for the poorest condition. Mr. Dorman selected an
above-average 2-percent rating, noting that Godfrey had available financial
statements that were audited by independent public accounts. It is enigmatic that
Mr. Dorman would assign a less than favorable rating under these
circumstances. Moreover, there is no reason provided as to why any discount
should be attributable here, where the subject has ample and quality financial
information available. Accordingly, we do not attribute any discount to this
factor.
The scale provided to rate investment size is an arithmetic progression by 2,
starting with one and proceeding to eight discount points. Mr. Dorman explains
that this adjustment is made to reflect the premise that the larger the necessary
capital investment, the less likely a buyer would be willing to place it at risk.
Because Mr. Dorman reached a $3,466,000 undiscounted value for the 187.5
shares in Godfrey, he considered the investment quite large and therefore
assigned six discount points to this aspect. We view this aspect as one of the
considerations associated with the risk factor in investing in a minority interest
in a closely held family corporation. It would be reasonable to assess six
discount points for this factor.
The third category concerns Godfrey's financial outlook, management, and
growth potential, and the scale is another arithmetic progression by 2. However,
it starts with 2 and proceeds to 10 discount points. Here Mr. Dorman indicates
that Godfrey has had some sales fluctuation, but that operating expenses have
shown continuous and steady decline, and that the short-term fmancial
information indicates an improving trend. The record here reflects a much more
positive picture of Godfrey's financial record and prospects. Accordingly, we
consider Mr. Dorman's evaluation to be too conservative.
From another perspective, the financial outlook category should ostensibly be
addressing the potential for return on invested capital. In that regard, the sixth
category of the matrix more directly addresses that aspect and assigns as much
as 14 discount points for that aspect. The third category appears, in that respect,
to be a duplication. Mr. Dorman has given an "above average" rating, assigning
4 discount points to the third category. In any event, Godfrey's fmancial picture
is such that we would assign no discount for that aspect.
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Ability to control is the fourth category, and Mr. Donnan assigns a median
discount of 10 in an arithmetic progression by 5, ranging from 0 to 20. His
reasoning is that the 187.5 shares "represents 20 percent of the outstanding
common stock, and is therefore the second largest holding out of approximately
twenty shareholders." He concludes that the investor would not have control but
"would enjoy swing power, and have a strong voice in the day-to-day operations
and decision making of the company." We agree with Mr. Donnan's use of 10
discount points for lack of ability to control.
In the fifth category, which concerns restrictions on transfer and anticipated
holding period, Mr. Donnan selected a median 8 discount points in an arithmetic
progression by 3, ranging from 2 to 14. His conclusion is based on a holding
period of 5 years or more. Mr. Donnan stated that "To the best of * * * [his]
knowledge at the present time, there is no likelihood that Godfrey * * * will be
sold within the foreseeable future." We agree that there would be restrictions
and possible delay in a sale of an interest in a family-owned entity as opposed to
a publicly traded stock. The record before us, however, does not reflect that the
holding period would be extended for 5 years or more, or that there are any
particular difficulties in connection with the Deputy family. Accordingly, five
discount points would be more appropriate to reflect the restriction situation in
these cases.
Finally, the sixth category, which addresses dividend payout history, seems to
address the return on capital factor. In this category, Mr. Donnan selected the
poorest rating of 14 discount points from an arithmetic progression by 3, ranging
from 2 to 14. His reason for the rating is that Godfrey has not paid any dividends
and it is unlikely that any will be paid in the future. However, the actual
payment of dividends is not the sole measure. The potential to pay dividends
must also be considered. A return may also be expected in the form of increase
in the value of the investment or potential for capital gain. In other words,
prospective earning power is important. See sec. 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs.;
Rev. Rul. 59-60,1959-1 c.B. 237.
Mr. Donnan's analysis completely ignores any potential for gain due to increase
in value. Godfrey's financial performance and future prospects would likely
result in an increase in the investment value. The lack of dividends, when
factored with the prospect of capital appreciation, would place Godfrey's return
potential more in the middle range. Accordingly, 8 discount points would seem a
better match than the 14 discount points attributed by Mr. Dorman to this aspect.
Using the matrix as a guide, we would have arrived at a sum of 29 percent after
considering the six factors. Factoring in the studies cited in the reports of the
experts, considering the record in these cases, and recognizing the imprecise
nature of the process in which we are engaged, we hold that a 30-percent
discount is appropriate to reflect the lack of marketability and minority
discounts connected with the 187.5 shares of Godfrey. Accordingly, we hold
that the 187.5 shares of Godfrey had a discounted value of $3,358,20912 on
September 15, 1997, the date of decedent's death.
Counsel for the taxpayer stated to this writer that, "We were pleased with the outcome in Deputy. The IRS
expert was very good. The FLP discounts agreed to were 35% for the lifetime gifts and 30% for the estate. The
estate included a .5% general partnership interest and a 75% limited partnership interest. The notice of deficiency
included a Section 2036 argument which was abandoned before trial."
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3.

Discounting Other Assets For Built-In Income Taxes. The Tax Court of New Jersey rejected

the argument that an IRA should be valued "net" of income taxes in Carlin v. Director, 2001 WL 1677449 (N.J.
Tax):
New Jersey Transfer Inheritance Tax is computed "upon the clear market value
of the property transferred" subject to certain specific deductions, none of which
expressly includes income tax liability, "and no others." N.J.S.A. 54:34-5.
Plaintiff contends that his claimed reduction in the taxable value of the IRA is
not a *547 deduction under N.J.S.A. 54:34-5. He characterizes the reduction as a
discount in value resulting from the income tax liability inherent in the IRA.
Defendant responds that plaintiff's attempt to reduce the taxable value of the
IRA represents an effort to take a deduction not permitted by N.J.S.A. 54:34-5
and further contends that, even if the reduction in taxable value is treated as a
discount to clear market value, the discount is not allowable under In re Estate
ofRomnes, supra 79 N.J. 139,398 A.2d 543.
The Romnes decision is critical to the determination of this appeal. Accordingly,
a detailed explanation and analysis of that decision is warranted. There, the
executors of the estate of Haakon I. Romnes sought a reduction, based on
income tax liability, in the value for Transfer Inheritance Tax purposes of an
annuity providing annual fixed income payments to the decedent's widow for
the duration of her life. The fund from which the annuity was to be paid was
accumulated during the decedent's lifetime from contributions to a pension plan
by his employer. Income taxes on contributions to the fund were deferred, and,
as a result, the annual annuity payments to Mrs. Romnes were subject to federal
income tax. The estate argued that, as of the date of death, the deferred tax
obligation was a burden upon the annuity payments to be received by Mrs.
Romnes, and reduced their value. "Otherwise expressed, it is argued that since
Mrs. Romnes will never enjoy in a beneficial sense that portion of her annuity
payments that must be devoted to paying income taxes, she should not now be
required to pay an inheritance tax upon what she will never beneficially
receive." Id. at 143, 398 A.2d 543. The estate sought a value discount equal to
the taxes payable by Mrs. Romnes with respect to the annuity payments,
assuming each payment was added to her other income.
In analyzing the estate's argument, the Supreme Court defined "clear market
value" under N.J.S.A. 54:34-5 as the equivalent of fair market value, that is, the
price which would be paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller when neither is
under compulsion to buy or sell and both parties have reasonable knowledge of
the relevant facts. Id. at 144-45, 398 A.2d 543. The Court commented that, in
determining the clear market value of assets for which there is not an active
market, a court must "create a hypothetical buyer and a hypothetical seller,
whom we then place in a hypothetical market place. We attribute to each of
these persons all information which might affect value, and then, weighing all
relevant factors, decide how they would reach a price satisfactory to each." Id. at
145, 398 A.2d 543. This price or value must be determined objectively without
consideration of any factors personal to either the hypothetical buyer or the
hypothetical seller. "The use of an objective standard necessarily precludes
resort to any factors personal to the seller or the buyer. Courts have consistently
so held." Id. at 147,398 A.2d 543.
In applying these principles to the annuity in question, the Supreme Court
concluded that neither a hypothetical seller nor a hypothetical buyer would be
concerned with Mrs. Romnes' tax liability.
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A hypothetical purchaser of such an income interest as this annuity
would be interested in the annuitant's health, in her life style, and in the
solvency of the payor. ... He would be utterly unconcerned with the
annuitant's personal income tax picture.
Nor would a hypothetical seller, about to divest himself of the income
interest, be concerned in any way with a presumptive future liability he
would never be called upon to meet. As soon as he divested himself of
the interest, the prospective future liability would cease to exist. The
same would be true if Mrs. Romnes herself is thought of as the seller.
She would have no interest in a prospective liability that was about to
end.
Finally, is there any even remote possibility that Mrs. Romnes would
accept as the purchase price of her annuity the amount of money that
she asks the State of New Jersey to accept as being the value of this
asset? There is of course no such possibility.
[Id. at 148-49,398 A.2d 543.]
The Court also noted that the result of permitting a valuation discount calculated
in the manner suggested by the estate would be that the wealthier the recipient,
the greater the tax liability attributable to the annuity (because of the graduated
tax rates under the Internal Revenue Code) and, therefore, the greater the
discount in value which would be claimed.
Thus it would follow that the rich would pay a smaller [transfer
inheritance] tax than the less affluent and the very rich less than the
rich. This rather startling result must again rest upon presumed
legislative intent. But of course neither this nor any other tax statute has
ever been intentionally drafted to classify taxpayers according to wealth
and then impose graduated taxes in such a way that the richest pay the
least.
[Id. at 153,398 A.2d 543.]

***
The law is well established that each taxpayer should pay his or her fair share of
taxes. See Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 8 N.J.Tax
354, 358-59 (1986). If Transfer Inheritance Taxes are reduced on a purely
artificial or hypothetical basis, without taking into account the actual amount
that will be received by the beneficiary, then the beneficiary may pay less than
his or her fair share of taxes, or may pay excessive taxes. Calculating a proper
valuation discount, therefore, must involve consideration of the actual tax
circumstances of the beneficiary. However, consideration of those circumstances
results in a deviation from the objective standard of value applicable for
purposes of determining Transfer Inheritance Tax. In re Estate of Romnes,
supra, 79 N.J. at 147, 398 A.2d 543.
Plaintiff is correct in asserting that, without a discount in the value of the IRA,
he will pay Transfer Inheritance Tax on a portion of the IRA which must be
used to pay federal and New Jersey income taxes. There appears to be some
degree of unfairness in this result. But, as the preceding analysis demonstrates,
allowing a discount based on income tax liability is not appropriate for two
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reasons: 1) determining the proper discount requires abandonment of the
objective standard of value, because calculating income tax liability without
regard to the actual tax circumstances of the beneficiary could result in an
excessive or inadequate discount, and 2) the Romnes decision precludes such a
discount.
In TAM 200247001 the IRS agreed. The TAM states:
In Estate of Robinson v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 222 (1977), during her lifetime,
the decedent sold stock in exchange for a promissory note. The decedent
properly elected to report the gain on this sale ratably as each payment was
received, under the installment method pursuant to section 453. The decedent
died before the note was satisfied. In determining the value of the note
includible in the gross estate, Decedent's executor discounted the note to reflect
the potential income taxes that would be payable on receipt of subsequent
installment payments. The court concluded that under the "willing buyer-willing
seller" standard of the regulations, property is to be valued at the price a
hypothetical willing buyer would pay a willing seller and not the intrinsic value
of the property in the hands of the individual decedent or his beneficiaries. In
this case, on purchase of the note, a willing buyer's basis in the note would be
increased to the purchase price, and thus, the buyer would not incur any income
tax on receipt of the installments. The fact that the willing seller might incur
income tax on the sale of the note does not impact on the sales price.
Accordingly, a willing buyer would not take potential income tax into account in
determining what he would be willing to pay for the note, and a willing seller
would not accept any discount for potential income tax in determining the price
of sale. The court also noted that taking potential income tax into account would
require consideration of many factors that are peculiar to the individual
decedent, the decedent's estate and the beneficiaries. Consideration of these
subjective factors would not be consistent with the "willing buyer-willing seller"
standard that looks to hypothetical parties.
Finally, the court in Estate of Robinson stated that Congress focused on the
problem of income tax inherent in certain assets included in the gross estate by
allowing an income tax deduction under section 691(c). As discussed above,
section 691(c) provides an income tax deduction determined by reference to the
estate tax attributable to the assets. The court reasoned that Congress recognized
that an installment obligation which includes income in respect of a decedent is
subject to both income tax and estate tax. Congress chose to ameliorate the
impact of the income taxation of the property by allowing an income tax
deduction under section 691(c). The court found that there was no basis for
supplementing this income tax relief with additional estate tax relief.
We believe the court's rationale in Estate of Robinson is equally applicable in
the instant case involving Decedent's IRAs. As was the case in Estate of
Robinson, the fact that these assets are subject to income tax on distribution,
should not impact on the application of the "willing buyer- willing seller"
standard. The IRA distributee can sell the assets at market price without any
discount. A willing seller would not accept any discount on the sales price. The
situation is analogous to that presented where a donor transfers low basis
property by gift. The value of the gift for gift tax purposes is the undiscounted
value of the property because that is the amount a willing buyer would be
willing to pay for the property, and it is also the minimum amount for which the
willing seller would sell the property. The fact that the donee might incur
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income tax upon a later sale of the property does not decrease the value of the
gift, which is determined under the "willing buyer-willing seller" standard.
Further, as was the case in Estate of Robinson, the adverse impact of the
potential income tax inherent in the IRAs is alleviated by the section 691(c)
deduction. Thus, this income tax benefit functions as a statutory substitute for
the valuation discount. Under these circumstances, any additional reduction in
estate tax for the potential income tax would be unwarranted. See Estate of
Robinson, 69 T.C. at 226 - 227.
Finally, the value of the IRAs should not be discounted due to lack of
marketability. While section 408(e) imposes penalties on the transfer or
assignment of the IRA, there are no restrictions preventing the distribution of
assets to the beneficiaries after decedent's death. The beneficiaries can request
that the custodian distribute the assets of the IRAs and the beneficiaries can then
sell the assets to any willing buyer. Furthermore, short administrative delays in
processing the beneficiaries' request for distribution should not warrant a
discount. The underlying assets are marketable, so no valuation discount should
apply. Accordingly, the value of Decedent's lRAs should not be discounted for
estate tax purposes to reflect income taxes that will be payable by the
beneficiaries upon receipt of distributions from the IRAs, or for lack of
marketability.
The TAM distinguished Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998):
The situation in Eisenberg is distinguishable from the facts in this case. Upon
sale of the stock of the corporation, a hypothetical buyer of the stock in
Eisenberg will obtain a cost basis for the stock that he purchases, but the
corporation's basis in its assets will not change. When the corporation liquidates
or distributes the assets, a capital gains tax will be imposed. This potential
liability reduces the inherent value of the corporation to the buyer. However, in
the instant case, if we assume arguendo that the IRAs could be sold, the
hypothetical buyer, as in Estate of Robinson, would receive a cost basis in the
assets and would not incur any income tax on the resale of those assets, unless
the assets appreciate in value. Therefore, the hypothetical buyer will be willing
to pay the full value of the underlying assets for the IRA. Although the seller
might incur income tax on the sale (see section 408(e)(2», this income tax
liability cannot be the basis for an estate tax valuation discount.
Further, we do not believe that for valuation purposes an IRA is properly viewed
as a separate entity, like a corporation. Rather, an IRA is a custodial
arrangement and the stocks, bonds, and mutual funds held in the IRA are
properly viewed as individual assets no different than stocks and bonds held in a
brokerage account.
Finally, and most significantly, Eisenberg did not involve a situation where the
adverse impacts of the potential income tax is alleviated by the section 691 (c)
deduction as is the case here. As discussed above, we believe that this deduction
is a statutory remedy for the adverse income tax impact and makes any valuation
discount inappropriate, if the deduction applies.
The estate also cites Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 198 F.3d 515 (5th Cir.
1999), rev'g 108 T.C. 412 (1997), nonacq. 2000-19 IRB 1 (May 8, 2000). In
Estate of Smith, prior to his death, the decedent had been paid oil and gas
royalties and had reported the payments as income. Subsequently, the corporate
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payor of the royalties sued the decedent for $2.48 million dollars, claiming the
payments had been excessive by that amount. The proceeding was still pending
at the time of decedent's death. Fifteen months after decedents' death, the estate
settled the suit for $681,840. The estate claimed a deduction under section 2053,
as a claim against the estate, for $2.48 million, the amount the decedent was
being sued for at the date of death. The Fifth Circuit held that the amount
deductible was the value of the claim as of the date of death determined without
consideration of the post-death settlement. Further, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the income tax benefit inuring to the estate under section 1341 (providing
relief in the form of an income tax deduction or credit to taxpayers who are
forced to repay an amount previously taken into income) was one of the factors
to be considered in valuing the claim, and was not to be included as a separate
asset, as the Tax Court had concluded. Similarly, in the instant case, it could be
argued that tax benefit available under section 691(c) is merely a factor to be
taken into account in determining the appropriate discount.
In TAM 200303010 the IRS refused to allow income taxes due on accrued interest on Series E U.S. savings
bonds to create a lack of marketability discount. The TAM states:
In Rev. Rul. 55-278, 1955-1 C.B. 471, in 1948, A purchased entirely with his
own funds Series E United States savings bonds and registered the bonds in the
names of A and his son B. In 1953, the bonds were reissued in the name of B
alone in order to effect a gift to him. The Service held that the redemption value
of Series E United States savings bonds at the time reissued is the proper value
to be used by A with respect to the gift for federal gift tax purposes. In the
ruling, the Service stated "since Series E United States savings bonds are
generally nonnegotiable and nontransferable, they are nonmarketable and,
accordingly, have no particular 'market' value. Although ownership therein is
transferable by death and by reissue in certain cases, (citing Department Circular
No. 530, supra) their only definitely indicated or ascertainable value is the
amount at which they are redeemable by the United States Treasury." In that
ruling, the Service referred to an earlier memorandum issued by the Service in
which the Service held that Series E United States savings bonds are includible
in the gross estate at their redemption value. Mim. 5109, C.B. 1940-2,283, and
Mim. 5002, C.B. 1941-2,241.
The estate asserts that the interpretation by the Service in Rev. Rul. 55-278
"clearly contravenes the definition of willing buyer discussed in section
20.2031-1 (b)." The estate argues that "[t]he contractual limitation on U.S.
Savings Bonds, that they are only redeemable by the United States Treasury,
does not change the definition of a hypothetical willing buyer." According to the
estate, "a hypothetical willing buyer of the bonds would consider the built-in
income tax liability in determining the amount he would be willing to pay for
those bonds." In support of this position, the estate relies on Eisenberg v.
Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1998) and Estate of Davis v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530 (1998).

***
Under consideration in this case and in the revenue ruling is an issue similar to
the issue considered by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973). In Cartwright, the Court granted certiorari to
determine the value of shares of mutual funds to be included in a decedent's
gross estate under section 2031. The mutual fund shares were not traded on
exchanges or generally in the over-the-counter market, but were sold by the
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investment fund through a principal underwriter, and redeemed by the fund, at
prices which were related to the net asset value. The Court stated that in
implementing section 2031, the value of property is to be determined by its fair
market value at the time of decedent's death and the fair market value is the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.
The Court recognized the fact that the fund was under an obligation to redeem
its shares at the redemption price and stated "that shares so held are, in
important respects, similar to ordinary corporate stock held subject to a
restrictive agreement, ... so long as the restriction is a bona fide one, the value
of the shares in the hands of the restricted stockholder is determined in
accordance with the terms of the restriction. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h).
Outstanding mutual fund shares are likewise held subject to a restriction, as the
Court of Appeals noted. . . . Those shares may not be "sold" at the public
offering price. By statute, they may be "sold" back to the mutual fund only at
the redemption price. We see no valid justification for disregarding this reality
connected with the ownership of mutual fund shares." Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the redemption price was the value to be used in reporting the
funds in the gross estate of the decedent.
Similarly, in this case and the revenue ruling, the only willing seller is the
decedent or decedent's estate and the only willing buyer is the United States
government. By contractual arrangement, the Bonds will be redeemed by the
United States Treasury at the redemption price.
Eisenberg and Davis are distinguishable from this case. In those cases, the
taxpayers transferred stock in a closely held corporation to family members. In
valuing the stock for gift tax purposes, the taxpayers discounted the value of the
stock to take into account the potential capital gains tax liabilities that may be
incurred by the corporation if the corporation were to liquidate or distribute and
sell its appreciated assets. In each case, the court held that the taxpayer was
entitled to a discount for the potential capital gains tax liabilities because the
court determined that a hypothetical buyer would take the corporation's
potential capital gains tax liabilities into account in determining the value of the
stock.
Eisenberg and Davis involve situations in which the hypothetical willing buyer
acquires stock in a corporation that owns appreciated assets with built-in capital
gain. The fact that the buyer will pay tax on the sale of the appreciated assets
may be a factor in determining the price the willing buyer would pay for the
stock. This case involves a situation in which the hypothetical willing seller
must include in his/her gross income the interest accrued on the Bonds prior to
the date of the "sale" (the redemption). Under section 454(c), the accrued
interest on the Bonds is includible in the gross income of the taxpayer in the
taxable year in which the obligation is fmally redeemed or in the taxable year of
final maturity, whichever is earlier. The income tax on the accrued interest is
paid by the seller in this case. The courts recognize that it is not appropriate to
allow a discount for the hypothetical willing seller's costs in determining the fair
market value of an asset for estate tax purposes.
No discount was allowed in valuing retirement plans by the U.S. District Court in Estate of Louis R. Smith
v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D. Tex. 2004). The opinion states that the IRD deduction under section
691(c) remedies any "fairness concerns" ofthe estate.
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4.

Lottery Payments. Valuation of a stream of lottery payments continues to generation litigation.

In Estate of Paul e. Gubauskas v.

Commission~r,

342 F. 3d 85 (2003), the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court

and held that lottery winnings in an estate should not be valued using section 7520. The Ninth Circuit held the same
in Shackleford v. U.S., 262 F.3d 1028 (2001). On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit applied section 7520 in Cook v.
Commissioner, 349 F.3d 850 (2003). So, there is a split among the Circuits which may lead to Supreme Court
review (imagine!).
5.

Mitchell Affirmed. The Ninth District has affIrmed the Tax Court's redetermination of the value

of 49.094% of John Paul Mitchell Systems, with a total discount of 35%. Patrick T. Fuiieki v. Commissioner, No.
02-72043 (2003)(not for publication).
6.

Real Estate Valued Using Comparables.

Estate of Michael Dunia v. Commissioner, T.e.

Memo. 2004-123, involved the straightforward valuation of a tract ofland using comparables.
SECTION 2032 G.
VALUATION
1.

ALTERNATE VALUATION AND SECTION 2032A -

SPECIAL USE

Corporate Distributions. An interesting issue was presented in TAM 200343002:
Whether amounts earned by Corporation during the six month period after
Decedent's death that were not distributed to the Decedent's estate as the sole
shareholder during that period are "excluded property" for purposes of
determining the value of the stock of Corporation included in Decedent's gross
estate under § 2032 of the Internal Revenue Code.

The answer given was "no." Section 2.2032-I(d)(4) sets forth the treatment of corporate stock under
alternate valution:
Stock of a corporation. Shares of stock in a corporation and dividends
declared to stockholders of record on or before the date of the
decedent's death and not collected at the date of death constitute
"included property" of the estate. On the other hand, ordinary dividends
out of earnings and profits (whether in cash, shares of the corporation,
or other property) declared to shareholders of record after the date of
decedent's death are "excluded property" and are not to be valued under
the alternate valuation method. If, however, dividends are declared to
stockholders of record after the decedent's death with the effect that the
shares of stock at the subsequent valuation date do not reasonably
represent the same "included property" of the gross estate as existed at
the date of the decedent's death, the dividends are "included property,"
except to the extent that they are out of earnings of the corporation
after, the date of the decedent's death. For example, if a corporation
makes a distribution in partial liquidation to stockholders of record
during the alternate valuation period which is not accompanied by a
surrender of a stock certificate for cancellation, the amount of the
distribution received on stock included in the gross, estate is itself
"included property," except to the extent that the distribution was out of
earnings and profits since the date of the decedent's death. Similarly, if
a corporation, in which the decedent owned a substantial interest and
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which possessed at the date of the decedent's death accumulated
earnings and profits equal to its paid-in capital, distributed all of its
accumulated earnings and profits as a cash dividend to stockholders of
record during the alternate valuation period, the amount of the
dividends received on stock includible in the gross estate will be
included in the gross estate under the alternate valuation method.
Likewise, a stock dividend distributed under such circumstances is
"included property".
That regulation was in response to a 1941 Supreme Court decision, Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443 (1941).
In Maass v. Higgins, the applicable Treasury Regulation governing the
(optional) alternate valuation rules provided that, in the case of stocks, the value
of the stock and the value of the right to dividends thereon constituted separable
property and each constituted an element of the value of the stock. Thus, under
the regulation, if a dividend was received during the alternate valuation period,
the portion attributable to the period after death had to be included in full in the
gross estate. The Commissioner argued that, under the regulation, the amount
received was either a payment on account of principal, or a disposition of
property existing on the date of death that was included in the gross estate. The
Court, however, concluded that dividends, rents and interest received during the
alternate valuation period, are commonly considered income rather than a
payment or disposition of principal, and are not to be included in the value of the
gross estate under the alternate method of valuation. The Court stated:
[I]n common understanding, rents, interest, and dividends are income.
Under the revenue acts, if such items are collected by a decedent's
estate, the executors are bound to return them and pay tax upon them as
income. In the case of a living holder, such receipts are never treated as
on account of principal. Nor does the promise to pay interest, rents or
dividends either to a living owner of the asset or to his executor after
death, which has not been legally separated from the asset of which it is
an incident, have any market value apart from the asset, or bear any
invariable relation to the value of the capital asset.
... [T]he promise to pay interest or rent, or the expectancy of dividends
upon stock, the amount of such payments. . . . and other elements
bearing upon the expectation of the receipt of income affect the value
of any income producing property. But these elements are not
separately valued in appraising the worth of the asset at any given time.
It is the uniform practice to value the asset as an entirety, taking into
consideration all elements that go to give it value in the market.
(Emphasis added.) Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 447 - 448. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court also noted that "[T]he method always adopted for
valuation at death is the same used in fixing a sale price; that is, to take the
market value of the bond and add accrued interest to the date of transfer, at the
rate stipulated in the instrument. It is not believed that Congress, in providing
for two dates of valuation, intended that a different method should be followed if
one date were chosen rather than the other." Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 448.
The TAM concludes:
These regulations, rulings and cases make it clear that in order for post-death
corporate earnings to be considered excluded property under § 2032(a), the
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property must be sufficiently severed from the corporate estate. Prior to such
severance, these amounts have not been "earned or accrued" by the estate or the
beneficiary of the shares. Rather, these amounts are part ofthe "corporate estate"
and are reflected in the value of the corporate stock. The value of the stock on
the alternate valuation date properly includes post-death appreciation and
depreciation during the alternate valuation period, which is directly effected by
profits and losses during that period. These amounts are a part of the corporate
assets until the corporation severs these assets from the corporate estate and the
assets pass to the shareholders.
Finally, to the extent the Taxpayer's argument results in the use of a different
method to value stock subject to alternate valuation than is used in the absence
of the alternate valuation election, the position conflicts with the Court's
decision in Maass v. Higgins, indicating that the alternate valuation provision in
providing for two dates of valuation, was not intended to sanction different
methods of valuation if one valuation date were chosen rather than the other.
Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 448.
The Taxpayer contends that post-death corporate earnings are per se "excluded
property" citing § 20.2031-1(d), providing that "property earned or accrued
(whether received or not) after the decedent's death and during the alternate
valuation period" with respect to property existing on the date of death, is
excluded property. However, as noted above, for federal estate tax purposes,
there is no accrual of corporate earnings to the shareholder prior to the
declaration of the dividend and the shareholder record date. Thus, the corporate
earnings in this case do not constitute property "earned or accrued" within the
meaning of § 20.2032-1 (d). Further, § 20.2032-1 (d)(4), the regulation
specifically addressing the alternate valuation of corporations, and the cases
cited above, make it clear that a necessary prerequisite for characterization as
excluded property, is a "severance of earnings and profits from the corporate
estate." Estate of Schlosser v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d at 269. Thus, we do not
believe that the regulations contain any "per se" rule.
The Taxpayer next argues that, it is clear that under § 20.2032-1(d)(4), ordinary
dividends declared after the date of death are excluded property. In this case, the
Decedent owned 100 percent of the stock in Corporation and therefore,
Decedent's estate could have withdrawn and distributed earnings at any time,
with or without formal action. Consequently, the Taxpayer argues that. in this
case, the declaration of dividends would have been a mere ministerial act or
formality, that under the regulations, should not constitute a prerequisite to
qualification as excluded property. We have not reviewed whether under the
corporate by-laws, or other documents and rules governing the operation of
Corporation, the declaration of a dividend by Corporation, that is engaged in
Business X, had a book value of $W, and employed Y personnel, would be a
mere formality or ministerial act. In any event, we do not believe that § 20.20321(d)(4) draws any distinction between a corporation controlled by the Decedent's
estate and one that is not so controlled, in determining what constitutes
excludible property. Indeed such a test, dependent on the extent to which a
shareholder could influence corporate actions, would be difficult, if not
impossible, to apply. Rather, as discussed above, the test that is applicable
requires a severance of the earnings and profits.

2.

Manner and Time of Election. New proposed regulations have been issued changing Treas.

Reg. § 20.2032-1(b). REG-139845-02. The proposed regulations state:
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Method and effect of election -- (1) In general. The election to use the alternate
valuation method is made on the return of tax imposed by section 2001. For
purposes of this paragraph (b), the term return of tax imposed by section 2001
means the last estate tax return filed by the executor on or before the due date of
the return (including extensions of time to file actually granted) or, if a timely
return is not filed, the fIrst estate tax return filed by the executor after the due
date, provided the return is filed no later than 1 year after the due date (including
extensions of time to file actually granted). Once the election is made, it is
irrevocable, provided that an election may be revoked on a subsequent return
filed on or before the due date of the return (including extensions of time to file
actually granted). The election may be made only if it will decrease both the
value of the gross estate and the sum (reduced by allowable credits) of the estate
tax and the generation-skipping transfer tax with respect to the property
includible in the decedent=s gross estate. If the election is made, the alternate
valuation method applies to all property included in the gross estate and cannot
be applied to only a portion ofthe property.
The proposed regulations allow a protective election, which is helpful:
Protective election. If, based on the return of tax as filed, use of the alternate
valuation method would not result in a decrease in both the value of the gross
estate and the sum (reduced by allowable credits) of the estate tax and the
generation-skipping transfer tax liability of the estate, a protective election may
be made to use the alternate valuation method if it is subsequently determined
that such a decrease would occur. A protective election made on the return of
tax imposed by section 2001 is irrevocable, provided that it may be revoked on a
subsequent return filed on or before the due date of the return (including
extensions of time to file actually granted). Absent such revocation, if it is later
determined that use of the alternate valuation method would result in a decrease
in both the value of the gross estate and in the sum (reduced by allowable
credits) of the estate tax and generation- skipping transfer tax liability of the
estate, the protective election becomes effective and cannot thereafter be
revoked.

H.

SECTIONS 2035-2038 - RETAINED INTERESTS
1.

Application of Section 2036 to Family Limited Partnerships.

The IRS has attempted to

mInImIZe or eliminate the discounts claimed by taxpayers through family limited partnerships with various
arguments, some based on general tax principles like the step-transaction doctrine and others more specifIcally
Code based, typically sections 2703 and 2704.

None of these arguments have been proven winners for the

government. In fact, to date, most of the instances in which taxpayers have had difficulty have been when the form
of the partnership was not respected by those involved. Stated another way, mistakes by the taxpayer and the
taxpayer's family have generated about as many wins for the government as the government has earned on its own.
Most recently the government has scored a signifIcant victory in Strangi, but suffered a signifIcant defeat in the Fifth
Circuit in Kimbell.
The case of Estate of Morton B. Harper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-121, illustrates how taxpayers
often hurt their case. The decedent, Mr. Harper, and his children formed a limited partnership using the assets in

Mr. Harper's living trust. The particular facts recited by the court are important:
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At a time not entirely clear from the record, decedent made the decision to form
a limited partnership and to contribute thereto the majority of his assets. An
Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial Company, L. P. (HFLP),
was prepared and sets forth the governing provisions for the entity. The
document begins with language stating that the Agreement was made "as of the
1st day of January, 1994", but later recites that the partnership shall commence
its existence upon the date a certificate of limited partnership is duly filed with
the California Secretary of State.

***
Michael and Lynn were named as the general partners ofHFLP and the Trust as
the sole limited partner, with interests of.4 percent, .6 percent, and 99 percent,
respectively. Michael was also designated to serve as the managing general
partner.

***
Although "the Portfolio" is not defmed in the Agreement, there appears to be no
dispute between the parties that it consisted of: (1) Securities held in a brokerage
account at M. L. Stem & Co., Inc., (2) securities held in a Putnam Investments
account, (3) securities held in two Franklin Fund accounts, (4) 2,500 shares of
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc., and (5) a $450,000 note receivable from
Jack P. Marsh. The parties value these assets at between $1.6 and $1.7 million
(rounded), an amount representing approximately 94 percent of decedent's total
assets. The Trust's capital account in HFLP was credited with 99 percent of the
value of the property contributed. Decedent retained, personally or through the
Trust, his personal effects, a checking account, an automobile, and his Palm
Springs condominium.

***
The Agreement was signed by decedent on behalf of the Trust, by Michael, and
by Lynn. Although the signatures are undated, the document was executed by
Michael in Mayor June of 1994. Lynn could not remember when she signed the
Agreement and did not read it prior to signing. A certificate of limited
partnership was filed on behalf of HFLP with the California Secretary of State
on June 14, 1994.
From June 17 to June 20, 1994, decedent was hospitalized in Palm Springs.
Medical records prepared at that time contain the explanation set forth below:
This is one of multiple Desert Hospital admissions for this 85-year-old
Caucasian who is well known to have metastatic colonic carcinoma and
prostatic carcinoma and admitted at the present time for poor oral
intake, poor fluid intake, dehydration and for further rehydration, close
observation, nutrition support, etc.
After his release, decedent went to Oregon, where he resided until his death. He
first stayed with Michael for approximately a month and then moved into a
nearby Oregon retirement facility known as Carmen Oaks. Carmen Oaks served
independent individuals and was not a nursing center.
Thereafter, by a document entitled Assignment of Partnership Interest and
Amendment No. 1 to Agreement of Limited Partnership for Harper Financial
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Company, L. P., dated and made effective as of July 1, 1994, the Trust
transferred to Michael and Lynn 60 percent of the Trust's partnership interest.
As a result, Michael and Lynn became holders of 24-and 36-percent limited
partnership interests, respectively, and were given corresponding percentages of
the Trust's capital account balance. The limited partnership interests held by
Michael and Lynn were designated as "Class B Limited Partnership Interest[s]"
and were entitled to 60 percent of the income and loss of the entity, with 40
percent thereof going to Michael and 60 percent to Lynn.
The Amendment also reclassified the Trust's remaining 39- percent limited
partnership interest as a "Class A Limited Partnership Interest" which was
entitled to 39 percent of the entity's income and losses and to a "Guaranteed
Payment" of "4.25% annually of its Capital Account balance on the Effective
Date, payable quarterly no later than twenty (20) days after the close of any such
calendar quarter (or sooner, if cash flow permits)." Decedent, as trustee of the
Trust, Michael, and Lynn signed the document.
On July 26, 1994, decedent commenced the process of transferring the Trust's
portfolio to the partnership, which process continued for approximately the next
4 months. On July 26, 1994, decedent executed as trustee an allonge
endorsement assigning to HFLP the Trust's interest in the Marsh note. A
collateral assignment of the Trust's interest in property securing the note was
also signed on that date. Then, on August 28, 1994, a letter agreement
confirming and/or finalizing the transfer was executed by or on behalf of Mr.
Marsh, the Trust, and HFLP.
Next, a letter dated September 29, 1994, was sent by decedent to M. L. Stem &
Co. confirming instructions for (1) the sale of all securities held in the Trust's
account and (2) the use of the proceeds for the immediate repurchase of the
same securities for an account established on behalf of the partnership. Michael,
as managing general partner, completed the requisite form opening a new
account with M. L. Stem & Co. for the partnership. The form designated
Michael as the "individual * * * authorized to enter orders on behalf of
customer". Neil Hattem served as decedent's broker and subsequently as the
broker on the HFLP account.
Letters dated September 30, 1994, were then sent by decedent to Putnam
Investor Services and to Franklin Templeton requesting transfer of the
respective Putnam and Franklin Fund accounts to HFLP. Lastly, by a letter dated
November 22, 1994, decedent requested transfer of the Trust's stock in
Rockefeller Center Properties to the partnership.
During this period, on September 23, 1994, Michael opened a checking account
at Bank of America in the name of the partnership with a $200 deposit.
Thereafter, the first activity in the account, other than the debiting of a monthly
service charge, was a deposit on October 13, 1994, of $3,750 representing
interest paid on the Marsh note.
The Tax Court concluded that the form of the partnership was not respected.

Again, the facts are

instructive:
As previously indicated, section 2036 mandates inclusion in the gross estate of
transferred property with respect to which the decedent retained, by express or
implied agreement, possession, control, enjoyment, or the right to income. The
focus here is on whether there existed an implicit agreement that decedent would
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retain control or enjoyment, Le., economic benefit, of the assets he transferred to
HFLP.
Respondent avers that section 2036's applicability is established on these facts,
emphasizing in particular actual conduct with respect to partnership funds.
Respondent further maintains that this case is indistinguishable from the
situations presented in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra, and Estate of
Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-242. The estate, on the other
hand, discounts the evidence and cases relied on by respondent, emphasizing
instead the formal terms of the partnership arrangement and the accounting
treatment of entity assets.
In Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 147-148, the decedent formed
a family limited partnership, the general partner of which was a revocable trust
created on the same date. The decedent and his two children were named as
cotrustees, but only the decedent performed any meaningful functions as trustee.
Id. at 147, 152. He was the only trustee to sign the articles of limited
partnership, to open brokerage accounts, or to sign partnership checks. Id. at
152. He transferred his residence and all of his other property (except for his car,
personal effects, and a small amount of cash in his checking account) to the
partnership and subsequently gave his two children limited partnership interests.
Id. at 148-149, 152-153. The decedent deposited partnership income in his
personal account, used the partnership checking account as his personal account,
and lived at his residence without paying rent to the partnership. Id. at 152.
Based on these facts, we concluded that nothing but legal title changed in the
decedent's relationship to his assets after he transferred them to the partnership.
Id. at 152-153.
In Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, the decedent formed three
limited partnerships. The decedent and one of her three children were named as
the general partners of each partnership, with the decedent's being designated as
the managing partner. Id. The decedent transferred business assets, including
real estate, partnership interests, and notes receivable, to the partnerships in
undivided one-third shares. Id. Limited partnership interests in these entities
were given to family members. Id. Partnership bank accounts were opened, but
the decedent deposited the income earned by the partnerships into the account
she used as her personal checking account, where it was commingled with funds
from other sources. Id. Checks were then written from this account to pay both
personal and partnership expenses. Id. The decedent's children later
acknowledged at trial that formation of the partnerships was merely a way to
enable the decedent to assign interests in the partnership assets to family
members, with the assets to be managed by the decedent exactly as in the past.
Id. We therefore found the assets includable under section 2036(a). Id.
We agree with respondent that the circumstances before us bear many
similarities to those in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.e. 144
(2000), and Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, and are convinced
that a like result should obtain. We focus particularly on the commingling of
funds, the history of disproportionate distributions, and the testamentary
characteristics of the arrangement in support of our conclusion that there existed
an implied agreement that decedent would retain the economic benefit of the
assets transferred to HFLP.
As regards commingling of funds, we note that this fact was one of the most
heavily relied upon in both Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 152,
and Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra. We find the disregard here
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for partnership form to be equally egregious. The Agreement specified: "All
funds of the Partnership shall be deposited in a separate bank account or
accounts". Yet no such account was even opened for HFLP until September 23,
1994, more than 3 months after the entity began its legal existence. Prior to that
time, partnership income was deposited in the Trust's account, resulting in an
unavoidable commingling of funds.
Michael testified concerning this delay as follows:
Inadvertently, either my account or I failed to apply timely for any an employee [sic] identification number. That is required before a
checking account is open. So I just made the determination that without
a checking account and I wanted the flow of cash, what we would do is
use the Morton B. Harper Trust account as a holding account, and then
I instructed the accountant to properly credit and account for those
funds. * * *
This explanation, however, seems to beg the question. Had Michael sought
promptly upon HFLP's creation to establish a bank account, he would have been
immediately alerted to the need for an EIN. Hence, he either neglected to
attempt opening and/or using an account or allowed the lack of an EIN to
continue for several months after having been reminded of its necessity. Both
reflect at best a less than orderly approach to the formal partnership structure so
pressed by the estate.
Moreover, we fmd Michael's reliance on post mortem accounting manipulations
to be especially unavailing. Michael and Mr. Blankstein, HFLP's accountant,
each testified that no moneys actually changed hands in connection with the
adjustments. In response to similar contentions in Estate of Reichardt v.
Commissioner, supra at 154-155, we stated:
The 1993 yearend and 1994 post mortem adjusting entries made by
Hannah's firm were a belated attempt to undo decedent's commingling
of partnership and personal accounts. There is no evidence that the
partnership or decedent transferred any funds to the other as a result of
the adjusting entries. After-the- fact paperwork by decedent's C. P. A.
does not refute that decedent and his children had agreed that decedent
could continue to use and control the property during his life. [Fn. ref.
omitted.]
Here Michael did not even hire Mr. Blankstein until after decedent's death,
strengthening the inference that the partners had little concern for establishing
any precise demarcation between partnership and other funds during decedent's
life.
Closely related to the delay in opening the partnership bank account and
consequent commingling of income is the delay in formally transferring the
underlying portfolio assets to HFLP. No attempt was made to begin the process
of title transfer until July 26, 1994, when decedent executed an allonge
endorsement assigning the Marsh note to HFLP. No action was taken with
respect to any of the other securities until September 29 and 30, 1994, when
letters addressing transfer of the M. L. Stem & Co., Putnam, and Franklin
accounts were drafted and an account with M. L. Stem & Co. was opened on
behalf of HFLP. A letter requesting transfer of the Rockefeller Center Properties
stock was not prepared until November 22, 1994.
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When Michael was asked on cross-examination to explain this delay between
the effective date of the partnership and the formal transfer of assets into the
entity, he replied: "Probably for different reasons, some mechanical delays and
who we're dealing with, but generally, there was no rush to do it. We were just
doing it in an orderly fashion." Next, in response to a further question asking
why there was no rush, he continued: "There was no rush. I mean, we were just
handling the business in an orderly fashion. There wasn't any deadline or
urgency to do it and get it done." The following colloquy then ensued:
Q

Now let's talk for a moment about the income from the portfolio assets.
Before the title to the assets was transferred to the partnership, your
father or his trust continued to receive the income from those assets.
Isn't that right?

A

Would you restate that? I'm lost.

Q

Okay. At a certain point in time the assets were contributed to the
partnership, correct?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay. Before that happened, your father's trust continued to receive the
income from those assets, correct?

A

Probably.

Q

Well, why isn't it Yes?

A

Well, before he contributed it, he was in control of that. Who else
would get it? I say probably.

Hence, we are again met with an example of indifference by those involved
toward the formal structure of the partnership arrangement and, as a corollary,
toward the degree of separation that the Agreement facially purports to establish.
Moreover, until title to the assets was transferred to HFLP, decedent would not
have forfeited the control over the underlying securities that he through the Trust
possessed as legal holder. Thus, at the time of the June 14, 1994, creation of
HFLP and for some months following, decedent's Trust retained title to the
underlying assets and was issued the dividends and interest generated thereby. In
addition, according to Michael's own testimony, the partners were in no hurry to
alter this state of affairs. This speaks volumes concerning how little the partners
understood to have changed in decedent's relationship to his assets as a result of
the entity's formation.
Turning to facts regarding distribution of partnership funds, we find equally
compelling indicia of an implied understanding or agreement that the
partnership arrangement would not curtail decedent's ability to enjoy the
economic benefit of assets contributed to HFLP. In addition to the deemed
distributions engendered by the commingling discussed above, even the
distributions made by Michael from the partnership checking account are
heavily weighted in favor of decedent. The check register indicates that during
the period extending from September of 1994 through early November 1995,
partnership funds were distributed for the benefit of Michael and Lynn in the
amounts of $5,800 and $8,700, respectively. These distributions occurred on
November 9, 1994, December 19, 1994, and January 10, 1995. During that same

A-86

time frame, partnership checks totaling $231,820, were remitted to the Trust,
with the last being written on October 30, 1995. Only then did distributions to
Michael and Lynn resume with checks drawn on November 15, 1995, in the
amounts of $4,800 and $7,200, respectively. Given this pattern, we would be
hard pressed to conclude other than that the partnership arrangement did little to
curtail the access of decedent or his estate to the economic benefit of the
contributed property.
Similarly significant is the evidence that certain of the distributions to the Trust
were linked to a contemporaneous expense of decedent personally or of his
estate. These amounts, variously labeled by Michael "additional distribution",
"return of capital", or "capital return", totaled $220,520 and even included
$4,000 to enable decedent to complete a gift 2 days before he died. This
evidence buttresses the inference that decedent and his estate had ready access to
partnership cash when needed.
The estate also argued that the partnership units were consideration sufficient to move the transaction out of
section 2036. The court rejected the contention:
Having decided that decedent retained enjoyment of the transferred assets for
purposes of section 2036(a), we tum to the question whether the statute's
application may nonetheless be avoided on the basis of the parenthetical
exception for "a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth". The estate contends:
The primary reason why I.R.C. 2036 does not apply to Petitioner is that
the Trust's transfer of the Portfolio to the Partnership in exchange for a
credit to its capital account for 99% of the fair market value of the
Portfolio assets and a 99% interest in profits and losses is a "bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." * * *
We, however, disagree on the ground that the estate's position fails to take into
account significant aspects of the jurisprudence addressing this exclusionary
language. The phrase, as used in a predecessor statute, was explained in early
caselaw of this Court, as follows:
Accordingly, the exemption from tax is limited to those transfers of
property where the transferor or donor has received benefit in full
consideration in a genuine arm's length transaction; and the exemption
is not to be allowed in a case where there is only contractual
consideration but not "adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth." * * * [Estate of Goetchius v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.
495,503 (1951).]

***
On the facts before us, HFLP's formation at a minimum falls short of meeting
the bona fide sale requirement. Decedent, independently of any other anticipated
interest-holder, determined how HFLP was to be structured and operated,
decided what property would be contributed to capitalize the entity, and declared
what interest the Trust would receive therein. He essentially stood on both sides
of the transaction and conducted the partnership's formation in absence of any
bargaining or negotiating whatsoever. It would be an oxymoron to say that one
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can engage in an arm's-length transaction with oneself, and we simply are
unable to fmd any other independent party involved in the creation ofHFLP.
Furthermore, lack of a bona fide sale aside, we believe that to call what occurred
here a transfer for consideration within the meaning of section 2036(a), much
less a transfer for an adequate and full consideration, would stretch the
exception far beyond its intended scope. In actuality, all decedent did was to
change the form in which he held his beneficial interest in the contributed
property. We see little practical difference in whether the Trust held the property
directly or as a 99-percent partner (and entitled to a commensurate 99-percent
share of profits) in a partnership holding the property. Essentially, the value of
the partnership interest the Trust received derived solely from the assets the
Trust had just contributed. Without any change whatsoever in the underlying
pool of assets or prospect for profit, as, for example, where others make
contributions of property or services in the interest of true joint ownership or
enterprise, there exists nothing but a circuitous "recycling" of value. Weare
satisfied that such instances of pure recycling do not rise to the level of a
payment of consideration. To hold otherwise would open section 2036 to a
myriad of abuses engendered by unilateral paper transformations.
We note that the foregoing interpretation is supported by our holdings in both
Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 +TC. 144 (2000), and, by
implication, Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1997-242.
In Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 155-156, the taxpayer
contended that the parenthetical exception should apply. We, however, rejected
this argument, observing that neither did the decedent's children give anything
to him or to the partnership at the time he contributed his assets nor did he sell
the transferred property to the entity. Id. In Estate of Schauerhamer v.
Commissioner, supra, the contributed assets were included in the decedent's
gross estate under section 2036(a) without discussion of the exception, leading
to the inference that it would not apply in such circumstances.
We further are convinced that the cases cited by the estate do not require a
contrary conclusion. The estate points in particular to Estate of Jones v.
Commissioner, 116 TC. 121 (2001); Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115
T.e. 478 (2000); Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.e. 376 (2000), affd. 283
F.3d 1258 (lIth Cir. 2002); Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, TC. Memo.
1987-8; and Church v. United States, 85 AFTR 2d 2000-804,2000-1 USTC par.
60,369 (W. D. Tex. 2000), affd. without published opinion 268 F.3d 1063 (5th
Cir. 2001). The estate apparently argues that the just-cited cases establish that a
proportionate partnership interest constitutes per se adequate and full
consideration for contributed assets. We believe, however, that any such global
formulation would overreach what can be drawn from the decisions.
First, with respect to Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, supra, Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner, supra, and Shepherd v. Commissioner, supra, none of these
opinions involved section 2036. Rather, they considered whether gifts were
made at the inception of family limited partnership arrangements. [citations
omitted] The cases therefore do not control interpretation of the requirements of
section 2036. Furthermore, while section 2512(b) describes a gift as a transfer of
property "for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth", there exists an equally fundamental principle that a gift requires a donee
- some other individual must be enriched. In this connection, we note that
Estate of Jones v. Commissioner, supra at 127-128, and Estate of Strangi v.
Commissioner, supra at 489-490, which fmd no gift at inception, say nothing
explicit about adequate and full consideration but do refer to enhancement, or
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lack thereof, of other partners' interests. Hence, even if relevant here, we would
be unable to conclude that these rulings resolve the question of whether a
proportionate entity interest, in and of itself, constitutes adequate and full
consideration for contributed assets.
Second, although Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, supra, and Church v.
United States, supra, do address section 2036, there exist significant differences
between these cases, on the one hand, and Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner,
supra, and Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, supra, on the other, which
distinguish the two groups. In both Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, supra,
and Church v. United States, supra, the other partners made contributions at the
formation of the entity which were not de minimis in nature. The partnership
entity thus served as the vehicle for a genuine pooling of interests. The court in
each case then went on to conclude that the partnerships had been created for a
business purpose. Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, supra; Church v. United
States, supra.
Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that a genuine pooling for
business purposes injects something different into the adequate and full
consideration calculus than does mere, unilateral value "recycling" as seen in
Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra, Estate of Schauerhamer v.
Commissioner, supra, and the present matter. In the former situation, there is at
least the potential that intangibles stemming from a pooling for joint enterprise
might support a ruling of adequate and full consideration. We also note that
section 25.2512-8, Gift Tax Regs., specifies that transfers "made in the ordinary
course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free
from any donative intent), will be considered as made for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth."
We therefore hold that where a transaction involves only the genre of value
"recycling" described above and does not appear to be motivated primarily by
legitimate business concerns, no transfer for consideration within the meaning of
section 2036(a) has taken place. Hence, the exception provided in that statute is
inapplicable. Furthermore, although section 2043 can entitle taxpayers to an
offset for partial consideration in cases where a transfer is otherwise subject to
section 2036, this section, too, is inapplicable where, as here, there has been
only a recycling of value and not a transfer for consideration.
Similarly, the Tax Court applied section 2036 in Estate of Theodore R. Thompson v. Commissioner,
T.C.Memo. 2002-246 (2002). The opinion states:
In this case, the circumstances surrounding establishment of the partnerships
show that, at the time of the transfer, there was an implied agreement or
understanding that decedent would retain the enjoyment and economic benefit of
the property he had transferred. Before the partnerships were formed, Betsy
[decedent's daughter] sought assurances from the financial advisers that
decedent would be able to withdraw assets from the partnerships in order to
make cash gifts each year to his children, grandchildren, and great
grandchildren. In late November 1993 after the partnerships were formed,
George [decedent's son-in-law] asked the advisers how decedent could get
$40,000 out of the partnerships to give as Christmas presents. The implied
agreement among decedent, Robert [decedent's son], Betsy, and George that
decedent would retain the enjoyment and economic benefit of the transferred
property is reflected also by the distributions made by the partnerships to
decedent. Late in 1993 and again in 1994, both the Turner Partnership and the
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Thompson Partnership made distributions to decedent of $40,000 so that he
could continue his practice of giving substantial gifts at Christmastime to his
family members.
The circumstances also demonstrate an understanding that decedent's interest in
the transferred property would last until his death. When the partnerships were
established, decedent parted with almost all of his wealth, retaining enough to
support himself for less than 2 years. Betsy's correspondence in early 1995 to
Robert shows that the amount decedent retained was insufficient - his original
holdings had diminished to $31,806, while his expenses for the prior year totaled
$57,202. Betsy informed Robert that decedent would need "an infusion" of
funds to cover the balance of decedent's anticipated 1995 expenses. She
proposed that the Turner Partnership and the Thompson Partnership transfer
assets of equal value to their father. In March 1995 the Thompson Partnership
distributed $12,500 to decedent.
We are not persuaded otherwise by the insistence of decedent's estate that
decedent always asked Betsy and Robert, in their respective capacity as officers
of the corporate general partners of their partnerships, for the cash decedent
needed to provide Christmas gifts. 11 The fact that decedent requested those
sums does not vitiate the existence of an understanding that he would receive
them.
Here, decedent's outright transfer of the vast bulk of his assets to the
partnerships would have deprived him of the assets needed for his own support.
Thus, the transfers from the partnerships to decedent can only be explained if
decedent had at least an implied understanding that his children would agree to
his requests for money from the assets he contributed to the partnerships, and
that they would do so for as long as he lived.
While we acknowledge that, as a result of the creation of the partnerships, prior
to decedent's death some change ensued in the formal relationship of decedent
to the assets he contributed to the partnerships, we are satisfied that the practical
effect of these changes during decedent's life was minimal. Decedent continued
to be the principal economic beneficiary of the contributed property after the
partnerships were created. Based on these facts, we conclude that nothing but
legal title changed in the decedent's relationship to his assets after he transferred
them to the partnerships. Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, supra at 152-153.
Any control over management and distributions by Betsy and Robert is likewise
of little import. Documents in the record show that the composition of the
portfolio changed little prior to decedent's death. We place little weight on
averments concerning change, during decedent's life, in the partners'
relationships to the contributed property.
Reichardt, Schauerhamer, Harper, and Thompson guide those who create and operate family limited
partnerships, but are not generally troubling because they do not attack the theory behind those entities. Stated
differently, those cases are based on section 2036(a)(l) which include in the gross estate property over which
decedent has the right to enjoyment. The application of2036(a)(l) may be avoided by respecting the form of the
entity and ensuring that minimal (or no) benefits, such as income distributions are made to the decedent limited
partner.
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On June 17,2002 the Fifth Circuit remanded Estate of Strangi, now called Rosalie Gulig v. Commissioner,
No. 01-60538, so that the Tax Court could consider section 2036. In Strangi the decedent's attorney-in-fact formed
the partnership two month's before the decedent's death. The decedent retained a 99% limited interest and a 47%
interest in the 1% corporate general partner. The decedent's children paid for the other shares in the general partner.
Over 75% of the partnerships' assets were marketable securities. The point here is not only section 2036(a)(1) but
also 2036(a)(2), namely that by having an interest in the general partner the decedent had the right to designate those
who would enjoy property.
In its initial Strangi opinion, which did not consider section 2036, the Tax Court first determined that the
"business purposes" for the partnership were bogus but that the partnership would be respected anyway because the
partnership was validly formed under state law. The Tax Court then rejected the applicability of section 2703 and
went on to consider whether there was a gift on formation:
In this case, the estate claims that the assets were transferred to SFLP for the
business purposes discussed above. Following the formation of SFLP, decedent
owned a 99-percent limited partnership interest in SFLP and 47 percent of the
corporate general partner, Stranco. Even assuming arguendo that decedent's
asserted business purposes were real, we do not believe that decedent would
give up over $3 million in value to achieve those business purposes.
Nonetheless, in this case, because we do not believe that decedent gave up
control over the assets, his beneficial interest in them exceeded 99 percent, and
his contribution was allocated to his own capital account, the instinctive reaction
that there was a gift at the inception of the partnership does not lead to a
determination of gift tax liability. In a situation such as that in Kincaid, where
other shareholders or partners have a significant interest in an entity that is
enhanced as a result of a transfer to the entity, or in a situation such as Shepherd
v. Commissioner, 115 T.e. _, _ (2000) (slip. op. at 21), where contributions
of a taxpayer are allocated to the capital accounts of other partners, there is a
gift. However, in view of decedent's continuing interest in SFLP and the
reflection of the contributions in his own capital account, he did not transfer
more than a minuscule proportion of the value that would be "lost" on the
conveyance of his assets to the partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest. See Kincaid v. United States, supra at 1224. Realistically, in this case,
the disparity between the value of the assets in the hands of decedent and the
alleged value of his partnership interest reflects on the credibility of the claimed
discount applicable to the partnership interest. It does not reflect a taxable gift.
Clearly the court thought another theory should be asserted, but was not - section 2036:
The actual control exercised by Mr. Gulig, combined with the 99-percent limited
partnership interest in SFLP and the 47- percent interest in Stranco, suggest the
possibility of including the property transferred to the partnership in decedent's
estate under section 2036. See, e.g., Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. 144 (2000). Section 2036 is not an issue in this case, however, because
respondent asserted it only in a proposed amendment to answer tendered shortly
before trial. Respondent's motion to amend the answer was denied because it
was untimely. Applying the economic substance doctrine in this case on the
basis of decedent's continuing control would be equivalent to applying section
2036(a) and including the transferred assets in decedent's estate. As discussed
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below, absent application of section 2036, Congress has adopted an alternative
approach to perceived valuation abuses.
The IRS expert allowed a 31 % discount which the court, reluctantly, accepted.
The Fifth Circuit stated on remand:
Fifty-two days before trial, the Commissioner filed a motion to amend to add a
claim that under §§ 2036 the estate should include the value of SFLP's assets
transferred from the decedent. The tax court denied the motion to amend,
apparently because it considered the motion untimely. We review the tax court's
decision to deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion. Halbert v. City of
Sherman, Tex., 33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). "A decision to grant leave is
within the discretion of the court, although if the court lacks a substantial reason
to deny leave, its discretion is not broad enough to permit denial." State of
Louisiana v. Litton Mortgage Co., 50 F.3d 1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1995)
(internal citations and quotes omitted). "In the absence of any apparent or
declared reason - such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules
require, be 'freely give.''' Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The only insight we have into the tax court's reasoning for the denial is its
statement that, even though §§ 2036 might apply on the facts, it was "not an
issue in this case, however, because respondent asserted it only in a proposed
amendment to answer tendered shortly before trial. Respondent's motion to
amend the answer was denied because it was untimely." However, the motion
was made nearly two months, not "shortly," before trial and was unlikely to
cause delay or prejudice. If the tax court's true reasoning was that the
Commissioner could have sought to assert the applicability of §§ 2036 earlier in
the proceedings, it did not assert such and did not discuss any evidence of bad
faith or dilatory motive. We cannot assume bad faith on the record here. The
record does not present an obvious reason for denial of leave to amend. See
Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Where reasons for
denying leave to amend are 'ample and obvious,' the district court's failure to
articulate specific reasons does not indicate an abuse of discretion."). We find
that the denial was an abuse of discretion.
Judge Cohen issued the second Tax Court opinion in Strangi on May 20,2003. T. C. Memo 2003 - 145.
The opinion is not a reviewed decision. The opinion deals with both section 2036(a)(1) and 2036(a)(2). The latter
analysis will cause more concern. The opinion summarizes the relevant facts as follows:
The SFLP agreement provides that distributions of proceeds and assets from the
entity shall be made in the sole discretion of the managing general partner. The
SFLP agreement also designates Stranco as the managing general partner.
Stranco, in turn, executed the management agreement employing Mr. Gulig to
manage the day-to-day business of SFLP, as well as of Stranco itself. Yet Mr.
Gulig was already decedent's attorney in fact pursuant to the 1988 general
power of attorney. Under this instrument, Mr. Gulig was granted full and
durable authority to act for decedent in his "name, place and stead". Mr. Gulig
set up the SFLP/Stranco arrangement to facilitate decedent's estate planning
goals and capitalized the partnership primarily with decedent's property.
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When distilled to their most essential terms, the governing documents gave Mr.
Gulig authority to specify distributions from SFLP, which is entirely consistent
with his authority under the 1988 power of attorney. Although the estate protests
that Mr. Gulig's authority under the management agreement was limited to
managing "the day-to-day business" of the partnership and did not extend to
making distributions or loans, the pertinent instruments provide no basis for
concluding that making distributions would be outside the day-to-day business
of a partnership capitalized nearly exclusively with investment assets. As a
practical matter, actual disbursement of funds occurred when checks were issued
by Mr. and Mrs. Gulig in their various related capacities, pursuant to rights
granted to them by decedent, acting through Mr. Gulig.
Hence, to summarize, the SFLP agreement named Stranco managing general
partner with the sole discretion to determine distributions. The Stranco
shareholders, including decedent (through Mr. Gulig), then acted together to
delegate such authority to Mr. Gulig under the management agreement.
Decedent's attorney in fact thereby stood in a position to make distribution
decisions. Mrs. Gulig effectuated these decisions by signing checks to the
recipients so designated.
The first issue for the court was the application of section 2036(a)(l).

The taxpayer attempted to

distinguish this case from the Schauerhamer to Reichardt and Harper line of cases. The court acknowledged that the
taxpayer here dotted more "i's" and crossed more "t's" than in the aforementioned cases but ultimately reached the
same result. Judge Cohen writes:
At the outset, we acknowledge that, in contrast to certain of the prior cases, the
participants involved in the SFLP/Stranco arrangement generally proceeded
such that "the proverbial 'i's were dotted' and 't's were crossed'." Strangi I at
486. Steps were taken to abide by the formal terms of the structure created. Such
measures may give SFLP and Stranco sufficient substance to be recognized as
legal entities in the context of valuation, which requires assumption of a
hypothetical buyer and seller. They do not preclude implicit retention by
decedent of economic benefit from the transferred property for purposes of
section 2036(a)(1).
First, we cannot lose sight of the fact that decedent contributed approximately
98 percent of his wealth, including his residence, to the SFLP/Stranco
arrangement. Respondent alleges that the transfer left decedent with inadequate
assets and cash flow to meet his living expenses, to which the estate takes
objection. The estate goes to great lengths to counter respondent'S assertion,
claiming that decedent at his death possessed liquefiable assets of at least
$172,000 and received on a monthly basis a pension of $1,438.18 and Social
Security of $1,559. The estate also stresses that respondent has not established
the amount of decedent's living expenses and maintains that, even if the
$33,323.22 in checks paid from decedent's account in August and September
were used as an estimate, the purported liquefiable assets would have covered
decedent's needs for his concededly short life expectancy of 12 to 24 months.
However, the relative dearth of liquefied (decedent's Form 706 showed two
bank accounts with funds totaling $762), as opposed to "liquefiable", assets
persuades us that decedent and his children and Mr. Gulig all expected that
SFLP and Stranco would be a primary source of decedent's liquidity. It is
unreasonable to expect that decedent would be forced to rely on sale of assets to
meet his basic costs of living.
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A second feature highly probative under section 2036(a)(l) is decedent's
continued physical possession of his residence after its transfer to SFLP. The
estate maintains that any otherwise negative implications of this circumstance
are neutralized by the fact that SFLP "charged Mr. Strangi rent" on occupancy
of the home and reported rental income on its 1994 tax return. Decedent
likewise reported a rent obligation on his estate tax return. For accounting
purposes, the accrued rent was recorded by SFLP on its books. Yet the accrued
amount was not paid until January 1997. A residential lessor dealing at arm's
length would hardly be content merely to accrue a rental obligation for eventual
payment more than 2 years later. As we have remarked, accounting entries alone
are of small moment in belying the existence of an agreement for retained
possession and enjoyment. Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at
154-155; Estate of Haroer v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2002-121.
Concerning factors that relate to use of entity funds, the estate emphasizes that
each disbursement for decedent or his estate was accompanied by a pro rata
allotment to Stranco. Where, as here, the only interest in the partnership other
than that held by the decedent is de minimis, a pro rata payment is hardly more
than a token in nature. In these circumstances, pro rata disbursements are
insufficient to negate the probability that the decedent retained economic
enjoyment of his or her assets. After all, distributing 1 percent to Stranco would
not in any substantial way operate to curb decedent's ability to benefit from
SFLP property. Accordingly, we direct our attention to the purpose, as opposed
to the mechanics, of partnership distributions and expenditures.
The record reveals several instances where SFLP expended funds in response to
a need of decedent or his estate. SFLP paid for Ms. Stone's back surgery to
alleviate an injury she sustained in caring for decedent prior to the formation of
SFLP. In 1994, SFLP expended nearly $40,000 for funeral expenses, estate
administration, and related debts, including a $19,810.28 check to Olsten to pay
for nursing services rendered to decedent before his death. These sums were
followed in 1995 and 1996 by further payment of over $65,000 for estate
expenses and a specific bequest. SFLP also disbursed approximately $3 million
directed toward decedent's estate and inheritance taxes.
The estate seeks to justify these payments primarily by emphasizing that they
were accounted for on SFLP's books as advances to partners and later closed as
distributions, with pro rata amounts either advanced or distributed to Stranco.
The evidence also indicates that the $65,000-plus amount was repaid in January
1997. The estate further explains that certain of these payments from SFLP were
necessitated by the delay in probate of decedent's estate engendered by the
process of getting TCB to decline executorship.
To the extent that the estate's arguments focus on accounting manipulations,
they are unavailing. As demonstrated in Estate of Reichardt v. Commissioner,
supra at 154-155, and Estate of Harner v. Commissioner, supra, accounting
adjustments do not preclude a conclusion that those involved understood that the
decedent's assets would be made available as needs materialized. Belated
repayment of certain amounts likewise does not refute the inference of an
implicit agreement for retained enjoyment that arises from the demonstrated and
contemporaneous availability of large sums. Furthermore, to the extent that the
estate's explanations focus on a delay in probate, they lack specificity. The more
salient feature would appear to be the insufficiency of the assets not contributed
to SFLP and Stranco to cover the significant expenses reasonably to be expected
to ensue in connection with decedent's poor health and death. That, in turn,
speaks to retained enjoyment.
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Regarding testamentary characteristics, the SFLP/Stranco arrangement also
bears greater resemblance to one man's estate plan than to any sort of
arm's-length, joint enterprise. As in Estate of Harper v. Commissioner, supra,
"the largely unilateral nature of the formation, the extent and type of the assets
contributed thereto, and decedent's personal situation are indicative." Mr. Gulig
established the entities using Fortress documents with little, if any, input from
other family members. The contributed property included the majority of
decedent's assets in general and his investments, a prime concern of estate
planning, in particular. Decedent was advanced in age and suffering from
serious health conditions. Furthermore, as discussed in Strangi I at 485-486, the
purpose of the partnership arrangement was not to provide a joint investment
vehicle for the management of decedent's assets, but was consistent with
testamentary intent.
Moreover, the crucial characteristic is that virtually nothing beyond formal title
changed in decedent's relationship to his assets. Mr. Gulig managed decedent's
affairs both before and after the transfer. Decedent's children did not obtain a
meaningful economic stake in the property during decedent's life. They raised
no objections or concerns when large sums were advanced for expenditures of
decedent or his estate, thus implying an understanding that decedent's access
thereto would not be restricted.
In face of the foregoing realities, the estate argues that whatever possession or
enjoyment of the contributed property decedent may have experienced was
neither "retained" by means of a contemporaneous agreement nor "with respect
to the transferred property". As regards the fIrst point, the estate contends that
respondent has offered no evidence to prove a contemporaneous agreement
requiring the distributions made, as opposed to an independent subsequent
decision by Stranco to make the same outlay. According to the estate:
Even if decisions to make distributions were made based on "sympathy
for poor old dad," i. e., "Oops, Mr. Strangi imprudently put too much
money into SFLP and we need to give some back" that would not meet
the criteria set by judicial precedent for determining the existence of a
retained expectation of possession of [sic] enjoyment: which is that
there must have been an implied agreement that was contemporaneous
with the transfer of the property at issue, not a subsequent agreement or
act. * * * [Fn. ref. omitted.]
We are persuaded that the evidence and circumstances detailed above render
such a contemporaneous agreement more likely than not.
The second point mentioned stems from the estate's view that pro rata
distributions were made not with respect to the transferred property, in which
decedent possessed no legal interest under the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act (TRLPA), Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132a-l, sec. 7.01
(Vernon Supp. 2003), but with respect to his partnership interest. Yet this
argument relies on paper title to the exclusion of the practicalities that are the
focus of section 2036(a)(I). The property contributed by decedent was the
source of the payments made. Furthermore, the record suggests that the impetus
underlying a number of signifIcant SFLP disbursements was needs of decedent
or his estate, rather than exigencies pertaining to Stranco or the partnership
itself.
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To this point, the opinion has been a bit more aggressively anti-taxpayer than the previous 2036(a)(1) cases
have been, but nonetheless the issues raised were essentially the same. However, the court did not stop there.
Noting that the taxpayer and the government argued extensively about the application of section 2036(a)(2) the court
decided to weigh in.

(So, before going further, remember this is arguably dicta in an unreviewed Tax Court

opinion.)
Judge Cohen describes the application of section 2036(a)(2) and the meaning oflhTIm! as follows:
As stated above, section 2036(a)(2) mandates inclusion in the gross estate of
transferred property with respect to which the decedent retained the right to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or its income. This
provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum, 408
U.S. 125 (1972), and both parties devote a significant portion of their respective
arguments to the implications of that decision. We address these arguments as
an alternative to our conclusions concerning section 2036(a)(1) and with
particular consideration of the facts of this case.
In United States v. Byrum, supra at 126, the decedent, Mr. Byrum, created an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children. He funded the trust with shares
of three closely held corporations but retained the right to vote the shares and to
veto any sale or transfer of the stock. Id. at 126-127. As a result, Mr. Byrum at
his death continued to have the right to vote not less than 71 percent of the
common stock in each of the three corporations. Id. at 128-129. The three
corporations were involved in lithography-related businesses and had a
substantial number of minority shareholders unrelated to Mr. Byrum. Id. at 130
& n. 2, 142 & n.20. (The Supreme Court noted that 11 of 12, 5 of 8, and 11 of
14 stockholders, respectively, in the three corporations appeared to be unrelated
to Mr. Byrum. Id. at 142 n.20.) The trust instrument specified that there be, and
Mr. Byrum named, an independent corporate trustee. Id. at 126. The trustee was
authorized in its "absolute and sole discretion" to pay income and principal to or
for the benefit of the beneficiaries. Id. at 127.
The Commissioner argued that, by retaining voting control over the
corporations, Mr. Byrum was in a position to select the corporate directors and
thereby to control corporate dividend policy. Id. at 131-132. According to the
Commissioner, the scenario in dispute gave Mr. Byrum the ability to regulate
the flow of income to the trust, which ability was characterized as tantamount to
a grantor-trustee's power to accumulate trust income for remaindermen or to
distribute to present beneficiaries. Id. at 132. The Court had previously ruled
that the latter power to accumulate rather than disburse constituted a right to
designate under section 2036(a)(2). Id. at 135-136; United States v. O'Malley,
383 U.S. 627, 631 (1966).
Given the above facts, the Supreme Court held "that Byrum did not have an
unconstrained de facto power to regulate the flow of dividends to the trust, much
less the 'right' to designate who was to enjoy the income from trust property."
United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 143. The Court rejected the
Commissioner's "control rationale" as it "would create a standard - not
specified in the statute - so vague and amorphous as to be impossible of
ascertainment in many instances." Id. at 137 n. 10. In reaching its conclusion,
the Court relied on a series of "economic and legal constraints" to which any
power that Mr. Byrum might have had was subject and which prevented such
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power from being equivalent to a right to designate persons to enjoy trust
income. Id. at 144.
The Court emphasized that the independent corporate trustee alone had the right
under the trust instrument to payout or withhold income. Id. at 137. Even if Mr.
Byrum had managed to flood the trust with dividends, he had no way of
compelling the trustee to payout or accumulate that income. Id. at 143. The
Court also noted that the power to elect directors conferred no legal right to
command them to payor not pay dividends. Id. at 137. Moreover, the flow of
dividends from the corporations would be subject to economic vicissitudes,
retained earnings policies, and business needs. Id. at 139-140. In this regard, the
Court explained:
There is no reason to suppose that the three corporations controlled by
Byrum were other than typical small businesses. The customary
vicissitudes of such enterprises - bad years; product obsolescence;
new competition; disastrous litigation; new, inhibiting Government
regulations; even bankruptcy - prevent any certainty or predictability
as to earnings or dividends. There is no assurance that a small
corporation will have a flow of net earnings or that income earned will
in fact be available for dividends. Thus, Byrum's alleged de facto
"power to control the flow of dividends" to the trust was subject to
business and economic variables over which he had little or no control.
[ Id. at 249.]
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stressed that "A majority shareholder has a
fiduciary duty not to misuse his power by promoting his personal interests at the
expense of corporate interests" and the directors of a corporation "have a
fiduciary duty to promote the interests ofthe corporation." Id. at 137-138. Such
duties were legally enforceable by means of, for example, a derivative suit. Id. at
141-142.
The court then noted that in fact Mr. Strangi had the ability to designate who would receive the benefits of
the partnership acting in conjunction with others, namely the general partner. The simplest illustration of the
principle is that Mr. Strangi, as limited partner, could act with the general partner to liquidate the partnership, and
thus receive the vast majority of the partnership assets. The opinion states:
With respect to SFLP income and as previously recounted in greater detail, the
SFLP agreement named Stranco managing general partner and conferred on the
managing general partner sole discretion to determine distributions. The Stranco
shareholders, including decedent (through Mr. Gulig), then acted together to
delegate this authority to Mr. Gulig through the management agreement. The
effect of these actions placed decedent's attorney in fact in a position to make
distribution decisions. Mrs. Gulig effectuated such decisions by executing
checks to the recipients so designated.
In addition to the rights described above related to income, decedent also
retained the right, acting in conjunction with other Stranco shareholders, to
designate who shall enjoy the transferred SFLP property itself. The Supreme
Court indicated in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. at 143 n.23 (citing
Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946», that a "power to
terminate the trust and thereby designate the beneficiaries at a time selected by
the settlor" would implicate section 2036(a)(2). Pursuant to the SFLP
agreement, the partnership would be dissolved and terminated upon a
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unanimous vote of the limited partners and the unanimous consent of the general
partner. The shareholders agreement likewise specifies that dissolution of SFLP
requires the affmnative vote of all Stranco shareholders. Once dissolution and
termination occur, liquidation is accomplished as set forth in the SFLP
agreement. The managing general partner is named as the liquidator, which in
tum disburses partnership assets first in payment of debts and then in repayment
of partners' capital account balances. Authority is expressly granted for
distributions in kind. Accordingly, decedent can act together with other Stranco
shareholders essentially to revoke the SFLP arrangement and thereby to bring
about or accelerate present enjoyment of partnership assets. Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that such action would likely revest in decedent himself, as the
99-percent limited partner, the majority ofthe contributed property.
As regards property transferred to Stranco and income therefrom, decedent held
the right, in conjunction with one or more other Stranco directors, to declare
dividends. The corporation's bylaws authorize the board of directors to declare
dividends from the entity. For the board to take such action, a majority vote of
the directors at a meeting with a quorum present is sufficient. Under the bylaws,
a majority of the directors then serving constitutes a quorum. Because Stranco
had five directors, a quorum would consist of three, so two directors (e. g.,
decedent through Mr. Gulig and one other) could potentially act together to
declare a dividend. The Stranco shareholders agreement further provided that
each of the initial five directors would be reelected annually, thus effectively
ensuring decedent's position on the board.
In response to various of the above concepts pertammg to Jomt action,
particularly by stockowners, the estate suggests: "If the mere fact that a
shareholder could band together with all of the other shareholders of a
corporation and such banding together would be sufficient to cause inclusion
under Section 2036, then it would have been impossible for the United States
Supreme Court to reach the decision that it did in Byrum." The estate's
observation ignores the existence in United States v. Byrum, supra, of the
independent trustee who alone had the ability to determine distributions from the
disputed trust, notwithstanding any prior action by corporate owners or
directors. It also ignores the identity of the shareholders in this case and the dual
roles played by Mr. Gulig.
To summarize, review of the documentary evidence discussed above reveals that
decedent here retained rights of a far different genre from those at issue in
United States v. Byrum, supra. Rather than mere "control", management, or
influence, there are traceable to decedent through the explicit provisions of the
governing instruments ascertainable and legally enforceable rights to designate
persons who shall enjoy the transferred property and its income. The estate's
reliance on a limited partner's lack under the TRLPA of participation in control
and under the SFLP agreement of management authority is thus misplaced. The
alleged absence of such powers cannot negate the dispositive rights granted in
the instant case. The SFLP/Stranco arrangement placed decedent in a position to
act, alone or in conjunction with others, through his attorney in fact, to cause
distributions of property previously transferred to the entities or of income
therefrom. Decedent's powers, absent sufficient limitation as discussed infra,
therefore fall within the purview of section 2036(a)(2).
What about the fiduciary duty argument that saved the taxpayer in!bTI!m? The court gave the argument
short-shrift fmding that the fiduciary duties which existed mostly ran to Mr. Strangi himself:
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The fiduciary duties present in United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), ran
to a significant number of unrelated parties and had their genesis in operating
businesses that would lend meaning to the standard of acting in the best interests
of the entity. As a result, there existed both a realistic possibility for
enforcement and an objective business environment against which to judge
potential dereliction. Given the emphasis that the Supreme Court laid on these
factual realities, fuTI!m simply does not require blind application of its holding
to scenarios where the purported fiduciary duties have no comparable substance.
We therefore analyze the situation before us to determine whether the fiduciary
duties relied upon by the estate would genuinely circumscribe use of powers to
designate.
The estate summarizes its contentions regarding fiduciary duties as follows:
Just like Mr. Byrum, Mr. Strangi's "rights" (whatever those rights
appear to be) were severely limited by the fiduciary duties of other
people who (according to Byrum) presumably could be counted on the
[sic 1 observe those restraints against whatever desires they might
otherwise have had to run pell-mell to do the bidding of the Decedent:
(I) Mr. Gulig, who (separate and apart from his role as attorney-in-fact
for Mr. Strangi) had fiduciary duties to Stranco, whom he served as
manager; (2) the directors of Stranco, who had fiduciary duties to both
Stranco and to SFLP as a whole; and (3) McLennan County
Community College ("MCCC"), which had rights as a minority
shareholder of Stranco and a fiduciary obligation to enforce such rights
for the benefit of its own beneficiaries as well as the people of the State
of Texas (with the Attorney General of Texas having the ability to step
in to enforce such rights ifMCCC failed in its duties). * * *
None of the foregoing obligations cited by the estate is sufficiently on par with
those detailed in United States v. Byrum, supra, to bring the present case within
the Supreme Court's rationale.
Concerning Mr. Gulig, any fiduciary duties that Mr. Gulig might have had in his
role as manager of Stranco (and thereby of SFLP) are entitled to comparatively
little weight on these facts. Prior to his instigation of the SFLP/Stranco
arrangement, Mr. Gulig stood in a confidential relationship, and owed fiduciary
duties, to decedent personally as his attorney in fact. Thus, to the extent that
Stranco or SFLP's interests might diverge from those of decedent, we do not
believe that Mr. Gulig would disregard his preexisting obligation to decedent.
As regards fiduciary obligations of Stranco and its directors, these duties, too,
have little significance in the present context. Although Stranco would owe a
fiduciary duty to SFLP and to the limited partners, decedent owned the sole,
99-percent limited partnership interest. The rights to designate traceable to
decedent through Stranco cannot be characterized as limited in any meaningful
way by duties owed essentially to himself. Nor do the obligations of Stranco
directors to the corporation itself warrant any different conclusion. Decedent
held 47 percent of Stranco, and his own children held 52 of the remaining 53
percent. Intrafamily fiduciary duties within an investment vehicle simply are not
equivalent in nature to the obligations created by the United States v. Byrum,
supra, scenario.
With respect to the role of MCC Foundation, United States v. Byrum, supra,
affords no basis for permitting outcomes under section 2036(a)(2). to tum on
factors amounting to no more than window dressing. A charity given a
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gratuitous I-percent interest would not realistically exercise any meaningful
oversight.
Finally, and not unsurprisingly, Judge Cohen concluded that the arrangement had not been entered into for
full and adequate consideration. She writes:
We see no distinction of consequence between the scenario analyzed in Estate of
Harper v. Commissioner, supra, and that of the present case. Decedent
contributed more than 99 percent of the total property placed in the
SFLP/Stranco arrangement and received back an interest the value of which
derived almost exclusively from the assets he had just assigned. Furthermore,
the SFLP/Stranco arrangement patently fails to qualitY as the sort of functioning
business enterprise that could potentially inject intangibles that would lift the
situation beyond mere recycling. Cf. Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, T.e.
Memo. 1987-8; Church v. United States, 85 AFTR 2d 2000-804, 2000-1 USTC
par. 60,369 (W.O. Tex. 2000), affd. without published opinion 268 F.3d 1063
(5th Cir. 200 I) (both involving contributions by other participants not de
minimis in nature, for a genuine pooling of interests). We therefore hold that
decedent did not engage in any transfer for consideration upon the creation and
funding of SFLP and Stranco. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to no exception
to the treatment mandated by section 2036(a).
If the limited interests had been held in a marital trust included in Mr. Strangi's estate would the result have
been differenP What if Me Strangi had transferred the limited interests to a trust over which he retained a special
power of appointment but no other rights? That is, if the limited partnership interests had been included in his estate
but in fact he had not had the right to assist in the liquidation of the partnership would Judge Cohen have held
differently? Supposing such were the case, presumable section 2035 would impose the three-year rule. Is the effect
any different were the limited interests given away prior to death?
The practical effect of Strangi will be to embolden the IRS to argue against significant discounts when
valuing limited partnership interests in estates. The theoretical underpinnings of Strangi are more suspect. The
opinion pushes taxpayers to create partnership arrangements and avoid ever having control over the partnership. In
tum, that raises the possibility that the "gift on formation" issue reappears. Arguably, the Tax Court analysis dealing
with the gift on formation has not directly confronted a situation in which the Tax Court believes the creator did not
retain de facto control over the partnership.
The taxpayers defeated a section 2036(a)(I) argument in Estate of Eugene E. Stone, III v. Commissioner,
T.e. Memo 2003-309, because the Court found full and adequate consideration rather than a "mere recycling" of
value. The Court held as follows:
On the record before us, we agree with the estates' position and reject
respondent's position. The instant cases are distinguishable from Estate of
Harper v. Commissioner, supra, and other cases factually similar to Estate of
Harper on which respondent relies, and respondent's reliance on such cases is
misplaced. Unlike the transfers involved in Estate of Harper and those other
cases, we have found on the record in the instant cases that the respective
transfers of assets by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of the Five Partnerships,
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as well as the respective transfers of assets by the other partners to each such
partnership, were bona fide, arm's-length transfers.
On the record before us, we reject respondent's contention that, because Mr.
Stone and Ms. Stone did not actively participate in the negotiations by the
children, the respective transfers of assets by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of
the Five Partnerships were not bona fide, arm's-length transfers. Each member
of the Stone family was represented by his or her own independent counsel and
had input into the decision-making as to how each of the Five Partnerships was
to be structured and operated and what property was to be transferred to each
such partnership. The Stone family understood that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone
would not be bound by any agreements that the children were able to reach as a
result of the children's negotiations and that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone would
make the ultimate decision as to which, if any, of their respective assets to
transfer to each of the Five Partnerships. In this connection, although Mr. Stone
and Ms. Stone agreed to form the Five Partnerships, they did not intend to, and
did not, transfer all their respective assets to such partnerships. Instead, they
retained sufficient assets to enable them to maintain their respective accustomed
standards of living. Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone did not accept the children's
recommendations resulting from the children's negotiations regarding the
structure, funding, and operation of the Five Partnerships without thought,
comment, or question. For example, it was Mr. Merline, Mr. Stone's attorney,
who drafted proposed partnership agreements for the Five Partnerships. Mr.
Merline discussed with Mr. Stone the children's and their respective attorneys'
suggested changes to those proposed agreements. Only after Mr. Stone agreed to
certain of those suggested changes did Mr. Merline revise the proposed
partnerships agreements to reflect the changes to which Mr. Stone agreed.
The record also establishes that the respective transfers at issue did not
constitute gifts by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone, respectively, to the other partners of
each of the Five Partnerships. In addition, the record shows that those transfers
were motivated primarily by investment and business concerns relating to the
management of certain of the respective assets of Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone
during their lives [and thereafter and the resolution of the litigation among the
children.
Unlike the decedent in Estate of Harper and other cases factually similar to that
case, the record in the instant cases establishes that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone did
substantially more than "change the form in which he [and she] held his [and
her] beneficial interest in the contributed property." Estate of Harper v.
Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2002-121. The record in the instant cases shows
that the Five Partnerships had economic substance and operated as joint
enterprises for profit through which the children actively participated in the
management and development of the respective assets of such partnerships
during their parents' lives (and thereafter). When the partners of ES3LP formed
and funded that partnership, they contemplated and intended that ES3LP operate
as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that the
children contribute their services in providing such management. After ES3LP
was funded in April 1997, the children actively managed the assets of that
partnership, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended. When the partners of ES4LP
formed and funded that partnership, they contemplated and intended that ES4LP
operate as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that
Eugene Earle Stone, IV, contribute his services in providing such management.
After the funding of ES4LP in April 1997, Eugene Earle Stone, IV, began
actively managing the assets of ES4LP, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended.
When the partners of CRSLP formed and funded that partnership, they
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contemplated and intended that CRSLP operate as a joint enterprise for profit for
the management of its assets and that C. Rivers Stone contribute his services in
providing such management. After the funding of CRSLP in April 1997, e.
Rivers Stone began actively managing the assets of that partnership, as Mr.
Stone and Ms. Stone intended. When the partners of RSMLP formed and funded
that partnership, they contemplated and intended that RSMLP operate as a joint
enterprise for profit for the management of its assets and that Ms. Morris
contribute her services in providing such management. After the funding of
RSMLP in April 1997, Ms. Morris began actively managing the assets of that
partnership, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended. When the partners of MSFLP
formed and funded that partnership, they contemplated and ,intended that
MSFLP operate as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its assets
and that Ms. Fraser contribute her services in providing such management. After
the funding of MSFLP in April 1997, Ms. Fraser began actively managing the
assets of that partnership, as Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone intended.
On the record in the instant cases, we find that, unlike the transfers involved in
Estate of Harper and other cases factually similar to that case, the respective
transfers at issue by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone did not constitute "circuitous
'recycling' of value".
On the record before us, we further fmd that the respective transfers of assets by
Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of the Five Partnerships were for adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth. We have found that such transfers
were not, and respondent does not claim that they were, gifts by Mr. Stone and
Ms. Stone, respectively, to the other partners of each such partnership. We have
also found, and respondent agrees and/or does not dispute, that after all the
partners of each of the Five Partnerships transferred to each such partnership
certain of their respective assets and after certain gifts were made by Mr. Stone
in April 1997 to correct the unintended consequences of certain inadvertent
valuation errors: (I) All partners of each of the Five Partnerships held respective
partnership interests in each such partnership that were proportionate to the fair
market value of the assets that such partners respectively transferred to each
such partnership; (2) the respective assets that the partners of each such
partnership transferred to each such partnership were properly credited to the
respective capital accounts of such partners; and (3) upon the termination or
dissolution of each of the Five Partnerships, the partners of each such
partnership were entitled to distributions from each such partnership in amounts
equal to their respective capital accounts. Under the circumstances presented in
the instant cases, we find that Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone, as well as the other
partners of each of the Five Partnerships, received in exchange for their
respective transfers of assets to each such partnership respective partnership
interests in each such partnership that were adequate and full equivalents
reducible to a money value. See sees. 20.2036-1(a), 20.2043-1 (a), Estate Tax
Regs.; see also Estate of Goetchius, 17 T.e. at 503.
Respondent nonetheless argues that, because Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone received
respective partnership interests in each of the Five Partnerships the value of
which, taking into account appropriate discounts, was less than the value of the
respective assets that they transferred to each such partnership, they did not
receive adequate and full consideration for the assets transferred. Respondent's
argument in effect reads out of section 2036(a) the exception for "a bona fide
sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" in any
case where there is a bona fide, arm's- length transfer of property to a business
entity (e.g., a partnership or a corporation) for which the transferor receives an
interest in such entity (e.g., a partnership interest or stock) that is proportionate
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to the fair market value of the property transferred to such entity and the
determination of the value of such an interest takes into account appropriate
discounts. We reject such an argument by respondent that reads out of section
2036(a) the exception that Congress expressly prescribed when it enacted that
statute.
Respondent's argument about the discounted values of the partnership interests
at issue also ignores the fact that each of the Five Partnerships was created,
funded, and operated as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its
assets in which there was a genuine pooling of property and services. We have
found that, when the partners of each of the Five Partnerships formed and
funded each such partnership, they contemplated and intended that each such
partnership operate as a joint enterprise for profit for the management of its
assets and that the children contribute services in providing such management in
the case of ES3LP and that Eugene Earle Stone, IV, C. Rivers Stone, Ms.
Morris, and Ms. Fraser contribute services in providing such management in the
case of ES4LP, CRSLP, RSMLP, and MSFLP, respectively. As Mr. Stone and
Ms. Stone intended, after the funding of ES3LP, the children actively
participated in the management of the assets of that partnership, and after the
funding of ES4LP, CRSLP, RSMLP, and MSFLP, Eugene Earle Stone, IV, C.
Rivers Stone, Ms. Morris, and Ms. Fraser, respectively, actively participated in
the management of the assets of such partnerships.
Based upon our examination of the entire record before us, we find that the
respective transfers of assets by Mr. Stone and Ms. Stone to each of the Five
Partnerships were bona fide sales for adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth under section 2036(a).
Estate of Ida Abraham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-39, involved 2036(a)(l). Mrs. Abraham was
declared incompetent on March 10, 1993; on December 30, 1993 the guardians received court permission to make
gifts on behalf of Mrs. Abraham; and on June 13, 1994 Mrs. Abraham's children and the guardians agreed upon a
giving plan involving various partnerships, corporate general partners, and trusts.
Judge Ruwe held that Mrs. Abraham was always to receive the income from the assets transferred to the
partnerships because that was the plan. The opinion states:
It is clear from the documentary evidence and the testimony elicited at trial that,

regardless of the form of decedent's transfers, she continued to enjoy the right to
support and maintenance from all the income that the FLPs generated.
According to the decree (the document which authorized the creation of the
FLPs), decedent's needs for support were contemplated first from the income
that the FLPs generated. Only after decedent's support needs, if any, were met
did the children/limited partners receive their proportionate share of the
partnership income. Decedent's support needs were treated as an obligation of
the FLPs. For example, the decree provided that decedent's children
shall receive income from said * * * [FLPs] * * * after deducting from
the gross income of the partnership all fees, taxes, partnership
administration expenses, reserve for expenses and monies needed in the
discretion of the limited Guardian ad litem * * * for Ida Abraham's
support.
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In the decree, decedent's children agreed that they would
share equally any and all costs and expenses related to * * * the support
of Ida Abraham insofar as the funds generated by Ida Abraham's
properties maintained by her do not provide sufficient funds for her
adequate health, safety, welfare and comfort as determined by the
limited Guardian ad litem * * *
The document further provided:
Ida Abraham's living arrangement shall remain in accordance with the
present arrangement and every effort will be made to maintain her in
"status quo." Her segregated assets shall be maintained at a level
established by the limited Guardian ad litem in his sole discretion.
Estate of Lea K. Hillgren v. Commissioner,

T.e. Memo 2004-46, also involved section 2036 (a)(1).

On

October 31, 1996 the decedent attempted suicide; on January 1, 1997 the decedent and her brother formed a limited
partnership together; on June 5, 1997 the decedent committed suicide. The decedent and her brother had a variety of
business deals together, loans between them, etc.

The opinion describes the formation and operation of the

partnership, known as LKHP:
Decedent and Hillgren formed LKHP with an effective date of January
1, 1997. The term of the partnership was set for 29 years. Walsworth
represented both decedent and Hillgren in the formation of the
partnership. Decedent held a 99.95-percent capital interest and a 75percent profit interest in LKHP. Decedent gave Hillgren a .05- percent
capital interest and a 25-percent profit interest in the partnership. The
term "profit interest" was defined in the partnership agreement as "a
partnership interest other than a capital interest * * * which will give
rise to a partnership capital account * * * only if and when there is
future economic income" (25-percent profit interest). The partnership
agreement also provided Hillgren with 25 percent of the amount, if any,
by which the partnership profits from operations in any year exceeded
profits from operations realized by decedent in 1996 from the
properties transferred (25-percent operational interest). The 25-percent
operational interest was compensation to Hillgren for time spent in the
management of LKHP. Decedent made no other gifts of partnership
interests.
Decedent contributed seven properties (the LKHP properties) to LKHP,
as described in exhibit B to the partnership agreement. Hillgren did not
contribute any property to LKHP. The seven LKHP properties that
were contributed to the partnership at its formation included the three
Orange County properties and the University property that were already
the subject of the BLA and that were used to fund the amended trust. In
addition, the other three properties that were contributed were the
Crescent Bay, Railroad, and Manzanita properties in California that
also previously were used to fund the amended trust. After the initial
contributions were made, no additional property was transferred to the
partnership.
Decedent did not deed or transfer title to the seven LKHP properties to
the partnership. The partnership agreement provided that title to any
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property that was contributed by a limited partner, and was deemed to
be owned by the partnership, would remain in the name of the limited
partner for the benefit of the partnership. The leases that encumbered
the LKHP properties were not formally assigned to LKHP prior to
decedent's death. The leases remained in the name of decedent, or in
the name of Sea Shell [a sole proprietorship of decedent], after LKHP
was formed. The title remained in the name of decedent or Sea Shell in
order to hide the change of ownership from the general public and from
the tenants of the properties. Under the partnership agreement, Hillgren
could conduct partnership business without disclosing the existence of
the partnership. The partnership was designed generally to be invisible
to the public and to persons with whom decedent and Hillgren did
business.
On May 27, 1997, decedent executed seven quitclaim deeds,
transferring her interest in the LKHp properties to the amended trust.
The deeds were umecorded at the time of her death. Also on May 27,
1997, decedent assigned her partnership interest to the amended trust.
2. Operation ofLKHP
The partnership agreement provided that the general partner need not
open a bank account in the name of the partnership, but could instead
maintain the existing bank account that was used by Sea Shell and the
amended trust. As a result, LKHP did not have a dedicated bank
account during decedent's lifetime. Decedent held a bank account at
Wells Fargo Bank (Wells Fargo) that operated under the name of the
amended trust, doing business as Sea Shell. The Wells Fargo account
was used for operation of LKHP.
LKHP's fmancial statement dated June 5, 1997, and its general ledger
from January 1 through June 30, 1997, included decedent's residence,
the mortgage on her residence, and the mortgage and property tax
payments that were made on the residence. Decedent's residence and
the expenses attributed to the residence were removed from the ledger
in a journal entry by an adjustment dated January I, 1997. The adjusted
journal entry was not posted until after decedent's death. It was the
practice of decedent and Hillgren to post the opening entries on their
accounting books anywhere from 6 to 8 months after the start of the
year. As a result, the opening entries for LKHP wer~ not made until
after decedent's death. Also, the balance sheets, leqgers, and check
registers that represented the fmandal information I of LKHP were
actually maintained under the name of Sea Shell.
.
After the formation of LKHP, leases were executed on the LKHP
properties in the name of Sea Shell. Also after the formation, all
contracts that were entered into for maintenance and improvement of
the LKHP properties, as well as all bills that were received, were in
names other than that of LKHP. On March 12, 1997, a check was
issued under the name of Sea Shell to pay property taxes for various
properties including Manzanita and Enterprise. On May 22, 1998, Sea
Shell also paid for landlord's insurance on the Manzanita property.
After the formation of LKHP, Nordica completed refmancing of its
properties. During the loan application process, it was represented to a
mortgage broker, Walker Mortgage, and a lender, Homesteader's Life

A-I05

Co., that decedent owned and controlled all of the LKHP properties. No
mention was made to either the mortgage broker or the lender that the
properties were restricted by the BLA or that they were owned by
LKHP. The disclosure was not made to the lender because it might
have caused the refinancing to fail.
There were no recorded minutes of any meetings of partners of LKHP.
On May 13, 1999, after decedent's death, a certificate of limited
partnership was filed for LKHP with the California Secretary of State.
3. LKHP Distributions
The partnership agreement provided for distributions of cash at the sole
discretion of Hillgren, as the general partner. From January 1 through
June 5, 1997, decedent received distributions totaling $99,363. Hillgren
did not receive any distributions during this period. The distributions
that were received by decedent during 1997 were made specifically to
enable decedent to pay her living expenses, and she was dependent on
the cashtlow of the partnership to cover her personal expenses.
LKHP also paid the costs of the estate. On March 5, 1998, distributions
in the amounts of $135,000 and $80,000 were made from the
partnership to the amended trust. The distributions were applied to pay
installments of decedent's estate taxes due to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and to the California State Treasurer. From 1998 until
2002, distributions were consistently made from LKHP to the amended
trust to continue payment of decedent's estate taxes to the IRS and to
the California Franchise Tax Board.
4. Management of the LKHP Properties
MSL Properties, Inc. (MSL), is a property management company in
Orange, California, with the same business address as Hillgren. Debra
Gates (Gates) is the president and registered agent of MSL. Gates and
decedent met in 1984 and became friends. Decedent appointed Gates as
an alternate under decedent's durable power of attorney for health care.
Since MSL was incorporated in 1986, MSL continuously managed
properties that were owned by Hillgren family entities. MSL had
approximately 12 clients in addition to LKHP, all of which were related
entities of the Hillgren family. The related entities included, among
others, the amended trust, Carl C. Hillgren, Hillgren, Hillgren's
children, the Mark Hillgren Children's Trust, and Seaward. The duties
that were performed by MSL included property management, general
office functions, and bookkeeping. Gates worked with decedent in
managing the properties, and decedent would set parameters for Gates's
responsibilities.
Prior to the formation of LKHP, MSL managed the seven LKHP
properties. In 1997, MSL continued to manage the LKHP properties
after the formation of LKHP. Gates understood that LKHP was to
continue using the Wells Fargo bank account, used previously by Sea
Shell and the amended trust, after the partnership commenced.
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To perform its bookkeeping duties, MSL gave each client an individual
company number in order to keep their books. The LKHP properties
were managed under "company number 50" prior to the formation of
LKHP. From January 1 through June 30, 1997, the LKHP properties
continued to be managed for LKHP under company number 50. After
formation of the partnership, the books remained the same as before.
Gates planned to make journal adjustments for the partnership for
"year-end tax return purposes".
5. LKHP's Federal Tax Returns
For 1997, LKHP filed a Form 1065, U.S. Partnership Return ofIncome
(1997 return). The 1997 return reported no ordinary income to LKHP.
On LKHP's Schedule K, Partners' Shares of Income, Credits,
Deductions, etc., the partnership reported net income from real estate
activities of $93,304, depreciation of $1,011, and distributions of
$100,601. On LKHP's Schedule K-l, Partner's Share of Income,
Credits, Deductions, etc., filed for the amended trust, as a partner, the
partnership reported income from rental activities of $93,257,
depreciation of $1,010, and distributions of $100,601. The amended
trust was allocated a 99.95-percent interest in LKHP. The Schedule K-l
filed for Hillgren reported income from rental activities of $47 and
depreciation of $1. The schedule of activities that was filed with the
1997 return reported rental real estate income or loss associated with
the seven LKHP properties as allocated to both the amended trust and
Hillgren, as reported on their respective Schedules K-1. The partnership
also filed a statement with the 1997 return notifying the IRS that it
intended to file an amended return.
For 1997, LKHP filed an additional Form 1065 as an amended return
(1997 first amended return). The 1997 first amended return made an
election to adjust the basis in the LKHP properties under section 754.
The Schedule K and Schedules K-l remained the same as in the
original return.
Also for 1997, LKHP filed an additional Form 1065 as an amended
return (1997 second amended return). The 1997 second amended return
was filed to correct the allocation of partnership income as 75 percent
to the amended trust and 25 percent to Hillgren. The Schedules K-l for
the amended trust, and for Hillgren, were adjusted for this change,
showing that the amended trust held a 99.0027- percent capital interest
and a 75-percent profit interest and that Hillgren held a .9973-percent
capital interest and a 25-percent profit interest. As a result, the net
income from real estate and the depreciation on the Schedules K-l were
reallocated accordingly. The reported distribution of $100,601 to the
amended trust remained allocated to the amended trust on the Schedule
K-l.

For 1998, LKHP filed a Form 1065 (1998 return) with attached
Schedule K reporting net income of $389,124 and distributions of
$423,500. The 1998 return's Schedule K-l for the amended trust
reported allocations of $388,929 of income in accordance with the
99.95-percent profit interest and the entire amount of the distribution.
Hillgren's Schedule K-l reported $195 in income and no distribution.
Also for 1998, LKHP filed an amended Form 1065 (1998 amended
return). The 1998 amended return reduced the net income to $320,369
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and reported guaranteed payments to partners of $68,755. The
distribution remained unchanged. Similar to the 1997 second amended
return, the 1998 amended return reported a corrected allocation of the
25-percent profit interest to Hillgren. The income that was reported on
the Schedules K-l was reallocated accordingly, but the amount of the
distribution to the amended trust remained the same.
For 1999, LKHP filed a Fonn 1065 and an amended Fonn 1065 to
report again the corrected allocation of the profits interest and to report
guaranteed payments to partners. For 2000 and 2001, LKHP filed
Fonns 1065 with the correct allocation of the profits interest, and no
amended returns were filed.
Judge Cohen concluded:
The estate claims that decedent was "in excellent physical health, on
new antidepressant medication, and not contemplating suicide" and
that, therefore, the partnership was not an alternate testamentary
vehicle. The evidence contradicts this claim. Shortly before her death,
decedent attempted suicide, was on various medications, was under the
care of a psychiatrist, and suffered from severe pain due to
degenerative disc disease. After her initial suicide attempt, LKHP was
fonned.
Decedent and Hillgren started many businesses over the years and
disregarded entities as they saw fit, making various "situational
representations", i. e., statements about their property ownership and
values to support a then existing purpose, without regard to accuracy.
Even the stipulated facts contain inconsistencies regarding entity names
and dates of creation and dissolution. The stipulations of the parties
were often contradicted by the documents that were provided by
Hillgren. Hillgren and the estate's representatives continued to
disregard the LKHP agreement both prior to and after decedent's death.
Interestingly, the taxpayer won on valuation using a different theory, namely that the decedent and her
brother had previously entered into a "business loan agreement ("BLA") which was respected and had business
purposes. Among other features, the decedent's brother's agreement was necessary if decedent wanted to sell any of
the properties. The IRS argued the partnership superseded the BLA but Judge Cohen held the partnership had zero
effect. The Fonn 706 had reported various discounts for different properties ranging from 35% to 50% which the
court allowed.
Hillgren points out the importance of considering, and arguing for, all possible discounts, and rationales for
discounts, on the Fonn 706 as well as in court. The Fonn 706 is treated a stipulation.
The most important case in 2004 dealing with partnerships is Kimbell v. U.S., 371 F.3d 257 (5th Cir.
2004), where the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court directly on 2036 grounds. The District Court had held that
section 2036(a)(l) would apply to assets in a partnership where the decedent was a 99% limited partner and the
partnership agreement allowed a 70% partner to remove and replace the general partner. The opinion states:
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Plaintiff argues that Decedent's transfer of assets to the Partnership was a bona
fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. The
Tax Court has explained, and this Court agrees, that "applicability of the [bona
fide sale] exception rests on two requirements: (1) [a] bona fide sale, meaning an
arm's-length transaction, and (2) adequate and full consideration." Harper,
T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-121, *21.
In the instant case, Decedent's transfer fails both requirements. Plaintiff has
produced no credible evidence that the formation of the Partnership was the
product of an arm's length transaction, i.e. a transaction "between two parties
who are not related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly
equal bargaining power." Black's Law Dictionary 103 (7th ed. 1999). Indeed,
one cannot even find two parties, much less two parties conducting an arm's
length negotiation leading to a "bona fide sale". See Mollenberg's Estate v.
Commissioner, 173 F.2d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1949)(quoted in Harper, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2002-121, *21)(defming a 'sale' as "an exchange resulting from a
bargain"). Ownership interests in the Partnership are held by two entities: 99%
by the Trust which was wholly-owned by Decedent, and 1% by the LLC which
was 50% owned by the Trust. Therefore, Decedent not only "stood on both sides
of the transaction," but, for all intensive purposes, was both sides of the
transaction. Harper, T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-121, *21 (noting that "it would be an
oxymoron to say that one can engage in an arm's length transaction with
oneself').
Moreover, even if one assumes the Partnership was the result of "a bona fide
sale," Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Decedent received "adequate and
full consideration" for the sale. While "adequate and full consideration" is not
defmed in the Code, Wheeler v. U.S., 116 F.3d 749, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1997), this
Court agrees with the Tax Court that the meaning of "adequate and full
consideration" does not include paper transactions such as the one at issue in the
current case. The Decedent, through the Trust, contributed 99% of the capital for
the Partnership and in return received a 99% interest in the partnership.
Decedent received no consideration other than the interest in the Partnership.
Plaintiff, before becoming the general partner of the Partnership, was already
managing both the Trust, from where 99% of the assets of the Partnership came
and the LLC from where the other 1% came (of which 0.5% were from the
Trust). Nothing appears to have changed.
The taxpayer also argued that the fiduciary duty of the general partner precludes the application of section
2036:
Plaintiff contends that Decedent did not have the power to take over the
partnership because she had fiduciary duties. Plaintiff makes much of a Supreme
Court case, U.S. v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), in which the Court held that
§§2036 did not apply to a decedent who retained voting interest in several
corporations. However, I!Yrum, is not only distinguishable on its facts from our
case, but was expressly overruled by Congressional enactment of §§2036(b)
which states that "the retention of the right to vote (directly or indirectly) shares
of stock of a controlled corporation shall be considered to be a retention of the
enjoyment of the transferred property." Moreover, section 2.95 of the
Partnership Agreement states: "The General Partner will not owe a fiduciary
duty to the Partnership or to any Partner."6 If Decedent, at any time, could
remove the general partner and herself become general partner, then, by the
terms of the Agreement, she would not owe a fiduciary duty to the other
Partners, who, in any case, own only a minuscule share of the Partnership.
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Assuming such fiduciary duties exist, to whom does a party which owns 99.% of
the Partnership owe them? The fiduciary argument falls flat.
The Fifth Circuit approached the case differently, finding that section 2036(a) did not apply ab initio. The
opinion summarizes section 2036(a) like this:
The statute provides two exceptions that will allow a transfer to escape the
operation of § 2036(a). First, if the transfer is a bona fide sale for full and
adequate consideration, then § 2036(a) does not apply. See Treas. Reg. §§
20.2036-I(a), 20.2043- I(l)(as amended in 1960). If the transfer is not a bona
fide sale for full and adequate consideration, then the transfer may still be
excluded from the estate of the decedent under the second exception, if the
decedent did not retain either the (1) possession, enjoyment or rights to the
transferred property, or (2) the right to designate the persons who would possess
or enjoy the transferred property. Estate of Stone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH)
551,578 [TC Memo 2003-309] (T.e. 2003); 26 U.S.C. § 2036(a).
The Fifth Circuit found that the first exception applied here. The opinion states:
In summary, what is required for the transfer by Mrs. Kimbell to the Partnership
to qualify as a bona fide sale is that it be a sale in which the decedent/transferor
actually parted with her interest in the assets transferred and the
partnership/transferee actually parted with the partnership interest issued in
exchange. In order for the sale to be for adequate and full consideration, the
exchange of assets for partnership interests must be roughly equivalent so the
transfer does not deplete the estate. In addition, when the transaction is between
family members, it is subject to heightened scrutiny to insure that the sale is not
a sham transaction or disguised gift. The scrutiny is limited to the examination
of objective facts that would confirm or deny the taxpayer's assertion that the
transaction is bona fide or genuine. We now tum to the application of these
principles to today's case.
The first question was whether the transfer was for "full and adequate consideration." The language quoted
above -- that a sale is for full and adequate consideration -- suggested a problem for the taxpayer. However, the
court applied a different test:
The district court found that the exchange of a limited partnership interest for
the assets Mrs. Kimbell transferred to the Partnership was not a bona fide sale
for adequate and full consideration. It did not separately analyze the two
requirements. Rather it concluded that Mrs. Kimbell's contribution of more than
99% of the assets into the Partnership to be managed (as they were before the
transfer) by her son was nothing more than a recycling of value and the interest
in the Partnership Mrs. Kimbell received not a transfer of consideration. The
government adopted that position and argues in addition that it is inconsistent
for the estate to assert, on one hand, that the value of Mrs. Kimbell's interest in
the Partnership is worth only 50% of the assets she transferred (as discounted for
lack of control and marketability), and on the other hand claim that the
Partnership interest Mrs. Kimbell received in exchange for the assets transferred
was adequate and full consideration for the transfer.

***
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We would only add to the Tax Court's rejection of the government's
inconsistency argument that it is a classic mixing of apples and oranges: The
government is attempting to equate the venerable "willing buyer-willing seller"
test of fair market value (which applies when calculating gift or estate tax) with
the proper test for adequate and full consideration under § 2036(a). This
conflation misses the mark: The business decision to exchange cash or other
assets for a transfer-restricted, non- managerial interest in a limited partnership
involves financial considerations other than the purchaser's ability to turn right
around and sell the newly acquired limited partnership interest for 100 cents on
the dollar. Investors who acquire such interests do so with the expectation of
realizing benefits such as management expertise, security and preservation of
assets, capital appreciation and avoidance of personal liability. Thus there is
nothing inconsistent in acknowledging, on the one hand, that the investor's
dollars have acquired a limited partnership interest at arm's length for adequate
and full consideration and, on the other hand, that the asset thus acquired has a
present fair market value, i.e., immediate sale potential, of substantially less than
the dollars just paid - a classic informed trade-off.
As this principle applies to wholly unrelated buyers and sellers of interests in
limited partnerships, it must be equally true of buyers and sellers of such
interests who happen to be related by blood or affmity, unless (1) the evidence
demonstrates the absence of good faith, i.e., a sham transaction motivated solely
by tax avoidance, or (2) Congress or the courts are ready to change long-held
positions and establish a per se rule that related parties can never enter into
arms-length transactions for adequate and full consideration - positions that
none has shown any inclination to assume. Certainly, close scrutiny must be
applied when the parties are related, but close scrutiny is not synonymous with
automatic proscription or impossibility vel non.
The proper focus therefore on whether a transfer to a partnership is for adequate
and full consideration is: (1) whether the interests credited to each of the
partners was proportionate to the fair market value of the assets each partner
contributed to the partnership, (2) whether the assets contributed by each partner
to the partnership were properly credited to the respective capital accounts of the
partners, and (3) whether on termination or dissolution of the partnership the
partners were entitled to distributions from the partnership in amounts equal to
their respective capital accounts. Id. at 580. The answer to each of these
questions in this case is yes. Mrs. Kimbell received a partnership interest that
was proportionate to the assets she contributed to the Partnership. There is no
question raised as to whether her partnership account was properly credited with
the assets she contributed. Also, on termination and liquidation of the
Partnership, the Partnership Agreement requires distribution to the Partners
according to their capital account balances.
Thus the court is clear:

if a proper allocation to capital accounts is made there is full and adequate

consideration.
The court next considers whether the creation of the partnership was a bona fide sale. Recall that it was
formed by her son as attorney-in-fact two months before the 96 year old decedent died.
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The opinion states:
Our review of the record reveals that the taxpayer established the following
objective facts (uncontroverted by the government) that would support their
position that the transfer to the Partnership was a bona fide sale:
(1) Mrs. Kimbell retained sufficient assets outside the Partnership for
her own support and there was no commingling of Partnership and her
personal assets. See Estate of Strangi, 85 T.C.M. at 1338-39; Estate of
Harper, 83 T.C.M. at 1650.
(2) Partnership formalities were satisfied and the assets contributed to
the Partnership were actually assigned to the Partnership. Id.
(3) The assets contributed to the Partnership included working interests
in oil and gas properties which do require active management. A
working interest in an oil and gas lease is a cost-bearing operating
interest in the property. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 40
(2003). The owners of the working interest have the exclusive right to
exploit the minerals on the land. Williams & Meyers, Manual of Oil
and Gas Terms 1207, lith edition (2000). Nonoperating working
interest owners are called upon to pay their share of operating expenses
and to make elections whether to participate in drilling operations or
various phases thereof. Lowe at 387-92. A royalty interest, in contrast,
is a passive right to receive a share of production, if and when there is
production, free of costs. Manual of Oil & Gas Terms at 964. At
formation, $438,000 of approximately $2.5 million in assets were oil
and gas properties. Approximately 71 % of the oil and gas interests
were working interests. Strangi, 85 T.C.M. at 1344; Thompson, 84
T.C.M at 388.
(4) David Kimbell and Michael Elyea advanced several credible and
unchallenged non-tax business reasons for the formation of the
Partnership that could not be accomplished via Mrs. Kimbell's Trust.
Harper, 83 T.C.M. at 1654; Thompson, 84 T.C.M. at 389.
Michael Elyea, Mrs. Kimbell's business advisor, testified as follows regarding
the business strategy for forming the Partnership. He stated that he and Mrs.
Kimbell first discussed placing the assets in a limited partnership around the
same time the living trust was formed in the early 1990's. Although some
business strategies were accomplished by the trust, others were not. Specifically,
a living trust did not provide legal protection from creditors as a limited
partnership would. That protection was viewed as essential by Mr. Elyea and
Mrs. Kimbell because she was investing as a working interest owner in oil and
gas properties and could be personally liable for any environmental issues that
arose in the operation of those properties. Mr. Elyea also stated that Mrs.
Kimbell wanted the oil and gas operations to continue beyond her lifetime and
they felt that by putting the assets in a limited partnership, they could keep the
pool of capital together in one entity that would be enhanced over time rather
than subdivided by distributions to subsequent generations. Keeping the assets
in one pool, under one management would reduce administrative costs by
keeping all accounting functions together. The partnership would also avoid
costs of recording transfers of oil and gas properties as the property was passed
from generation to generation. Mrs. Kimbell wanted to keep the asset in an
entity that would preserve the property as separate property of her descendants.
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The family had faced that issue during the divorce of one of Mrs. Kimbell's
grandsons. The partnership also served the purpose of setting up the
management of the assets if something should happen to her son, which was a
concern as he had experienced some heart problems and had undergone a
serious surgery. The partnership agreement provided that all disputes be
resolved through mediation or arbitration to avoid interfamily litigation if
disputes should arise. This statement of reasons is supported by the recitation of
purposes in the formation documents of the Partnership (which the government
and the district court selectively excerpt) and the deposition testimony of Mrs.
Kimbell's son. More to the point, the stated reasons for the formation of the
Partnership are confirmed by objective facts, many of which relate to the rights
and responsibilities associated with investments in oil and gas investments.
The partnership owned a substantial portion of the decedent's assets which would not be sheltered from
creditors created by the oil and gas interests, and, of course, the decedent had presumably lived with the liability for
many years already. Thus the true relevance of the oil and gas interest -- 11% working interests, 4% royalty
interests, of the total partnership -- may be questioned.
The court rejected the need for others to make substantial contributions, or for investments to change after
the partnerships wee formed:
The government contends that one fact pointing toward a conclusion that Mrs.
Kimbell's transfer to the Partnership was not a bona fide sale is the de minimis
contribution to the partnership made by the other partners. Mrs. Kimbell's son
and his wife contributed approximately $20,000 of the $2.4 million in assets in
the Partnership. This argument amounts to a restatement of the government's
recycling of value argument and does not justify treating the transaction as a
sham. In addition, we know of no principle of partnership law that would require
the minority partner to own a minimum percentage interest in the partnership for
the entity to be legitimate and its transfers bona fide. The government also
points out that the management of the Partnership assets did not change as a
result of the transaction. Prior to the formation of the Partnership, David
Kimbell managed Mrs. Kimbell's assets in the Trust. He continued to manage
the assets once they were transferred to the Partnership. However, the important
fact is that David Kimbell contributed his management expertise to the
Partnership after its formation. Given the business reasons established above for
the change in business form, the fact that David Kimbell performed the same
services for the assets in the Trust is irrelevant.
Interestingly, the court also rejected the direct inclusion of one-half of 1% of the underlying partnership
assets through the decedent's 50% ownership of an LLC which was the 1% general partner. In what would appear
to be a holding clearly contrary to Judge Cohen's opinion in Strangi, the court stated:
The district court's application of § 2036(a) to the LLC transfer was erroneous.
Even if the transfer did not constitute a bona fide sale for full and adequate
consideration, Mrs. Kimbell did not retain sufficient control of the assets
transferred to the LLC to make her transfer subject to § 2036(a). Mrs. Kimbell's
interest in the LLC was only a 50% interest, and her son had sole management
powers over the LLC. Thus, Mrs. Kimbell did not retain the right to enjoy or
designate who would enjoy the LLC property. Accordingly, we vacate the ruling
of the district court on this issue.
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A different issue was present in Estate of Threefoot, 316 F. Supp. 2d 636 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). The
decedent died before forming a limited partnership with her daughter ("Miller") in which she would own 99% and
daughter I%. The court noted the following facts:
Under the Partnership Agreement and a related Subscription Agreement,
Threefoot would have agreed to contribute to the Partnership all of her interest
in certain tracts of real estate in Perry County, Tennessee (the "Perry County real
estate") and in certain securities, bonds, and cash in her brokerage accounts.
The Certificate of Formation for the Partnership was signed by Miller and filed
with the Tennessee Secretary of State on September 16, 2002, and with the
Shelby County Register on September 23, 2002. The Partnership Agreement
and Subscription Materials for the Partnership were prepared by September 20,
2002, but they were not executed prior to Threefoot's death on September 23,
2002. Threefoot died testate.
Miller alleges that she and Threefoot made a binding oral agreement to enter
into the Partnership Agreement and seeks to enforce that oral agreement. As
executrix, she requests that the court authorize the execution and consummation
of the transactions outlined in the Partnership Agreement and the Subscription
Agreement. Additionally, she states that there are insufficient liquid assets in
Threefoot's estate to fully fund the Partnership and satisfy all current expenses,
including estate taxes She requests that the court authorize the sale of an
apartment located at 585 South Greer in Memphis, Tennessee (the "Memphis
real estate") so that the proceeds can be used to satisfy those obligations.
The case began in Probate Court but was removed by the government to federal district court:
On August 27, 2003, Anne W. Miller, as executrix of the estate of her mother,
Anne F. Threefoot, brought a petition in the Probate Court of Shelby County,
Tennessee. In that petition, Miller seeks to execute a Partnership Agreement on
behalf of the estate, to transfer certain property to the partnership, and to sell
certain real estate and fund the partnership with the proceeds. She also seeks a
determination that the lien for federal estate taxes arising under 26 U.S.C. §
6324(a)(I) applies to the partnership interest which is part of the decedent's
estate rather than to the property to be transferred to the partnership. Miller
joined the United States as a party under 28 U.S.C. § 2410. The United States
removed the case to this court on October 2, 2003, asserting that the court has
federal question jurisdiction. Miller filed a motion to remand to state court on
October 31, 2003, in which she also requests attorney's fees, and the United
States filed a brief in opposition to the motion to remand on November 18,2003.
For the following reasons, Miller's motion to remand is GRANTED, and her
request for attorney's fees is DENIED.
The issue before the court, then, was subject matter jurisdiction. The opinion states:
When a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over an action that has
been removed, it should remand the case to state court, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The
party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction
exists. Ahearn v. Charter Township of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 453-54 (6th
Cir. 1996). "Due regard for state governments' rightful independence requires
federal courts scrupulously to confine their own jurisdiction to precise statutory
limits." Id. at 454.
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The government contends that this court has federal question jurisdiction under
the quiet title provision of the Judiciary Code, which provides in part:
[T]he United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in
any district court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter -- (1) to quiet title to . . . real or personal property on which the
United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.
28 U.S.C. § 241O(a). The government asserts that it has a federal estate tax lien
against the gross estate of Threefoot, which arose under 26 U.S.C. § 63241 on
the date of her death.
A related statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1444, provides:
Any action brought under section 2410 of this title against the United
States in any State court may be removed by the United States to the
district court of the United States for the district and division in which
the action is pending.
Miller argues that her petition is not an action to quiet title within the meaning
of § 2410, although her petition does state that the United States should be
joined as a party under § 2410 "for the purpose of quieting title to the property
that the decedent agreed to transfer to the Partnership." Rather, she seeks to
determine the property that is subject to the federal estate tax lien. In other
words, among other relief, she seeks to determine whether certain property is
part of the gross estate. The United States characterizes the action as follows:
"the Court need only determine if an alleged oral contract and a family limited
partnership are valid."
In support of her argument, Miller cites Walters v. Schmidt, 1979 WL 1376
(E.D. Mo. March 14, 1979). In Walters, the plaintiff brought suit in Missouri
state court to contest the probate of her husband's will. Id. at *1. She alleged that
a determination about the validity of the will would affect the amount due to the
United States under 26 U.S.c. § 6324. Id. The United States removed the case to
federal court. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, finding that "[i]n order for the United States to be a proper party to
this will contest under 28 U.S.C. § 241O(a), the plaintiffs allegations must relate
to the legality of the procedures used by the United States to enforce the tax lien
and not to the validity of the tax assessment itself." Id. See also Aqua Bar &
Lounge, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Treasury Internal Rev. Serv., 539 F.2d
935, 939-40 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that § 2410 is a waiver of sovereign
immunity to a suit brought by a taxpayer against the United States which
challenges the validity of a federal tax lien and sale "so long as the taxpayer
refrains from contesting the merits of the underlying tax assessment itself.)"
In Walters, the court noted that the § 6324 lien attaches to all assets ofthe gross
estate, and that the lien would be valid regardless of the will contest. "The effect
of the will contest is only to determine which assets are includable in the gross
estate to which the lien attaches." 1979 WL 1376 at *1. Therefore, the court
dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
In a later case, Wieland v. Savetz, 734 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Mo. 1990), the court
reached a similar result. In Wieland, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court seeking
a declaration as to the proper construction of a testamentary trust. Id. at 409.
They joined as a defendant the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,
who removed the case to federal court. Id. The plaintiffs sought no affirmative
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relief from the Commissioner, but joined him as a defendant because Internal
Revenue Service agents had raised the controversy regarding the interpretation
of the trust by disallowing a marital deduction with respect to the trust estate. Id.
The court remanded the action to state court, stating:
Upon reviewing plaintiffs' complaint, the Court concludes that
plaintiffs seek a declaration of the proper construction ofa testamentary
trust under state law. Although this determination may have resulting
tax implications, plaintiffs do not seek a determination of federal tax
liability nor is such a determination necessary to their state law cause of
action. The mere fact that the Commissioner, a federal official, has
been named as a defendant herein does not provide a basis for the
exercise of federal question jurisdiction.
Id. at 410.
Miller argues that hers is not an action to quiet title. Quiet title actions have been
defined as those seeking "a determination that a tax lien does not exist, has been
extinguished, or is inferior in rank." Estate of Johnson v. United States, 836 F.2d
940, 946 (5th Cir. 1988) (citation and emphasis omitted). Miller's action seeks
enforcement of an alleged oral agreement, authorization to sell certain property,
and a determination as to what property is subject to the § 6324 lien. Although
Miller stated in her petition that she sought to quiet title to certain property, that
statement does not give rise to federal jurisdiction if § 2410 does not in fact
apply to her action. See Walters, 1979 WL 1376, at *1 (finding that no subject
matter jurisdiction existed although the plaintiff cited § 6324 and joined the
United States as a party pursuant to § 2410). This case does not involve the
types of actions described in Johnson. Rather, in this case, as in Walters and
Wieland, the resolution of the state law issues will determine whether certain
property is included in the gross estate, which in tum affects the amount of
federal estate tax, if any, owed. Miller seeks no affirmative relief from the
United States. The United States has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating
that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists.
Even if the court had found subject matter jurisdiction it would have remanded the case because of the
probate exception, which the court discussed as follows:
Alternatively, even assuming that Millers probate court petition did raise a
federal question, it would be inappropriate for this court to consider the case
because of the probate exception to federal jurisdiction, which extends to
matters that would require a federal court to interfere with the probate of an
estate. See, e.g., Bedo v. McGuire, 767 F.2d 305,306 (6th Cir. 1985) (lilt is well
settled that federal courts have no probate jurisdiction."); Mangieri v. Mangieri.
226 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 2000) (liAs a general matter, courts tend to view the
probate exception as extending to all suits 'ancillary' to the probate of a will. ")
(internal quotation omitted). In Markham v. Allen. the Supreme Court stated that
"a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate, the
reason being that the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 .
. . did not extend to probate matters." 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946). "[F]ederal
courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits in favor of creditors, legatees
and heirs and other claimants against a decedent's estate to establish their claims
so long as the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or
assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in the
custody of the state court." Id (internal quotations omitted, citing Waterman v.
Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 (1909)).
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There are several policy reasons underlying the probate exception to federal
jurisdiction. See Dragan v. Miller. 679 F.2d 712, 714 (7th Cir. 1982). First, it
promotes legal certainty by limiting probate matters to one court system.
"Certainty is desirable in every area of the law but has been thought especially
so with regard to the transfer of property at death." Id Second, it promotes
judicial economy. The disposition of a decedent's assets normally begins in state
court, and the probate exception "serves to preserve the resources of both the
federal and state judicial systems and avoids the piecemeal or haphazard
resolution of all matters surrounding the disposition of the decedent's wishes."
Storm v. Storm. 328 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2003). Third, the state probate
courts have more expertise in deciding probate questions. "Because state courts
have nearly exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, state judges vested with
probate jurisdiction develop a greater familiarity with such legal issues. " Id A
final, related reason for the probate exception is to avoid unnecessary
interference with state courts: "if state courts have the exclusive task of
probating a will, and thus develop the relative expertise to do so (including the
expertise to deal with all matters ancillary to probate), then federal court
resolution of such matters is . . . an unnecessary interference with the state
system." Id

***
A two-part inquiry governs whether the probate exception applies to bar Miller's
suit from federal court. The first question is whether the court is being asked to
probate a will or administer an estate. The second question is whether
entertaining the action would cause the court to interfere with the probate
proceedings or assume general jurisdiction or control of property in custody of
the state court. Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 2002). If the answer
to either question is yes, the case should be remanded for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The "interference prong" is "the workhorse of the probate
exception." Id.
The Moser court stated that the first question, whether the court is being asked
to probate a will or an [sic] administer an estate directly, is rarely answered
affirmatively, "since few practitioners would be so misdirected as to seek, for
example, letters testamentary or letters of administration from a federal judge.
Id. The same is true here; the first test is not met because Miller's action is not a
"purely probate" matter.
The second question is whether the court is being asked to interfere with the
probate proceedings, to assume general jurisdiction of the probate, or to assume
control of property in the custody of the state court. If any of those three
situations exists, the probate exception applies and the action should be
remanded.
Miller's petition seeks resolution of three questions: (1) whether the alleged oral
agreement between Threefoot and Miller is enforceable, (2) whether Miller may
sell the Memphis real estate in order to satisfy the estate's obligations, and (3)
whether the property Threefoot allegedly agreed to transfer to the Partnership is
part of her gross estate. The first question is a contract question that merely
involves an estate, and it is the sort of question that federal courts can answer
despite the probate exception where jurisdiction exists. See Markham, 326 U.S.
at 494 (noting that federal courts can entertain suits in favor of claimants against
an estate to establish their claims). The second question presented by Miller's
petition, however, is much more closely related to the probate proceeding in that
it asks the court to order the sale of an asset of the estate. In requesting that the
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court authorize the sale of the Memphis real estate, Miller does not seek to
determine the rights of a specific creditor, legatee, or heir. Rather, she asks that
the court authorize the transfer of that property in order that its proceeds be used
to pay "all costs of administration, including attorneys, fees and all just and
lawful claims against the decedent's estate." Deciding whether to authorize the
sale of real estate in Threefoot's estate would require the court to interfere with
the probate proceedings, in the sense that this court would be directing
disposition of the estate's assets. See Torelli v. Torelli, 941 F. Supp. 36, 39
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that probate exception applied to bar suit seeking to
clear title to real estate and arrange for its sale); cf. Ashton v. Josephine Bay
Paul and C. Michael Paul Found., Inc., 918 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir. 1990)
("[T]he Supreme Court has regularly rebuked the few efforts of lower federal
courts to take over, generally, the administration of a decedent's estate, including
the exercise of otherwise proper jurisdiction over the accounting of an estate.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, as an alternate ground for
remanding the suit the probate exception applies to bar this court from
exercising jurisdiction.
The government argues that the issues presented by Miller will not interfere with
the probate of Threefoot's estate. (Govt.'s Opp'n at 6-7.) It states that "[n]o party
is contesting the will itself or any bequest made pursuant to the will. Moreover,
Miller alleges that the real property at issue is not even part of the decedent's
estate. To the contrary: she alleges that the decedent transferred the property
before her death into a family limited partnership." (Id.) However, Miller does
seek to sell real property in Threefoot's estate (the Memphis real estate), which
is separate from the real property she contends Threefoot agreed to transfer to
the Partnership (the Perry County real estate).
The government also argues that the probate exception does not apply to
disputes over will substitutes, such as trusts. That argument is not supported by
case law. See Macken ex reI. Macken v. Jensen, 333 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir.
2003) ("the probate exception applies to disputes about trusts used in lieu of
wills, if the parties present an issue that would be resolved in probate had a will
been used, or the issue is ancillary to such a dispute"); Storm, 328 F.3d at 947
("Given the growth in recent years of various 'will substitutes,' we are loath to
throw open the doors of the federal courts to disputes over testamentary intent
simply because a decedent chose to use a will substitute rather than a traditional
will to dispose of his or her estate."); Georges v. Glick, 856 F.2d 971, 974 n. 2
(7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that probate exception was inapplicable
because the action related to an inter vivos trust rather than a will). The single
case cited by the government in support of its argument, Beattie v. J.M. Tull
Foundation, 941 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.S.C. 1996), is distinguishable. In Beattie, a
trustee brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the terms of a
testamentary trust permitted him to distribute the entire capital gain of the trust
to the life tenant. Id. at 958. The court acknowledged that the distribution of the
trust's assets was tangentially related to administration of the estate, but the court
held that the action was not barred by the probate exception because it did not
require the court "to disturb possession of an estate properly in the hands of a
state probate court. Presumably, after thirty years, the estate has already been
administrated and closed." Id. at 959. In this case, by contrast, the probate estate
remains open and its assets are subject to the jurisdiction of the Shelby County
Probate Court. (Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand at 5.) Considering the facts of
this case and the case law applying the probate exception, the court finds that the
exception applies here and warrants remand of the action to the Shelby County
Probate Court.
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2.

Application of Step-Transaction Doctrine to Gift Tax Payments. In Betty R. Brown v. United

States, 329 F3d 664 (9th Cir. 2003) the decedent gave his wife money which she contributed to an insurance trust
thereby making a taxable gift. He then gave her the money to pay the gift taxes. Husband died within three years,
but wife survived. The District Court and Ninth Circuit treated the gift tax as being paid by the husband via the
step-transaction doctrine:
The Step Transaction
The "step-transaction" doctrine collapses "formally distinct steps in an
integrated transaction" in order to assess federal tax liability on the basis of a
"realistic view of the entire transaction." Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726,
738 (1989); accord Custom Chrome, 217 F3d at 1127. As such, the doctrine is
part of the "broader tax concept that substance should prevail over form."
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1521 (10th
Cir. 1991). Under these principles, the IRS argues, the two transactions which
resulted in the payment of gift taxes (gift from Willett to Betty, payment by
Betty) should be collapsed into one (payment by Willet).
The substance-over-form doctrines are, however, bound by, and in some tension
with, the principle, equally lauded in tax law, that "anyone may so arrange his
affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose the
pattern which will best pay the Treasury." Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d
241,242 (2d Cir. 1973). We look to two principles to reconcile these competing
concerns.
First, we attempt to distinguish between legitimate "tax avoidance" -- actions
which, although motivated in part by tax considerations, also have an
independent purpose or effect -- and illegitimate "tax evasion" -- actions which
have no, or minimal, purpose or effect beyond tax liabilities. See Stewart v.
Commissioner, 714 F.2d 977, 987-988 (9th Cir. 1983)(citing Bittker, Pervasive
Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal Revenue Code, 21 How.
L.J. 693, 695 (1978».
Second, we scrutinize whether the facts presented "fall within the intended scope
of the Internal Revenue provision at issue." Stewart, 714 F.2d at 988. This
second step is crucial in areas, such as estate planning, in which it is common
for Congress to create, and taxpayers to exploit, various tax planning incentives.
See Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax
Controversies, 42 B.C.L. Rev. 587, 599, 603-04, 615-16 (2001). For example, §
2513 allowed Willet and Betty, by exercising certain elections, to treat the
underlying $3,100,000 gift from Willet to the life insurance trust as if made by
both of them, when in reality Willet supplied the entirety of the funds. The IRS
has never argued that the substance-over-form doctrine invalidated that election,
for obvious reasons: That approach would deny taxpayers the tax benefits
intentionally created by the plain language of the Code.
Applying these two principles with appropriate caution, we conclude that the
two-step transaction between Willet, Betty, and the IRS, was properly treated as
if Willet had paid the gift taxes directly.
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1. Betty As A Mere Conduit of Funds

Navigating the murky distinction between "tax avoidance" and "tax evasion"
requires careful stewardship. In the context of the step transaction doctrine,
however, we have identified a class of cases in which the form of the transaction
is particularly suspect. Where a party acts as a "mere conduit" of funds -- a
fleeting stop in a predetermined voyage toward a particular result -- we have
readily ignored the role of the intermediary in order appropriately to characterize
the transaction. Robino Inc. Pension Trust v. Commissioner, 894 F.2d 342, 344
(9th Cir. 1990) (where taxpayers sold options on land to two trusts but the trusts
acted as mere "conduits" for the ultimate sale to a third party, role of trust
disregarded under step transaction doctrine); Stewart, 714 F.2d at 991 (where
corporation acted as "merely a conduit" for the sale of appreciated securities by
the taxpayer, several steps collapsed into one under the substance-over-form
principle). See also Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1158,1163 (8th
Cir. 1988) (because donor of net gift used donee as a "conduit" to pay taxes,
donor deemed to have paid the gift tax).
Viewing the historical facts in the light most favorable to the Estate, it is
nonetheless clear that Betty was a "mere conduit" of Willet's funds. The Browns
do not advance any argument that the payment to Betty had any purpose or
effect other than as a step towards facilitating Willet's payment of the gift tax
liability and Betty owned Willet's funds for exactly one day. Betty's fleeting
ownership can therefore be disregarded under the principles of Robino and
Stewart.
True, Betty was under no binding commitment to complete the prearranged
plan. "Despite intimations to the contrary in the early cases," however, "there is
ample authority for linking several prearranged or contemplated steps, even in
the absence of a contractual obligation or fmancial compulsion to follow
through." Boris I. Bittker, Fed. Inc. Tax'n ofIndiv. §1.03[5] (2d. ed.). See, e.g.,
Kornfeld v. Commissioner, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235-1236 (lOth Cir. 1998);
McDonald's Restaurants v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1982);
Blake v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 1982). Where the two
parties to the transaction were sufficiently related or commonly controlled, we
have twice applied the step transaction analysis without any finding that the
intermediary was legally bound to complete the prearranged plan. See Robino,
894 F.2d at 345 (transactions between two taxpayers and trust controlled by
taxpayers and spouse of one taxpayer); Stewart, 714 F.2d at 984 (transaction
between taxpayer and corporation he controlled).
Particularly apt is the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Kornfeld, applying the step
transaction doctrine where, as here, family members colluded to accomplish a
prearranged plan. In Kornfeld, the taxpayer, an experienced tax attorney, gave
cash payments to his daughters and secretary. 137 F.3d at 1232-33. The gift
recipients then immediately used those funds to purchase remainder interests in
bonds. Id. The Tenth Circuit determined that the series of transactions should be
treated as if the taxpayer had purchased the bonds in fee simple and given the
remainder interests to his daughters and secretary (a determination which had
negative tax consequences for the taxpayer). Id. In so determining, the Tenth
Circuit applied a heightened level of skepticism to transactions between related
parties. Id. at 1235. In addition, the court was swayed by the facts that the
"taxpayer [had] stipulated that his intention in making gifts was to enable the
donees to make the purchases," and that the donees would be unlikely to flout
the taxpayer's intention. Id. at 1236. As the court noted, "one does not look a gift
horse in the mouth." Id.
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The same factors which applied in Kornfeld apply here: The parties are related,
so heightened scrutiny is appropriate. Willet's admitted intention in giving the
funds to Betty was to enable her to make the gift tax payments. Finally, Betty
was unlikely to flout the desires of her husband because it was she, as the initial
beneficiary of the Estate, who stood to gain if the gift tax wager was successful.
The two transactions culminating in gift tax payments should therefore be
treated as one integrated whole despite the lack of a legally binding
commitment.
2. The End Run Around § 2035
Our conclusion is reinforced by a consideration of the statute here at issue, §
2035(c)(l993). We begin, in considering that statute, with the Eighth Circuit's
analysis of a quite similar situation in Estate of Sachs v. Commissioner, 856
F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1988). In Sachs, Samuel Sachs gave stock in trust to his
grandchildren within three years of his death. Id. at 1159. The gift was
structured as a "net gift," meaning that the donees were legally bound to pay the
gift taxes otherwise chargeable to the donor. Id. Relying in part on the plain
language of § 2035, and in part on the substance-over-form doctrine, the Eighth
Circuit held that "the gift tax paid under this arrangement is a 'tax paid ... by the
decedent or his estate' under § 2035." Id. at 1164.
The instant case differs from Sachs, however, in that Betty was jointly liable
under § 2513(d) to pay the gift tax liability. In comparison, no matter how the
beneficiaries in Sachs received funds to pay the gift taxes, the gift tax payment
was attributable to the donor, if for no other reason than because only the donor
was liable for the debt owed to the IRS. Id. at 1163-64.
The question then is whether the Willet-Betty-IRS transaction, though on its
face an end-run around § 2035(c)(1993), is nonetheless authorized by § 2513.
Had Betty truly paid the gift tax from her own funds, § 2035 would not apply to
Betty's payments of the gift tax, because of § 2513. Id. at 1165. The Estate
argues that because § 2513 authorizes the very "actuarial bet" the couple made,
the source of Betty's funds is irrelevant.
The source of the funds is pertinent. Sachs, 856 F.2d at 1165 (because the gift
tax was paid with funds from decedent's estate, fact that gift was split between
decedent and his wife under § 2513 did not alter application of § 2035(c). The
language and the history of § 2035(c)(l993) emphasize that this section applies
to actual gift t~ payments, regardless of the relative gift tax liability among
spouses.
First, § 2035(c)(l993) requires that the decedent include in his estate gift taxes"
paid . . . on any gift made by the decedent or his spouse ." (Emphasis added).
Second, the legislative history states:
The amount of the gift tax subject to this rule would include tax paid by
the decedent or his estate on any gift made by the donor ... It would
not, however, include any gift tax paid by the spouse on a gift made by
the decedent within three years of death which is treated as made onehalf by the spouse [ e.g., under § 2513], since the spouse's payment of
such tax would not reduce the decedent's estate at the time of death.
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H. Rep. No. 94-1380, *14, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1976) (emphasis added).
The reason the source of funds matters is that § 2035(c)(1993) was designed to
reverse the effect of funds transferred out of an estate within three years of
death. If Willet pays the gift tax, it is his net worth that is reduced and therefore
his estate that will escape estate tax liability on the funds if he outlives the threeyear reach of § 2035(c)(1993). Accordingly, it is his estate that must reverse the
effect of the transfer if he dies within the three-year period. Only if Betty pays
the gift tax by using her own financial resources is her estate reduced, such that
her estate should bear the risk that the payment be included in her estate via §
2035(c)(1993).
By channeling Willet's funds through Betty's estate, the Browns created a
transaction sequence in which the tax risk diverged from the economics of the
payment. Where one spouse has significantly fewer assets than the other spouse,
shifting the risk of § 2035- inclusion onto the estate of the less wealthy spouse,
while actually transferring the assets out of the estate of the more wealthy
spouse, could have tax evasion advantages for the couple beyond the effect of
divergent mortality probabilities: The smaller estate may be subject to lower tax
rates, see § 2001 (c), or to no tax at all, see § 2010, so that the inclusion risk does
not adequately reverse the effect of the reduction in the larger estate. We do not
know whether this was the case in the Brown estate. We note the effect,
however, to demonstrate that requiring, as the text and legislative history plainly
do, that the § 2035 inclusion risk follow the economics of the gift tax payment is
not a pointless formality. Thus, the fact that the "actuarial bet" the Browns
attempted may have been proper under § 2035 and § 2513 had Betty actually
paid the gift taxes does not imply that the Browns' maneuvering here was
similarly appropriate.

***
3. Impact of Lack of Certainty of Tax Benefit

In a variant of its assertion that the actuarial bet was entirely proper, the Estate,
noting that the end result of the machinations did not create a certain tax
advantage, contends that the transaction sequence is therefore immune from the
step transaction doctrine. That the tax advantages flowing from Willet's plan
were uncertain does not, as the Estate contends, distinguish this case from other
instances in which the step transaction or substance over form doctrine has been
applied.
For example, in Sachs, Samuel Sachs' decision to route gift tax payments
through his grandchildren's trust created a tax advantage only because he died
within three years of the gift, such that § 2035 would apply if the gift tax
payment were attributed to him. Just as Willet's actuarial bet had an uncertain
payoff, Sachs' attempt to evade § 2035 could have been rendered useless by
subsequent events.
Similarly, in Robino, we looked through the form of a transaction even though
the choice of form did not create a certain tax advantage. In Robino, individuals
devised a complicated cross-option scheme, using two trusts as conduits to hold,
and ultimately sell, real property. This arrangement "let the taxpayers keep the
parcel if it did not appreciate in value but shift the gain on the parcel to the trusts
if it did increase in value." 894 F.2d at 345 . The real estate market was
"volatile" during the relevant time period, id. at 343, so a gain on the real
property, and therefore the tax advantage of the scheme, was by no means
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assured. As both Robino and Sachs therefore demonstrate, a certain tax
advantage is not a prerequisite to application ofthe step transaction doctrine.
Tax consequences aside, the nature of the Browns' transaction sequence
(ultimately, a transfer of funds from Willet to the IRS) was fixed the moment
Betty wrote out the check to the IRS. Focusing only on Betty's role within that
predetermined result, it is clear that her participation had no significance beyond
the attempt to alter tax liabilities. Unlike a situation in which Betty paid the gift
taxes by reducing her own net worth, a decision with independent economic
effect on Betty's estate, Betty's role as a conduit altered the economics of the
transaction only by shifting the risk of § 2035 inclusion from Willet's estate to
Betty's estate. Where, as here, that risk shift did not reflect the reality of the
underlying transaction sequence, application of the step transaction is
appropriate.
The [mal component of the Estate's uncertainty argument relates to its complaint
that the step transaction doctrine can be, and often is, applied asymmetrically:
Had Betty died within three years of the gift tax payments, it is quite unlikely
that the IRS would adamantly advocate in favor of treating the funds as if paid
by Willet, so as to relieve Betty of the estate tax liability. The IRS's lawyer so
indicated at oral argument.
The possibility of a one-way rachet does give us pause. We are not alone: Both
courts and commentators have struggled with whether the substance over form
principle is a one-or two-way street, and whether, even if a two-way street, it
nonetheless "run[ s] downhill for the Commissioner and uphill for the taxpayer."
Bittker & McMahon, Fed. Inc. Tax'n ofIndiv., § 1.03 (quoting Rogers' Estate v.
CIR, 70,192 P-H Memo. TC (1970), affd 445 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1971» but see
Clark, 489 U.S. at 737 (invoking the doctrine in favor of the taxpayer). See
generally, William S. Blatt, Lost On A One-Way Street: The Taxpayers's Ability
to Disavow Form, 70 Or. L. Rev 381 (1991).
Had Betty indeed died first, we would be faced with the difficult question of
whether symmetry required application of the step transaction doctrine, or
whether the taxpayer, having complete control over the form of the transaction,
must bear the consequences of the chosen form without recourse to the step
transaction doctrine. Whether the doctrine must be applied symmetrically is not,
however, the issue now before us, and we do not reach it.
I.

SECTION 2040 1.

JOINT INTERESTS

Adequate Consideration Test Met. In Estate of Marie L. Concordia, et al. v. Commissioner,

T.C.Memo. 2002-216, the decedent died owning half of a house called "Western." The other half had been deeded
by the decedent to her niece in exchange for (1) being able to live with and be cared for by the niece, and (2) the
niece's husband managing certain rental property ("Bradley property").

The opinion described other facts as

follows:
Around that same time decedent conferred with Mr. McReady [niece's husband]
about other alternatives. Decedent inquired whether she could live at Primrose
[niece's home] with her dogs and pay rent that she could [mance by either
renting or selling Western. The McReadys were not willing to board her dogs,
because they already had two dogs of their own. Further discussions and
negotiations resulted in an agreement under which decedent agreed to deed
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Western to the McReadys, and Mr. McReady would manage the rental activity
at Bradley for decedent. It was also understood that decedent would live with the
McReadys at Primrose, that decedent's dogs could remain at Western, and that
the McReadys' daughters would reside at Western during breaks from college
and after their graduations. It was also expressly understood that as long as the
McReady children used Western, decedent would have access to visit and care
for her dogs.
Decedent did not execute a deed to Western until November 1990, when she
deeded Western to herself and her niece Mrs. McReady as joint tenants. The
transfer by deed did not take place until almost 4 years after the agreement
because of Mr. McReady's request for a delay. He was the subject of a lawsuit
and did not wish to have additional property in his name. Mr. McReady was not
made a joint tenant of Western. At the time of the transfer by deed, it was agreed
to make decedent a joint tenant on Western in order to continue to take
advantage of homestead and senior citizen deductions available in the District of
Columbia.
In accord with the agreement, decedent resided at Primrose with the McReadys
from February 1987 through the time of her death, June 1996. During most of
that period, decedent continued to be in good health, and she took care of her
own needs. Decedent was also financially self-sufficient during that period.
During that period, various of the McReady children occupied Western in
accord with the agreement. Also, Mr. McReady managed the Bradley rental
property during the period 1987 through decedent's death, placing tenants,
negotiating leases, collecting rents, and seeing to its maintenance.
Mr. McReady lent decedent $95,000 to enable her to payoff an existing
mortgage and refmance the Bradley mortgage to obtain more favorable interest
rates.
At the time of decedent's death, Western had a fair market value of $270,000,
50 percent ($135,000) of which was included in the gross estate. The remainder
of the principal assets in the gross estate consisted of: Bradley ($280,000);
securities ($227,913); and cash and bank accounts ($56,983). The deductions
from the gross estate included: Funeral expenses ($11,736); attorney's fees
($1,481); other expenses ($1,653); fmancing and closing costs incurred to
refmance Bradley ($10,070); and debts of decedent ($109,152, $95,000 of which
was due to Mr. McReady).
The court concluded:
We recognize that Mrs. McReady, along with her sister, was the natural object
of decedent's bounty and named as the sole heir of decedent, and that fact
causes us t02 more closely scrutinize their transactions. However, it does not
automatically negate their agreements. See Caligiuri v. Commissioner, 549 F.2d
1155, 1157 (8th Cir. 1977), affg. T.C. Memo. 1975-319; Perry v. Commissioner,
92 T.C. 470, 481 (1989), affd. 912 F.2d 1466 (5th Cir. 1990).
It is important to note that Mrs. McReady and her sister, as beneficiaries, each

received a distribution of assets worth $225,800. The consideration received by
the McReadys is outside of that distribution. In other words, the deeding of
Western in 1990, 6 years before decedent's death, was outside of the equal
division of the probate estate. Upon the death of decedent, Mrs. McReady
became the sole owner of Western.
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Although respondent questions whether the facts in the record support the
ultimate conclusion that there was an agreement and that consideration was
exchanged, the credible and uncontradicted testimony of witnesses and
corroborating evidence in the record support the existence of the agreement and
the exchange of consideration between the parties.
Having decided that there were an agreement and the exchange of consideration,
we must now decide the amount of "adequate and full" consideration given by
the McReadys in exchange for an interest in Western. The estate contends that
there are two types of the consideration exchanged for Bradley - the rental
value of Primrose and the value of Mr. McReady's services in managing
Bradley.
With respect to the fair rental value, the estate called two expert witnesses and
through their testimony was able to establish an indexed fair rental value for
Primrose. We have found that the fair rental value of Primrose for the period
under consideration was $408,560. With three adults sharing Primrose, we use
one-third of the rental value or $136,187 as the consideration attributable to the
decedent's use of Primrose. The rental value was calculated for the amount of
time that decedent actually survived from the time of the 1987 agreement.6
We note that $136,187 is greater than one-half the $270,000 fair market value of
Western at the time of decedent's death. However, the standard for evaluating
the amount of consideration in this context is specifically set out in section
20.2040-1(a), Estate Tax Regs.7 That formulaic approach to determining the
portion of the fair market value of a jointly held asset that should be excluded
from the gross estate, may be expressed as follows: the fair market value of the
property at the date of death is multiplied by a ratio that has the consideration
furnished by the survivor as the numerator and the total consideration paid to
acquire and improve the property as the denominator. See Estate of Young v.
Commissioner, 110 T.e. 297, 315 (1998); Estate of Van Tine v. Commissioner,
T.e. Memo. 1998-344.
The approach used in section 20.2040-1(a)(2), Estate Tax Regs., measures the
survivor's contribution to the jointly owned property against the decedent's
contribution. At the time of the 1987 agreement, decedent's sister had just died,
and decedent had become the sole owner of Western. However, the regulation,
with respect to the denominator of the exclusionary formula, uses the language
"total cost of acquisition and capital additions."
It is somewhat difficult to apply the concept of cost to the circumstances of this
case. In 1987, decedent had just acquired the sole ownership of the property as
sole survivor of three joint tenants culminating a 36-year period. In 1987,
decedent exchanged an undivided one-half interest for a place to live and for
services. As it relates to decedent, it could be said that her cost might have been
the amount she paid, if any, at the time (1951) she began occupying Western.

No matter which approach we use, the cost, plus improvements of Western,
would not exceed its $270,000 agreed fair market value as of the time of
decedent's death in 1996. Using the $270,000 in the denominator of the fraction
clearly sets a higher bar for the estate's quest for exclusion of Mrs. McReady's
joint interest. We are not called upon to decide whether an exclusion of more
than one-half of the fair market value from decedent's gross estate may have
been warranted because the McReadys may have paid more consideration than
decedent; the parties have not placed these aspects in issue or addressed them.
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Our holding that $136,187 was the indexed fair rental value exchanged for the
undivided one-half interest in Western satisfies the estate's burden of showing
that Mrs. McReady's acquisition was for an adequate and sufficient
consideration to support the estate's claim that $135,000 of the $270,000 fair
market value can be excluded from the gross estate.
Although the estate has satisfied its burden with respect to excluding $135,000
from the gross estate, we note that we have not decided the value of the services
performed by Mr. McReady in managing the Bradley rental property. On this
record, his services would likely be difficult to value, but if those services
should be included in the numerator of the formula for exclusion, it is clear that
additional value would be added to the numerator of the exclusionary equation
because of his performance over 9 years. Because the estate has shown
sufficient consideration to warrant the exclusion of one-half of the fair market
value of Western (the amount claimed by the estate), we need not address the
value of Mr. McReady's services in managing Bradley.
J.

SECTIONS 2041 AND 2514 - GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
1.

Modification of General Power is Not a Release. PLR 200335015 dealt with a general power

which was modified as part of divorce settlement. The power, and modification, were:
Article III, Paragraph C of Trust 1 provides that Taxpayer shall have the
following testamentary power of appointment with respect to all or any part of
the income or principal of Trust 2:
A general power of appointment in favor of anyone or more of a group
consisting of any of Grantor's issue (except Taxpayer), spouses of
Grantor's issue, charities, and one creditor (other than the spouse of
Taxpayer, an issue of Taxpayer, or the spouse of an issue of Taxpayer)
of Taxpayer, exercisable by will at the Taxpayer's death. Taxpayer may
appoint outright or in trust, select the trustees, create new powers of
appointment in others, establish administrative powers, create life
interests or other limited interests in some with future interests in
others, impose lawful conditions on such new powers of appointment,
impose lawful spendthrift provisions, and in general appoint by will in
any lawful manner; provided always, however, that no appointment by
Taxpayer shall benefit directly or indirectly one not an object of this
power and that nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing
Taxpayer to appoint to himself, his estate, more than one of his
creditors or more than one of the creditors of his estate. Paragraph A of
this Article is subject to this power.
Taxpayer proposes, as part of a divorce settlement, to enter into an agreement
with regard to his exercise of the testamentary general power of appointment
granted him under Trust 1, Article III, Paragraph C. Under the proposed
agreement, the terms and provisions of the testamentary general power of
appointment are the same as provided in Trust 1 except that if Taxpayer elects to
appoint all or any portion of Trust 2 to or for the benefit of any issue of his other
than Daughter or her issue, then Taxpayer agrees to make an identical or more
favorable appointment to or for the benefit of Daughter or her issue; except that,
if Daughter is under a severe and permanent mental or physical impairment that
would prevent her enjoyment, use or possession of any property appointed
pursuant to the power of appointment and Taxpayer otherwise has provided
amply for her comfort, welfare, health, support, and maintenance needs, then
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Taxpayer may appoint all or any portion of Trust 2 to or for the benefit of any of
his issue without limitation.
Because the taxpayer could still appoint to a creditor the power remained general. The limitation to appoint
to one creditor, or one estate creditor, is an interesting approach.
2.

Inadvertent Exercise of Power of Appointment.

The danger of inadvertently exercising a

power of appointment is evident in Estate of Sarah W. Grove v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2004-91. In 1933,
Sarah S. Wright, decedent's grandmother created a general power in decedent. Decedent never knew about the
power, which would have excluded the assets from her estate because the power was created before October 21,
1942, but under Pennsylvania law her residuary clause exercised it!
K.

SECTIONS 61, 83, 2042 AND 7872 - LIFE INSURANCE
1.

Guidance on Split-Dollar Life Insurance. Final regulations have been issued. T.D. 9092, IRB

2003-46 at 1055 (September 11,2003). In general the final regulations are the same as the proposed regulations and
are effective for arrangements entered into after September 17, 2003 and arrangements entered into on or before that
date which are materially modified afterwards. To oversimplify, payments made by the owner of a policy through
an arrangement which benefits a non-owner (commonly referred to as an endowment arrangement) are taxed
looking at the economic benefit to the non-owner (i.e., as compensation, dividend, or gift); payments made by a nonowner through an arrangement that benefits the owner (commonly referred to as a collateral assignment
arrangement) are taxed as loans under section 7872. The Background and Explanation of Provisions states:
Definition of split-dollar life insurance arrangement
The final regulations generally define a split-dollar life insurance arrangement as
any arrangement between an owner of a life insurance contract and a non-owner
of the contract under which either party to the arrangement pays all or part of the
premiums, and one of the parties paying the premiums is entitled to recover
(either conditionally or unconditionally) all or any portion of those premiums
and such recovery is to be made from, or is secured by, the proceeds of the
contract. The defmition does not cover the purchase of an insurance contract in
which the only parties to the arrangement are the policy owner and the life
insurance company acting only in its capacity as issuer of the contract.
The fmal regulations also retain the special rules from the 2002 proposed
regulations that treat certain arrangements entered into either in connection with
the performance of services or between a corporation and another person in that
person's capacity as a shareholder in the corporation as split-dollar life insurance
arrangements regardless of whether the arrangements otherwise satisfy the
general definition of a split-dollar life insurance arrangement. Neither the
general rule nor the special rules cover so-called "key man" life insurance
arrangements under which a company purchases a life insurance contract to
insure the life of a "key" employee or shareholder but retains all the rights and
benefits of the contract (including the rights to all death benefits and cash value).
The IRS and Treasury are concerned that certain arrangements may be
inappropriately structured to avoid the application of these regulations (for
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example, by using separate life insurance contracts that are, in substance, one
life insurance contract). The Commissioner will use existing authority to
challenge any such transaction.
Mutually exclusive regimes
The final regulations retain the approach of using two mutually exclusive
regimes -- an economic benefit regime and a loan regime -- for determining the
tax treatment of split-dollar life insurance arrangements. As under the 2002
proposed regulations, ownership of the life insurance contract determines which
regime applies. Several commentators on both the 2002 and the 2003 proposed
regulations argued that the use of the two mutually exclusive regimes is an
artificial and rigid approach that fails to account adequately for the economic
reality of a split-dollar life insurance arrangement. However, the IRS and
Treasury believe that the final regulations, like the 2002 and 2003 proposed
regulations, properly account for the division of the costs and benefits of a splitdollar life insurance arrangement.
Several commentators asked that taxpayers be permitted to elect which regime
would apply to their split-dollar life insurance arrangements. However, in the
view of the IRS and the Treasury, taxpayers effectively have the ability to elect
which regime will apply by designating one party or the other as the owner of
the life insurance contract.
One commentator asserted that there is no authority under section 7872 to treat
payments made pursuant to split-dollar life insurance arrangements as loans.
Therefore, this commentator recommends that taxation of split-dollar life
insurance arrangements under section 7872 should occur only if affirmatively
elected by the parties to the arrangement. The IRS and Treasury believe there is
sufficient authority to require the application of section 7872 to split-dollar life
insurance arrangements. There is no legislative history indicating that Congress
did not intend section 7872 to apply to payments made pursuant to these
arrangements.
A number of commentators expressed concern about the possible application of
section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), Public Law
107-204, to all or certain split-dollar life insurance arrangements entered into by
companies subject to Sarbanes-Oxley. These regulations do not address this
issue, as interpretation and administration of Sarbanes-Oxley fall within the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The [mal regulations adopt the general rule in the 2002 proposed regulations for
determining which regime applies to a split- dollar life insurance arrangement.
The 2002 proposed regulations provided a special rule that the economic benefit
regime applied to a split-dollar life insurance arrangement if the arrangement is
entered into in connection with the performance of services, and the employee
or service provider is not the owner of the life insurance contract; or the
arrangement is entered into between a donor and a donee (for example, a life
insurance trust) and the donee is not the owner of the life insurance contract.
The [mal regulations adopt this special rule, but provide that this rule applies
when the employer, service recipient or donor is the owner.
The [mal regulations add a rule regarding the treatment of a transfer of a life
insurance contract under a split-dollar life insurance arrangement from an owner
to a non-owner when payments under the arrangement had been treated, prior to
transfer, as split- dollar loans under §1.7872-15. Under this rule, the economic
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benefit regime applies to the split-dollar life insurance arrangement from the
date of the transfer and the payments made (both before and after the transfer)
are not treated as split-dollar loans on or after the date of the transfer. The
transferor of the life insurance contract must fully take into account all economic
benefits provided under the split-dollar life insurance arrangement.
Owners and non-owners
The final regulations generally retain the rules in the 2002 proposed regulations
for determining the owner and the non-owner of the life insurance contract.
Thus, the owner generally is the person named as the policy owner. If two or
more persons are designated as the policy owners, the first-named person
generally is treated as the owner of the entire contract.
Several commentators argued that determining tax ownership based on whom
the parties name as the policy owner of the life insurance contract represents a
departure from general tax principles. Commentators suggested that a splitdollar life insurance arrangement is like any co-ownership situation in which
two or more parties agree to share in the costs and benefits of a policy such that
. each party will be entitled to exercise certain rights with respect to the
underlying policy and will have certain responsibilities.
The IRS and Treasury disagree with that argument. Split- dollar life insurance
arrangements are structured in myriad ways, some formally as loans to the
employee (for example, collateral- assignment arrangements), some formally as
co-ownership arrangements between the employer and the employee, and some
as arrangements in which the employer is, in form, the sole owner (for example,
endorsement arrangements). In addition, split-dollar life insurance arrangements
ordinarily involve division of the benefits and costs of the life insurance
contract, but the division of benefits ordinarily does not correspond to the
division of costs. Because the division of the burdens and benefits of the life
insurance contract vary widely in split-dollar life insurance arrangements, and
because title ownership generally is a factor in determining tax ownership, it is
reasonable to determine tax ownership based on who is the named owner of the
policy. In addition, this rule provides a clear objective standard so that both
taxpayers and the IRS can readily determine which regime applies under the
final regulations.
If two or more persons are named as policy owners of a life insurance contract
and each person has, at all times, all the incidents of ownership with respect to
an undivided interest in the contract, those persons are treated as owners of
separate contracts for purposes of these regulations (although not for purposes of
section 7702 and other rules for the taxation of life insurance contracts). An
undivided interest in a life insurance contract consists of an identical fractional
or percentage interest or share in each right, benefit, and obligation with respect
to the contract. For example, if an employer and an employee own a life
insurance contract and share equally in all rights, benefits and obligations under
the contract, they are treated as owning two separate contracts; ordinarily neither
contract would be treated as part of a split-dollar life insurance arrangement.
However, if the employer and the employee agree to enter into a split-dollar life
insurance arrangement with respect to what otherwise would have been treated
as the employer's (or the employee's) separate contract, the purported undivided
interests will be disregarded, and the entire arrangement will be treated as a
split-dollar life insurance arrangement. The Commissioner will consider all of
the facts and circumstances of an arrangement to determine whether the parties
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have appropriately characterized the arrangement as one involving undivided
interests and, therefore, not subject to these regulations.
The fmal regulations provide attribution rules for compensatory split-dollar life
insurance arrangements. Under these rules, the employer or service recipient
will be treated as the owner of the life insurance contract if the contract is owned
by a member of the employer's controlled group (determined under the rules of
sections 414(b) and 414(c)), a trust described in section 402(b) (sometimes
referred to as a "secular trust"), a grantor trust treated as owned by the employer
(including a rabbi trust), or a welfare benefit fund (within the meaning of section
419(e)(l)).
The fmal regulations retain the special rule for non-equity split-dollar life
insurance arrangements. Under this special rule, non-equity arrangements
entered into in a compensatory context or a gift context will be subject to the
economic benefit regime. The final regulations provide rules for determining the
tax treatment of the arrangement if the parties subsequently modifY the
arrangement so that it is no longer a non-equity arrangement. If, immediately
after the modification, the employer, service recipient, or donor is the owner of
the life insurance contract (determined without regard to the special rule for nonequity arrangements), the employer, service recipient, or donor continues to be
treated as the owner of the life insurance contract (such that the normal rules of
the economic benefit regime for equity split-dollar life insurance arrangements
will apply). If, immediately after the modification, the employer, service
recipient, or donor is not the owner, the employer, service recipient, or donor is
treated as having made a transfer of the contract to the employee, service
provider, or donee as of the date of the modification. For purposes of these rules,
the replacement of a non-equity arrangement with a successor equity
arrangement will be treated as a modification of the non-equity arrangement.
2.

Correction to Life Insurance Trust for Scrivener's Error. In PLR 200314009 the settlor of a

trust intended to include restrictions that would not allow her to appoint herself or a person subordinate to he as
trustee, but due to scrivener's error the restriction was omitted. The IRS approved the effectiveness of a court
reformation to fix the problem.
3.

Selling Life Insurance Policies From One Trust to Another. Suppose a life insurance policy is

owned by an irrevocable trust with undesirable terms. Traditionally there have been three simple alternatives.
First, the insured could purchase the policy from the trust. That purchase is not a transfer for value because
a purchase by the insured is an exception to the transfer for value rules. Recall that if an insurance policy is ever
transferred for value the death proceeds become taxable under section 101. The downside to this option is that the
insured now owns the policy and it is included in the insureds estate. If the insured gives the policy to a new
irrevocable trust, section 2035 imposes a three year waiting period before the policy is excluded.
The second option is to create a new irrevocable trust and have the insured and the new trust form a
partnership. The insured then contributes cash to the new trust and the new trust purchases the policy from the
original trust. That is not a transfer for value because the new trust is a partner of the insured, and, again, that is an
exception to the transfer for value rules. The downside to the second option is that a partnership has to be formed.
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The upside is that there is no three year inclusion issue because the insured never owned the policy. PLR 20012007
confIrmed the favorable transfer for value result using an LLC taxed as a partnership.
The third option is to create a new trust that is a grantor trust for income tax purposes. The grantor may
contribute cash to the new trust which will purchase the policy from the original trust. Because the new trust is a
grantor trust it is the same as the grantor for all income tax purposes, including section 101. For many years the
primary authority for the application of the grantor trust rules to section 101 was Swanson v. Commissioner, 518
F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1975). In Swanson the trust was a grantor trust because the grantor had the power to partially
amend the trust instrument "he had almost unlimited power to change benefIciaries, and he had complete control
over the trust property" rather than for technical reasons. In principle, this distinction would make no difference but
it often did in the minds of practitioners.
In PLR 200228019, the IRS accepted the Swanson rationale (without citing it). The ruling states:
Taxpayer [the purchasing trust] has requested a ruling that section IOl(a)(l) of
the Code will be applicable to the proceeds of the Policies which are paid upon
the deaths of Husband and Wife. Taxpayer represents that both it and Trust 2
are grantor trusts owned by Husband. Under Rev. Rul. 85-13, a transaction
cannot be recognized as a sale for federal income tax purposes if the same
person is treated as owning the purported consideration both before and after the
transaction. Husband is treated for federal income tax purposes as owning the
assets of Trust 2 and Taxpayer. Therefore, the transfer of the Policies is
disregarded for federal income tax purposes and will not affect the application of
section 101(a)(l) to amount that the benefIciaries of the Policies will receive
upon the death of Husband and Wife.
See PLR 200247006 for a similar ruling. The purchasing trust must be a grantor trust with respect to both
income and principal.

A trust with Crummey withdrawal powers may be such a trust but that result is not

foreordained. A withdrawal right, as in a Crummey trust, makes the power-holder the grantor of that portion of the
trust. What if the trust contains other provisions that would make the real grantor - the person putting money in the
trust - the grantor? Do those provisions trump the withdrawal rights? Stated in Code terms, do sections 671-677
trump section 678? The IRS ruling position with respect to income is yes, and most commentators believes that is
the right result with respect to principal as well. However, the authority is sparse on the issue.
Is it significant that both the buying and selling trusts be grantor trusts? The tax status of the selling trust
should not effect the transaction.
If the grantor engages in this transaction may the IRS argue that the grantor has, in effect, retained the right
to change the terms of the trust thus creating an incident of ownership? The IRS would have the same argument
whether the transaction is engaged in or merely "could be" and such argument should fail.
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L.

SECTION 2053 and 2054 - DEBTS AND ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES
1.

Interest on Specific Bequest. For the deductibility of interest for income tax purposes, see A-3.

In Turner ex reI. Estate of Jackson v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Tex. 2004), the decedent's
Will left $ I 0,000,000 to a charity and the executor waited until a closing letter was received for the estate to pay the
bequest. The delay required an additional payment of $1,052,054.79 in statutory interest under Texas law. The
court allowed the interest to be deducted under section 2053. The opinion tries to limit the holding to cases where
interest was required to be paid because of delay.
M.

SECTIONS 2056, 2056A AND 2519- MARITAL DEDUCTION
1.

Disposition For Section 2519 Purposes is a Net Gift. Final regulations issued on July 17,2003

(T.D. 9077, IRB 2003-39 at 634) provide that a gift caused by section 2519 will be calculated as a net gift. The
donee spouse will be able to recover the amount of the gift tax caused by the transfer, and that right will reduce the
amount of the gift. Failure to recover the gift tax will be a gift. On this point, Treas. Reg. § 25.22070A-l was
amended to add a new paragraph:
(b) Failure of a person to exercise the right of recovery. (1) The failure of a
person to exercise a right of recovery provided by section 2207A(b) upon a
lifetime transfer subject to section 2519 is treated as a transfer for Federal gift
tax purposes of the unrecovered amounts to the person(s) from whom the
recovery could have been obtained. See §25.2511-1. The transfer is considered
to be made when the right to recovery is no longer enforceable under applicable
law and is treated as a gift even if recovery is impossible. A delay in the exercise
of the right of recovery without payment of sufficient interest is a below-market
loan. Section 1.7872-5T of this chapter describes factors that are used to
determine, based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, whether a
loan otherwise subject to imputation under section 7872 (relating to the
treatment of below-market loans) is exempted from its provisions.
(2) The transferor subject to section 2519 may execute a written waiver of the
right of recovery arising under section 2207A before that right of recovery
becomes unenforceable. If a waiver is executed, the transfer of the unrecovered
amounts by the transferor is considered to be made on the later of -(i) The date of the valid and irrevocable waiver rendering the right of recovery
no longer enforceable; or

(ii) The date of the payment of the tax by the transferor.
This is a more "complete" regulation then the proposed regulation.
See also PLR 2003 19002 (widow's sale and transfer of marital trust interest a net gift).
2.

Restriction on Income. The following clause was found not to give the surviving spouse "all the

income" for purposes of section 2056 by the Tax Court in Estate of Ralph H. Davis, et al. v. Commissioner,
T.C.Memo 2003-55:
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After the death of trustor survived by his spouse and during the lifetime of his
surviving spouse, the trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of the surviving
spouse, in quarter annual or more frequent installments, all of the net income
from the trust estate as the trustee, in the trustee's reasonable discretion, shall
determine to be proper for the health, education, or support, maintenance,
comfort and welfare of grantor's surviving spouse in accordance with the
surviving spouse's accustomed manner of living.
The opinion states:
Pursuant to Section Two of the amended trust, the surviving spouse's right to
receive income is significantly restricted. In determining the appropriate amount
of income to distribute to the surviving spouse, Section Two of the amended
trust charges the trustee to consider, in the trustee's reasonable discretion, the
surviving spouse's health, education, support, maintenance, comfort, and
welfare, in light of her accustomed manner ofliving.
The expression, "in accordance with the surviving spouse's accustomed manner
of living" modifies and limits the expression that precedes it: "all of the net
income from the trust estate as the trustee, in the trustee's reasonable discretion,
shall determine to be proper for the health, education, or support, maintenance,
comfort and welfare". In Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, 964 F.2d 959,
964-965 (9th Cir. 1992), revg. 96 T.C. 760 (1991), the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, the circuit to which any appeal of the instant case would lie, stated
that, the language used by the Nicholson trust [in Estate of Nicholson v.
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 666 (1990)] - 'usual and customary standard of living'
- is much narrower and more specific than that used in this case - 'best
interests.' Interpreting the Nicholson trust as qualifying for the QTIP deduction
would have required the Tax Court to 'rewrite the trust instrument.'
The "usual and customary standard of living" clause under consideration in the
instant case is analogous to the clause in Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner,
supra, and distinguishable from the "best interests" clause directly considered by
the court in Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, supra. The language in the
amended trust is more restrictive than the "best interests" language in the trust in
Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, supra. The use of the word "comfort" in
the amended trust is limited by the expression, "in accordance with the surviving
spouse's accustomed manner of living." Accordingly, we interpret the language
of the amended trust to mean that the surviving spouse does not have such
"command over the income that it is virtually hers". See sec. 20.2056(b)-5(t)(8),
Estate Tax Regs.9 In the instant case, Section Four of the amended trust
provides that the trustee, in exercising reasonable discretion, may consider "any
other income or resources of the beneficiary known to the trustee and reasonably
available."l0 In the instant case, Section Two of the amended trust limits the
surviving spouse's entitlement to income without using the term "best interests".
Moreover, in the instant case, the clause under consideration is much narrower
and more specific than the "best interests" clause considered by the court in
Estate of Nicholson v. Commissioner, supra. We conclude that the foregoing
limitations prevent the surviving spouse from being entitled to the entire income
from the trust.
Moreover, the surviving spouse's role as sole trustee under the trust does not
assure her the requisite control over the trust income for life, because, by the
terms of the amended trust, decedent's daughters could become sole or
cotrustees of the trust, in the event of the surviving spouse's resignation or her
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incapacity to serve as a trustee. Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner, supra at
962 (citing Estate of Kyle v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 829 (1990)). Additionally,
unlike the "Marital Deduction Trust" in Estate of Ellingson v. Commissioner,
supra, there is no language in the amended trust which explicitly refers to a
marital deduction under section 2056. Accordingly, we conclude that the
decedent did not intend to grant the surviving spouse the entire income interest
for life from the surviving spouse's interest in the estate.
At issue in Estate of Zorn v. Zorn Farms, Inc., 62 P.3d 854 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), was the extent of a
spouse's right to make unproductive property "productive" in a marital trust. The Court held that where it was clear
a settlor intended for land to be retained, unproductive land could be sold only to meet "present or immediately
foreseeable" income needs.

Whether such a limited reading violates section 2056(b)(5) is unclear.

In TAM

200339003, the IRS allowed a marital deduction for non-dividend paying stock passing to a QTIP because of the
spouse's power to make the property productive.
3.

Supplemental QTIP Election.

In PLR 200323010 the IRS allowed an estate to file a

supplemental estate tax return to correct the amount shown on Schedule M. The ruling states:
In the instant case, a QTIP election under § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) was made on
Decedent's timely filed estate tax return. The property for which the election
was made was described as the "Residue of Decedent's interest in the [Family
Trust]." The residue of Decedent's interest in the Family Trust consisted of the
assets remaining in the Husband's Separate Property Trust after the distribution
of the specific pecuniary bequests plus Decedent's one- half share of the assets
of the Community Property Trust. However, under Sections 3.03 and 3.04 of the
Family Trust Declaration, these assets were to be distributed to Trust B, which
was to be funded with the "Marital Deduction Amount," and Trust C, which was
to be funded with the "Exemption Equivalent Amount." Therefore, the QTIP
election was made for both the QTIP trust and the credit shelter trust. Pursuant
to Rev. Proc. 2001-38, the QTIP election with respect to Trust C, the credit
shelter trust, will be treated as a nullity for federal estate, gift, and
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. However, since Trust B meets the
requirements for qualified terminable interest property and the election under §
2056(b)(7)(B)(v) was made on a timely filed estate tax return, the QTIP election
for the property passing to Trust B, the marital trust, is valid and irrevocable.
As a result of a miscalculation, the value of the property which passed to Trust B
under the provisions of Section 3.03 of the Family Trust Declaration was
reported incorrectly on Schedule M of Decedent's estate tax return. As a result
of this miscalculation, the marital deduction claimed for Trust B was less than
the amount that should have been claimed, resulting in an estate tax liability.
Based on the facts submitted and the representations made, we conclude that the
description of the QTIP property on Schedule M does not invalidate the QTIP
election for the property passing to Trust B pursuant to Section 3.03 of the
Family Trust Declaration. Similarly, we conclude that the miscalculation of the
value of the property passing to Trust B under the provisions of Section 3.03
does not preclude a marital deduction for the full value of the property which
will actually fund Trust B under the terms of the governing instrument.
Accordingly, the personal representative of Decedent's estate should file a
supplemental Form 706 with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Cincinnati,
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Ohio 45999, prior to the time prescribed by § 6511 for claiming a credit or
refund. The supplemental Form 706 should supply the correct description of the
trust for which the QTIP election was made and report the full value of the
property subject to the QTIP election. A copy of this letter should be attached to
the supplemental return. A copy is enclosed for that purpose.
4.

Effect of Administration Expenses. In Betty R. Brown v. United States, 32d F.3d 664 (9th Cir.

2003), the estate filed the estate tax return showing about $1,700,000 in administration expenses; later it increased
its claim to about $3,600,000 based on expenses incurred. The IRS agreed but reduced the marital deduction
accordingly where the expenses were paid from funds earmarked for the marital trust.
5.

Obtaining Step-Up In Basis. PLR 200403094 is important. Husband created a trust and funded

it with his own assets. The trust allowed him to revoke or amend it during his lifetime and to withdraw income and
principal. The trust also gave his wife a testamentary general power of appointment if she died first:
At my wife's death, if I am still living, I give to my wife a testamentary general
power of appointment, exercisable alone and in all events to appoint part of the
assets of the Trust Estate, having a value equal to (i) the amount of my wife's
remaining applicable exclusion amount less (ii) the value of my wife's taxable
estate determined by excluding the amount of those assets subject to this power,
free of trust to my deceased wife's estate or to or for the benefit of one or more
persons or entities, in such proportions, outright, in trust, or otherwise as my
wife may direct in her Will.
Ifhusband died first a traditional marital/exemption equivalent plan would be implemented with the marital
share passing outright to wife, and the exemption equivalent share being held in a Family Trust for wife and for
husband's descendants, subject to ascertainable standards.

Wife also had a testamentary special power of

appointment among husband's descendants.
The ruling states that wife intends to execute a Will which was described as follows:
Wife plans to execute Will. Article 2.1 of Will makes gifts of Wife's tangible
personality.
Article 2.2 of Will provides:
I exercise in favor of my estate the power of appointment given to me
by Section 4.5 of the Trust created by [Husband] dated U, and direct
that assets having a value equal to (i) the amount of my remaining
applicable exclusion amount less (ii) the value of my taxable estate,
determined by excluding the amount of those assets subject to this
power, be distributed to my estate as soon after my death as possible.
Article 2.3 of Will provides that if Husband survives Wife, Husband will receive
a fraction of Wife's residuary estate, after the payment of estate taxes, debts, and
expenses, determined as follows:
The numerator of the fraction will be the smallest pecuniary amount
that, if given outright to [Husband], would eliminate or reduce to the
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lowest possible sum the state and federal estate tax liability of [Wife's]
estate. This amount will be calculated by taking into account [Wife's]
applicable exclusion amount and all other tax credits, deductions, and
other preferences allowed to [Wife's] estate.
The balance of the residuary estate will be held as a separate trust (Wife's
Family Trust). If Husband does not survive Wife, the entire residuary estate will
be held as the Family Trust. Under Article 3 of Will, any part of the gift to
Husband that he disclaims will become part of Wife's Family Trust.
The Family Trust is parallel to the Family Trust described above.
The Service granted four rulings:
1. On the death of Wife during Husband's lifetime, if Wife exercises the power
of appointment granted her under article 4.5 of Trust, Husband will be treated as
making a gift that qualifies for the federal gift tax marital deduction to Wife with
respect to that portion of Trust appointed by Wife.
2. If Wife predeceases Husband, of the assets in Trust, the value of Trust assets
over which Wife holds a power of appointment under article 4.5 of Trust will be
included in Wife's gross estate.
3. Any assets that originated in Trust and that pass to or from Wife's Family
Trust established under Will will not constitute a gift from Husband to the other
beneficiaries of Wife's Family Trust.
4. Any assets that originated in Trust and that pass to Wife's Family Trust
established under Will will not be included in Husband's gross estate.
Presumably the point of this exercise was for the assets in the trust passing into the Family Trust at the first
death to receive a step-up in bases by reason of being included in the estate of the first to die. No income tax ruling
is mentioned which suggests the Service was not prepared to rule (or to rule favorably) on the basis issue.
Assets which pass back to a donee surviving spouse from a donor deceased spouse where the gift occurred
within one year are denied a basis step-up. Thus, the question is, would these assets pass from husband to wife to
husband if wife died first and, of course, that depends on the status of husband and the Family Trust.
Also see PLR 200413011 where husband retained a special power of appointment over assets in an
irrevocable trust, which passed into a QTIP if the power were released.
6.

Effect of Disability Clause. In Estate of Merle A. Whiting, If. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo

2004-68, the court applied Arkansas law to determine that a clause allowing trustee to accumulate income instead of
distributing it to a disabled beneficiary would not apply to the marital deduction QTIP trust.
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The opinion states:
Decedent manifested his intent to qualify for the marital deduction in numerous
ways. First, the trust agreement named two of the trusts in reference to the
marital deduction: The "Marital Deduction Trust" and the "Non-Marital
Deduction Trust". The name of a trust is evidence of decedent's intent.
Second, it is evident from the trust agreement that decedent intended to
minimize Federal estate taxes through the use of the marital deduction. See
Estate of Todd v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 288, 294 (1971) (references to the
marital deduction and citations to section 2056 clearly establish that the trust's
purpose was to secure the marital deduction). In valuing the assets to be placed
in the marital deduction trust, the trust agreement states that decedent intended
to "have the result of qualifying the marital deduction for estate tax purposes".
Only assets which qualify for the marital deduction may be placed in the marital
deduction trust. The amount of the distribution to the marital deduction trust is
"the excess * * * of the decedent's taxable estate * * * over the exemption
equivalent of the * * * unified credit". Additionally, the terms "marital
deduction", "gross estate", and others are defined in the trust agreement as
having the same meaning as the definitions found in the Internal Revenue Code.
Third, the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the trust indicate that
decedent intended to qualify for the marital deduction. Decedent knew that he
was terminally ill and hired specialized tax attorneys to draft the trust: Two are
Arkansas board recognized specialists in tax law, one is a certified public
accountant, and two have a master of laws in taxation. The intent of the
draftsman of the marital deduction trust was to create a trust which qualified for
the marital deduction.
7.

No Relief For Excessive QTIP Election. Rev. Rul. 2001-38, 2001-1CB 1335, provides relief in

certain situations where a QTIP election was unnecessary to reduce the estate tax to zero. Specifically.
This revenue procedure applies to elections under section 2056(b)(7) to treat
property as qualified terminable interest property where the election was not
necessary to reduce the estate tax liability to zero, based on values as finally
determined for federal estate tax purposes. This revenue procedure does not
apply in situations where a partial QTIP election was required with respect to a
trust to reduce the estate tax liability and the executor made the election with
respect to more trust property than was necessary to reduce the estate tax
liability to zero. This revenue procedure also does not apply to elections that are
stated in terms of a formula designed to reduce the estate tax to zero. See, for
example, section 20.2056(b)-7(h), Examples 7 and 8. In addition, this revenue
procedure does not apply to protective elections under section 20.2056(b)-7(c).
In PLR 200422050 a QTIP election was made for more of a marital trust than was necessary to produce
zero estate tax and the IRS held that all of the trust for which the election was made would be included in the
surviving spouse's estate under section 2044. The ruling denies all relief to the taxpayer:
In the instant case, the taxpayer is not seeking an extension of time to make the
QTIP election. Rather, the taxpayer is in effect seeking to partially revoke a
QTIP election previously made, that, pursuant to § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) is
irrevocable. See Estate of Cavenaugh v. Commissioner. 100 T.C. 407 at 421
(1993). Accordingly, § 301.9100 is not applicable in this case.
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Furthermore, the situation presented is not within the purview of Rev. Proc.
2001-38,2001-1 C.B. 1335. Pursuant to this revenue procedure, under certain
circumstances, the Service will treat a QTIP election as null and void for
purposes of §§ 2044(a), 2056(b)(7), 2519(a) and 2652. Rev. Proc. 2001-38
applies where the election was not necessary to reduce the estate tax liability to
zero, based on values as fmally determined for federal estate tax purposes. The
revenue procedure does not apply in situations where a partial QTIP election
was required with respect to a trust to reduce the estate tax liability and the
executor made the election with respect to more trust property than was
necessary to reduce the estate tax liability to zero.
In this case, a QTIP election was required with respect to the marital trust to
reduce Decedent's estate tax liability to zero. However, the election was made
for more marital trust property than was necessary in order to reduce Decedent's
estate tax liability to zero. This situation is specifically excluded from the
purview of Rev. Proc. 2001-38. Accordingly, the QTIP election with respect to
the entire marital trust is valid and effective for estate tax purposes. Therefore,
100 percent of the value of the marital trust on the applicable valuation date will
be includible in Spouse's gross estate under § 2044.
N.

SECTIONS 2501 TO 2524 - GIFTS
1.

Reciprocal Gifts. In Estate of Robert V. Schuler v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 575 (8th Cir. 2002),

the Eighth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's extension of the reciprocal gift doctrine to transfers of different assets.
The facts were:
Two brothers, Robert Schuler (Robert) and George Schuler, Jr. (George), owned
interests in two family operated companies -Minn- Kota Ag Products, Inc.
(Minn-Kota) and Sigco Sunplant, Inc. (Sigco). Prior to the stock transfers at
issue, George's son, Jody, owned all Minn-Kota Class A voting common stock,
and Robert's son, Jay, George, and Jody owned all the restricted Class B
common stock. Sigco was equally owned by Robert and George.
Before Robert's death, he and George had discussed with their insurance agent
their desire to have their families succeed them in the businesses. The brothers
told their insurance agent they wanted Robert's family to control Sigco and
George's family to control Minn-Kota. Together, with assistance from the
insurance agent, Robert and George devised two three-step plans to transfer
divided ownership ofMinn-Kota and Sigco to each other's family and to employ
section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to exclude the transfers from
estate taxes.
The first step for gaining family control of Sigco required Robert and his wife to
make joint gifts of Sigco stock equal to approximately $20,000 each to their
children, their spouses and grandchildren and to Jody, his wife and son during
December 1994 and January 1995. The second step required George and his
wife to make joint transfers of stock equal to approximately $20,000 to each of
Robert's children and their spouses. The third step required several of Robert's
children to transfer their shares to four siblings, including Jay and his children.
Similarly, the first step for gaining family control of Minn-Kota required George
and his wife to make joint gifts of Minn- Kota stock valued at approximately
$20,000 to each of their children and grandchildren in December 1994 and
January 1995. The second step required Robert and his wife to transfer
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approximately $20,000 of Minn-Kota stock each to George, his wife and their
children. The third step required some of George's children and their spouses to
transfer stock valued at approximately $10,000 each to Jody, his wife, and their
children.
Between December 1994 and January 1995, Robert transferred stock valued at
$440,467.20 to George's family, and George transferred stock valued at
$382,140 to Robert's family. After these stock transfers, Robert's family owned
nearly 80 percent of Sigco, George's family owned nearly 68 percent of MinnKota, and Jody retained ownership of all Minn-Kota voting common stock.
Robert and George separately filed Form 709s2 for the years 1994 and 1995. On
both Form 709s Robert and his wife claimed twelve gift tax exclusions for gifts
made to George's family along with additional exclusions for gifts made to their
own family members. On both Form 709s George and his wife claimed nine gift
tax exclusions for gifts made to Robert's family along with additional exclusions
for gifts made to their own family members.
In October 1995, Robert died. His sons, Jay and Thomas Schuler, filed a Form
706 3 excluding gifts ofSigco and Minn-Kota stock made in 1994 and 1995 from
their deceased father's taxable gifts. Thereafter, on December 18, 1996, January
2, 1997, and January 2, 1998, George and his wife made transfers ofMinn-Kota
stock, each valued at $19,926, to Robert's son, Jay. The aggregate value of these
three subsequent stock transfers totaled $59,778, which, when added to the value
of George's 1994-95 stock transfers, amounted to $441,918, or just $1,451 more
than the value of stock Robert had transferred to George's family in 1994 and
1995.
The opinion states:
We have jurisdiction over appeals from the tax court pursuant to 26 U.
S. C. §§ 7482. We review the tax court's factual findings for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. Bean v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d
553, 556 (8th Cir. 2001). "Whether a transaction lacks economic
substance, and whether several transactions should be considered
integrated steps of a single transaction, are both fact questions which
we review for clear error." Sather v. Commissioner, 251 F.3d 1168,
1173 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
For purposes of this appeal, we must determine whether the gifts at issue,
similar stock transfers made by Robert and George to each other's children,
were reciprocal cross gifts, that is, indirect gifts to each donor's own children. In
doing so, we are guided by our recent decision in Sather. Id. at 1173-76
(applying the reciprocal trust doctrine 4 in a gift tax context to determine the
economic substance of gift transfers).
We explained in Sather that the reciprocal trust doctrine is a variation
of the substance over form concept which developed in the trust context
"to prevent taxpayers from transferring similar property in trust to each
other as life tenants, thus removing the property from the settlor's
estate and avoiding estate taxes, while receiving identical property for
their lifetime enjoyment that would likewise not be included in their
estate." Id. at 1173 (citing Estate of Grace, 395 U. S. at 320). The
application of the reciprocal trust doctrine is not limited only to
identifying the true transferor or transferee, but also applies to
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detennining the nature of the property transferred. Sather, 251 F.3d at
1174. The doctrine applies to multiple transactions which are
interrelated and which, "to the extent of mutual value, leave . . . the
settlors in approximately the same economic position as they would
have been in had they created trusts naming themselves as life
beneficiaries." Id. at 1173-74 (quoting Estate of Grace, 395 U. S. at
324).
Applying these trust principles to gifts in Sather, we ruled the gifts were part of
a jointly designed and executed plan devised for the purpose of benefitting each
brother's own children. Id. at 1174-75. The Sather case involved three brothers,
each of whom had three children. The Sather brothers made identical gifts of
stock in a family-owned corporation on the same date to each of their children
and to each of their six nieces and nephews for a total of nine gifts. A fourth,
unmarried brother also made identical gifts of stock on the same date to his nine
nieces and nephews. !d. at 1170-71.
Subsequent to the stock transfers, each child (transferee) was left in the same
economic position as if his father had given the stock directly to him. !d. at
1174-75. We deemed as immaterial the fact that the brothers circuitously routed
the gifts to their own children through their nieces and nephews, and we upheld
the tax court's ruling that each brother was entitled to only three annual
exclusions. We also concluded that the result was not affected by the fact the
fourth, unmarried brother had made gifts of stock to his nieces and nephews
which resulted in a net decrease in his economic value. The effect of uncrossing
the reciprocal transfers left each of the transferors (except the unmarried
brother) with children in the same economic position as if he had made stock
transfers only to his own children. Id. at 1175.
Applying the reciprocal trust doctrine to this case, we cannot say the tax court
was clearly erroneous in fmding the gifts of stocks were interrelated. Robert and
George Schuler jointly sought the advice of their insurance agent on how to
have their children succeed them in the family-owned businesses. With their
insurance agent's assistance, they devised a plan whereby Robert's family
would increase its interest in Sigco while George's family would increase its
interest in Minn-Kota. The 1994 and 1995 reciprocal transfers of stock were
identical in type and amount and occurred on the same days. Similar to the
Sather brothers, the Schuler brothers received no direct economic benefit from
the stock transfers, but they received an economic benefit indirectly by
benefitting their children as successors to the family-controlled businesses.
The Schulers contend their case is distinguishable from Estate of Grace and
Sather, inter alia, because those cases involved transfers of identical property. In
contrast, Schulers argue this case involves transfers of stock in two distinct
companies whose assets, businesses, and management are different. We find
such distinctions immaterial. Certainly, the three-part plans jointly executed in
this case were more complicated than the transfers in Sather. However, the net
effect was the same -simultaneous cross transfers of stock amounting to
transfers of each brother's stock to his own children.
Nor are we persuaded the tax court was clearly wrong in finding interrelatedness when Robert and George had a business purpose in separating the
ownership of the two businesses between the children of the two Schuler
families. Intrafamily transfers demand close scrutiny "precisely because the
genuineness of the transaction cannot reasonably be inferred" from assurances
of business purpose. Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir.
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1982) (quoting Fehrs v. United States, 620 F.2d 255, 260 (Ct. Cl. 1980». In this
case, the tax court flatly rejected the assertion that business purpose was the
primary motivation for making the reciprocal stock transfers. Instead, the tax
court reached the "inescapable conclusion that decedent and his brother made
the circuitous transfers for the primary purpose of increasing the number of
exclusions under section 2503(b) that otherwise would have been available to
them."
After uncrossing the gifts to discern the taxability of the transactions, the tax
court found Robert's children received stock from George of approximately the
same economic value as they would have received by direct transfers from
Robert. The tax court rested its finding on the fact that the difference in the
value of the 1994 and 1995 cross stock transfers, which amounted to
$58,327.20, was all but eliminated by George's transfers of stock valued at
$59,778 to Robert's son in the three years following Robert's death.
The Schulers contend the tax court ignored the substantial changes in ownership
and control that resulted from the reciprocal transfers. After the stock transfers,
the Schulers claim Robert's family interest in Sigco increased from 75 percent to
80 percent. 5 In analyzing the effect of the stock transfers, the tax court
recognized the stock transfers resulted in a small shift in Sigco ownership from
75 percent to almost 80 percent. Before the transfers, Robert owned 25 percent
of Sigco shares outstanding and his son, Jay, owned 50 percent; together they
owned a 75 percent majority. Before and after the transfers, George's son, Jody,
owed 100 percent of the Minn-Kota voting stock. Thus, the tax court found that
acquiring control of the family business was not the purpose of the transfers.
Husband and wife created similar Crummey trusts and asked whether they were reciprocal
200426008. The IRS said no. The ruling states:
In the present case, Husband's Trust differs from Wife's Trust in several
respects. Husband's Trust grants Wife the right to withdraw specified amounts of
trust principal after Sonl 's death. Husband's Trust also grants Wife an inter
vivos special power, effective at Son 1's death, to appoint trust principal among
any of Husband's issue and their spouses or any trust created primarily for the
benefit of one or more of those persons. Further, to the extent Wife does not
exercise her inter vivos special power, Husband's Trust grants Wife an inter
vivos or testamentary special power, effective at Sonl's death, to appoint trust
principal among any of Husband's issue and any charities Wife designates or any
trust created primarily for the benefit of one or more of those persons. Finally, if
a Marital Trust is established, Husband's Trust grants Wife a testamentary
special power to appoint the assets remaining in the Marital Trust among any of
Husband's issue and any charities Wife designates or any trust created primarily
for the benefit of one or more of those persons.
Under Wife's Trust, with respect to any trust established under Wife's Trust
except a Marital Trust, Husband cannot be a beneficiary until three years after
Wife's death and then will only be a beneficiary at any time when his net worth
is under $a and his income from personal services is under $a. Distributions to
Husband under this provision are limited to an amount equal to $b reduced by
Husband's income from personal services during the calendar year of the
distribution.
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III

PLR

Thus, we conclude that Husband's Trust and Wife's Trust are not interrelated. As
in Levy, there is no need to consider the second test. Accordingly, based on the
facts submitted and the representations made, we rule as follows:
1. Neither the Husband's Trust nor the Wife's Trust will be includible in the
Husband's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes by application of the
reciprocal trust doctrine.
2. Neither the Husband's Trust nor the Wife's Trust will be includible in the
Wife's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes by application of the
reciprocal trust doctrine.
2.

Gift under Federal Law. In Wells Fargo Bank New Mexico, et at v. United States, 319 F.3d

1222 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the question of whether a completed gift had
been made. Essentially, wife created a lifetime QTIP but the QTIP election was not made, thus creating an
unwanted gift. The estate of the now deceased wife argued there was no gift under state law because her intent was
foiled. The court disagreed and the opinion states:
At this point, two propositions emerge. First, the language employed in the trust
instrument concerning the finality of the transfer of funds could not be any
clearer. Indeed, the architect of the trust employed virtually every word in a
legal scrivner's lexicon to denote the complete abandonment by Ms. Nielsen of
any interest in the transferred property. Second, had the election required by §
2325(f)(I) been made, Ms. Nielsen's intent to create a QTIP would have been
achieved, and no gift tax would have attached to the transfer of the $550,000.
Unfortunately for Ms. Nielsen, for the want of an election, the exemption was
lost.
In an attempt to recover from this loss, the Estate paid the tax and filed this
refund action in the district court, contending under New Mexico law, the
transfer of funds to the lifetime QTIP trust was incomplete because Ms.
Nielsen's donative intent was foiled. The district court granted the Estate's
motion for summary judgment predicated upon its reading of Estate of
Davenport v. Commissioner, 184 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 1999). The court relied
upon our holding "in federal taxation cases, state law controls only to the extent
that certain statutory provisions of the federal revenue laws make their
application dependent on state law." Id. at 1176. The district court believed
Davenport mandated application of state law to determine the nature of the
ownership interest before applying federal law to decide the taxability of that
property. Finding donative intent, a required element of a completed gift under
New Mexico law, was absent here, the court concluded the Commissioner
wrongfully assessed a gift tax against the Estate. We disagree with this analysis.
We believe the point at which the district court's reasoning strayed from the
proper path was in not recognizing the settled principle that for federal tax
purposes, the essence of a completed transfer is determined by whether there
was a "passage of dominion and control over the economic benefits of
property." Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939). There is
nothing within the applicable parts of the Internal Revenue Code that even
suggests state law overrides this rule of federal law. The notion is buttressed by
Treasury Regulation § 25.2511-1(g)(I) which states:
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Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element
in the application of the gift tax to the transfer. The application of the
tax is based on the objective facts of the transfer and the circumstances
under which it is made, rather than on the subjective motives of the
donor.
See also Tres. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (a gift is complete for federal tax purposes
when "the donor has so parted with dominion and control as to leave in him no
power to change its disposition.").
Under the previously described language of the trust instrument, can it be any
plainer that Ms. Nielsen intended to give up dominion and control of the trust
property? We think not. The verbiage of the meticulous legal scrivener drove
that point home.
Though this analysis is sufficient for the proper disposition of the case, the
obviously sincere efforts thoughtfully expended by the district court require
further comment. We do not believe that Davenport points to the conclusion the
district court reached. First, in that case, we looked to state law merely to
determine whether the donor had an ownership interest in property she
attempted to transfer to the donee. This search did not implicate a determination
of whether the transfer was complete for federal tax purposes. Second, we did
not hold that, for federal gift tax purposes, all essential state law elements of a
valid gift must be satisfied. Indeed, whether a transfer is complete for federal tax
purposes is strictly a matter of federal law.
More importantly, the Supreme Court has made plain that the "elusive state of
mind" involved in the formation of donative intent has been eradicated from the
tax code by Congress. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945). The
Court has substituted the search for donative intent with the "much more
workable external test, that where property is transferred for less than an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, the excess in such
money value shall for purposes of the tax ... be deemed a gift." Id. (internal
quotes omitted) We conclude while a donor's intent to make a gift may be a
helpful factor in the ultimate determination of whether a gift has been made, for
federal tax purposes, that determination in no way turns upon the absence of
evidence of such an intent.
3.

Self-Cancelling Installment Note. The Sixth Circuit has upheld the general validity of SCINs

and remanded to the Tax Court the question of valuation in Estate of Duilio Costanza, et al. v. Commissioner, 320
F.3d 595 (2003). The facts were simple:
Duilio Costanza was born in Italy in 1919. He immigrated to the United States
and worked as a welder for General Motors, Inc. in Flint, Michigan until 1966.
Upon retiring from GM, Duilio opened an Italian restaurant on property he
owned in Flint. He later built a small office plaza on nearby property that he also
owned. Both properties were appraised in 1991 at a value of$830,000.
In October of 1992, when he was 73 years old, Duilio wanted to return to Italy

and sell his Flint properties. He accordingly sought the advice of his attorney,
John Spath, who suggested that Duilio sell the restaurant and properties to
Michael in exchange for a SCIN. In late December of 1992 or early January of
1993, Michael signed a SCIN in the amount of $830,000. A mortgage fully
securing the obligation was recorded in February of 1993. The SCIN, which
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provided for payment in monthly installments over a period of 11 years,
contained a cancellation-upon-death provision.
Duilio orally told Michael that he need not make a payment every month,
instead authorizing Michael to remit the payments on a quarterly basis.
Accordingly, on March 8, 1993, Michael made the note payments for January,
February, and March by means of three back- dated checks. Michael tendered no
further payments on the SCIN prior to Duilio's death on May 12, 1993.
Duitio unexpectedly died from a toxic reaction to bypass surgery performed the
previous day. He had been suffering from heart disease during the final 15 years
of his life. Nevertheless, Duilio's life expectancy at the time be executed the
SCIN was between 5 and 13.9 years.
As the executor of his father's estate, Michael filed a federal estate tax return
declaring that the estate had no estate tax liability. The estate tax return
identified the SCIN as an estate asset, but claimed that the note had no value to
the estate due to the cancellation-upon-death provision.
The opinion states:
Michael affumatively testified that it was the Costanzas' intention for Michael
to satisfy all of the payments due pursuant to the SCIN. Attorney Spath also
testified that the Costanzas expected the note to be paid in full:
Q:

Was Duilio Costanza willing to simply gift these properties to
Michael?

A:

No.

Q:

Why not?

A:

Because ... [h]e wanted payment over time so he could retire
in Italy.

The tax court, however, questioned the parties' sincerity, expressing concerns
about the actual date the documents were signed, the date on which the three
payments were made, and the fact that Michael altered the dates of the checks.
But Michael satisfactorily explained all three circumstances. A brief delay in
execution after the stated date of December 15, 1992 was simply due to the need
of the attorney to pick a date upon which to base an amortization schedule where
the documents were to be circulated by mail for signature. The fact that all of the
documents were signed within several weeks thereafter is thus entirely
inconsequential.
As for the delay in making the first three installments, Michael testified that his
father wanted to be paid "on a quarterly basis to limit the number of bank
transactions." Although issuing three separate checks would not technically
decrease the number of bank transactions, since the bank would need to process
each check individually, this method of payment obviously served to ease the
burden of having to deposit one check every month.
The quarterly payment plan also explains why Michael altered the dates of the
checks. As Michael explained in his brief, he re-dated the checks "so as to
clearly document the months for which Note payments had been made." The
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fact that he obviously wrote a different date on top of the original dates is further
evidence that he was not trying to hide anything by the alterations. Moreover,
pursuant to Duilio's oral instructions concerning the payment plan, it is not
surprising that Michael did not make another payment on the note after
tendering the three checks in March. The next quarterly payment would not have
taken place until June, which was after Duilio had died.
Finally, the Commissioner argues that Michael and Duilio entered into the SCIN
agreement because they presumed that Duilio would die prior to Michael fully
satisfying the note. If they had thought Duilio would outlive the final payment
due under the SCIN, the Commissioner reasons, there would have been no
reason to have signed the SCIN, as opposed to an unconditional promissory
note. This contention, however, basically questions the validity of any SCIN, an
argument that the tax court has long since rejected. Estate of Moss v. Comm'r,
74 T.C. 1239, 1247 (1981) (upholding the validity of a SCIN). See generally
Sheldon I. Banoff & Michael O. Hartz, New Tax Court Case Expands
Opportunities for Self- Cancelling Installment Notes, 76 J. Tax'n 332 (1992)
(discussing the permissibility of and reasons for executing a SCIN).
Moreover, despite Duilio's heart problems, there was no evidence that either
Michael or Duilio presumed that Duilio would die within a few years of signing
the SCIN, let alone within five months of the signing. Medical experts testified
at trial that Duilio was expected to live somewhere between 5 and 13.9 years
from the time that he signed the SCIN. His premature death due to
complications from surgery was clearly not anticipated. In addition, the fact that
the SCIN was fully secured by a mortgage on the properties further refutes any
inference that the sale was not bona fide.
The petitioners have thus rebutted the presumption against the enforceability of
an intrafamily SCIN by affirmatively showing that there existed at the time of
the transaction a real expectation of repayment and intent to enforce the
collection of the indebtedness. As such, we conclude that the tax court clearly
erred in finding that the execution of the SCIN was not a bona fide transaction.
Cf. Estate of Musgrove v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 657 (1995) (holding that
the sale of property via a SCIN was not a bona fide transaction when the
taxpayer declared that he was not likely to demand payment on the note).
Perhaps of most interest is the Circuit Court's reversal on factual findings.
4.

Restoration of Unified Credit. In PLR 200334020 a widow assigned her interests in a marital

trust but the assignment was invalid because of prohibitions in the husband's Will. The ruling restored the widow's
unified credit/applicable exclusion.
5.

Tax Payments in Grantor Trust Context. Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-27, considers the gift tax

consequences when a grantor pays the income tax on income attributable to assets in a grantor trust, and the estate
tax consequences if the grantor may be reimbursed by the trust for such income tax payments under the instrument
or applicable state law.
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The fact situations contemplated are:
During Year 1, Trust receives taxable income of $lOx. Pursuant to § 671, A
includes the $lOx in A's taxable income. As a result, A's personal income tax
liability for Year 1 increases by $2.5x. A dies in Year 3. As of the date of A's
death, the fair market value of Trust's assets is $150x.
Situation 1: Neither State law nor the governing instrument of Trust contains
any provision requiring or permitting the trustee to distribute to A amounts
sufficient to satisfy A's income tax liability attributable to the inclusion of Trust's
income in A's taxable income. Accordingly, A pays the additional $2.5x liability
from A's own funds.
Situation 2: The governing instrument of Trust provides that if A is treated as the
owner of any portion of Trust pursuant to the provisions of subpart E for any
taxable year, the trustee shall distribute to A for the taxable year, income or
principal sufficient to satisfy A's personal income tax liability attributable to the
inclusion of all or part of Trust's income in A's taxable income. Accordingly, the
trustee distributes $2.5x to A to reimburse A for the $2.5x income tax liability.
Situation 3: The governing instrument of Trust provides that if A is treated as the
owner of any portion of Trust pursuant to the provisions of subpart E for any
taxable year, the trustee may, in the trustee's discretion, distribute to A for the
taxable year, income or principal sufficient to satisfy A's personal income tax
liability attributable to the inclusion of all or part of Trust's income in A's taxable
income. Pursuant to the exercise of the trustee's discretionary power, the trustee
distributes $2.5x to A to reimburse A for the $2.5x income tax liability.
The Ruling is favorable as to Situation l: no gift tax when the income tax is paid and no estate inclusion
because no rights were retained.
With respect to Situation 2, the IRS was less favorable:
In Situation 2, the governing instrument of Trust requires the trustee to
reimburse A from Trust's assets for the amount of income tax A pays that is
attributable to Trust's income. A's payment of the $2.5x income tax liability does
not constitute a gift by A, because A is liable for the tax. The trustee's
distribution of $2.5x to A as reimbursement for the income tax payment by A is
not a gift by the trust beneficiaries to A, because the distribution from Trust is
mandated by the terms of the trust instrument.
However, A has retained the right to have trust property expended in discharge
of A's legal obligation. A's retained right to receive reimbursement attributable to
Trust's income causes the full value of Trust's assets at A's death ($150x) to be
included in A's gross estate under § 2036(a)(l). The result would be the same if,
under applicable state law, the trustee must, unless the governing instrument
provides otherwise, reimburse A for A's personal income tax liability attributable
to the inclusion of all or part of the Trust's income in A's taxable income, and the
governing instrument does not provide otherwise.
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With respect to Trustee's discretion, Situation 3, the IRS was generally favorable assuming no express or
implied understanding between grantor and beneficiary:
In Situation 3, the governing instrument of Trust provides the trustee with the
discretion to reimburse A from Trust's assets for the amount of income tax A
pays that is attributable to Trust's income. As is the case in Situation 1 and
Situation 2, A's payment of the $2.5x income tax liability does not constitute a
gift by A because A is liable for the income tax. Further, the $2.5x paid to A from
Trust as reimbursement for A's income tax payment was distributed pursuant to
the exercise of the trustee's discretionary authority granted under the terms of the
trust instrument. Accordingly, this payment is not a gift by the trust beneficiaries
to A. In addition, assuming there is no understanding, express or implied,
between A and the trustee regarding the trustee's exercise of discretion, the
trustee's discretion to satisfY A's obligation would not alone cause the inclusion
of the trust in A's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. This is the case
regardless of whether or not the trustee actually reimburses A from Trust assets
for the amount of income tax A pays that is attributable to Trust's income. The
result would be the same if the trustee's discretion to reimburse A for this income
tax is granted under applicable state law rather than under the governing
instrument. However, such discretion combined with other facts (including but
not limited to: an understanding or pre-existing arrangement between A and the
trustee regarding the trustee's exercise of this discretion; a power retained by A
to remove the trustee and name A as successor trustee; or applicable local law
subjecting the trust assets to the claims of A's creditors) may cause inclusion of
Trust's assets in A's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes.
Trusts created before October 4, 2004 are grandfathered for Situation 2 but not Situation 3. Suppose a
Situation 3 trust exists where the trustee has reimbursed the grantor or other facts suggest an understanding? May
the trust be reformed prior to October 4, 2004 to be a Situation 2 trust and thereby protected? The application of the
Ruling to Crummey trusts must be considered as well.
O.

SECTION 2518 - DISCLAIMERS
1.

Disclaimer of Remainder Interests. In Thomas 1. Walshire, et al. v. United States, 288 F.3d 342

(8th Cir. 2002), the Eighth Circuit upheld the validity of the Treasury Regulations under section 2518 which prohibit
the disclaimer of a remainder interest while keeping the life interest. The opinion states:
Walshire attempted to disclaim a portion of the property he was entitled to
receive from his brother by dividing it horizontally, that is, by disclaiming the
remainder interest but retaining the right to the income and use of the property
during his lifetime, or the life estate. The regulation at issue in this case requires
that the undivided portion "consist of a fraction or percentage of each and every
substantial interest or right owned by the disclaimant in such property and must
extend over the entire term of the disclaimant's interest in such property and in
other property into which such property is converted." Treas. Reg. §§ 25.25183(b). In other words, the regulation requires a vertical division of the property.
The regulation specifically excludes the disclaimer attempted by Walshire. See
id. ("Thus, for example, a disclaimer made by the devisee of a fee simple
interest in Blackacre is not a qualified disclaimer if the disclaimant disclaims a
remainder interest in Blackacre but retains a life estate.")
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The executors argue that the regulation is contrary to the plain language of §§
2518(a), which allows the disclaimer of "any interest in property." The
executors argue that a remainder interest is "any interest in property" as that
phrase is used in §§ 2518(a) and that Walshire did not partition the remainder
interest but disclaimed all of it, so that we need not even look at §§ 2518(c).
This construction interprets subsection (a) in isolation. Congress specifically
enacted subsection (c) as a limitation on subsection (a). See I.R.C. §§ 2518(c)
("For purposes of subsection (a) ...."). To allow the disclaimant to partition the
interest bequeathed to him in any manner he chooses as "any interest in
property" under §§ 2518(a) ignores the requirement in §§ 2518(c) that only an
"undivided portion" of an interest may be disclaimed and violates a fundamental
rule of statutory interpretation to give effect to all words and phrases used in the
statute. See Herman v. Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc., 172 F.3d 1078, 108 I (8th
Cir. 1999). We therefore must construe subsection (a) in light of subsection (c)
since Walshire attempted to disclaim only a portion of what he was entitled to
receive under his brother's will.
The executors argue that even under subsection (c), a remainder interest falls
within the clear and unambiguous meaning of an "undivided portion of an
interest." I.R.C. §§ 2518(c). The statute does not defme "undivided portion of an
interest" as that term is used in §§ 2518(c) and we fmd the term to be, at best,
ambiguous. Because "the statute is silent ... with respect to the specific issue"
of whether a horizontal division of property could be considered an undivided
portion of an interest, we must determine "whether the agency's [regulation] is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." Miller, 65 F.3d 690 (internal
quotations omitted) (construing the failure to define a term as "an implicit
legislative delegation of authority to the Commissioner to clarify" the undefmed
term).
The term "undivided" in its common usage means "not separated out into parts
or shares." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2492 (1986). We are
most familiar with the concept of undivided interests in the context of a tenancy
in common, which is "[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in equal or unequal
undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess the whole
property." Black's Law Dictionary 1478 (17th ed. 1999). "jiThe central
characteristic of a tenancy in common is simply that each tenant is deemed to
own by himself, with most of the attributes of independent ownership, a
physically undivided part of the entire parcel. '" Id. (quoting Thomas F. Bergin
& Paul G. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and Future Interests 54 (2d ed.
1984». From these uses of the term "undivided," we discern that an undivided
portion of an interest is a portion that does not separate out the bundle of rights
associated with the interest being apportioned. Thus, if a disclaimant is
bequeathed a fee interest, as was Walshire, an undivided portion of that interest
would have to include all of the rights associated with the fee. Apportioning a
fee into a life estate and a remainder interest does not give the remainder interest
all of the rights associated with a fee because the remainderman is not entitled to
immediate possession, a fundamental right of a fee holder. A remainder interest
simply is not an undivided portion of the fee. See Estate of Brock v. Comm'r2,
630 F.2d 368, 369 n. I (5th Cir. 1980) (addressing similar terminology under
I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(B), which allows a charitable deduction for a contribution of
"an undivided portion of the decedent's entire interest in property," and noting
that "it cannot be contended seriously that the church received an undivided
interest in the property" where decedent left a life estate to his wife and a
remainder interest to the church). We do not believe it was unreasonable for the
Secretary to determine that such a division does not meet the definition of an
undivided portion when it promulgated the regulation that allows only vertical
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divisions of an interest, as opposed to horizontal divisions, to come within the
purview of §§ 2518.
P.

SECTIONS 2601-2654 - GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX

1.

Extension to Allocate GST Exemption. Rulings have begun to be issued with respect to section

9100 relief and late allocations of GST exemptions. To date, the ruling position seems liberal. See, e.g., PLR
200227017, 2002234026, 200320006, 200320009, 200320010, 200320016, 200318005, 200318006, 200318007,
200318008, 200318009, 200318010, 200318011, 200318012, 200318013, 200318014, 200318056, 200318057,
200318063,200317012,200317013,200316031, 200316033, 200316034,200316035, 200316036, 200315006,
200315008, 200315023, 200314006, 200314010, 200313008, 200313012, 200313013, 200311009, 200311013,
200310013, 200310016, 200309005, 200309007, 200309010, 200309026, 200308037, 200307078, 200307082,
200307088, 200306015, 200306016, 200306017, 200306018, 200306020, 200306031, 200306035, 200305022,
200304024, 200303022, 200303053, 200302017, 200302033, 200302035, 200302037, 200302038, 200301027,
200301028,200301037. The standards are:
Section 301.9100-3(b)(l)(v) provides that a taxpayer is deemed to have acted
reasonably and in good faith if the taxpayer reasonably relied on a qualified tax
professional, including a tax professional employed by the taxpayer, and the tax
professional failed to make, or advise the taxpayer to make, the election.
2.

Determination of Inclusion Ratio. PLR 200343019 dealt with calculating a trust's inclusion

ratio, specifically the effect of various expenses paid from the trust upon its termination. The ruling states:
In this case, Trust became irrevocable upon Grantor's death on Date 2. Trust
provided Spouse with the lifetime use of a residence and a monthly payment of
an amount that was subject to an adjustment by the trustee. The denominator is
the value of the property transferred to the trust reduced by Federal estate tax
and State death actually recovered from the trust attributable to the property.
Expenses that would not have been incurred but for the decedent's death and the
resulting necessity of collecting assets, paying debts, and distributing property
are excluded from the value of the property that passes to trust. The estate paid
$F for medical expenses incurred by Grantor during his life. The estate also paid
other expenses relating to the collection of Grantor's assets, paying his debts and
distributing his property. Theses expenses included attorney's fees of $C;
accountant's fees of $D; appraiser, expert, and other professional fees totaling
$E. The amounts paid for these expenses are properly excluded from the value
of the property that passes to trust for purposes of § 2642(a)(2)(B).
On the other hand, expenses of maintaining the trust after the amount that passes
to the trust has been established are not excluded from the value of the property
that passes to trust. Such expenses include the interest expense on the
underpayment of Federal estate and state death taxes. These expenses are not
excluded from the value of the property that passes to trust for purposes of §
2642(a)(2)(B).
Finally, the total Federal estate tax and State death tax due was $G. Section
2642(a)(2)(B) provides that the denominator is the value of the property
transferred to the trust (or involved in the direct skip), reduced by (ii) the sum of
(I) any Federal estate tax or state death tax actually recovered from the trust
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attributable to such property. In this case, the total Federal estate tax and State
death tax of $G was paid from assets of the Trust This amount is properly
excluded from the value of the property that passes to trust for purposes of §
2642(a)(2)(B).

3.

Section 2038 Produces ETIP. In PLR 200419011the taxpayer spouses created trusts and were

advisors with the power to approve principal distributions by trustee.

As originally drafted the trust lacked

ascertainable standards. Subsequently:
Donor and all other interested parties, including Child I, Child 2, and Child 3 in
their capacities as trustees and beneficiaries, and the grandchildren as
beneficiaries, obtained a court order that retroactively reformed Article
VII(A)(2) and Article VIII(A)(2) of each of the seven trusts to include certain
language that the parties contended had been omitted from the trust documents.
Pursuant to the court order, Article VII(A)(2) and Article VIII(A)(2) were each
reformed to read as follows:
2. The Trustee is authorized and empowered in the Trustee's sole and
absolute discretion at any time and from time to time, during the
lifetime of said beneficiary, to disburse from the principal of the trust
estate created under this Article (even to the point of completely
exhausting same), such amounts as the Trustee may deem advisable to
provide adequately and properly for the support and maintenance of the
said beneficiary thereof, including but not by way of limitation,
expenses incurred by reason of illness, disability and education. In
determining the amount of principal to be so disbursed, the Trustee
shall take into consideration any other income or property which such
beneficiary may have from any other source; and the Trustee's
discretion shall be conclusive as to the advisability of any such
disbursement and the same shall not be questioned by anyone. For all
sums so disbursed, the Trustee shall have full acquittance. [Emphasis
added].
The parties contended that the italicized language was contained in early drafts
of the trusts, but had been inadvertently deleted from the final versions that were
executed by Spouse and Donor. In conjunction with a civil law suit, the parties
involved had been deposed on issues concerning the creation of the trusts,
including the deletion of the language at issue, (hereinafter referred to as
ascertainable standard language). These depositions formed part of the record in
the reformation action.
The IRS did not give effect to the reformation:
Section 30-4-3-25 ofInd. Code Ann. (Michie 2002) provides:
Recission and reformation. -- Upon petition by an interested party, the
court may rescind or reform a trust according to the same general rules
applying to rescission or reformation of nontrust transfers of property.
In Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County, Indiana, 635 N.E. 2d 153 (Ind. 1994), the
Indiana Supreme Court noted that written instruments are presumed to reflect
the intentions of the parties to those instruments. Accordingly, "... to succeed in
a reformation action a party must show either mutual mistake or fraud by clear
and convincing evidence ... [and] a party seeking reformation must also show
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the original intent or agreement of the parties by clear and convincing evidence.
"Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County, Indiana, 635 N.E. 2d at 160. See also,
Heavenridge v. Mondy, 49 Ind. 434 (Ind. 1875) ("It is settled law, that to entitle
a party to the reformation of a written instrument, it must be clearly and
satisfactorily shown that there was a mistake of fact, and not of law. It must be
shown that words were inserted that were intended to be left out, or that words
were omitted which were intended to be inserted."); Seufert v. Mulzer, 2000
U.S. Dist. Lexis 13665 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (Indiana law is in accord with the
principle enunciated in Bogert & Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, 991
(2d ed. rev. 1983) to the effect that reformation will not be granted where the
mistake was as to the legal effect ofthe wording of the instrument.)
In the instant case, we do not believe the record provides clear and convincing
evidence that a mistake of fact was made, as required under Indiana law. On the
contrary, in the depositions noted above, Attorney testified that he had no
recollection of why the ascertainable standard language was removed. On the
other hand, there is specific testimony from Accountant that Spouse intended to
delete the ascertainable standard language and that Spouse and Donor intended
to make the invasion power very broad, and that Attorney had to be aware of the
changes. Further, as discussed above, the actions of the trustees in managing the
assets of the trusts have been consistent with the absence of any limitation that
would have been imposed by the ascertainable standard language. Thus, our
review of the record does not indicate that there was "clear and convincing
evidence" of a mutual mistake or clear and convincing evidence that the terms of
the executed instrument were contrary to the original intent of the grantors, the
standard for reformation under Indiana law. Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County,
Indiana, cited above. Thus, we conclude the reformation should not be given
retroactive effect for transfer tax purposes.
Thus, section 2038 applied to created an ETIP:
Donor and Spouse were members of the Advisory Committee from the creation
of the trusts on Date 1, until their resignations on Date 4. Article XIII requires
that the trustee consult with the Advisory Committee on all important matters,
including discretionary payments of principal. Under the Article, the trustee is
prohibited from taking any action involving discretionary payments of income
and of principal without the unanimous consent or approval of tbe Advisory
Committee. Only if the Advisory Committee fails to act within the time
prescribed, may the trustee act in its own discretion "as if no Advisory
Committee had been appointed." In addition, the Advisory Committee, acting
unanimously and at its own discretion, may remove and replace an acting trustee
and/or select a successor trustee, at any time and upon the death, incapacity, or
resignation of a current trustee.
As discussed above, we have concluded that the trustee's power to distribute
corpus was not limited by an ascertainable standard. Accordingly, if this power
was held directly by Donor and Spouse, as trustees, the corpus of each trust
would be subject to inclusion in their respective gross estates under § 2038, to
the extent of their contributions to the trusts. Rev. Rul. 73-143, cited above. In
this case, although neither Donor nor Spouse were trustees, as members of the
Advisory Committee, their consent was required before the trustee could make
any distribution. The fact that this consent or veto power could be exercised only
after the trustees initiated action does not alter the nature of the power as a
power exercisable by Donor or Spouse in conjunction with others, within the
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purview of § 2038. Rev. Rul. 70-513, 1970-2 C.B. 194, citing Estate of
Grossman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 707 (1957).1
Because Donor and Spouse initially retained a power over the trusts that would
cause trust property to be included in their gross estates under § 2038, the
transfers by Donor and Spouse to the trusts were subject to an "estate tax
inclusion period" under § 2642(f)(3), for purposes of the generation-skipping
transfer tax. The estate tax inclusion period did not terminate until Date 4, the
date that Donor and Spouse resigned from the Advisory Committee with respect
to each ofthe trusts.
Accordingly, for purposes of the generation-skipping transfer tax, an estate tax
inclusion period did exist with respect to the transfers made by Donor and
Spouse to the trusts.
Q.

SECTIONS 2701-2704 - SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
1.

Family Limited Partnerships. Taxpayers have won arguments that neither section 2703 nor

2704(b) apply (but see the section 2036 discussion above).
The Tax Court allowed a combined 40% minority and marketability discount in Estate of Elma M. Dailey,
et al. v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2001-263, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 710. The FLP transaction was straightforward:
On October 20, 1992, Mrs. Dailey executed a will, a Revocable Living Trust
(Trust), and an Agreement of Limited Partnership (Agreement) of Elma
Middleton Dailey FLP. The will provided that Mrs. Dailey's residuary estate
would pass to the Trust, from which her son would receive the corpus outright.
Upon execution of the Agreement, Mrs. Dailey took a 1- percent general and a
98-percent limited partnership interest, and Mr. Dailey [her son] received a 1percent limited partnership interest. On November 13, 1992, Mrs. Dailey
contributed, to the FLP, 400 AT&T, 20,000 Exxon, and 895 Bell South Corp.
shares. Mr. Dailey did not contribute any assets to the FLP. On December 4,
1992, the Texas Secretary of State filed the FLP's Celiificate of Limited
Partnership.
On December 8, 1992, Mrs. Dailey signed a letter which stated that by "the
terms of the Elma Middleton Dailey Family Limited Partnership, this letter shall
be sufficient evidence of my transfer and conveyance to you of the following
limited partnership interest", giving 45-, 15-, and 38-percent interests to Mr.
Dailey, his wife, and the Trust, respectively.

******
On March 16, 1995, Mrs. Dailey appointed Mr. Dailey as the FLP managing
partner. On July 26, 1995, he replaced her as the trustee of the Trust and FLP
general partner, and her I-percent general partnership interest became a limited
one.
Mrs. Dailey died on January 10, 1997.
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The opinion fIrst discusses whether the FLP should be respected for valuation purposes.

The entire

discussion is as follows:
The FLP was validly formed pursuant to Texas law, and we do not disregard it
for tax purposes. See Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478, 487
(2000); Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 506, 513-515 (2000).
The court declined to value the interests as assignee interests and went on to discuss the discount issue:
Mrs. Dailey gave Mr. Dailey a I-percent limited partnership interest on
formation, but the FLP had no assets on that date. Mrs. Dailey made gifts of 45and 15-percent limited partnership interests to her son and daughter-in-law,
respectively, and thus retained 39 percent in the trust at death. The parties
stipulated, however, that Mrs. Dailey retained 40 percent. Respondent
inexplicably does not contend that the initial I-percent limited partnership
interest transferred to Mr. Dailey had gift tax consequences at formation or
funding.
Both parties agree that the given and retained interests were, on December 8,
1992, and January 10, 1997, worth their proportionate share of the NAV of
$1,267,619 and $1,047,603 for gift and estate tax purposes, respectively. They
disagree, however, about the size of the minority and marketability discounts.
Both parties' experts compared the FLP to closed-end mutual funds, which trade
at a discount to NAV, but disagreed on the amounts of the discounts.
Petitioners' expert, citing published data, opined that the aggregate discount is
40 percent for lack of marketability, control, and liquidity and testifIed that he
considered the signifIcant amount of umealized capital gains relating to the
Exxon stock.
Respondent's expert, on the other hand, relied in part on an unpublished study
that he coauthored and, in a revised report submitted at trial, increased the
marketability discount purportedly substantiated by his unpublished study from
12.5 percent to 14.1 percent. Respondent's expert opined that an aggregate
discount of 15.72 percent on December 8, 1992, and 13.51 percent on January
10, 1997, should be applied. At trial, respondent's expert testifIed that he could
not recall reviewing the Agreement and, although he believed that unrealized
capital gains are "an important source of discounts", he did not review the
documents to determine if the FLP had any such gains. Respondent's expert's
testimony was contradictory, unsupported by the data, and inapplicable to the
facts.
In Charles T. McCord v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. No. 13 (2003), the IRS presented expert testimony as did
the taxpayer. The net result was a 15% minority interest discount and 20% lack of marketability discount on the
marketable securities portion of the partnership. Essentially the court averaged the various studies of comparable
transactions with which it was presented.
In Clarissa W. Lappo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-258, the issue was the valuation of a limited
partnership interest owning real estate and marketable securities. Mother retained the general partnership interest
(1%) and gave away her 98.7% limited partnership interest. The Court allowed a minority interest discount of 8.5%
for the marketable securities component and 19% for the real estate component.
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With respect to lack of

marketability, the Court allowed 24%. The taxpayer's expert was from Management Planning, Inc.; the government
expert was a professor from USC. The Court indicated a preference for private placement studies over restricted
stock studies. Section 2036 was not at issue.
A similar transaction was addressed in Peter S. Peracchio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-2809, where
the partnership owned only cash and marketable securities. The Court found both experts unhelpful because neither
explained how various restricted stock studies related to the facts before the court.

The Court allowed a 6%

minority interest discount and 25% lack of marketability discount.
2.

Qualified Personal Residence Trust Form. Rev. Proc. 2003-42 contains a form for a Qualified

Personal Residence Trust. The form is not surprising. With respect to a sale back to the grantor the form provides:
Prohibition on Sale of Residence to Transferor or Related Parties. The Trustee
is prohibited from selling transferring (as defined in § 25.2702-5(c)(9) of the
regulations) the Residence, directly or indirectly, to the Transferor, the
Transferor's spouse, or an entity controlled by the Transferor or the Transferor's
spouse during the retained term interest of the QPRT, or an any time after the
termination of the retained term interest in the QPRT while the trust is treated as
owned in whole or in part by the Transferor or the Transferor's spouse under §§
671 through 678 of the Code.
The Annotation states:
(4) Prohibition on Sale of Residence to Transferor or Related Person (Article II,
Paragraph B(5». The governing instrument must prohibit the trust from selling
or transferring the residence directly or indirectly to the transferor, the
transferor's spouse, or an entity controlled by the transferor or the transferor's
spouse during the retained term interest in the trust or any time after the
expiration of that interest when the trust is a grantor trust. For these purposes:
(A) a sale or transfer to another grantor trust of the transferor or the transferor's
spouse is considered a sale or transfer to the transferor of the transferor's
spouse; and (B) a "grantor trust" is a trust that is treated as owned in whole or in
part by the transferor or the transferor's spouse pursuant to §§ 671 through 678,
and "control" is as defined in § 25.2701-2(b)(5)(ii) and (iii).
This prohibition, however, does not apply to a distribution for no consideration
either to: (i) another grantor trust of the transferor or the transferor's spouse, if
the distributee-grantor trust includes the same prohibition against a sale or
transfer; (ii) the transferor's spouse after the term of the QPRT; or (iii) any
person pursuant to the trust instrument or the exercise of the transferor's retained
power of appointment, if any, if the transferor dies prior to the expiration of the
retained term interest. Section 25.2703-5(c)(9).
3.

Effect on Buy-Sell Agreement. The Tax Court disregarded a buy-sell agreement in Estate of

George C. Blount v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo 2004-116, in determining the value of closely-held stock (BBC).
The court found that the agreement allowed the decedent to amend it unilaterally, thus the agreement's restrictions
on lifetime transfers could have been eliminated and under pre-section 2703 law the buy-sell was ineffective to set

A-154

the price of shares subject to it. Further, in 1996 the agreement was amended, thus blowing the section 2703
grandfather.
The court also addressed the effect of life insurance payable to the company and the corporate obligation to
redeem stock from the decedent's estate:
We tum next to the question of how to account for the $3,146,134 million in life
insurance proceeds BCC was due to receive on decedent's death and BCC's $4
million obligation to redeem decedent's shares, as set forth in the Modified ]98]
Agreement. Mr. Fodor excluded both the insurance proceeds and the redemption
obligation when determining BCC's value on the theory that the insurance
proceeds were offset by the redemption obligation. In contrast, Mr. Hitchner
included the insurance proceeds in valuing BCC, adding their value to his $7
million "concluded" value for BCC, while disregarding the redemption
obligation.
Respondent argues that the insurance proceeds must be included in BCC's value
as a nonoperating asset, relying on section 20.2031-2(f), Estate Tax Regs., and
Estate of Huntsman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 861 (1976). In contrast, the estate
argues that, while insurance proceeds might be a nonoperating asset, under
Estate of Cartwright v. Commissioner, 183 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 1999), affg. in
part and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1996-286, they must be offset by BCC's
obligation to redeem decedent's shares, and therefore do not affect BCC's value.
Estate of Huntsman makes clear that insurance proceeds are treated like any
other nonoperating asset when determining a closely held corporation's value.
Estate of Huntsman v. Commissioner, supra at 874; see also sec. 20.2031-2(f),
Estate Tax Regs. (" consideration shall also be given to nonoperating assets,
including proceeds of life insurance policies payable to or for the benefit of the
company, to the extent such nonoperating assets have not been taken into
account in the determination of net worth, prospective earning power and
dividend-earning capacity"). Whether BCC's $4 million obligation to redeem
decedent's shares offsets the life insurance proceeds, as the estate argues, is
another question. In Estate of Huntsman, we reasoned that, because life
insurance proceeds should be treated like any other nonoperating asset, to the
extent such assets were considered in valuing a company, they were subject to
offset by corporate liabilities. However, we were not presented in that case with
the question of whether a corporation's obligation to redeem the very shares that
are to be valued should be treated as a liability, offsetting corporate assets.34
The estate here urges that we treat BCC's enforceable $4 million obligation to
redeem the shares whose value is at issue as a liability offsetting BCC's assets
(i.e., the $3,146,134 life insurance proceeds plus almost $1 million in other
assets) in arriving at the value of the same shares.
We decline to do so for two reasons. First, we have concluded that the
agreement under which BCC was obligated to redeem decedent's shares for $4
million must be disregarded under both section 20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs.,
and section 2703. In such circumstances, the terms of the disregarded agreement
are generally not taken into account in determining the fair market value of the
shares subject to the agreement. Estate of True v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2001-167; Estate of Lauder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-527; see also
Estate of Godley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-242, affd. 286 F.3d 210
(4th Cir. 2002). As we noted in Estate of Lauder,under these circumstances, the
willing buyer/seller analysis would be distorted if we disregarded the buy-sell
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agreement for purposes of fixing the value of the subject stock, yet allowed
provisions in the agreement to be taken into account when determining the
stock's fair market value. Thus, it would be improper here to consider the
redemption obligation in the disregarded buy-sell agreement when determining
the fair market value of the stock covered by that agreement.
Second, even if the impact of the redemption obligation on BCC's value were
not disregarded under the principles of Estate of Lauder and like cases, the
redemption obligation should not be treated as a value-depressing corporate
liability when the very shares that are the subject of the redemption obligation
are being valued. To do so would be to value BCC in its postredemption
configuration; namely, after decedent's shares had been redeemed and BCC's
assets had been contracted by the $4 million redemption payment. Valuing
decedent's 43,080 shares by means of the hypothetical willing buyer/seller
construct necessarily requires that the corporation's actual obligation to redeem
the shares be ignored; such a stance is inherent in the fiction that the shares are
being sold to a hypothetical third-party buyer on the valuation date rather than
being redeemed by the corporation. To the hypothetical willing buyer,
decedent's 43,080 BCC shares constituted an 83.2-percent interest in all of the
assets and income-generating potential of BCC on the valuation date, including
any assets that might be used to satisfy the actual redemption obligation. To treat
the corporation's obligation to redeem the very shares that are being valued as a
liability that reduces the value of the corporate entity thus distorts the nature of
the ownership interest represented by those shares.
By contrast, a hypothetical willing buyer of BCC shares other than decedent's
would treat the redemption obligation, on the valuation date, as a corporate
liability of BCC, but only in connection with a simultaneous accounting of the
impact of the redemption of decedent's shares on the ownership interest inherent
in the other shares not being redeemed.
A simplified example will illustrate the fallacy behind the estate's contention
that BCC's obligation to redeem decedent's shares should be treated as a liability
offsetting a corresponding amount of corporate assets. Assume corporation X
has 100 shares outstanding and two shareholders, A and B, each holding 50
shares. X's sole asset is $1 million in cash. X has entered into an agreement
obligating it to purchase B's shares at his death for $500,000. If, at B's death, X's
$500,000 redemption obligation is treated as a liability of X for purposes of
valuing B's shares, then X's value becomes $500,000 ($1 million cash less a
$500,000 redemption obligation). It would follow that the value of B's shares
(and A's shares) is $250,000 (i.e., one half of the corporation's $500,000
value35) upon B's death. Yet if B's shares are then redeemed for $500,000, A's
shares are then worth $500,000 -- that is, A's 50 shares constitute 100-percent
ownership of a corporation with $500,000 in cash.
It cannot be correct either that B's one-half interest in $1 million in cash is worth

only $250,000 or that A's one-half interest in the remainder shifts from a value
of $250,000 preredemption to a value of $500,000 postredemption.
The error with respect to B's shares in the example lies in the treatment of X's
redemption obligation as a claim on corporate assets when valuing the very
shares that would be redeemed with those assets. With respect to A's shares, a
willing buyer would pay $500,000 upon B's death (not $250,000) because he
would take account of both the liability arising from X's redemption obligation
and the shift in the proportionate ownership interest of A's shares occasioned by
the redemption -- but never the former without the latter.36
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The estate's reliance on Estate of Cartwright v. Commissioner, 183 F.3d 1034
(9th Cir. 1999), is misplaced, as that case is distinguishable. Estate of Cartwright
involved a law fIrm (organized as a C corporation) that entered into a buy-sell
agreement with its majority shareholder. The parties agreed that the fIrm would
purchase from the shareholder's estate his shares and his interest in the fees for
the fIrm's work in progress at his death. The consideration for this purchase was
designated as the proceeds from two $2.5 million life insurance policies on the
shareholder's life that the fIrm was required to obtain under the agreement.
Upon the shareholder's death, the fIrm paid the $5,062,02937 insurance proceeds
to the shareholder's estate. The taxpayer took the position that the entire
$5,062,029 was paid for the shareholder's stock, whereas the Commissioner
determined that approximately $4 million was paid for the shareholder's interest
in work in progress (and, therefore, was income in respect of a decedent).
Concluding that the insurance proceeds were consideration for both the stock
and the shareholder's interest in work in progress, this Court undertook to
allocate the consideration between the two by determining the stock's fair
market value at the shareholder's death, and treating the insurance proceeds in
excess of that fair market value as consideration paid for the shareholder's
interest in work in progress. In determining the fair market value of the stock,
we rejected the taxpayer's argument that the $5 million in insurance proceeds
should be treated as a nonoperating asset of the fIrm, augmenting the value of its
stock, on the grounds that the insurance proceeds were offset by the fIrm's
obligation to pay them over to the estate. In so concluding, we relied on Estate
of Huntsman v. Commissioner, 66 T.e. 861 (1976), as follows: "We said in
Estate of Huntsman that a buyer would not pay more for stock based on the
corporation's ownership of life insurance if the proceeds would be largely offset
by the corporation's liabilities. That is the case here." Estate of Cartwright v.
Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1996-286 (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affIrmed our position that the life insurance proceeds would
not be considered by a hypothetical willing buyer in these circumstances. Estate
of Cartwright v. Commissioner, 183 F.3d at 1038.
Estate of Cartwright is distinguishable. The lion's share of the corporate
liabilities in that case which were found to offset the insurance proceeds were
not obligations of the corporation to redeem its own stock. Rather, we
determined that approximately $4 million of the $5 million liability of the
corporation was to compensate the decedent shareholder for services; i.e., for his
interest in work in progress. Thus, a substantial portion of the liability was no
different from any third-party liability of the corporation that would be netted
against assets, including insurance proceeds, to ascertain net assets.
Concededly, a portion of the liability in Estate of Cartwright constituted an
obligation to redeem stock being valued. Nonetheless, in contrast to the instant
case, the buy-sell agreement in Estate of Cartwright had not been disregarded
pursuant to section 20.2031-2(h), Estate Tax Regs., or section 2703; indeed, our
principal task in Estate of Cartwright was to construe the terms of the buy-sell
agreement, which was fully respected. Given the disregarded status of the buysell agreement at issue here, Estate of Cartwright has no application.
Accordingly, we conclude that the $3,146,134 in insurance proceeds due BCC
upon decedent's death should be treated as a nonoperating asset of BCC and is
not offset by BCC's $4 million obligation to redeem decedent's shares.

A-157

R.

SECTION 6166 - EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX

1.

Use of Single-Member LLCs. In PLR 200321006 the IRS determined that single member LLCs,

or disregarded entities, had no effect on a section 6166 election. The ruling states:
Decedent died on Date 1, a resident of State X. Decedent's gross estate
consisted primarily of a sole proprietorship. The sole proprietorship was
engaged in direct farming operations of various crops on Y acres of land owned
and/or leased by Decedent. In addition, the sole proprietorship was engaged in
storage and processing functions with respect to those crops. Up until his death,
Decedent was actively involved in all aspects of the farming, storage, and
processing operations. The interest in the sole proprietorship included in
Decedent's gross estate qualified as an interest in a closely held business within
the meaning of section 6166(b)(1). As a result, the personal representative of
Decedent's estate elected under section 6166 to pay the portion of estate tax
attributable to the value of Decedent's interest in the sole proprietorship in
installments. Decedent's estate timely filed Form 706, United States Estate (and
Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return on Date 2 and included a section
6166 election.
Pursuant to the terms of Decedent's will, the majority of Decedent's assets were
distributable to a residuary trust with three primary beneficiaries, A, B, and C. A
and B are sons of Decedent. While C was raised by Decedent and changed his
last name to that of Decedent's, C is not a blood relative of Decedent.
Decedent's will expressed the intent that the beneficiaries continue the fanning
operations.
Decedent's will authorized the trust to lease portions or all of the Y acres ofland
to the trust beneficiaries, provided that the beneficiaries personally operate the
farm. Decedent's will further provided that in the event the trust beneficiaries,
individually or any combination of them, are the sole owners of a farming entity,
a lease to such entity is authorized. In accordance with these terms, Decedent's
estate has entered into cash leases under which it has leased certain of the Y
acres of farmland to LLC 1 and LLC 2. The leases are based on a fixed cash
price per acre. LLC 1 and LLC 2 were formed for the purpose of conducting
Decedent's farming operations.
LLC 1 is a limited liability company formed under State X law with A as its sole
owner. It is a disregarded entity for all federal tax purposes and its activities are
treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship of A. See Treas. Reg. §
30 1.770 1-2(a). Similarly, LLC 2 is a limited liability company formed under
State X law with C as its sole owner. Consequently, LLC 2 is treated as a sole
proprietorship of C for federal tax purposes.

***
The change in this case, from operating the farm operations as a sole
proprietorship to entering into cash leases with LLC I and LLC 2, owned and
operated by A and C respectively, does not materially alter the business. LLC 1
and LLC 2 are disregarded entities for all federal tax purposes and their
activities are treated in the same manner as sole proprietorships of A and C,
respectively. LLC 1 and LLC 2 continue the farming operations in the manner
previously performed by Decedent. Given LLC 1's status as a disregarded entity
for all federal tax purposes and LLC 1's close relationship to A, leasing the land
to LLC 1 should be viewed as leasing the land to A. In substance, LLC 1 is
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merely a trade name by which A conducts the farming business. Similarly, LLC
2 is a trade name by which C conducts the farming business. Therefore, the lease
transactions will not result in the acceleration of the estate tax installments.
S.

TAX ADMINISTRATION
1.

Tax-Apportionment; GST. In Estate of Mildred Green v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-348,

the decedent left one-half of her residuary estate to charity and the other half to a trust for her grandchildren. After a
valuation dispute, GST tax was owed to the government. The decedent's tax clause directed GST tax on direct skips
to be paid from the residuary estate, which reduced the charitable deduction.
2.

Tax Shelter, Anti-Abuse Efforts. On December 29, 2003 Treasury issued TO. 9108, final

regulations dealing with confidential transactions; T.O. 9109, [mal regulations dealing with defenses to accuracy
related penalties for failure to disclose reportable transactions or that a return position is contrary to a regulation; and
REG-122379-02, proposed amendments to Circular 230.
3.

Duty of Consistency. In Estate of Rose B. Posner v. Commissioner, TC. Memo 2004-112, the

court determined that a trust was not included in a surviving spouse's estate because she had no general power of
appointment. However, when the first spouse had died, in 1975, the IRS had allowed a marital deduction thinking
she did.
One of the issues was the duty of consistency, which the opinion described as follows:
As developed in caselaw, the duty of consistency (sometimes called quasiestoppel) prevents a taxpayer from benefiting in a later year from an error or
omission in an earlier year that cannot be corrected because the time to assess
tax for the earlier year has expired. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.
290,296 (1997), affd. without published opinion 212 F.3d 600 (1Ith Cir. 2000).
The duty of consistency may apply if: (1) The taxpayer made a representation of
fact or reported an item for tax purposes in one tax year; (2) the Commissioner
acquiesced in or relied on that fact for that year; and (3) the taxpayer desires to
change the representation previously made in a later tax year after the earlier
year has been closed by the statute of limitations. Id. at 297; LeFever v.
Commissioner, 103 T. C. 525, 543 (1994), affd. 100 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996).
Spouses, as well as their estates, may have sufficient identity of interests so that
one may be estopped under the duty of consistency by a prior representation of
the other. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, supra at 298; Cluck v.
Commissioner, 105 TC. 324, 333-336 (1995). Respondent contends that Mr.
Posner's estate and decedent's estate have sufficient identity of interests that the
duty of consistency is applicable. For purposes of this discussion, we assume,
without deciding, that there was privity of interest between Mr. Posner's estate
and decedent's estate.
On brief, respondent acknowledges that the duty of consistency applies "if the
inconsistency is a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law. It does
not apply to mutual mistake on the part of a taxpayer and the Service concerning
a pure question of law." See LeFever v. Commissioner, 100 F.3d at 788;
Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1988), affg. Glass v.
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Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75
T.C. 497, 560 (1980); Unvert v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 807, 816 (1979), affd.
656 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1981). With little elaboration, respondent contends on
brief that the inconsistency in question here is a "mixed question of fact and
law", so that the duty of consistency applies. We disagree.
In Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376,380 (6th Cir. 1956), the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that the duty of consistency "is probably
applicable in cases where the factual situation is such as to justify the taxpayer
in taking either of two possible positions" but generally does not apply "when
the error is one of law arising out of a definite factual situation". In the instant
case, the inconsistency arose because of a mutual mistake in deciding how Mr.
Posner's will should be construed under Maryland law -- a purely legal issue.
See McIntyre v. Byrne, 141 A. 2d 692, 695 (Md. 1958) ("The construction of a
will is a matter of law for the court to determine"). Mr. Posner's estate did not
misrepresent the property or type of property that Mr. Posner had devised to
decedent. Respondent has not alleged any facts to show that the estate has been
inconsistent with respect to any factual positions or to suggest that the
inconsistency in question arose from anything other than a purely legal error'in
the context of "a definite factual situation". Crosley Corp. v. United States, supra
at 380.
The interpretation of the Will was at issue in prolonged litigation in state court. The executor ultimately
lost the argument, which the court found important:
Moreover, the duty of consistency "does not apply where all pertinent facts are
known to both the Commissioner and the taxpayer", especially if "the crucial
facts are known to both parties and the erroneous deductions are due to a mutual
mistake of law." S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 560; cf.
Interlochen Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1956), affg. 24 T.e.
1000 (1955); Hull v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1937) (stating
that "a party either knowing the facts, or in a position to know them, cannot
claim the benefit of estoppel"), revg. 33 BTA. 178 (1935). In the instant case,
respondent had reason to know all the relevant facts. When Mr. Posner's estate
filed its estate tax return, it adequately disclosed the relevant facts and
documents, attaching a copy of Mr. Posner's wil1.15 Respondent audited the
estate tax return of Mr. Posner's estate and allowed the marital deduction.16
Respondent has not alleged any facts to suggest that this audit was insufficient
in any regard other than in the failure to apply the law correctly. Under these
circumstances, respondent caill10t be viewed as justifiably relying on the legal
representation on the estate tax return ofMr. Posner's estate.
The executor of Mr. Posner's estate and the executor of decedent's estate, as well
as respondent's agents upon audit of Mr. Posner's estate's estate tax return, all
acted in accordance with the mutual mistake of law that Mr. Posner's will gave
decedent a general power of appointment. Indeed, when he filed the estate tax
return of decedent's estate, decedent's executor included the marital trust
property in decedent's gross estate and paid the resulting estate tax. He
steadfastly maintained in the State court litigation that decedent possessed a
testamentary power of appointment over the marital trust property. Only after
the court of special appeals rejected this position and the Maryland Court of
Appeals declined to hear the appeal did he file the refund claim. Respondent has
not carried his burden to show that the duty of consistency should apply in these
circumstances.
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The IRS applied the duty of consistency in TAM 200407018. The facts are interesting; oil paintings passed
in a life estate to decedent's spouse for which no QTIP election was made, and other paintings passed into a QTIP
trust. A pastel painting was allocated to the QTIP trust. The surviving spouse died and the painting was sold, and
determined actually to be an oil painting. The surviving spouse's estate excluded the proceeds of the sale. The IRS
disagreed, stating:
As described above, the doctrine applies where the same taxpayer makes
conflicting representations. However, the duty of consistency can also be
applied to bind one person to a representation made by another where the two
are deemed to be in privity. Whether there is sufficient identity of interests
between the parties to warrant the application of the duty of consistency depends
on the facts and circumstances of each case. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner,
109 T.C. 290 (1997); Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.e. at 333-336 (concluding
that a husband and wife can have interests so closely aligned that one spouse
may be estopped under the duty of consistency doctrine by the prior
representations of the other spouse). See also, Beltzer v. United States, 495 F.2d
211 (8th Cir. 1973) (estate beneficiary was bound by representation of value
made by the executor-beneficiary of the estate); Griffith v. United States, 27
AFTR 2d 754 (N.D. Tex. 1971); McMillan v. United States, 14 AFTR 2d 5704
(S.D. W. Va. 1964); Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Ford v.
United States, 276 F.2d 17 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (estate beneficiaries who were minors
at the time the estate was administered were not bound by estate representations
as to the value of inherited property).
In Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, cited above, the decedent's husband's will
created a marital trust for the benefit of the decedent that was intended to qualifY
as QTIP property, for purposes of the federal estate tax marital deduction.
Decedent's only interests in the trust were a right to receive all trust income, a
right to withdraw up to $40,000 per year and a right to receive at the trustee's
discretion, distributions of principal for her comfort maintenance and support. Tn
preparing Schedule M of the estate tax return, the executors of husband's estate
checked the "no" box, utilized to signify that a QTIP election was not being
made. However, the executors claimed a marital deduction for the value of the
property passing to the marital trust. Upon the decedent's death, the decedent's
estate contended that the marital trust was not includible in the Decedent's gross
estate under section 2044, or any other Code section, on the basis that the
husband's estate, by checking the "no" box, had not treated the property as QTTP
property. Further, other than the power to withdraw $40,000 annually, the
decedent had no general power of appointment over the property justifying
inclusion under section 2041. The taxpayer further argued that a duty of
consistency did not apply between the decedent's estate and the estate of her
husband.
However, the Tax Court disagreed and found that there was a sufficient identity
of interests between the husband's estate and decedent's estate such that the duty
of consistency would apply. Initially, the Tax Court noted that, "[i]t is a basic
policy of the marital deduction that property that passes untaxed from a
predeceasing spouse to a surviving spouse is included in the gross estate of the
surviving spouse." Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 295. The court
then concluded:
There is a sufficient identity of interests between the Estates of James
Letts, Jr., and of decedent to trigger the duty of consistency. Dc;cedent
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and James Letts, Jr. were married. Their estates were a single economic
unit. Decedent's husband left his estate to decedent, James P. Letts III,
and Joanne Magbee [husband and decedent's children]. Decedent was
an executrix of her husband's estate. James P. Letts III signed both
returns. JoAnne Magbee is also a co-executor of, signed the estate tax
return for, decedent's estate.
Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 298.
In the instant case, we believe that the duty of consistency does apply to bind the
Decedent's estate to the representations made by H's estate regarding the
qualification of Painting for the marital deduction. Initially, we note that all
three elements required for application of the duty of consistency have been
satisfied. For purposes of the duty of consistency, a taxpayer's treatment of an
item on a return can be a representation that facts exist which are consistent with
how the taxpayer reports the item on the return. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner,
109 T.C. at 299. Several representations were made by H's estate on the estate
tax return, regarding the treatment of the Painting for estate tax purposes. An
appraisal attached to the federal estate tax return, identified Painting as a
"pastel". H's estate represented that Painting passed under Section V of H's will.
Further, by identifying the property as passing under Section V and claiming a
marital deduction for Painting, the estate represented that Decedent possessed a
life estate coupled with a general power of appointment with respect to Painting,
that qualified Painting for the marital deduction under section 2056(b)(5). Thus,
the first element has been met. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.e. at 300.
Further, the Service relied on the representations that Painting passed under
Section V of the will, that Decedent had a general power of appointment with
respect to Painting, and therefore that the Painting qualified for the marital
deduction. The Service relies on a fact if a taxpayer files a return that contains
an inadequately disclosed item of which the Service was not otherwise aware,
the Service accepts the return, and the time to assess tax expires without an audit
of that return. Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.e. at 300. In the instant
case, there was nothing on the estate tax return to alert the IRS as to any issue
presented regarding the treatment of Painting, nor did H's estate provide any
facts to show that Painting should have passed under Section IV and was not
subject to the marital deduction. Thus, based on the representations made on the
estate tax return, the Service allowed the marital deduction with respect to
Painting. The Service may rely on a presumption of correctness of a return that
is given to the Service under the penalties of peljury. Hughes & Luce, L.L.P. v.
Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1994-559. Further, the time to make an adjustment
and assess tax with respect to H's estate has expired. Thus, the second element of
the duty of consistency has been satisfied.

***
Although H's estate and Decedent's estate are different taxpayers, there is
sufficient privity between H's estate and Decedent's estate such that Decedent's
estate is bound by the representations made by H's estate under the duty of
consistency doctrine. Specifically, H and Decedent were married. As the court
noted in Estate of Letts, the basic policy rationale underlying the allowance of
the estate tax marital deduction is that the property for which a deduction is
allowed in the estate of the first spouse to die will be included in the gross estate
of the second spouse to die. Thus, H's estate derived a specific tax benefit, a
marital deduction, presumptively conditioned on consistent treatment of the
assets for which a deduction was allowed in Decedent's estate. Accordingly, for
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transfer tax purposes, the two estates are treated as a single economic unit. Next,
as a practical matter, H's estate and Decedent's estate functioned as a single
economic unit, pursuant to which H's estate's property was to be available to the
spouse during her lifetime and then pass to Son 1 and Son 2 when she died. Son
1 and Son 2 are the remainder beneficiaries of the interests created under
Section IV and Section V of H's will, and the marital trust created under the
residuary clause of H's will. The Section V property and the residuary marital
trust are also included in Decedent's gross estate. Moreover, Decedent was a coexecutor ofH's estate. As co-executor, Decedent signed the Form 706 declaring,
under the penalties of perjury, that she had examined the return, including
accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of her knowledge and
belief, the return was true, correct and complete. Thus, as was the case in Estate
of Letts, H's estate and Decedent's estate were in privity, both for purposes of
disposing ofH's property and for transfer tax purposes.
However, Decedent's estate contends that H's estate and Decedent's estate were
not in privity, and therefore, the duty of consistency does not apply. In this
regard, the estate notes that Decedent had little involvement with the preparation
of H's estate's Form 706, and relied on the other co-executors to make all
decisions regarding the Form 706, including the decision to characterize
Painting as Section V property.
It has been clearly established by several courts that a co-executor's lack of

participation does not preclude the application of the duty of consistency. In
Beltzer v. United States, the taxpayer, a co-executor of his father's estate,
inherited stock that had been reported on the estate tax return as having a fair
market value of$59,713. After the statute oflimitations on assessments against
the estate expired, the taxpayer sold his shares for $140,000. For purposes of
determining gain on the sale of the stock, the taxpayer asserted that the stock
had a fair market value of $118,020 on the date of his father's death, despite the
fact that he had signed the estate tax return and had received the benefit of the
lower reported estate tax value. The taxpayer argued that he should not be bound
by the estate's representation of value, because he relied on his co-executor to
prepare the estate tax return. The court rejected this argument stating: "A
taxpayer, in this situation, innocent or otherwise, who has already had the
advantages of a past alleged misstatement -- such advantage now beyond
recoupment -- may not change his posture, and by claiming he should have
properly paid more tax before, avoid the present levy." Beltzer v. United States,
495 F.2d at 212-13. See also, Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 298299; McMillan v. United States, 14 AFTR 2d at 5704.
In Conrad Janis, et ux. et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-117, the issue was whether the taxpayer
could calculate a gallery's cost of goods sold using the undiscounted value of the gallery's collection of artwork
rather than the discounted value used for federal estate tax purposes. The court applied the duty of consistency:
Respondent has established that all three elements of the duty of consistency are
present in this case. Conrad and Carroll agreed that the discounted value of the
collection was $14,500,000, and the Commissioner relied upon that value in
assessing the estate tax owed by Sidney's estate. Once the period for assessment
against Sidney's estate had closed, however, petitioners claimed that the
collection's undiscounted value should be used to calculate the gallery's COGS,
Because all three elements of the duty of consistency are satisfied, we hold that
petitioners are bound to use the collection's discounted value as their basis for
purposes of calculating the gallery's COGS for 1990 through 1997.
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4.

Effect of Probate Order. In Estate of McDonald v. United States, 302 F.Supp.2d 1285 N.D. Ala.

2003) the court rejected an IRS attempt to ignore the holdings of an Alabama probate court that the decedent
appointed attorneys-in-fact to act severally, not jointly, and the decedent intended to forgive a debt in her Will. The
case is interesting because it involved a District Court deciding directly issues of state law.
10223516.1
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I.

Legislative History
A.

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws

B.

1931 Uniform Principal and Income Act

C.

1962 Uniform Principal and Income Act

D.

I.

Adopted by Kentucky in 1992

2.

KRS 386.191 et seq.

1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act ("Uniform Act")
1.

Revision of 1931 and 1962 Uniform Acts had two general purposes!
a.

Support widespread use of the revocable living trust as a will
substitute, and to establish rules for new financial instruments.

b.

Provide means for implementing transition to an investment regime
based on principals embodied in Uniform Prudent Investor Act -e.g., principal of investing for total return rather than a certain level
of "income" as traditionally defined as interest, dividends and rents.

! Prefatory Notes and Comments to Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997) prepared
by National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved and
recommended for enactment in all states at its annual conference on July 25-August I, 1997,
Sacramento, California ("Notes and Comments").
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2.

Uniform Act deals with four questions affecting the rights ofbeneficiaries2
a.

How is income earned during administration of an estate to be
distributed to trusts and to persons who receive outright bequests of
specific property, pecuniary gifts and the residue?

b.

When an income interest in a trust begins (i.e., when a person who
creates the trust dies or when she transfers property to a trust during
life), what property is principal that will eventually go to the
remainder beneficiaries and what is income?
When an income interest ends, who gets the income that has been
received but not distributed, or that is due but not yet collected, or
that has accrued but is not yet due?

c.

d.

3.

After an income interest begins and before it ends, how should its
receipts and disbursements be allocated to or between principal and
income?

Significant Issues Addressed3
a.

The application of the probate administration rules to revocable
living trusts after the settlor's death and to other terminating trusts.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Uniform Act. Sections 4 through 8 of the
Kentucky Act [KRS 386.456 - 464].

b.

The payment of interest or some other amount on the delayed
payment ofan outright pecuniary gift that is made pursuant to a trust
agreement instead ofa will when the agreement or state law does not
provide for such a payment. Section 201(3) of the Uniform Act.
Section 4(3) of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.456].

c.

The allocation of net income from partnership interests acquired by
the trustee other than from a decedent (the old Uniform Acts deal
only with partnership interests acquired from a decedent). Section
401 of the Uniform Act. Section 9 of the Kentucky Act [KRS
386.466].
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d.

The allocation of receipts from discount obligations such as zerocoupon bonds. Section 406(b) ofthe Uniform Act. Section 13(2) of
the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.474].

e.

The allocation of net income from harvesting and selling timber
between principal and income. Section 412 of the Uniform Act.
Section 19 ofthe Kentucky Act [KRS 386.486].

f.

The allocation between principal and income of receipts from
derivatives, options and asset-backed securities. Sections 414 and
415 of the Uniform Act. Section 11(6) of the Kentucky Act [KRS
386.470] deals with options, but provisions of Uniform Act relating
to derivatives and asset-backed securities not included in the
Kentucky Act.
Disbursements made because of environmental laws. Section
502(a)(7) ofthe Uniform Act. Section 22(1 )(h) ofthe Kentucky Act
[KRS 386.492].

g.

4.

h.

Income tax obligations resulting from the ownership ofS corporation
stock and interests in partnerships. Section 505 of the Uniform Act.
Section 25 of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.498].

1.

The power to make adjustments between principal and income to
correct inequities caused by tax elections or peculiarities in the way
the fiduciary income tax rules apply. Section 506 of the Uniform
Act. Section 26 ofthe Kentucky Act [KRS 386.500].

A number of matters in prior Uniform Acts have been changed or clarified4
a.

An income beneficiary's estate will be entitled to receive only net
income actually received by a trust before the beneficiary's death and
not items of accrued income. Section 303 of the Uniform Act.
Section 8 ofthe Kentucky Act [KRS 386.464].

b.

Income from a partnership is based on actual distributions from the
partnership, in the same manner as corporate distributions. Section
401 of the Uniform Act. Section 9 of the Kentucky Act [KRS
386.466].

c.

Distributions from corporations and partnerships that exceed 20% of
the entity's gross assets will be principal whether or not intended by
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the entity to be a partial liquidation. Section 401 (d)(2) of the
Uniform Act. Section 9(4)(b) of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.466].

E.

d.

Deferred compensation is dealt with in greater detail in a separate
section. Section 409 ofthe Uniform Act. Section 16 ofthe Kentucky
Act [KRS 386.480].

e.

The 1962 Act rule for "property subject to depletion" (patents,
copyrights, royalties and the like), which provides that a trustee may
allocate up to 5% of the asset's inventory value to income and the
balance to principal, has been replaced by a rule that allocates 90%
of the amounts received to principal and the balance to income.
Section 410 of the Uniform Act. Section 17 of the Kentucky Act
[KRS 386.482].

f.

The percentage used to allocate amounts received from oil and gas
has been changed -- 90% of those receipts are allocated to principal
and the balance to income. Section 411 ofthe Uniform Act. Section
18 of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.484].

g.

The unproductive property rule has been eliminated for trusts other
than marital deduction trusts. Section 413 of the Uniform Act.
Section 20 of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.488].

h.

Charging depreciation against income is no longer mandatory, and is
left to the discretion ofthe trustee. Section 503 of the Uniform Act.
Section 23 ofthe Kentucky Act [KRS 386.494].

Kentucky Principal and Income Act ("Kentucky Act")
1.

Effective January 1,2005.

2.

KRS 386.450 through 386.504 [statute with subsections as will appear in
Michie (official Publisher) will be available on line at Legislative Research
Commission website on or about July 15,2004].

3.

Repeals the Kentucky Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act enacted
in 1992 and found at KRS 386.191 to 386.349.

4.

Applicable to all trusts administered under Kentucky law, except as
otherwise specifically provided in the instrument creating the trust, regardless
of when created.

5.

Modeled on 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act.
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F.

II.

Cross Reference Chart for Uniform Act, Kentucky Act in House Bill 517 Format and
Kentucky Act in KRS format (to be available on or about July 15, 2004) - See
ExhibitA.

Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994)
A.

Has been enacted in 35 states and the District of Columbia

B.

Kentucky has not adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act

C.

Kentucky has adopted a prudent investor rule. KRS 287.277

D.

1.

The "prudent investor rule" repeals the "prudent man rule."

2.

Enacted in 1996.

3.

Applies to banks (with trust powers) and trust companies.

4.

Does not apply to individual fiduciaries.

5.

But, under Kentucky Act, individual Kentucky fiduciary can elect to have
KRS 287.277 prudent investor rule apply, with Court approval. Section 3(1)
of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.454].

Purposes of Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994)5
1.

Removes much ofthe common law restriction upon the investment authority
of fiduciaries.

2.

Allows fiduciaries to utilize modem portfolio theory to guide investment
decisions.
a.

Damage to trust assets from inflation.

b.

Iftrustees cannot invest in way that achieves a return in excess ofrate
of inflation, the result is diminution of the corpus passing to
remainder beneficiaries.

5 Prefatory Notes and Comments to Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994) prepared by

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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c.

E.

III.

Income and principal beneficiaries lose if investment approach
restricted.

3.

Fiduciary's performance is measured on the performance of the entire
portfolio, not upon the performance of each individual asset.

4.

Allows the fiduciary to delegate investment decisions to qualified and
supervised agents.

Advantages of Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994)6 and the Kentucky Ace
1.

Trusts are likely to achieve a higher return for beneficiaries.

2.

Trustees can protect the trust corpus better through diversification of assets.

3.

Trustees can invest to counter the effects of inflation.

4.

Trustee no longer forced to rely upon his own knowledge and expertise, but
can acquire investment services to enhance his knowledge and skill.

5.

Trustees can take into account the changing character and kinds of assets
available for investment, free of restrictions.

6.

Trustees are judged on overall performance of the assets in the trust, rather
than performance of single assets.

7.

Specific needs ofeach trust can be taken into account in devising investment
strategy, rather than having to subordinate to generic investment rules
treating all trusts the same.

Coordination between the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (1994) and Uniform Principal and
Income Act (1997) 8
A.

Law of trust investment has been modernized. See Uniform Prudent Investor Act
(1994); Restatement (Third) of Trusts; Prudent Investor Rule (1992).

7 Noted advantages true for corporate trustees under existing Kentucky law and will be
true for trusts with individual fiduciaries if prudent investor rule elected (with Court approval)
under Section 3(1) of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.464].

8

Notes and Comments
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B.

Need to update principal and income allocation rules so the two bodies of doctrine
can work well together.

C.

Reconciling modern investment theory and traditional income allocation.
1.

2.

3.

IV.

Starting point is to use traditional system -- i.e.., if prudent investing of all
the assets in a trust, viewed as a portfolio, and traditional allocation
effectuate the intent ofthe Settlor, then nothing needs to be done.
But the Uniform Act helps the trustee who has made a prudent, modern
portfolio-based investment decision that has the initial effect of skewing
return from all the assets under management, viewed as a portfolio, as
between income and principal beneficiaries.
The Uniform Act gives the trustee a power to reallocate the portfolio return
appropriately.

Final Regulations under Section 643 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
("Code")
A.

Issued by the IRS on December 30,2003.

B.

Background
1.

Decline in dividend yields on common stocks and long period oflow interest
rates make it difficult for trustees to achieve reasonable income levels and
reasonable growth in the same portfolio.

2.

Modern portfolio theory suggests that (i) investments should be made as a
part of a total portfolio which is balanced with respect to potential risk and
potential return, (ii) investments should be diversified to reduce risks, and
(iii) judging investments individually is no longer appropriate.

3.

A "total return" (interest/dividend income plus capital appreciation) is a more
appropriate measure of performance.

4.

Federal fiduciary income tax rules based on traditional state law concepts of
"income" and "principal."

5.

Historically, trustees were required to distribute only the income to the
income beneficiaries, retaining the principal and all capital gains realized by
the trust for the ultimate benefit of the trust's remaindermen.

6.

Even where trustees are granted discretion to distribute principal to the
income beneficiary, income tax rules severely restrict the ability of the

B -7

trustee to include distributed capital gains in distributable net income
("DNI") taxable to the income beneficiaries.
C.

The purpose of the regulations is to insure that the amount paid out to an income
beneficiary, where the income beneficiary is entitled to all of the income from the
trust, is adequate for the trust to receive any special tax benefits accorded to the trust
under any new non-traditional state law definition ofincome (e.g., adjustment power
under Section 3 of the Kentucky Act; KRS 386.454).

D.

Definition of "income" under the final regulations

E.

v.

1.

Section 643(b) of the Code and Treas. Reg. §1.643(b-I).

2.

Ifstate law permits a non-traditional allocation between income and principal
(e.g., under Section 3 of the Kentucky Act), trust provisions following that
law will be respected for tax purposes.

3.

Final regulations provide a safe harbor by providing that a unitrust amount
which is no less than 3% and no more than 5% of the annual fair market
value of the trust is held to be a reasonable apportionment.

4.

Final regulations authorize a "smoothing rule" that allows the amount to be
distributed as a unitrust percentage to be determined using the value of the
assets averaged on a multiple year basis.

5.

The trustee has the ability to include realized capital gain in trust accounting
income if the allocation is made pursuant to the terms of the governing
instrument and local law, or pursuant to a reasonable and impartial exercise
of a discretionary power granted to the trustee by local law or by the
governing instrument, ifnot prohibited by local law. Treas. Reg. §1.643(b)1.

The intent of the regulation is to permit a trustee to invest in a manner that will
maximize investment performance without shortchanging the income or remainder
beneficiaries.

Kentucky Principal and Income Act ("Kentucky Act") -- Selected Provisions
A.

Copy of the Kentucky Act in the format of House Bill 517, where the new statute
originated, is attached as Exhibit B.

B.

Article I (Definitions and Fiduciary Duties)
1.

Definitions (Section 1 of the Kentucky Act) (KRS 386.450]
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a.

2.

3.

"District Court Approval" -- the consent of:
(1)

All current beneficiaries;

(2)

All remainder beneficiaries in the oldest generation, and

(3)

District Court.

Fiduciary Duties; General Principles (Section 2 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS
386.452]
a.

A fiduciary must administer a trust or estate in accordance with terms
of instrument, even ifthere is a different provision in Kentucky Act.

b.

A fiduciary must administer a trust or estate in accordance with the
Kentucky Act ifthe instrument does not contain a different provision
or does not give the fiduciary a discretionary power of
administration.

c.

A receipt or disbursement is allocated to principal if there is no
provision for a different allocation in the terms of the instrument or
the Kentucky Act.

d.

When there are two or more beneficiaries, a fiduciary is under a duty
to deal impartially with them, except to the extent the terms of the
instrument manifest a contrary intent.

Trustee's Power to Adjust (Section 3 ofthe Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.454]
a.

An individual trustee may elect to have the Kentucky prudent

investor rule found at KRS 287.277 apply to a trust with approval of
the District Court.
b.

Permits the trustee to adjust between principal and income to the
extent the trustee considers necessary if:
(1)

KRS 287.277 applies by law or by election -- i.e., trustee
must be managing the trust assets under the prudent investor
rule;

(2)

The terms of the trust describe the income beneficiary's
distribution rights in terms ofthe right to receive "income" in
the traditional trust accounting sense;
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(3)

c.

d.

The adjustment is necessary for the fiduciary to administer
the trust or estate impartially, based on what is fair and
reasonable to all beneficiaries, and

(4)
The adjustment is approved by the District Court.
This includes an adjustment method such as an annual percentage
distribution of between 3% and 5% of the fair market value of the
trust assets determined annually.
The Kentucky Act does not contain a list of factors included in the
Uniform Act that the fiduciary must consider in deciding whether and
to what extent the power to adjust should be exercised:
(1)

Nature, purpose and expected duration ofthe trust;

(2)

Intent of the Settlor;

(3)

Identity and circumstances ofthe beneficiaries;

(4)

Needs for liquidity, regularity ofincome and preservation and
appreciation of capital;

(5)

The assets held in the trust; the extent to which they consist
of financial assets, interests in closely-held enterprises,
tangible and intangible personal property, or real property;
the extent to which an asset is used by a beneficiary; and
whether an asset is purchased by the trustee or received from
the Settlor;

(6)

The net amount allocated to income under the other sections
of the Uniform Act and the increase or decrease in the value
of the principal assets, which the trustee may estimate as to
assets for which market values are not readily available;

(7)

Whether and to what extent the terms of the trust give the
trustee the power to invade principal or accumulate income or
prohibit the trustee from invading principal or accumulating
income, and the extent to which the trustee has exercised a
power from time to time to invade principal or accumulate
income;
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(8)

The actual and anticipated effect of economic conditions on
principal and income and effects of inflation and deflation;
and

(9)

The anticipated tax consequences of an adjustment.

e.

Rules can apply to the personal representative of an estate with
approval of the District Court.

f.

Adjustment is prohibited under the Kentucky Act if:
(1)

The adjustment diminishes the income interest in a trust that
requires that all income be paid at least annually to a spouse
and for which any estate tax or gift tax marital deduction
would be allowed;

(2)

The adjustment reduces the actuarial value of the income
interest in a trust to which a person transfers property with the
intent to qualify for a gift tax exclusion;

(3)

The adjustment changes the amount payable to a beneficiary
as a fixed annuity or a fixed fraction of the value of the trust
assets -- applies to annuity trusts and unitrusts with no
charitable beneficiaries as well as trusts with charitable
income or remainder beneficiaries. The purpose is to make
clear that a beneficiary's right to receive a fixed annuity or a
fixed fraction of the value ofthe trust's assets is not subject
to adjustment;

(4)

If the adjustment is from any amount that is permanently set
aside for charitable purposes under a will or the terms of the
trust, unless both income and principal are so set aside;

(5)

Possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment
causes an individual to be treated as the owner of all or any
part of the trust for estate or income tax purposes, and the
individual would not otherwise be treated as the owner;

(6)

Possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment
causes all or part ofthe trust or estate assets to be included for
estate tax purposes in the estate of an individual who has the
power to remove a fiduciary, appoint a fiduciary, or both, and
the assets would not otherwise be included in the estate ofthe
individual;
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g.

C.

(7)

The fiduciary is a beneficiary of the trust or estate; or

(8)

The adjustment would benefit a non-beneficiary fiduciary
directly or indirectly; except that any effect on the fiduciary's
compensation does not preclude an adjustment so long as the
fiduciary's fees are reasonable and otherwise comply with
applicable law.

Examples from Notes and Comments illustrate the application ofthe
adjustment rules -- See Exhibit C.

Article 2 (Decedent's Estate or Terminating Income Interest)
1.

2.

General
a.

A simple trust that provides for a single income beneficiary and an
outright distribution ofthe remainder ends when the income interest
ends.

b.

A complex trust may have a number of income interests, either
concurrent or successive, and the trust will not necessarily end when
one of the income interests ends.

c.

For that reason, the Kentucky Acts speaks in terrris of "income
interests" ending and beginning rather than trusts ending and
beginning.

d.

A terminating income interest is one that has ended but whose
administration is not necessarily complete.

e.

The fact that a trust mayor may not end when an income interest
ends is not significant for purposes of the Kentucky Act.

Determination and Distribution of Net Income (Section 4 of the Kentucky
Act) [KRS 386.456]
a.

A fiduciary may pay administration expenses and interest on death
taxes from either income or principal. Section 4(2)(b) of the
Kentucky Act. Ifthe fiduciary decision regarding source ofpayment
is consistent with the decision to deduct these expenses for income
for estate taxes purposes, permitting the fiduciary to choose the
source ofpayment (i.e., income or principal first) eliminates the need
to adjust between principal and interest that may arise when, for
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example, an expense that is paid from principal is deducted for
income tax purposes or an expense is paid from income is deducted
for estate tax purposes.
b.

3.

D.

The beneficiary of an outright pecuniary amount is to receive the
interest or other amount provided by applicable law if there is no
provision in the will or the terms ofthe trust. See Section 4(3) ofthe
Kentucky Act. Many states, including Kentucky, have no applicable
law that provides for interest or some other method to be treated on
an outright pecuniary gift under an inter vivos trust. In this case, this
section provides that the interest or other amount to be paid shall be
the same as the interest or the other amount required to be paid on
testamentary pecuniary gifts. This provision gives some inter vivos
instruments the same treatment as testamentary gifts. See KRS
394.520 which requires the payment of interest on pecuniary gifts
unpaid after one year from probate of will if the will contains no
fixed time for payment.

Distribution to Residuary and Remainder Beneficiaries (Section 5 of the
Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.458]
a.

Residuary legatees of estates receive the net income earned during
the period of administration on the basis of their proportionate
interest in the undistributed assets when distributions are made. This
rule applies to the gain or loss realized from the disposition of assets
during administration.

b.

Determination ofproportionate interest is based on asset values as of
the date reasonably near the time of distribution, rather than
"inventory" (e.g., date of death, cost) values. This rule applies to
distributions from terminating trusts as well as estates.

Article 3 (Apportionment at Beginning and End ofIncome Interest)
1.

When Right to Income Begins and Ends (Section 6 of the Kentucky Act)
[KRS 386.460]
a.

An income beneficiary is entitled to net income from the date on
which the income interest begins. The income interest begins on:
(1)

The date specified in the terms of the trust; or

(2)

Ifno date is specified, on the date an asset becomes subject to
a trust or successive income interest.
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2.

b.

In the case of a testamentary trust, an asset becomes "subject to a
trust" on the date ofa testator's death, even ifthere is an intervening
period of administration of the testator's estate.

c.

An income interest ends on the date before an income beneficiary
dies or another determining event occurs, or on the last day of a
period during which there is no beneficiary to whom a trustee may
distribute income.
(I)

The purpose ofthe last phrase is to provide that, at the end of
a period during which there is no beneficiary to whom a
trustee may distribute income, the trustee must apply the
same proportionate rule that applies when a mandatory period
ends.

(2)

For example, what happens if a settlor creates a trust for
grandchildren before any grandchildren are born? When the
first grandchild is born, the period preceding the date ofbirth
is treated as having ended, followed by a successive income
interest, and the proportionate rules in Section 7 and 8
(described below) apply accordingly ifthe terms ofthe trusts
do not contain different provisions.

Apportionment of Receipts and Disbursements When Decedent Dies or
Income Ends (Section 7 ofthe Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.462]
a.

To simplify trust administration, Section 7 applies the same rules to
inter vivos trusts (revocable and irrevocable), testamentary trusts, and
assets that become subject to an inter vivos trust by a testamentary
bequest (e.g., pour over will to unfunded inter vivos trust).

b.

Periodic Payments. A periodic payment is principal if it is due but
unpaid before a decedent dies or before an asset becomes subject to
a trust, but the next payment is allocated entirely to income and is not
apportioned. Thus, periodic receipts such as rents, dividends, interest,
and annuities and disbursements such as the interest portion of a
mortgage payment, are not apportioned.

c.

Non-Period Payments. Interest on an obligation that does not provide
a due date for the interest payment (e.g., interest on income tax
refund) is apportioned to principal to the extent it accrues before a
person dies or an income interest begins unless the obligation is
specifically given to a devisee or remainder beneficiary, in which
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case all of the accrued interest passes to the person who receives the
obligation. The same rule applies to interest on an obligation that has
a due date but does not provide for periodic payments. Ifthere is no
stated interest on an obligation (e.g., zero coupon bond) and the
proceeds from the obligation are received more than one year after it
is purchased or acquired by the trustee, the entire amount received is
principal under Section 13 of the Kentucky Act.
3.

9

Apportionment when Income Interest Ends (Section 8 ofthe Kentucky Act)
[KRS 386.464]
a.

"Undistributed income" (i.e., income received before the date on
which an income interest ends) is paid to the income beneficiary or
his estate.

b.

Accrued periodic payments.
(1)

Under the prior Uniform Act, an income beneficiary or his
estate was entitled to receive a portion ofany payments (other
than dividends), that were due or that accrued when the
income interest terminated.

(2)

Section 8 changes old rules by providing that accrued items,
such as periodic payments ofinterest, rents and dividends, are
not included in undistributed income. The rule also applies
to expenses that are due or accrued.

(3)

Example: 9 Assume that a periodic payment ofrent that is due
on July 20 has not been paid when an income interest ends on
July 30. The successive income interest begins on July 31,
and the rent payment that was due on July 20 is paid on
August 3. Under Section 7(1) of the Kentucky Act, the July
payment is added to the principal of the successive income
interest when received. Under Section 7(2) of the Kentucky
Act, the entire periodic payment ofrent that is due August 20
is income when received by the successive income interest.
Under Section 8 of the Kentucky Act, neither the income
beneficiary of the terminated income interest nor the
beneficiary's estate is entitled to any part of either the July
20th or the August 30th payment because neither one was

Taken from Notes and Comments to Section 303 of the Uniform Act.
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received before the income interest ended on July 30. The
same principal is applied to expenses of the trust.
c.

E.

The last sentence of Section 8(3) ofthe Kentucky Act is in addition
to the Uniform Act and it permits a settlor to change the charitable
beneficiary of a trust by will or through written notice to the trustee,
so long as the change does not alter the income, gift, estate or other
tax benefits available under the terms ofthe trust. For example, this
will permit the settlor of a charitable remainder trust to change the
charitable remainder beneficiary(ies) where the terms ofthe trust do
not give anyone the power to do so.

Article 4 (Allocation of Receipts During Administration of Trust)
1.

Character of Receipts (Section 9 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.466]
a.

Deals with receipts from "entities," but does not apply to receipts
from tenancy-in-common property.

b.

Receipts from an entity that are allocated to principal include, but are
not limited to:
(1 )

Partial liquidations.
(a)

Any distribution designated by the entity as a partial
liquidating distribution, regardless of the percentage
of total assets that it represents.

(b)

2.

If a distribution exceeds 20% of the entity's gross
assets, the entire distribution is considered a partial
liquidation whether or not the entity describes it as a
partial liquidation.
In determining whether a
distribution is greater than 20% of the gross assets,
the portion ofthe distribution that does not exceed the
amount of income tax that the trustee or a beneficiary
must pay on the entity's taxable income is ignored.
Distribution from Trust or Estate (Section 10 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS
386.468]
a.

Amounts received as a distribution of income from a trust or estate
are allocated to income of the recipient trust, and amounts received
as a distribution of principal from a trust or estate are allocated to
principal of the recipient trust.
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b.

3.

4.

If a trustee purchases an interest in a mutual fund, a common trust
fund, a business trust or other entity organized as a trust for the
purposes ofreceiving capital contributed by investors, investing that
capital and managing investment assets, Section 10 ofthe Kentucky
Act applies to receipts from such trust.

Principal Receipts (Section 11 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.470]
a.

Even though the award in an eminent domain proceeding may
include an amount for a loss offuture rent on a lease, the entire award
is principal if that amount is not separately stated. Amounts paid or
received for the granting of an option is allocated to principal.

b.

Any gain or loss realized upon the exercise of an option is allocated
to principal

Rental Property (Section 12 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.472]
a.

An amount received as rent ofreal or personal property, including an

amount received for cancellation or renewal ofa lease, is allocated to
Income.
b.

An amount received as a refundable deposit, including a security

deposit or a deposit that is to be applied as rent for future periods,
must be added to principal, and held subject to terms ofthe lease and
is not available for distribution to a beneficiary until the trustee's
contractual obligations have been satisfied with respect to that
amount.
c.

5.

Receipts that are capital in nature
(1)

A portion of the payment under a lease may be a
reimbursement ofprincipal expenditures for improvements to
the leased property that is characterized as rent for purposes
of invoking contractual or statutory remedies for nonpayment.

(2)

Transfer from income to reimburse principal may be
appropriate under Section 24 ofthe Kentucky Act (Transfers
from Income to Reimburse Principal) to the extent that some
of the "rent" is really a reimbursement for improvements.

Obligation to Pay Money (Section 13 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.474]
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6.

7.

a.

An amount received as interest on an obligation to pay money to the
trustee, including an amount received as consideration for prepaying
principal, is allocated to income without any provision for
amortization of premium.

b.

Discount Obligations

(1)

Subsection (2) of Section 13 the Kentucky Act applies to all
obligations acquired at a discount, including short-term
obligations such as U. S. Treasury bills, long-term obligations
such as U.S. Savings Bond, zero-coupon bonds and discount
bonds that pay interest during part, but not all, of the period
before maturity.

(2)

The entire increase in value of these obligations is principal
when the trustee receives the proceeds from the disposition
unless the obligation, when acquired, has a maturity of less
than one year.

Insurance Policies and Similar Contracts (Section 14 of the Kentucky Act)
[KRS 386.476]
a.

Proceeds from a contract that insures the trustee against loss of
occupancy or other use by an income beneficiary, loss of income, or
loss of profits from a business, are allocated to income.

b.

Proceeds from a life insurance policy or other contract in which the
trust or its trustee is named as beneficiary, including a contract that
insures the trust or its trustee against loss for damage to, destruction
of, or loss of title to a trust asset (except as otherwise provided), are
allocated to principa1.

Unsubstantial Allocations Not Required (Section 15 of the Kentucky Act)
[KRS 386.478]
a.

This section relieves a trustee from making relatively small
allocations to income while preserving the trustee's right to do so if
an allocation is large in terms of absolute dollars.

b.

Example: 10Assume that a trust's assets, which include a working
interest in an oil well, have a value of $1,000,000; the net income

10 Taken from Notes and Comments to Section 408 of the Uniform Act.
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from the assets other than the working interest is $40,000; and the net
receipts from the working interest are $400. The trustee may allocate
all of the net receipts from the working interest to principal instead
of allocating 10%, or $40, to income under Section 18 of the
Kentucky Act (Minerals, Water and Other Natural Resources). Ifthe
net receipts from the working interest are $35,000, so that the amount
allocated to income under Section 18 ofthe Kentucky Act would be
$3,500, the trustee may decide that this amount is sufficiently
significant to the income beneficiary that the allocation provided for
by Section 18 of the Kentucky Act should be made, even though the
trustee is still permitted under Section 15 of the Kentucky Act
(Unsubstantial Allocations) to allocate all of the net receipts to
principal because the $3,500 would increase the net income of
$40,000, as determined before making an allocation under Section 18
of the Kentucky Act, by less than 10%.

8.

c.

This section also relieves a trustee from having to allocate net
receipts from the sale of trees in a small woodlot between principal
and income.

d.

Allocations are not permitted under this section in circumstances
described in Section 3(4) (prohibited adjustments) of the Kentucky
Act [KRS 386.454] to eliminate claims that the power in this section
has adverse tax consequences.

Deferred Compensation, Annuities and Similar Payments (Section 16 ofthe
Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.480]
a.

This section applies to:
(1)

Fees from all forms of annuities and deferred compensation
arrangements, where the payment will be received by the trust
in a lump sum or in installments over a period of years;

(2)

Payments that may be received over two or three years;

(3)

Payments that may last for much longer periods, including
payments from an IRA, deferred compensation plan (whether
qualified or non-qualified), and insurance renewal
commissions;

(4)

Retirement plan to which the settlor has made contributions,
and an annuity policy that the settlor purchased individually;
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(5)

Variable annuities, deferred annuities, annuities issued by a
commercial insurance companies and private annuities;

b.

The focus ofSection 16, for purposes ofallocating payments received
by a trust to or between principal and income, is on the payment right
rather than on assets that may be held in a fund from which the
payments are made.

c.

Required minimum distributions (RMD) from a qualified plan or IRA

d.

(1)

To the extent that a payment is required to be made, 10% of
the amount received is allocated to income and the balance is
allocated to principal;

(2)

All other payments are allocated to principal because they
represent a change in the form of a principal asset;

(3)

This rule holds true in Section 7(2) of the Kentucky Act
(Apportionment of Receipts and Disbursements When
Decedent Dies or Income Interest Ends), which provides that
money or property received from a change in the form of a
principal asset be allocated to principal.

Marital deduction requirements
(1)

When an IRA is payable to a QTIP marital deduction trust,
the IRS treats the IRA as separate terminable interest property
and requires that a QTIP election be made for it.

(2)

To qualify for QTIP treatment, the spouse must be entitled for
life to all the income earned on the assets in the IRA payable
at least annually.

(3)

An IRS ruling states that if the terms of the QTIP marital
deduction trust provide that all of the trust income must be
distributed to the spouse and the spouse is given the power,
exercisable at least annually, to compel the trustee to
withdraw from the IRA an amount equal to all the income
earned on the assets held in the IRA and pay that amount to
the spouse, then the IRA will qualify for QTIP treatment even
if the IRA in fact distributes less than all of its income to the
marital deduction trust and the spouse does not in fact
exercise such power. Rev. Rul. 2000-2,2000-1 C.B. 305.
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9.

If the allocation to income under this section of 10% of the
required distribution from the IRA does not meet the
requirement that all of the IRA's income be distributed from
the trust to the spouse, subsection (4) of Section 16 of the
Kentucky Act requires the trustee to make a larger allocation
to income to the extent necessary to qualify for the marital
deduction.

(5)

If the terms of the marital deduction trust do not permit the
spouse to require the trustee to withdraw from the IRA an
amount equal to all the income earned on the assets held in
the IRA and distribute such amount to the spouse, a
distribution under subsection (4) may be necessary.

Liquidating Assets (Section 17 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.482]
a.

b.

c.

10.

(4)

"Liquidating asset" means that an asset whose value will diminish or
terminate because the asset is expected to produce receipts for a
period of limited duration, including leasehold, patent, copyright,
royalty rights, and right to receive payments during a period ofmore
than one year under an arrangement that does not provide for the
payment of interest on the unpaid balance (e.g., lottery payments);
The term does not include a payment subject to Section 16 of the
Kentucky Act (Deferred Compensation, Annuities and Similar
Payments) or any asset for which the trustee establishes a reserve for
depreciation under Section 23 ofthe Kentucky Act [KRS 386.494];
The trustee shall allocate to income 10% of the receipts from a
liquidating asset and the balance to principal.

Minerals, Water, and Other Natural Resources (Section 18 ofthe Kentucky
Act) [KRS 386.484]
a.

This section applies to the extent that the trustee does not allocate all
of the receipts to principal under Section 15 of the Kentucky Act
[KRS 386.478] (Unsubstantial Allocations Not Required). If
applicable:
(1)

Royalty. shut-in-well-payment. take-or-pay payment. bonus
delay rental. Allocate 90% of net receipts to principal and
10% to income if receipt is more than nominal. If nominal,
allocate to income;
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b.

11.

(2)

Production payment income. A receipt must be allocated to
income if and to the extent that the agreement creating the
production payment provides a factor for interest or its
equivalent. The balance is allocated to principal;

(3)

Subsection (3) of Section 18 provides that the Kentucky Act
applies whether or not a decedent or donor is extracting
minerals, water, or other natural resources before the interest
became subject to the trust. The purpose ofthis subsection is
to abolish the "open mine doctrine" as it may apply to the
rights of an income beneficiary and a remainder beneficiary
in receipts from the production of minerals from land owned
or leased by a trust. Such receipts are to be allocated to or
between principal and income in accordance with the
provisions of the Kentucky Act.

Proceeds from the disposition of mineral interest is allocated in the
same manner as receipts from that interest.

Timber (Section 19 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.486]
a.

Applicability
(1)

Applies to net receipts from the sale oftrees and by-products
from harvesting and processing trees without regard to the
kind oftrees that are cut or whether the trees are cut before or
after a particular number of years of growth;

(2)

Applies to the sale of trees that are expected to produce
lumber for building purposes, trees sold as pulp wood, and
Christmas and other ornamental trees;

(3)

Subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Kentucky Act applies to
net receipts from property owned or leased by the trustee;

(4)

Provisions are not intended to prevent a tenant in possession
ofthe property from using wood that he cuts on the property
for personal, non-commercial purposes -- e.g., Christmas tree,
firewood, mending old fences or building new fences, or
making repairs to structures on the property;
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b.

12.

Net receipts from the sale of timber are allocated:
(1)

To income to the extent that the amount of timber removed
from the land does not exceed the rate ofgrowth ofthe timber
during the accounting periods in which a beneficiary has a
mandatory income interest;

(2)

To principal to the extent that the amount oftimber removed
from the land exceeds the rate of growth ofthe timber or the
net receipts are from the sale of standing timber;

(3)

To or between income and principal if the net receipts are
from the lease oftimberland or from a contract to cut timber
from land owned by a trust, by determining the amount of
timber removed from the land under the lease or contract and
applying the above rules; or

(4)

To principal to the extent that advance payments, bonuses and
other payments are not allocated pursuant to the above
provisions.

Property Not Productive of Income (Section 20 ofthe Kentucky Act) [KRS
386.488]
a.

If a marital deduction is allowed for all or part of a trust that is not
producing income, the spouse may require the trustee to make the
trust income productive.

b.

In all other cases, proceeds from the sale or disposition ofan asset are
principal without regard to the amount of income the asset produces
during any accounting period.

c.

(l)

Existing KRS 386.295 gives the income beneficiary a right to
receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of
underproductive property as "delayed income."

(2)

Sub~ection

(2) of Section 20 of the Kentucky Act abolishes
the right to receive delayed income from the sale proceeds of
an asset that produces little or no income.

The provision does not alter existing state law regarding the income
beneficiary's right to compel the trustee to make property productive
of income.

B-23

F.

Article 5 (Allocation of Disbursements During Administration of Trust)
1.

Disbursements from Income (Section 21 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS
386.490]
a.

50% of the regular compensation of the trustee and any person
providing investment advisory or custodial services to the trustee,
except as provided in KRS 386.180 (testamentary trustee entitled to
6% ofthe income plus .3% ofprincipal, or 6% ofprincipal at the time
of principal distribution);

b.

50% of all expenses for accountings, judicial proceedings or other
matters involving both income and remainder interests;

c.

All other ordinary expenses incurred in connection with the
administration, management, or preservation oftrust property and the
distribution of income, including interest, ordinary repairs, regularly
recurring taxes assessed against principal, and expenses of a
proceeding or other matter that concerns primarily the income
interest;
Recurring premiums on insurance covering the loss of a principal
asset or the loss of income from or use of the asset. "Recurring"
intended to distinguish premiums paid annually for fire insurance
from premiums on title insurance, each ofwhich covers the loss of a
principal asset. Title insurance premiums would be a principal
disbursement under Section 22 ofthe Kentucky Act [KRS 386.492].

d.

2.

Disbursements from Principal (Section 22 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS
386.492]
a.

That portion of the regular compensation of a trustee, investment
advisor and custodian not paid from income under Section 21 of the
Kentucky Act [KRS 386.490] described above;

b.

50% of the disbursements for accountings, judicial proceedings or
other matters involving both income and remainder interests;

c.

All ofthe trustee's compensation calculated on principal as a fee for
acceptance, distribution or termination, and disbursements made to
prepare a property for sale;

d.

Payments on the principal of a trust debt;
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3.

e.

Expenses ofa proceeding that concerns primarily principal, including
a proceeding to construe the trust or to protect the trust or its
property;

f.

Premiums paid on an insurance policy not described in Section 21 (4)
of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.490] -- e.g., title insurance;

g.

Estate, inheritance and other transfer taxes (e.g., generation-skipping
transfer taxes), including penalties, apportioned to the trust;

h.

Disbursements related to environmental matters.

Transfers from Income to Principal for Depreciation (Section 23 of the
Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.494]
a.

b.

A trustee has discretion to transfer to principal a reasonable amount
of the net cash receipts from a principal asset that is subject to
depreciation, but the trustee may not transfer any amount for
depreciation:
(1)

Ofthat portion ofreal property used or available for use by a
beneficiary as a residence or of tangible personal property
held or made available for personal use or enjoyment for a
beneficiary;

(2)

During the administration of a decedent's estate.

Background 11
(1)

11

KRS 386.305(1)(b) provides that a charge shall be made
against income for "... a reasonable allowance for
depreciation on property subject to depreciation under
generally accepted accounting practices,..." Such provisions
in multiple jurisdictions have been resisted by many trustees,
who do not provide for any depreciation for a variety of
reasons. One theory is that depreciation is not needed to
protect the remainder beneficiaries if the value of the land is
increasing; another is that generally accepted accounting
principals may not require depreciation to be taken if the
property is not part of a business;

Notes and Comments.
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(2)

The drafting committee of the Uniform Act concluded that
the decision to provide for depreciation should be
discretionary with the trustee;

(3)

The power to transfer funds from income to principal that is
granted by this section is a discretionary part of the
adjustment referred in Section 2(2) ofthe Kentucky Act, and
in exercising the power a trustee must comply with Section
2(2) of the Kentucky Act [KRS 386.452].
(a)

4.

Transfers from Income to Reimburse Principal (Section 24 of the Kentucky
Act) [KRS 386.496]
a.

5.

One purpose served by transferring cash from income
to principal for depreciation is to be provide funds to
pay the principal of an indebtedness secured by the
depreciable property.
Section 24(2)(d) of the
Kentucky Act [KRS 386.496] permits the trustee to
transfer additional cash from income to principal for
this purpose to the extent that the amount transferred
from income to principal for depreciation is less than
the amount of the principal payments.

The trustee may transfer income to principal for certain principal
disbursements:
(1)

Extraordinary repairs;

(2)

Capital improvements and special assessments;

(3)

Expenses to prepare a property for rental, including tenant
allowances, leaseholder improvements and broker's
commISSIOn;

(4)

Principal payment on a mortgage ifthe depreciation charged
against the income is less than the principal payments on the
mortgage.

Income Taxes (Section 25 of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.498]
a.

Tax required to be paid by a trustee on the trust's share ofan entity's
taxable income shall be paid proportionately:

B - 26

b.

6.

(l)

From income to the extent that receipts from the entity are
allocated to income; and

(2)

From principal to the extent that:
(a)

Receipts from the entity are allocated to principal; and

(b)

The trust's share of the entity's taxable income
exceeds the total receipts described in (1) above and
(2)(a) above.

Electing Small Business Trusts ("ESBT")
(1)

An ESBT may qualify as an S corporation stockholder even
if the trustee does not distribute all of the trust's income
annually to its beneficiaries.

(2)

The portion of an ESBT that consists of the S corporation's
stock is treated as a separate trust for tax purposes (but not for
trust accounting purposes), and the S corporation income is
taxed directly to that portion ofthe trust even ifsome or all of
that income is distributed to the beneficiaries.

(3)

A trust normally receives a deduction for distributions it
makes to its beneficiaries. Subsection (4) ofSection 25 ofthe
Kentucky Act provides that receipts allocated to principal or
income must be reduced by the amount distributed to a
beneficiary from principal or income for which the trust
receives a deduction in calculating the tax. Thus, this section
takes into account the possibility that an ESBT may not
receive a deduction for trust accounting income that is
distributed to the beneficiaries.

Adjustments Between Principal and Income Because of Taxes (Section 26
of the Kentucky Act) [KRS 386.500]
a.

Permits the fiduciary to make adjustments between income and
principal because oftax law provisions, with district court approval.

b.

Examples of situations meriting a discretionary adjustment:
(1)

A fiduciary elects to deduct administration expenses that are
paid from principal on an income tax return instead ofon the
estate tax return;

B - 27

(2)

A distribution of a principal asset to a trust or other
beneficiary causes the taxable income of an estate or trust to
be carried out to the distributee and relieves the persons who
received the income of any obligation to pay income tax on
the income; or

(3)

A trustee realizes a capital gain on the sale ofa principal asset
and pays a large state income tax on the gain, but under
applicable federal income tax rules the trustee may not
deduct the state income tax payment from the capital gain in
calculating the trust's federal capital gain tax, and the income
beneficiary receives the benefit of the deduction for state
income tax paid on the capital gain.

c.

Subsection 1(c) of Section 26 of the Kentucky Act applies to a
Qualified Subchapter S Trust ("QSST") whose income beneficiary is
required to include a pro rata share of the S corporation's taxable
income in his return. Ifa QSST does not receive a cash distribution
from the corporation that is large enough to cover the income
beneficiary's tax liability, the trustee may distribute additional cash
from principal to the income beneficiary.

d.

Subsection (2) of Section 26 of the Kentucky Act mandates an
adjustment from income to principal to preserve an estate tax marital
deduction or charitable contribution deduction where such deduction
is reduced by the payment of additional estate taxes because of the
fiduciary's election to deduct certain expenses on income tax returns.
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EXHIBIT A
HOUSE BILL 5171

AN ACT relating to the administration of trusts and estates.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:

ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
SECTION 1.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

"Accounting period" means a calendar year unless another twelve (12) month
period is selected by a fiduciary. The term includes a portion ofa calendar year or
other twelve (12) month period that begins when an income interest begins or
)

ends when an income interest ends;
(2)

"Beneficiary" includes, in the case of a decedent's estate, an heir, legatee, and
devisee and, in the case of a trust, an income beneficiary and a remainder
beneficiary;

(3)

(4)

"District Court approval" means the consent of:
(a)

All current beneficiaries;

(b)

All remainder beneficiaries in the oldest generation; and

(c)

The court;

"Fiduciary" means a personal representative or a trustee. The term includes an
executor,

administrator,

successor

personal

representative,

and

public

administrator;
(5)

"Income" means money or property that a fiduciary receives as current return
from a principal asset. The term includes a portion of receipts from a sale,
exchange, or liquidation of a principal asset, to the extent provided in Articles 4
and 5 ofthe Kentucky Principal and Income Act;

(6)

"Income beneficiary" means a person to whom net income ofa trust is or may be
payable;

(7)

"Income interest" means the right ofan income beneficiary to receive all or part
Page 1 of27
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of net income, whether the terms of the trust require it to be distributed or
authorize it to be distributed in the trustee's discretion;
(8)

"Mandatory income interest" means the right ofan income beneficiary to receive
net income that the terms ofthe trust require the fiduciary to distribute;

(9)

"Net income" means the total receipts allocated to income during an accounting
period minus the disbursements made from income during the period, plus or
minus transfers under Sections 1 to 2 7 of this Act to or from income during the
period;

(10) "Principal" means property held in trust (or distribution to a remainder
beneficiary when the trust terminates;
(11) "Remainder beneficiary" means a person entitled to receive principal when an
income interest ends;
(12) "Terms ofa trust" means the manifestation ofthe intent of a settlor or decedent
with respect to the trust, expressed in a manner that admits of its proof in a
judicial proceeding, whether by written or spoken words or by conduct; and
(13) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, or successor trustee, whether or not
appointed or confirmed by a court.

SECTION 2.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

In allocating receipts and disbursements to or between principal and income, and
with respect to any matter within the scope of Articles 2 and 3 of the Kentucky
Principal and Income Act, afiduciary:
(a)

Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with the terms of the trust
or the will, even if there is a different provision in Sections 1 to 27 of this
Act;

(b)

May administer a trust or estate by the exercise of a discretionary power of
administration given to the fiduciary by the terms of the trust or the will,
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even if the exercise of the power produces a result different from a result
required or permitted by Sections 1 to 27 ofthis Act;
(c)

Shall administer a trust or estate in accordance with Sections 1 to 27 ofthis
Act if the terms of the trust or the will do not contain a different provision
or do not give the fiduciary a discretionary power ofadministration; and

(d)

Shall add a receipt or charge a disbursement to principal to the extent that
neither the terms ofthe trust nor Sections 1 to 27 ofthis Act provide a rule
for allocating the receipt or disbursement to or between principal and
income.

(2)

In exercising the power to adjust under subsection (2) or (3) of Section 3 of this
Act or a discretionary power of administration regarding a matter within the
scope of Sections 1 to 27 of this Act, whether granted by the terms of a trust, a
will, or Sections 1 to 27 of this Act, a fiduciary shall administer a trust or estate
impartially, based on what is fair and reasonable to all ofthe beneficiaries, except
to the extent that the terms of the trust or the will clearly manifest a contrary
intention. Except as provided in this subsection, determination in accordance
with Sections 1 to 27 ofthis Act shall be presumed to befair and reasonable to all
ofthe beneficiaries.

SECTION 3.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

Notwithstanding any provision ofKentucky law to the contrary, the trustee ofa
trust to which by law KRS 287.277 does not apply may elect to have such
provisions apply to the administration of the trust with approval of the District
Court.

(2)

A ·trustee may adjust between principal and income to the extent the trustee
considers necessary if KRS 287.277 applies by law or by election made and
approved under subsection (1) of this Act, the terms of the trust describe the
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amount that mayor shall be distributed to a beneficiary by referring to the trust's
income, the trustee determines, after applying the rules in subsection (1) of
Section 2 of this Act, that the trustee is unable to comply with subsection (2) of
Section 2 ofthis Act and the adjustment, including an adjustment method such as
an annual percentage distribution if the percentage is not less than three percent
(3%) nor more than five percent (5%) 01 the fair market value ofthe trust assets
determined annually, is approved by the District Court.
(3)

(a)

A personal representative may adjust between principal and income in the
same manner as a trustee if KRS 287.277 applies to the personal
representative by law or if the personal representative elects to have KRS
287.277 apply to the administration of the estate, upon approval of the
District Court, which approval may be an adjustment method such as an
annual percentage distribution if the percentage is not less than three
percent (3%) nor more than five percent (5%) ofthe fair market value ofthe
trust assets determined annually, and:
1.

The amount distributable to a beneficiary of the estate is determined
by reference to the income ofthe estate; and

2.

The personal representative determines, and after applying the rules
of subsection (1) of Section 2 of this Act, that the personal
representative is unable to comply with subsection (2) of Section 2 of
this Act.

(4)

A fiduciary shall not make an adjustment:
(a)

That diminishes the income interest in a trust that requires all ofthe income
to be paid at least annually to a spouse and for which an estate tax or gift
tax marital deduction would be allowed, in whole or in part, if the fiduciary
did not have the power to make the adjustment;

(b)

That reduces the actuarial value ofthe income interest in a trust to which a
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person transfers property with the intent to qualify for a gift tax exclusion;
(c)

That changes the amount payable to a beneficiary as a fIXed annuity or a
fIXed fraction ofthe value ofthe trust assets;

(d)

From any amount that is permanently set aside for charitable purposes
under a will or the terms ofa trust unless both income and principal are so
set aside;

(e)

If possessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes an
individual to be treated as the owner of all or part of the trust or estate for
income tax purposes, and the individual would not be treated as the owner if
the fiduciary did not possess the power to make an adjustment;

(f)

Ifpossessing or exercising the power to make an adjustment causes all or
part ofthe trust or estate assets to be included for estate tax purposes in the
estate of an individual who has the power to remove a fiduciary, appoint a
fiduciary, or both, and the assets would not be included in the estate of the
individual if the fiduciary did not possess the power to make an adjustment;

(g)

Ifthe fiduciary is a beneficiary ofthe trust or estate; or

(h)

If the fiduciary is not a beneficiary, but the adjustment would benefit the
fiduciary directly or indirectly; except that any effect on the fiduciary's
compensation shall not preclude an adjustment so long as the fiduciary's
fees are reasonable and otherwise comply with the applicable law.

(5)

Ifparagraph (e), (f), (g), or (h) of subsection (4) of this section applies to a
fiduciary and there is more than one (1) fiduciary, a cofiduciary to whom the
provision shall not apply may make the adjustment unless the exercise of the
power by the remaining fiduciary or fiduciaries is not permitted by the terms of
the trust.

(6)

A fiduciary may release the entire power conferred by subsection (2) or (3) ofthis
section or may release only the power to adjust from income to principal or the
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power to adjust from principal to income

if the fiduciary is uncertain about

whether possessing or exercising the power will cause a result described in
paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (4) of this section or paragraph (h) of
subsection (4) of this section, or

if the fiduciary determines that possessing or

exercising the power will or may deprive the trust ofa tax benefit or impose a tax
burden not described in subsection (4) of this section. The release may be
permanent or for a specified period, including a period measured by the life ofan
individuaL Such release shall require approval of the District Court. Further,
with approval ofthe District Court, a fiduciary may divide a trust into one (1) or
more fractional shares ifthe division does not change the beneficial interests.
(7)

Terms ofa trust or will that limit the power ofa fiduciary to make an adjustment
between principal and income do not affect the application of this section unless
it is clear from the terms of the trust or will that the terms are intended to deny
the fiduciary the power of adjustment conferred by subsection (2) or (3) of this
section.
ARTICLE 2
DECEDENT'S ESTATE OR
TERMINATING INCOME INTEREST
SECTION 4. . A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

After a decedent dies, in the case of an estate, or after an income interest in a trust
ends, the following rules apply.
(1)

A fiduciary of an estate or of a terminating income interest shall determine the
amount of net income and net principal receipts received from property
specifically given to a beneficiary under the rules in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the
Kentucky Principal and Income Act that apply to trustees and the rules in
subsection (5) of this section. The fiduciary shall distribute the net income and
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net principal receipts to the beneficiary who is to receive the specific property.
(2)

A fiduciary shall determine the remaining net income of a decedent's estate or a
terminating income interest under the rules in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the
Kentucky Principal and Income Act that apply to trustees and by:
(a)

Including in net income all income from property used to discharge
liabilities;

(b)

Paying from income or principal, in the fiduciary's discretion, fees to
aUorneys, accountants, and fiduciaries; court costs and other expenses of
administration; and interest on death taxes, but the fiduciary may pay those
expenses from income ofproperty passing to a trust for which the fiduciary
claims an estate tax marital or charitable deduction only to the extent that
the payment of those expenses from income will not cause the reduction or
loss ofthe deduction; and

(c)

Paying from principal all other disbursements made or incurred in
connection with the settlement of a decedent's estate or the winding up of a
terminating income interest, including debts, funeral expenses, disposition
of remains, family allowances, and death taxes and related penalties that
are apportioned to the estate or terminating income interest by the will, the
terms ofthe trust, or applicable law.

(3)

A fiduciary shall distribute to a beneficiary who receives a pecuniary amount
outright the interest or any other amount provided by the will, the terms of the
trust, or applicable law from net income determined under subsection (2) of this
section, or ,from principal to the extent that net income is insufficient. If a
beneficiary is to receive a pecuniary amount outright from a trust after an income
interest ends and no interest or other amount is provided for by the terms of the
trust or applicable law, the fiduciary shall distribute the interest or other amount
to which the beneficiary would be entitled under applicable law

if the pecuniary
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amount were required to be paid under a will.
(4)

A fiduciary shall distribute the net income remaining after distributions required
by subsection (3) 0/ this section in the manner described in Section 5 0/ this Act
to all other beneficiaries, including a beneficiary who receives a pecuniary
amount in trust, even if the beneficiary holds an unqualified power to withdraw
assets from the trust or other presently exercisable general power ofappointment
over the trust.

(5)

A fiduciary shall not reduce principal or income receipts from property described
in subsection (1) of this section because of a payment described in Section 21 of
this Act to the extent that the will, the terms of the trust, or applicable law
requires the fiduciary to make the payment from assets other than the property or
to the extent that the fiduciary recovers or expects to recover the payment from a
third party. The net income and principal receipts from the property are
determined by including all of the amounts the fiduciary receives or pays with
respect to the property, whether those amounts accrued or became due before, on,
or after the date of a decedent's death or an income interest's terminating event,
and by making a reasonable provision {or amounts that the fiduciary believes the
estate or terminating income interest may become obligated to pay after the
property is distributed.
SECTION 5.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

Each beneficiary described in subsection (4) o/Section 4 ofthis Act is entitled to
receive a portion ofthe net income equal to the beneficiary's fractional interest in
undistributed principal assets, using values as of the distribution date. If a
fiduciary makes more than one (1) distribution ofassets to beneficiaries to whom
this section applies, each beneficiary, including one (1) who shall not receive part
of the distribution, is entitled, as of each distribution date, to the net income the
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fiduciary has received after the date of the death or terminating event or earlier
distribution date but has not distributed as ofthe current distribution date.
(2)

In determining a beneficiary's share ofnet income, the following rules apply.
(a)

The beneficiary is entitled to receive a portion ofthe net income equal to the
beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed principal assets
immediately before the distribution date, including assets that later may be
sold to meet principal obligations.

(b)

The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed principal assets
shall be calculated without regard to property specifically given to a
beneficiary and property required to pay pecuniary amounts not in trust.

(c)

The beneficiary's fractional interest in the undistributed principal assets
shall be calculated on the basis ofthe aggregate value of those assets as of
the distribution date without reducing the value by an unpaid principal
obligation.

(d)

The distribution date for purposes of this section may be the date as of
which the fiduciary calculates the value of the assets if that date is
reasonably near the date on which assets are actually distributed.

(3)

If a fiduciary does not distribute all ofthe collected but undistributed net income
to each person as of a distribution date, the fiduciary shall maintain appropriate
records showing the interest ofeach beneficiary in that net income.

(4)

A fiduciary may apply the rules in this section, to the extent that the fiduciary
considers it appropriate, to net gain or loss realized after the date of death or
terminating event or earlier distribution date from the disposition of a principal
asset if this section applies to the income from the asset.

ARTICLE 3
APPORTIONMENT AT BEGINNING
AND END OF INCOME INTEREST
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SECTION 6.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

An income beneficiary is entitled to net income from the date on which the
income interest begins. An income interest begins on the date specified in the
terms ofthe trust or, if no date is specified, on the date an asset becomes subject
to a trust or successive income interest.

(2)

An asset becomes subject to a trust:
(a)

On the date it is transferred to the trust in the case of an asset that is
transferred to a trust during the transferor's life;

(b)

On the date ofa testator's death in the case ofan asset that becomes subject
to a trust by reason of a will, even if there is an intervening period of
administration ofthe testator's estate; or

(c)

On the date of an individual's death in the case of an asset that is
transferred to a fiduciary by a third party because ofthe individual's death.

(3)

An asset becomes subject to a successive income interest on the day after the
preceding income interest ends, as determined under subjection (4) of this
section, even if there is an intervening period of administration to wind up the
preceding income interest.

(4)

An income interest ends on the day before an income beneficiary dies or another
terminating event occurs, or on the last day of a period during which there is no
beneficiary to whom a trustee may distribute income.

SECTION 7.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

A trustee shall allocate an income receipt or disbursement other than one to
which subsection (1) of Section 4 of this Act applies to principal

if its due date

occurs before a decedent dies in the case ofan estate or before an income interest
begins in the case ofa trust or successive income interest.
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(2)

A trustee shall allocate an income receipt or disbursement to income if its due
date occurs on or after the date on which a decedent dies or an income interest
begins and it is a periodic due date. An income receipt or disbursement shall be
treated as accruing from day to day if its due date is not periodic or it has no due
date. The portion of the receipt or disbursement accruing before the date on
which a decedent dies or an income interest begins shall be allocated to principal
and the balance shall be allocated to income.

(3)

An item of income or an obligation is due on the date the payer is required to
make a payment. If a payment date is not stated, there is no due date for the
purposes of Sections 1 to 27 of this Act. Distributions to shareholders or other
owners from an entity to which Section 9 ofthis Act applies are deemed to be due
on the date fIXed by the entity for determining who is entitled to receive the
distribution or, if no date is fIXed, on the declaration date (or the distribution. A
due date is periodic for receipts or disbursements that shall be paid at regular
intervals under a lease or an obligation to pay interest or if an entity customarily
makes distributions at regular intervals.

SECTION 8.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

In this section, "undistributed income" means net income received before the
date on which an income interest ends. The term shall not include an item of
income or expense that is due or accrued or net income that has been added or is
required to be added to principal under the terms ofthe trust.

(2)

When a mandatory income interest ends, the trustee shall pay to a mandatory
income beneficiary who survives that date, or the estate of a deceased mandatory
income beneficiary whose death causes the interest to end, the beneficiary's share
of the undistributed income that is not disposed of under the terms of the trust
unless the beneficiary has an unqualified power to revoke more than five percent
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(5%) of the trust immediately before the income interest ends. In the latter case,
the undistributed income from the portion of the trust that may be revoked shall
be added to principal.
(3)

When a trustee's obligation to pay aflXed annuity or afixedfraction ofthe value
ofthe trust's assets ends, the trustee shall prorate the final payment if and to the
extent required by applicable law to accomplish a purpose of the trust or its
settlor relating to income, gift, estate, or other tax requirements. The settlor may
change the charitable beneficiary of a trust by Will or through written notice to
trustee, or may decline to make a change in like manner, so long as the change
does not alter the income, gift, estate, or other tax benefits available under the
terms ofthe trust.
ARTICLE 4
ALLOCATION OF RECEIPTS
DURING ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST

SECTION 9.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

In this section, ."entity" means a corporation, partnership, limited liability
company, regulated investment company, real estate investment trust, common
trust fund, or any other organization in which a trustee has an interest other than
a trust or estate to which Section 10 ofthis Act applies.

(2)

Except as otherwise provided in this section, a trustee shall allocate to income
money received from an entity.

(3)

A trustee shall allocate the following receipts from an entity to principal:
(a)

Property other than money;

(b)

Money received in one (1) distribution or a series of related distributions in
exchange for part or all ofa trust's interest in the entity;

(c)

Money received in total or partial liquidation ofthe entity; and
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(d)

Money received from an entity that is a regulated investment company or a
relil estate investment trust,

if the money distributed is a capital gain

dividend [or federal income tax purposes.
(4)

Money is received in partial liquidation:
(a)

To extent that the entity, at or near the time ofa distribution, indicates that
it is a distribution in partial liquidation; or

(b) • If the total amount of money and property received in a distribution or
series of related distributions is greater than twenty percent (20%) of the
entity's gross assets, as shown by the entity's year end financial statements
immediately preceding the initial receipt.
(5)

Money is not received in partial liquidation, nor may it be taken into account
under paragraph (b) ofsubsection (4) ofthis section to the extent that it does not
exceed the amount of income that a trustee or beneficiary shall pay on taxable
income ofthe entity that distributes the money.

(6)

A trustee may rely upon a statement made by an entity about the source or
character of a distribution

if the statement is made at or near the time of

distribution by the entity's board ofdirectors or other person or group ofpersons
authorized to exercise powers to pay money or transfer property comparable to
those ofa corporation's board ofdirectors.
SECTION 10.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
A trustee shall allocate to income an amount received as a distribution ofincome from
a trust or an estate in which the trust has an interest other than a purchased interest,
and shall allocate to principal an amount received as a distribution ofprincipal from
such a trust or estate. If a trustee purchases an Interest in a trust that is an investment
entity, or a decedent or donor transfers an interest in such a trust to a trustee, Section 9
ofthis Act applies to a receipt from the trust.
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SECTION 11.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
A trustee shall allocate to principal:
(1)

To the extent not allocated to income under Sections 1 to 27 of this Act, assets
received from a transferor during the transferor's lifetime, a decedent's estate, a
trust with a terminating income interest, or a payer under a contract naming the
trust or its trustee as beneficiary;

(2)

Money or other property received from the sale, exchange, liquidation, or change
in form of a principal asset, including stock splits and realized profit, subject to
this article;

(3)

Amounts recovered from third parties to reimburse the trust because of
disbursements described in subsection (l)(g) ofSection 22 ofthis Act or for other
reasons to the extent not based on the loss ofincome;

(4)

Proceeds ofproperty taken by eminent domain, but a separate award made for the
loss of income with respect to an accounting period during which a current
income beneficiary had a mandatory income interest is income;

(5)

Net income received in an accounting period during which there is no beneficiary
to whom a trustee mayor shall distribute income;

(6)

If a trustee grants an option to buy property from the trust, whether or not the
trust owns the property when the option is granted, grants an option that permits
another person to sell property to the trust, or acquires an option to buy property
for the trust or an option to sell an asset owned by the trust, and the trustee or
other owner ofthe asset is required to deliver the asset if the option is exercised,
an amount received for granting the option shall be allocated to principal. An
amount paid to acquire the option shall be paid from principal. A gain or loss
realized upon the exercise ofan option, including an option granted to a settlor of
the trust for services rendered, shall be allocated to principal; and
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(7)

Other receipts as provided in Sections 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 ofthis Act.
SECTION 12.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

To the extent that a trustee accounts for receipts from rental property under this
section, the trustee shall allocate to income an amount received as rent of real or
personal property, including an amount received for cancellation or renewal ofa lease.
An amount received as a refundable deposit, including a security deposit or a deposit
that is applied as rent for future periods, shall be added to principal and held subject to
the terms of the lease and is not available for distribution to a beneficiary until the
trustee's contractual obligations have been satisfied with respect to that amount.
SECTION 13.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

An amount received as interest, whether determined at a fIXed, variable, or
floating rate, on an obligation to pay money to the trustee, including an amount
received as consideration for prepaying principal, shall be allocated to income
without any provision for amortization ofpremium.

(2)

A trustee shall allocate to principal an amount received (rom the sale,
redemption, or other disposition ofan obligation to pay money to the trustee more
than one (1) year after it is purchased or acquired by the trustee, including an
obligation whose purchase price or value when it is acquired is less than its value
at maturity. If the obligation matures within one (1) year after it is purchased or
acquired by the trustee, an amount received in excess of its purchase price or its
value when acquired by the trust shall be allocated to income.

(3)

This section shall not apply to an obligation to which Section 12, 16, 17, 18, or 19
ofthis Act applies.
SECTION 14.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
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(1)

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, a trustee shall
allocate to principal the proceeds of a life insurance policy or other contract in
which the trust or its trustee is named as beneficiary, including a contract that
insures the trust or its trustee against loss for damage to, destruction of, or loss of
title to a trust asset. The trustee shall allocate dividends on an insurance policy to
income

if the premiums on the policy are paid from income, and to principal if

the premiums are paidfrom principaL
(2)

A trustee shall allocate to income proceeds of a contract that insures the trustee
against loss ofoccupancy or other use by an income beneficiary, loss of income,
or loss ofprofits from a business.

(3)

This section shall not apply to a contract to which Section 16 ofthis Act applies.

SECTION 15.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
If a trustee determines that an allocation between principal and income required by
Section 16, 17, 18, or 19 ofthis Act is unsubstantial, the trustee may allocate the entire
amount to principal unless one (1) of the circumstances described in subsection (4) of
Section 3 of this Act applies to the allocation. This power may be exercised by a
cotrustee in the circumstances described in subsection (4) ofSection 3 of this Act and
may be released for the reasons and in the manner described in subsection (6) of
Section 3 ofthis Act. An allocation is presumed to be insubstantial if:
(1)

The amount of the allocation would increase or decrease net income in an
accounting period, as determined before the allocation, by less than ten percent
(10%); or

(2)

The value of the asset producing the receipt for which the allocation would be
made is less than ten percent (10%) of the total value of the trust's assets at the
beginning ofthe accounting period.

SECTION 16.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO
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READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

In this section, "payment" means a payment that a trustee may receive over a
fIXed number ofyears or during the life ofone (1) or more individuals because of
services rendered or property transferred to the payer in exchange for future
payments. The term includes a payment made in money or property from the
payer's general assets or from a separate fund created by the payer, including a
private or commercial annuity, an individual retirement account, and a pension,
profit-sharing, stock-bonus, or stock-ownership plan.

(2)

To the extent that a payment is characterized as interest or a dividend or a
payment made in lieu of interest or a dividend, a trustee shall allocate it to
income. The trustee shall allocate to principal the balance of the payment and
any other payment received in the same accounting period that is not
characterized as interest, a dividend, or an equivalent payment.

(3)

If no part of a payment is characterized as interest, a dividend, or an equivalent
payment and all or part of the payment is required to be made, a trustee shall
allocate to income ten percent (10%) of the part that is required to be made
during the accounting period and the balance to principal. If no part of a
payment is required to be made or the payment received is the entire amount to
which the trustee is entitled, the trustee shall allocate the entire payment to
principal. For purposes of this subsection, a payment is not "required to be
made" to the extent that it is made because the trustee exercises a right of
withdrawal.

(4)

If, to obtain an estate tax marital deduction for a trust, a trustee shall allocate
more of a payment to income than provided for by this section, the trustee shall
allocate to income the additional amount necessary to obtain the marital
deduction.

(5)

This section shall not apply to payments to which Section 17 ofthis Act applies.
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SECTION 17.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

In this section, "liquidating asset" means an asset whose value will diminish or
terminate because the asset is expected to produce receipts for a period oflimited
duration. The term includes a leasehold, patent, copyright, royalty right, and
right to receive payments during a period of more than one (1) year under an
arrangement that shall not provide for the payment of interest on the unpaid
balance. The term shall not include an activity subject to Section 11(6) of this
Act, payment subject to Section 16 of this Act, resources subject to Section 18 of
this Act, timber subject to Section 19 ofthis Act, or any asset for which the trustee
establishes a reserve for depreciation under Section 23 ofthis Act.

(2)

A trustee shall allocate to income ten percent (10%) of the receipts from a
liquidating asset and the balance to principal.

SECTION 18.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

To the extent that a trustee accounts for receipts from an interest in minerals or
other natural resources pursuant to this section, the trustee shall allocate them as
follows:
(a)

If received as nominal delay rental or nominal annual rent on a lease, a
receipt shall be allocated to income;

(b)

If received from a production payment, a receipt shall be allocated to
income

~f

and to the extent that the agreement creating the production

payment provides a {actor for interest or its equivalent. The balance shall be
allocated to principal;
(c)

If an amount received as a royalty, shut-in-well payment, take-or-pay
payment, bonus, or delay rental is more than nominal, ninety percent (90%)
shall be allocated to principal and the balance to income; or
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(d)

If an amount is received from a working interest or any other interest not
provided for in paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection, ninety percent
(90%) of the net amount received shall be allocated to principal and the
balance to income.

(2)

An amount received on account ofan interest in water that is renewable shall be
allocated to income. If the water is not renewable, ninety percent (90%) of the
amount shall be allocated to principal and the balance to income.

(3)

Sections 1 to 27 of this Act apply whether or not a decedent or donor was
extracting minerals, water, or other natural resources before the interest became
subject to the trust.

(4)

If a trust owns an interest in minerals, water, or other natural resources on the
effective date of this Act, the trustee may allocate receipts from the interest as
provided in Sections 1 to 27 of this Act or in the manner used by the trustee
before the effective date of this Act. If the trust acquires an interest in minerals,
water, or other natural resources after the effective date of this Act, the trustee
shall allocate receipts from the interest as provided in Sections 1 to 27 ofthis Act.

(5)

The proceeds from any disposition ofan interest specified in this section shall be
allocated in the same manner as receipts from the interest.
SECTION 19. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

(1)

To the extent that a trustee accounts [or receipts from the sale of timber and
related products pursuant to this section, the trustee shall allocate the net
receipts:
(a)

To income to the extent that the amount of timber removed from the land
does not exceed the rate of growth of the timber during the accounting
periods in which a beneficiary has a mandatory income interest;

(b)

To principal to the extent that the amount oftimber removed from the land
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exceeds the rate ofgrowth ofthe timber or the net receipts are from the sale
ofstanding timber;
(c)

To or between income and principal if the net receipts are from the lease of
timberland or from a contract to cut timber from land owned by a trust, by
determining the amount oftimber removed from the land under the lease or
contract and applying the rules in paragraphs (a) and (b) ofthis subsection;
or

(d)

To principal to the extent that advance payments, bonuses, and other
payments are not allocated pursuant to paragraphs (a), (b), or (c) of this
subsection.

(2)

In determining net receipts allocated under subsection (1) of this section, a
trustee shall deduct and transfer to principal a reasonable amount for depletion.

(3)

Sections 1 to 27 of this Act apply whether or not a decedent or transferor was
harvesting timber from the property before it became subject to the trust.

(4)

If a trust owns an interest in timberland on the effective date of this Act, the
trustee may allocate net receipts from the sale of timber and related products as
provided in Sections 1 to 27 of this Act or in the manner used by the trustee
before the effective date ofthis Act. If the trust acquires an interest in timberland
after the effective date of this Act, the trustee shall allocate net receipts from the
sale oftimber and related products as provided in Sections 1 to 27 ofthis Act.
SECTION 20.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) If a marital deduction is allowed for all or part ofa trust, the spouse may require

the trustee to make the trust income productive.
(2)

In cases not governed by subsection (1) ofthis section, proceeds from the sale or
other disposition of an asset are principal without regard to the amount of
income the asset produces during any accounting period.
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ARTICLES
ALLOCATION OF DISBURSEMENTS DURING
ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST
SECTION 21.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
A trustee shall make the following disbursements from income to the extent that they
are not disbursements to which subsection (2)(b) or (2)(c) of Section 4 of this Act
applies:
(1)

One-half (1/2) of the regular compensation of the trustee and of any person
providing investment advisory or custodial services to the trustee, except as
provided in KRS 386.180;

(2)

One-half (1/2) of all expenses for accountings, judicial proceedings, or other
matters that involve both the income and remainder interests;

(3)

All of the other ordinary expenses incurred in

connection with the

administration, management, or preservation of trust property and the
distribution of income, including interest, ordinary repairs, regularly recurring
taxes assessed against principal, and expenses of a proceeding or other matter
that concerns primarily the income interest; and
(4)

Recurring premiums on insurance covering the loss of a principal asset or the
loss ofincome from or use ofthe asset.

SECTION 22.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) A trustee shall make the following disbursements from principal:

(a)

That portion of the regular compensation of the trustee and any person
providing investment advisory or custodial services to the trustee not paid
from income under subsection (1) ofSection 21 ofthis Act;

(b)

The remaining one-half (1/2) of the disbursements described in subsection
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(2) ofSection 21 ofthis Act;

(c)

All of the trustee's compensation calculated on principal as a fee (or
acceptance, distribution, or termination, and disbursements made to
prepare propertyfor sale;

(d)

Payments on the principal ofa trust debt;

(e)

Expenses of a proceeding that concerns primarily principal, including a
proceeding to construe the trust or to protect the trust or its property;

(f)

Premiums paid on a policy of insurance not described in subsection (4) of
Section 21 ofthis Act ofwhich the trust is the owner and beneficiary;

(gJ

Estate,

inheritance, and other transfer taxes,

including penalties,

apportioned to the trust; and
(b)

Disbursements related to environmental matters, including reclamation,
assessing

environmental

conditions,

remedying

and

removing

environmental contamination, monitoring remedial activities and the
release of substances, preventing future releases of substances, collecting
amounts from persons liable or potentially liable for the costs of those
activities, penalties imposed under environmental laws or regulations and
other payments made to comply with those laws or regulations, statutory or
common law claims by third parties, and defending claims based on
environmental matters.
(2)

If a principal asset is encumbered with an obligation that requires income from
that asset to be paid directly to the creditor, the trustee shall transfer from
principal to income an amount equal to the income paid to the creditor in
reduction ofthe principal balance ofthe obligation.

SECTION 23.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) In this section, "depreciation" means a reduction in value due to wear, tear,
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decay, corrosion, or gradual obsolescence of a fixed asset having a useful life of
more than one (1) year.
(2)

A trustee may transfer to principal a reasonable amount of the net cash receipts
from a principal asset that is subject to depreciation, but shall not transfer any
amount for depreciation:
(a)

Ofthat portion ofreal property used or available for use by a beneficiary as
a residence or of tangible personal property held or made available for the
personal use or enjoyment ofa beneficiary; or

(b)
(3)

During the administration ofa decedent's estate.

An amount transferred to principal need not be held as a separate fund.

SECTION 24.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

If a trustee makes or expects to make a principal disbursement described in this
section, the trustee may transfer an appropriate amount from income to principal
in one (1) or more accounting periods to reimburse principal or to provide a
reserve (or future principal disbursements.

(2)

Principal disbursements to which subsection (1) of this section applies include
the following, but only to the extent that the trustee has not been and does not
expect to be reimbursed by a third party:
(a)

An amount chargeable to income but paid from principal because it is
unusually large, including extraordinary repairs;

(b)

A capital improvement to a principal asset, whether in the form of changes
to an existing asset or the construction of a new asset, including special
assessments;

(c)

Disbursements made to prepare property for rental, including tenant
allowances, leasehold improvements, and broker's commissions;

(d)

Periodic payments on an obligation secured by a principal asset to the
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extent that the amount transferred from income to principal for
depreciation is less than the periodic payments; and
(e)
(3)

Disbursements described in subsection (1)(g) ofSection 22 ofthis Act.

If the asset whose ownership gives rise to the disbursements becomes subject to a
successive income interest after an income interest ends, a trustee may continue
to transfer amounts from income to principal as provided in subsection (1) ofthis
section.
SECTION 25.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:

(1) A tax required to be paid by a trustee based on receipts allocated to income shall
be paidfrom income.
(2)

A tax required to be paid by a trustee based on receipts allocated to principal shall
be paid from principal, even

if the tax is called an income tax by the taxing

authority.
(3)

A tax required to be paid by a trustee on the trust's share of an entity's taxable
income shall be paid proportionately:
(a)

From income to the extent that receipts from the entity are allocated to
income; and

(b)

From principal to the extent that:
1.

Receipts from the entity are allocated to principal; and

2.

The trust's share of the entity's taxable income exceeds the total
receipts described in paragraph (a) of this subsection and paragraph
(b)1. olthis subsection.

(4)

For purposes of this section, receipts allocated to principal or income shall be
reduced by the amount distributed to a beneficiary from principal or income {or
which the trust receives a deduction in calculating the tax.
SECTION 26.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO
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READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1)

A fiduciary may, with District Court approval, make adjustments between
principal and income to offset the shifting of economic interests or tax benefits
between income beneficiaries and remainder beneficiaries which arise from:
(aJ

Elections and decisions, other than those described in subsection (2) ofthis
section, that the fiduciary makes from time to time regarding tax matters;

(bJ

An income tax or any other tax that is imposed upon the fiduciary or a
beneficiary as a result ofa transaction involving, or a distribution from, the
estate or trust; or

(c)

The ownership by an estate or trust ofan interest in an entity whose taxable
income, whether or not distributed, is includable in the taxable income of
the estate, trust, or a beneficiary.

(2)

If the amount of an estate tax marital deduction or charitable contribution
deduction is reduced because a fiduciary deducts an amount paid from principal
for income tax purposes instead of deducting it for estate tax purposes and, as a
result, estate taxes paid from principal are increased and income taxes paid by an
estate, trust, or beneficiary are decreased, each estate, trust, or beneficiary that
benefits from the decrease in income tax shall reimburse the principal from
which the increase in estate tax is paid. The total reimbursement shall equal the
increase in the estate tax to the extent that the principal used to pay the increase
would have qualified for a marital deduction or charitable contribution deduction
but for the payment. The proportionate share of the reimbursement for each
estate, trust, or beneficiary whose income taxes are reduced shall be the same as
its proportionate share ofthe total decrease in income tax. An estate or trust shall
reimburse principal from income.

SECTION 27.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
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(1)

The provisions of Section 3 of this Act that allow a trustee to adopt the prudent
investor rule and make allocations to income shall not apply to any trust without
District Court approval.

(2)

The provisions of Sections 1 to 27 o.f this Act, other than Section 3 of this Act,
shall apply to all trusts administered under Kentucky law, except as otherwise
specifically provided in the instrument creating the trust, regardless of when
created.
ARTICLE 6
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISION

SECTION 28.

A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 386 IS CREATED TO

READ AS FOLLOWS:
Sections 1 to 27 ofthis Act may be cited as the" Kentucky Principal and Income Act."
SECTION 29. The following KRS sections are repealed:
386.191 Definitions for KRS 386.191 to 386.349.
386.195 Rules of trust administration.
386.205 Definition of income and principal.
386.215 Income interest -- Income beneficiary.
386.225 Determination and distribution of income.
386.235 Corporate distribution of shares.
386.245 Corporate securities.
386.255 Net profits of business.
386.265 Royalties and other receipts from disposition of natural resources.
386.275 Timber.
386.285 Other depletable property.
386.295 Delayed income from sale ofunderproductive property.
386.305 Charges against income.
386.315 Apportionment of expenses.
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386.325 Application of KRS 386.191 to 386.459.
386.335 Construction ofKRS 386.191 to 386.349.
386.345 Effective date -- Application on receipts and expenses.
386.349 Short title.
Section 30. This Act takes effect January 1, 2005.
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UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT ("UNIFORM ACT")

v.
KENTUCKY PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT ("KENTUCKY ACT")

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

Definitions and Fiduciary Duties

Article 1

Short Title

Section 101

Definitions

Section 102

NewKRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Section of
House Bill 517 1

Changes in Kentucky Act from
UniformAct2

Article 1

386.450

Section 1

t::d
01

Adds at Subsection (3) a definition of
"District Court Approval" to mean the
consent of:

....:J

(a)
(b)

(c)

All current beneficiaries
All remainder beneficiaries
in the oldest generation,
and
The court

Deleted from definition of a
"fiduciary" in Subsection (4) "a
person performing substantially the
same function."
Fiduciary Duties; General
Principles

Section 103

386.452

Section 2

~

....~
=
.1-3...

=

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

NewKRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Section of
House Bill 517 1

Changes in Kentucky Act from
Uniform Act2

Trustee's Power to Adjust

Section 104

386.454

Section 3

Adds Subsection (1) which allows an
individual trustee to elect to have the
Kentucky prudent investor rule at
KRS 287.277 apply to trust with
approval of the District Court.
Deletes the "factors" to consider
found in Section 104 (b) of the
Unifonn Act.
Subsection (2) of the Ky Act pennits
an adjustment method such as an
annual percentage distribution of not
less than 3% nor more than 5% of
FMV with approval of the District
Court.

t:I::l
en

(Xl

Subsection (3) extends provisions to
personal representative of estate.
Added Subsection (4)(h) which
provides that effect on compensation
of a non-beneficiary fiduciary does
not preclude an adjustment.
Subsection (6) provides that release of
power to adjust requires District Court
approval.
2

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

Decedent's Estate or Tenninating
Income Interest

Article 2

Detennination and Distribution
of Net Income

Section 201

Distribution to Residuary and
Remainder Beneficiaries

Section 202

Apportionment At Beginning and
End of Income Interest

Article 3

When Right to Income Begins
and Ends

Section 301

Apportionment of Receipts and
Disbursements when Decedent
Dies or Income Interest Ends

Section 302

386.462

Section 7

Apportionment when Income
Interest Ends

Section 303

386.464

Section 8

NewKRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Changes in Kentucky Act from
UniformActl
Section of
House Bill 517 1
Article 2

386.456

Section 4

\

386.458

Section 5

Article 3

~
01

CO

386.460

Section 6

\

3

Added last sentence of Subsection (3)
[Section 303(c) ofUnifonn Act] to
make clear a settlor can change
charitable beneficiary of a trust by
will or written notice to trustee, if
does not change tax consequences
even if trust agreement does not
expressly allow.

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

Allocation of Receipts During
Administration of Trust

Article 4

NewKRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Changes in Kentucky Act from
Section of
Uniform Ace
1
House Bill 517
Article 4

Part 1. Receipts from Entities

b:l
0)

o

Character of Receipts

Section 401

386.466 /

Section 9 .

Distribution from Trust or Estate

Section 402

386.468·

Section 10

Business and Other Activities
Conducted by Trustee

Section 403

Deleted in entirety.

Part 2. Receipts Not Normally
Apportioned
Principal Receipts

Section 404

Section 11

386.470

Added "stock splits" to Subsection (2)
Moved provisions dealing with
options from Uniform Act Section
414 to here because balance of
Section 414 dealing with derivatives
deleted in entirety.

Rental Property

Section 405

386.472

Section 12

Obligation to Pay Money

Section 406

386.474

Section 13

4

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

NewKRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Changes in Kentucky Act from
Section of
UniformAct2
1
House Bill 517

Insurance Policies and Similar
Contracts

Section 407

386.476

Section 14

Insubstantial Allocations not
Required

Section 408

386.478

Section 15

Deferred Compensation
Annuities and Similar Payments

Section 409

386.480

Section 16

Liquidating Asset

Section 410

386.482

Section 17

Minerals, Water, and Other
Natural Resources

Section 411

386.484

Section 18

Timber

Section 412

386.486

Section 19

Property Not Productive of
Income

Section 413

386.488

Section 20

Part 3. Receipts Normally
Apportioned
Statute uses word "unsubstantial"
rather than "insubstantial."

t:C

....

0')

5

Added a new Subsection (5) [or
Section 411(e) under Uniform Act],
which provides that proceeds from
disposition of mineral interest is
allocated in same manner as receipts
from the interest.

First subsection in Ky Act tracks the
QTIP marital deduction rules - '"
"spouse may require the trustee to
make the trust income productive."

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

Derivatives and Options

Section 414

Deleted derivatives portion of Section
414 of the Unifonn Act in entirety and
moved the option provision to Section
11(6) of the Ky Act.

Asset-Backed Securities

Section 415

Deleted in entirety.

Allocation of Disbursements
During Administration of Trust

Article 5

Disbursements from Income

Section 501

386.490

Section 21

Disbursements from Principal

Section 502

386.492

Section 22

Added Subsection (1) providing that
portion of regular compensation of
trustee/investment advisor/custodian
not paid from income under Section
12 [Section 501(1) ofUnifonn Act] is
paid from principal.

Transfers from Income to
Principal for Depreciation

Section 503

386.494

Section 23

Section 503(b)(3) ofUnifonn Act
deleted because Ky Act deleted
Unifonn Act Section 403 (Allocation
of Receipts from Business and Other
Activities).

Transfers from Income to
Reimburse Principal

Section 504

386.496

Section 24

NewKRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Changes in Kentucky Act from
UniformActl
Section of
House Bill 517 1

Article 5

b::l
C')

t.:l

6

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

NewKRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Section of
House Bill 517 1

Income Taxes

Section 505

386.498

Section 25

Adjustments Between Principal
and Income Because of Taxes

Section 506

389.500

Section 26

Ky Act requires court approval for
adjustments between principal and
income for tax effects.

Section 27

Subsection (1) provides that adoption
of prudent investor rule and making
allocations to income requires District
Court approval.

386.502

.

Changes in Kentucky Act from
Uniform Act2

Subsection (2) provides that Ky Act
Sections 1-27 (other than 3) apply to
all trusts administered under Ky law,
except as specifically provided in the
instrument creating the trust,
regardless of when created.

t:1j
C)

Ci'

Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 6

Article 6
386.504

Uniformity of Application and
Construction

Section 601

Severability Clause

Section 602

Section 28

7

Names the legislation the "Kentucky
Principal and Income Act."

New KRS
Chapter/Section

Kentucky Act
Changes in Kentucky Act from
Section of
UniformAct2
House Bill 517 1

Subject Matter

Uniform Act

Repeal

Section 603

Section 29

Effective Date

Section 604

Section 30

Application of Act to Existing
Trusts and Estates

Section 605

Ky Act effective January 1, 2005

LEX:649156.1

1. The Kentucky Act originated in House Bill 517.

~
I

2. Sections referred to in this column are the sections of House Bill 517 because KRS subsections not yet issued by Legislative
Research Commission.

0)
~

8

EXHIBITC
Examples of Adjustments to Principal and Income l
Example (1) -- T is the successor trustee of a trust that provides income to A for life,
remainder to B. T has received from the prior trustee a portfolio of financial assets invested 20%
in stocks and 80% in bonds. Following the prudent investor rule, T determines that a strategy of
investing the portfolio 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds has risk and return objectives that are
reasonably suited to the trust, but T also determines that adopting this approach will cause the trust
to receive a smaller amount ofdividend and interest income. After considering the factors in Section
104(b) [of the Uniform Act; but not included in of the Kentucky Act], T may transfer cash from
principal to income to the extent T considers it necessary to increase the amount distributed to the
income beneficiary.
Example (2) -- T is the trustee of a trust that requires the income to be paid to the settlor's
son C for life, remainder to C's daughter D. In a period of very high inflation, T purchases bonds
that pay double-digit interest and determines that a portion of the interest, which is allocated to
income under Section 406 [ofthe Uniform Act; Section 13 ofthe Kentucky Act; KRS 386.474], is
a return ofcapital. In consideration ofthe loss ofvalue ofprincipal due to inflation and other factors
that T considers relevant, T may transfer part of the interest to principal.
Example (3) -- T is the trustee of a trust that requires the income to be paid to the settlor's
sister E for life, remainder to charity F. E is a retired schoolteacher who is single and has no
children. E' s income from her social security, pension and saving exceeds the amount required to
provide for her accustomed standard ofliving. The terms of the trust permit T to invade principal
to provide for E' s health and to support her in her accustomed manner ofliving, but do not otherwise
indicate that T should favor E or F. Applying the prudent investor rule, T determines that the trust
assets should be invested entirely in growth stocks that produce very little dividend income. Even
though it is not necessary to invade principal to maintain E's accustomed standard ofliving, she is
entitled to receive from the trust the degree ofbeneficial enjoyment normally accorded a person who
is the sole income beneficiary ofa trust, and T may transfer cash from principal to income to provide
her with that degree of enjoyment.
Example (4) -- T is the trustee of a trust that is governed by the law of State X. The trust
became irrevocable before State X adopted the prudent investor rule. The terms ofthe trust require
all of the income to be paid to G for life, remainder to H, and also give T the power to invade
principal for the benefit ofG for "dire emergencies only." The terms ofthe trust limit the aggregate
amount that T can distribute to G from principal during G's life to 6% of the trust's value at its
inception. The trust's portfolio is invested initially 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds, but after State
X adopts the prudent investor rule T determines that, to achieve suitable risk and return objectives
These examples are taken from the Prefatory Notes and Comments to the Uniform
Principal and Income Act (1997) prepared by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and approved and recommended for enactment in all states at its annual
conference on July 25-August 1, 1997, Sacramento, California.
I
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for the trust, the assets should be invested 90% in stocks and 10% in bonds. This change increases
the total return from the portfolio and decreases the dividend and interest income. Thereafter, even
though G does not experience a dire emergency, T may exercise the power to adjust under Section
104(a) [of the Uniform Act; Section 3 of the Kentucky Act; KRS 386.454] to the extent that T
determines that the adjustment is from only the capital appreciation resulting from the change in the
portfolio's asset allocation. If T is unable to determine the extent to which capital appreciation
resulted from the change in asset allocation or is unable to maintain adequate records to determine
the extent to which principal distributions to G for dire emergencies do not exceed the 6% limitation,
T may not exercise the power to adjust. See Joel C. Dobris, Limits on the Doctrine of Equitable
Adjustment in Sophisticated Postmortem Tax Planning, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 273 (1981).
Example (5) -- T is the trustee of a trust for the Settlor's child. The trust owns a diversified
portfolio of marketable financial assets with a value of$600,000, and is also the sole beneficiary of
the settlor's IRA, which holds a diversified portfolio of marketable financial assets with a value of
$900,000. The trust receives a distribution from the IRA that is the minimum amount required to
be distributed under the Internal Revenue Code, and T allocates 10% of the distribution to income
under Section 409(c) [ofthe Uniform Act; Section 16(3) ofthe Kentucky Act; KRS 386.480] . The
total return on the IRA's assets exceeds the amount distributed to the trust, and the value ofthe IRA
at the end ofthe year is more than its value at the beginning ofthe year. Relevant factors that T may
consider in determining whether to exercise the power to adjust and the extent to which an
adjustment should be made to comply with Section 103(b) [ofthe Uniform Act; Section 2(2) ofthe
Kentucky Act; KRS 386.452] include the total return from all of the trust's assets, those owned
directly as well as its interest in the IRA, the extent to which the trust will be subject to income tax
on the portion of the IRA distribution that is allocated to principal, and the extent to which the
income beneficiary will be subject to income tax on the amount that T distributes to the income
beneficiary.
Example (6) -- T is the trustee of a trust whose portfolio includes a large parcel of
undeveloped real estate. T pays real property taxes on the undeveloped parcel from income each
year pursuant to Section 501(3) [of the Uniform Act; Section 21(3) of the Kentucky Act; KRS
386.490]. After considering the return from the trust's portfolio as a whole and other relevant factors
described in Section 104(b) [ofthe Uniform Act; not included in the Kentucky Act], T may exercise
the power to adjust under Section 104(a) [of the Uniform Act; Section 3 ofthe Kentucky Act; KRS
386.454] to transfer cash from principal to income in order to distribute to the income beneficiary
an amount that T considers necessary to comply with Section 103(b) [of the Uniform Act; Section
2(2) of the Kentucky Act; KRS 386.452].
Example (7) -- T is the trustee ofa trust whose portfolio includes an interest in a mutual fund
that is sponsored by T. As the manager of the mutual fund, T charges the fund a management fee
that reduces the amount available to distribute to the trust by $2,000. If the fee had been paid
directly by the trust, one-halfofthe fee would have been paid from income under Section 501 (1) [of
the Uniform Act; Section 21(1) of the Kentucky Act; KRS 386.490] and the other one-half would
have been paid from principal under Section 502(a)(1) [ofthe Uniform Act; Section 22(1)(a) ofthe
Kentucky Act; KRS 386.492]. After considering the total return from the portfolio as a whole and
other relevant factors described in Section 104(b) [ofthe Uniform Act; not included in the Kentucky
Act], T may exercise its power to adjust under Section 104(a) [of the Uniform Act; Section 3 of the
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Kentucky Act; KRS 386.454] by transferring $1,000, or half 0 fthe trust's proportionate share ofthe
fee, from principal to income.
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SECTIONC

A. AN OVERVIEW OF HIPAA.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"),
Public Law 104-191, was enacted on August 21, 1996. Sections 261 through 264 of
HIPAA required the Secretary ofHHS to publicize standards for the electronic exchange,
privacy and security of health information.

HIPAA required the Secretary to issue privacy regulations governing individually
identifiable health information, if Congress did not enact privacy legislation within three
years of the passage ofHIPAA. Because Congress did not enact privacy legislation,
HHS developed a proposed rule and released it for public comment on November 3,
1999. The final regulation, the Standards for Privacy ofIndividually Identifiable Health
Information ("Privacy Rule"), was published December 28, 2000.

In March 2002, the Department proposed and released for public comment
modifications to the Privacy Rule. The final modifications were published in final form
on August 14,2002. A text combining the final regulation and the modifications can be
found at 45 CFR Part 160 and Part 164, Subparts A and E on the HHS Office of Civil
Rights ("OCR") website: http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa.
The Privacy Rule establishes, for the first time, a set of national standards for the
protection of certain health information. The Privacy Rule standards address the use and
disclosure of individuals' health information-ealled "protected health information" or
"PHI" by organizations subject to the Privacy Rule-ealled "Covered Entities," as well
as standards for individuals' privacy rights to understand and control how their health
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information is used. Within HHS, the OCR has responsibility for implementing and
enforcing the Privacy Rule with respect to voluntary compliance activities and civil
money penalties.
The Privacy Rule became effective, for all but small providers and small health
plans, on April 14, 2003. Small providers and small health plans now are also subject to
HIPAA's Privacy Rule. The Privacy Rule applies to "Covered Entities" -- health plans!,
health clearing houses 2 , and to health care providers 3 who transmit health information
electronically in connection with a transaction subject to HIPAA.

4

Thus, some health

care providers have managed to avoid being subject to the Privacy Rule by refusing to
transact their business electronically; as a practical matter this means accepting no
patients whose charges would be paid by insurance, including from Medicare or
Medicaid, and not transferring or accepting PHI from another provider in an electronic
format. Once a provider becomes subject to HIPAA, all PHI in its possession or control is
subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule's requirements.

5

1 A health plan is defined as an individual or group plan providing, or paying for medical care, including
health insurers, HMOs, Medicare, Medicaid, Medicare supplement and long term care insurers, employee
benefit welfare plans, MEWAs, state high risk pools, other federal health care insurance programs and any
other individual or group plan which provides or pays for health care.
1 Clearing Houses are public or private entities that either process or facilitate the processing of standard
data to nonstandard data [or vice-versa]. This includes billing and repricing companies, certain health
management information systems and networks that facilitate the processing of health information received
from another entity.
3 Any provider of services identified in 42 USC 1395x(u) of medical or health services and any other
person or organization who furnishes, bills or is paid for health care in the normal course of business.
4
A fourth category of Covered Entity has recently been designated by HHS - sponsors of the new
Medicare prescription drug card benefit...
5 The Privacy Rule speaks of two types of health information: IIHI or Individually Identifiable Health
Information which is information collected from an individual and related to past, present or future
treatment, payment or provision of health care services and which could identify the individual; and PHI or
Protected Health Information, which is IIHI that is transmitted or maintained by a Covered Entity in any
format, not just electronically
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The Privacy Rule also applies to certain persons who work with or provide
services to Covered Entities and who are known as "Business Associates". In addition to
persons more directly involved in providing services necessary for the day-to-day
operation of a Covered Entity's business, Business Associates also include persons who
provide legal, actuarial, accounting and financial management services to a Covered
Entity. When providing services to a Covered Entity which relate to that Entity's health
care business [treatment, payment or operations] and which involves the use or disclosure
of PHI, a Business Associate is required to execute a contract binding it to comply with
the requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
For more on the background and general provisions ofHIPAA, see the "Summary
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule" at the OCR website at the address listed hereinabove.

B.

HIPAA DISCLOSURE RULES.

As attorneys, we may provide Business Associate services to a Covered Entity or
we may simply need access to PHI in order to provide services to our own trust and estate
(or other) clients. In either event we need to have a basic understanding of many of the
provisions ofthe Privacy Rule, most particularly those that relate to the ability to obtain
PHI from a Covered Entity.
Under HIPAA, a Covered Entity may use or disclose PHI only:
•

To the individual whose PHI it is or his/her duly authorized personal
representative;

•

In accordance with a valid authorization under 45 CFR 164.508 (5);
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•

As otherwise permitted or required under HIPAA, without written
authorization, but with advance notice and opportunity to object (limited
to circumstances such as inclusion in a hospital's phone directory of
patients or to discussing health condition in front of family member
accompanying the patient] 45 CFR 164.510);

•

As otherwise permitted or required under HIPAA without written
authorization or notice;

•

When required by law;

•

For public health activities;

•

When abuse, neglect or domestic violence is suspected;

•

For health oversight activities;

•

In connection with judicial & administrative actions;

•

For law enforcement activities;

•

About decedents to coroners, medical examiners and funeral directors;

•

To avert a serious threat to health or safety;

•

For specialized government purposes; or

•

For workers' compensation obligations.

Thus under HIPAA, a Covered Entity may, but is not required to, provide PHI to
others involved in the treatment of hislher patients. Because such disclosure is merely
permissive, and in view of HIPAA's potential fines and criminal sanctions, many
providers have elected to disclose PHI only when required under the Privacy Rules. This
is increasingly the case where a provider does not have a long-term relationship with a
patient and is, therefore, uncertain regarding the patient's circumstances or desires. Also,
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some providers are reporting that an increasing number of patients are requesting that
their health status NOT be shared with their families. Anecdotally, this appears to be
particularly true in the case of elderly patients fearing loss of independence if the true
state of their health is disclosed to family members.
In the context of estate planning and trust documents, the health of an individual
can be critical to the legal effectiveness of some or all of the terms of the client's
planning. The client's Power of Attorney may only take effect upon a physician-certified
disability, by its terms. If the client wants to use a funded Revocable Trust to provide for
asset management upon disability, but serve as his or her own trustee until disability
commences, the determination of the client's disability is crucial to the transition of the
Trust Agreement from the client's management to the successor trustee's management.
Further, in Trust Agreements, successor trustees' service may be expressly contingent
upon the successor trustee not being disabled either.

Finally, a client's Living Will

Directive prepared in accordance with Kentucky law only takes effect under KRS
311.621 and 311.625, when the client lacks "decisional capacity". In all these instances,
the attorney and family of the client must tum to the client's physician for assistance in
determining whether or not the client is disabled, before the disability or estate planning
can move ahead.
To provide the necessary cooperation of the client's physician when the need for a
disability determination will arise, there are two avenues available to the drafter. The
first is to assure that the relevant documents create a legally enforceable "personal
representative status" for a party named in the document as a matter of applicable state
law; the second is to obtain a HIPAA compliant authorization at the time the documents
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are drafted. It must be noted that neither approach is completely foolproof. There is a
wealth of writing and speaking on the subject, but a noted dearth of consensus on how
best to proceed. The presenters will give you a number of the concepts and forms being
advocated by various proponents, but with no assurance as to what may be best or
effective for your practice.

However, lest you decide to abandon all hope, one fact

should be considered: failure to attempt compliance with HIPAA's privacy requirements
virtually assures that health information will not be available when needed.

C.

THE "PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE" APPROACH.

HIPAA's Privacy Rule outlines when a person will be treated as a "personal
representative" of another and thus be entitled to assert the rights of that other person in a
matter related to the patient's health care needs. These provisions are found in 45 CFR
164.502.

Its provisions are applicable to adults [both competent and incompetent],

minors and deceased persons.
First, personal representative capacity is determined by reference to applicable
state law.

If that law would designate an individual as a personal representative

authorized to act with respect to the matter at hand (e.g. making health care decisions or
administering an estate), then a Covered Entity must honor that person's personal entity
status. See 45 CFR 164.502 (g)(2) & 164.502 (g) (4), respectively. Similarly, with respect
to an unemancipated minor, a parent or guardian, or other person having in loco parentis
status under state law and granted the right under that law to make health care decisions
for the minor, must be treated as the minor's personal representative. 45 CFR 164.502
(g)(3)(i).

From the Covered Entity's perspective, the only exceptions to these rules
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occurs when the provider, acting in good faith, suspects abuse, neglect or domestic
violence or where a more specific state law limits the personal representative's rights.
The specific language of the Privacy Rule addressing personal representative
capacity sets forth the main limitation which must be considered in drafting powers of
attorney, trust documents or in obtaining a court order granting personal representative
status:
If under applicable law a person has authority to act on
behalf of an individual who is an adult or an emancipated
minor in making decisions related to health care, a Covered
Entity must treat such person as a personal representative
under this subchapter, with respect to protected health
information relevant to such personal representative.
45 CPR 164.502 (g)(2).

OCR has addressed the limitations and requirements of his section of the Privacy Rule in
a series of answers to Frequently Asked Questions (hereinafter "OCR FAQ #"), posted on
its website cited in Section A hereinabove. These are paraphrased below.

•

The personal representative must - by reference to applicable state law be entitled to make health care decisions for the individual. In OCR FAQ
# 220, OCR has advised Covered Entities that a person holding a non-

health care power of attorney does not have the right to access the medical
records of the grantor unless the grantor has died and applicable state law
qualifies the POA as the personal representative of the decedent. This
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approach may be virtually useless to the planner; the Power of Attorney
dies with the client under most states' laws, and a personal representative
must be named under the decedent's Will.
•

If the right to make health care decisions is limited by state law, the
personal representative cannot obtain more general information.

OCR

FAQ # 221 discusses this, stating, "If a personal representative's authority
is limited to authorizing artificial life support, then the personal
information is limited to that information which may be relevant to
decisions about artificial life support."
•

A personal representative under a health care POA will have the right to
access the medical records of the individual for whom he/she serves as
POA to the same extent as that individual himself. OCR FAQ # 220.

•

A Covered Entity is required to verify a personal representative's authority
in accordance with 45 CFR 164.514(h). See OCR FAQ # 226.

•

"A Covered Entity does not have to treat a personal representative as the
individual's representative if it reasonably believes, in the exercise of
professional judgment, the individual is subject to domestic violence,
abuse or neglect by the personal representative, or doing so would
otherwise endanger the individual." OCR FAQ # 223.

•

Nothing in the Privacy Rule changes the way in which state law
determines the authority of, or authorizes, one person to make health care
decisions for another. OCR FAQ # 219.
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•

Because Covered Entities are required to verify that a person claiming
personal representative status does, in fact, hold that status, many are
requiring a copy of any POA or similar document before releasing any
information to a personal representative. Assuming the POA is sufficiently
broad in its reference to health care decisions, a Covered Entity will still
limit any information produced to the "minimum necessary" for the
intended purpose. If the PHI is needed for treatment by another provider,
the entire file may be sent; if it is needed to decide whether a patient may
safely travel, the information provided may be much less detailed.
Obviously, some Covered Entities will feel comfortable producing more
information than others. If the PHI is requested for a reason other than to
make a health care decision, a Covered Entity is well within its rights to
refuse to disclose the PHI absent a broadly worded document making clear
the representative's right to PHI under the circumstances at hand.

In Kentucky, there are a number of different fiduciary roles created or recognized
by statute. These include health care surrogates designated pursuant to KRS 311.623,
durable powers of attorney under KRS 386.093, guardians, limited guardians and
conservators under KRS 387.010-.280 as well as personal representatives [executors,
administrators or curators] under KRS 395.015.

Additionally there are statutes

addressing who may make a medical decision when an advance directive does not exist
or address the issue [KRS 311.631], who makes certain health care decisions when there
is both a court appointed fiduciary and a health care surrogate [KRS 311.6231], and
statutes allowing an estate to be processed without administration [KRS 395.455 & .470].
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Each of these statutes raises interesting questions under HIPAA both for an attorney
providing advice to the individual or his family and to Covered Entities with respect to
who is entitled to access the individual's PHI. The job of the planner is to coordinate
these roles in any documents drafted, subject to the limits imposed by state law. The goal
should be to have at least one person who is clearly the client's "personal representative"
for HIPAA purposes. That person should then be authorized to share PHI with others in
the overall plan who need the PHI to act properly under their governing document.
The question presented in Kentucky, as in many other jurisdictions, is whether the
"surrogate" named in the client's Living Will Directive will be recognized as the client's
"personal representative" entitled to receive the client's PHI. KRS 311.621 (15) defines
"surrogate" to mean an adult who has been designated to make health care decisions in
accordance with KRS 311.621 to 311.643. However, under KRS 311.629, a surrogate
designated pursuant to an advance directive may not make a health care decision for a
grantor in any situation in which the grantor's attending physician has determined in
good faith that the grantor has decisional capacity. In effect, then, the legal authority of
the surrogate only arises when the physician determines that the grantor lacks decisional
capacity. The question presented is whether the grantor's physician, who presumably is a
"Covered Entity" under HIPAA in most cases, will recognize the surrogate as the
"personal representative" of the grantor of the Living Will Directive entitled to receive
the information that the grantor lacks decisional capacity. Or, will the physician, in an
abundance of caution, fear that the disclosure of the grantor's lack of decisional capacity
to the surrogate will constitute a violation of HIPAA, since the authority of the surrogate
does not arise until the absence of decisional authority has been determined?
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This

potentially is a classic "Catch-22" situation which has been generally noted in the
literature, with no resolution yet offered by the OCR. In online dialog with other estate
planners, at least one has noted that the hospitals in his area take a practical view, and
will make the disclosure. However, as planners, we do not like to rely upon techniques
which may be practical if we are not certain that they are also a clearly valid legal
approach.
Cautious planners will want to take further steps to secure the "personal
representative" status of an individual on behalf of their client. For many years before
the Living Will statute was first enacted in 1990, Kentucky recognized the concept of the
Power of Attorney as a matter of the common law of agency.

Further, under KRS

386.093, there is a statutory provision enabling a Power of Attorney to survive the
disability of the principal, if so stated in the Power of Attorney with the proper
terminology. This suggests that a Power of Attorney which is presently effective and
which includes express health care decisional authority should be effective as a matter of
Kentucky law. If so, then the person named in that instrument should qualify as the
"personal representative" of the client, with the right to access the necessary health care
information. The broader the scope of health care authority set forth in the health care
Power of Attorney, arguably the broader the scope of medical information which the
client's physician and other health care entities will agree to provide. If the same person
is named in the Health Care Power of Attorney and as Surrogate in the client's Living
Will Directive, there should be no issue about "dueling personal representatives."
However, some provisions in the Power of Attorney to coordinate it with the Living Will
Directive may still be helpful. A sample Limited Power of Attorney for health care
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decisional authority which is presently effective is attached as part of the "Personal
Representative Forms" in Exhibit A at the end of these materials.
Also attached at the end of these materials are other forms of "personal
representative" language advocated by a variety of other authors. All of these are offered
in the hopes that one or more of them may be useful to you in your practice.

D.

THE "AUTHORIZATION" APPROACH.

A second possible solution to the issue created by the HIPAA Privacy Rules is to
use a HIPAA compliant authorization from the client, allowing a named individual to
obtain the client's health information.
As originally proposed, the Privacy Rule had two separate concepts - consent and
authorization. Consent was required before a provider could use or disclose PHI for
treatment, payment or operations, while authorization was required for other uses or
disclosures of PHI. Comments received after HHS proposed this approach consistently
noted the adverse impact this consent requirement would have on timely and appropriate
care - inability to consult with a specialist or order lab tests without prior written consent.
The comments also noted problems with payment - how does a provider get paid if a
patient refuses to allow him/her to provide information to the health insurance company?
As a result, the concept of consent was dropped from the Rule, except as a voluntary act
by the provider or when required under applicable state law. [See OCR FAQ # 360] A
provider may now use or disclose PHI as necessary and appropriate for his or her own
treatment, payment and operations rights and obligations. Any other use or disclosure of
PHI must be specifically permitted or required under the Privacy Rule, as discussed at the
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beginning of this outline. Outside of government public health and safety activities, this
generally means that an authorization to release medical information will be required.
An authorization is essentially a medical release form, but HIPAA requires that a

number of provisions be satisfied before such a form is deemed 'compliant'. Specifically,
these include:
•

A specific and meaningful description of the PHI to be used or disclosed,

•

The specific identity of the person, persons or class of persons authorized
to make the requested use or disclosure,

•

The specific identity of the person, persons or class of persons to whom
the Covered Entity may make the requested use or disclosure,

•

An expiration date which relates to the individual or specific purpose of
the use or disclosure,

•

A statement of the individual's right to revoke the authorization in writing,
the exceptions to that right [set forth in 45 CFR 164.508(b)(5)] and the
details of how the individual may revoke the authorization,

•

A statement that once disclosed pursuant to the authorization the
information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer
be protected under HIPAA, and

•

The signature of the individual and the date.

As is the case with questions relating to personal representative status, OCR has
issued answers to a number of frequently asked questions related to the scope and use of
authorizations. These address the following areas:
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•

An Authorization must contain either an expiration date or an expiration

event that relates to the individual or the purpose of the use or disclosure;
e.g., "one year from date this Authorization is signed" or "upon the
minor's age of majority." The fact that the expiration date is longer than
established by applicable state law does not invalidate the Authorization
under the Privacy Rule, but a more restrictive state law would control how
long it would be effective. OCR FAQ # 476.
•

A Covered Entity may disclose PHI as specified in a valid Authorization
[one that means the requirements of 45 CFR 164.508, set forth above],
that has been prepared by a third party such as an attorney or insurance
company. OCR FAQ # 472.

•

An Authorization form may be used to authorize uses and disclosures by

classes or categories of persons or entities without naming the particular
persons or entities. [45 CFR 164.508 (C) (1)]. A valid Authorization may
also specifically identify the person or class of persons entitled to PHI. [45
CFR 164.508 (C) (1)(iii)] OCR FAQ # 473.
•

An authorization is not required to be notarized or witnessed. OCR FAQ #

478.
•

An individual may revoke his or her Authorization in writing and a
HIP AA compliant authorization must state this fact. Revocation is not

effective until received by the Covered Entity. Authorization forms
created by third parties should not imply that revocation is effective when
the third party receives it. OCR FAQ # 474.
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A problem with the authorization approach is the duration limit. As noted above,
a state law limitation on the duration of an authorization will, effectively, end the
authorization even before its stated date of expiration. Under Kentucky law, the practice
has certainly been to limit the use of medical authorizations to a period of two years, in
the pre-HIPAA practice era.

Therefore, use of the release approach for long term

disability planning may not be effective. If the physician or other health care provider
that is a "Covered Entity" will not accept an authorization more than two years old, then
the only safe approach to use of the authorization approach is to have the client execute a
new one every two years.
As for addressing the ability to access the PHI of successor trustees, various
approaches have been suggested. Among them include the inclusion of a requirement in
the trust or Will that a successor trustee, by agreeing to serve thereas, must also consent
to the release of his PHI for purposes of determining whether or not he has become
disabled from serving as trustee, or a requirement that the successor trustee sign an
authorization for the same purpose at the time that the successor trustee assumes office.
Others have simply suggested adding such personal representative or authorization
language in the trust instrument itself, although this may be problematic where the
successor trustee has not signed the document.

Another approach is to give a non-

physician the ability to make the disability determination with respect to successor
trustees. Form language is included in Exhibit A addressing the trustee disability issue.
Attached at Exhibit B to these materials you will find a release form from a
leading New York estate planning attorney, for your consideration. Again, the presenters
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make no promises or guarantees as to efficacy, but provide the form in the hope it may be
useful to you in your practice.

E.

CONCLUSION.

The Privacy Rule ofHIPAA was enacted in order to protect a client's medical
records of privacy. The medical information arena is not necessarily an area familiar to
estate planners. The challenge facing us is to address these rules in our disability and
estate planning for our clients, so that the legal rights of privacy do not frustrate the
client's desire for information to be disclosed to their designated agents so that these
agents can act for the client's best interests. Because the Privacy Rules were not
promulgated with the disability and estate planning process in mind, and because the
regulators who control the regulations and implementation are not estate planners, the
challenge is even greater. Unfortunately, there is as yet no true consensus as to the best
approach to addressing HIPAA for the estate planner. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon
us all to take the best known steps to address these issues with our clients, in view of the
enactment and implementation of HIPAA and the penalties placed upon care providers if
they breach the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

For those interested in further reading, in addition to the OCR website cited in
Section A hereinabove, please see the attached Selected Bibliography.
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EXHIBIT A-SAMPLE AUTHORIZATION FORMS
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POWER OF ATTORNEY

I, ***, ofJefferson County, Kentucky, hereby make, constitute and appoint my spouse, ***,
or if my spouse shall die or cease to serve thereas for any reason, my children, *** and ***, either
of whom may act independently and without the consent or joinder of the other, as my true and
lawful Attorney-in-Fact, with full power of substitution, hereby revoking any and all powers of
attorney that may have been heretofore executed by me, with full power and authority for me in my
name, place and stead, to act in, manage, and conduct all my affairs, as I could do if acting
personally, effective immediately. For purposes ofacting as my Attorney-in-Fact, I hereby authorize
my said Attorney-in-Fact, for me and in my name, place and stead, and for my use and benefit, and
as my act and deed, to do, and execute, or to concur with persons and/or other legal entities jointly
interested with myselftherein in the doing or executing of, all or any necessary acts, deeds and things
including, but not limited to, the following:
(1)
HIPAA PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. TO ACT AS MY HEALTH
CARE SURROGATE to make any health care decisions for me, and to act for me and in my name
(in any way I could act in person) to make any and all decisions for me concerning my personal care,
medical treatment, hospitalization and health care and to require, withhold or withdraw any type of
medical treatment or procedure, even though my death may ensue. My Attorney-in-Fact/Health Care
Surrogate shall have the same access and rights with respect to my medical records that I have,
including the right to disclose the contents to others. I designate my current Attorney-in-Fact as my
limited attorney-in-fact and personal representative to have access to my medical records, and to
disclose the contents to others, for the purposes of acting as my health care surrogate hereunder and
for the purpose of aiding others (e.g. persons named in my Living Will Directive, my Trust
Agreement or otherwise) to assist me in case of my disability, incapacity, terminal illness or
persistent vegetative state whenever they are legally authorized to do so. THIS DESIGNATION
OF MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF 45CFR 164.502(g)(I), AND AS SUCH AUTHORIZES EACH OF MY
ATTENDING PHYSICIANS AND MY OTHER HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS OF ANY KIND
TO PROVIDE MY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH ALL RIGHTS THAT I POSSESS IN
AND TO MY MEDICAL AND OTHER PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION UNDER THE
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 ("HIPAA").
I hereby indemnify my said physicians and other health care providers from any liability for
providing my medical and other protected health information as so authorized. My Attorney-inFact/Health Care Surrogate shall also have full power to dispose of any part or all of my body for
medical purposes, authorize an autopsy and direct the disposition of my remains. Subject to any
Living Will Directive I may have to the contrary, I do not want my life to be prolonged nor do I want
life-sustaining treatment to be provided or continued ifmy Attorney-in-Fact/Health Care Surrogate
believes the burdens of the treatment outweigh the expected benefits. Subject to any Living Will
Directive I may have to the contrary, I want my Attorney-in-Fact/Health Care Surrogate to consider
the relief of suffering, the expense involved and the quality as well as the possible extension of my
life in making decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment. Without limiting the generality ofthe
foregoing, but subject to the foregoing direction, my Attorney-in-Fact/Health Care Surrogate shall
have the following powers:
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(a)
To give consent to and authorize orrefuse, or to withhold or withdraw
consent to, any and all types of medical care, treatment or procedures relating to my physical and
mental health, including any medication program, surgical procedures, life-sustaining treatment or
provision of food and water.
(b)
To admit to or discharge me from any and all types of hospitals,
institutions, homes, residential or nursing facilities, treatment centers and other health care institutions providing personal care or treatment for any type of physical or mental condition.
(c)
To contract for any and all types ofhealth care services and facilities
in the name of and on my behalf and to bind me to pay for all such services and facilities; and my
Attorney-in-Fact/Health Care Surrogate shall not be personally liable for any services or care
contracted for on my behalf.
(d)
At my expense and subject to reasonable rules ofa health care provider
to prevent disruption of my health care, to examine and copy and consent to disclosure of all my
medical records that my Attorney-in-Fact/Health Care Surrogate deems relevant to the exercise of
my Attorney-in-Fact/Health Care Surrogate's powers, whether the records relate to mental health or
any other medical condition and whether they are in the possession of or maintained by any
physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, therapist, hospital, nursing home or other health care provider.
(e)
To direct that an autopsy be made; to make a disposition of any part
or all of my body pursuant to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, as now or hereafter amended; and
to direct the disposition of my remains.
IfI have executed a Living Will Directive, (i) the language contained
in this Paragraph I shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, any health care proxy authority which
I may have granted in such Living Will Directive; and (ii) any binding directive set forth in such
Living Will Directive shall bind my Health Care Surrogate hereunder and shall supersede the
authority of my Health Care Surrogate as to the matters expressly covered thereby.
(2)
TO BUY, ACQUIRE, OBTAIN, TAKE OR HOLD POSSESSION of any
property or property rights of mine or for me whatsoever, whether real, personal or mixed; and to
retain such property as long as said Attorney-in-Fact shall deem it wise; and without limiting the
generality of the foregoing, to take possession of, and to order the removal and shipment of, any
property from any post, warehouse, depot, dock, or other place of storage or safekeeping,
governmental or private; and to execute and deliver any release, voucher, receipt, shipping ticket,
certificate or other instrument necessary or convenient for such purposes;
(3)
TO SELL, CONVEY (either with or without covenants ofwarranty), LEASE,
MANAGE, CARE FOR, PRESERVE, PROTECT INSURE, IMPROVE, CONTROL, STORE,
TRANSPORT, MAINTAIN, REPAIR, REMODEL, REBUILD, and in every way deal in and with
any property or property rights ofmine, real, personal or mixed, now or hereafter owned by me, and
to set up and carry reserves for repairs, improvements, upkeep and obsolescence ofreal and personal
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property; to ej ect, remove, or relieve tenants or other persons from, and to recover possession ofsuch
property, real, personal or mixed; and to deal with the United States government, or agencies thereof,
in the negotiating and executing of any contract;
(4)
TO BORROW MONEY, MORTGAGE MY REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY OR COMPLETE, EXTEND, MODIFY OR RENEW ANY OBLIGATIONS, GIVING
EITHER SECURED (including but not restricted to real estate mortgages, stock certificates and/or
insurance policies as collateral) or unsecured, negotiable or nonnegotiable obligations of the
undersigned, at a rate ofinterest and upon terms satisfactory to my said Attorney-in-Fact; to likewise
LEND MONEY, either with or without collateral; to EXTEND OR SECURE CREDIT; and to
GUARANTEE AND INSURE THE PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT OF OBLIGATIONS OF
ANOTHER PERSON, firm or corporation in the furtherance of any business of mine;
(5)
TO OPEN, MAINTAIN, OR CLOSE BANK, BROKERAGE OR OTHER
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ACCOUNTS, or to do any business with any banking, lending,
brokerage or other financial institution, in regard to any account of mine, to make deposits and
withdrawals, obtain statements and passbooks, to collect or receive funds, to sign, endorse or execute
checks, drafts, money orders, warrants, certificates or vouchers payable to me by any person, firm
or corporation, including political corporations, and including the United States of America; to
purchase and sell assets in and for my account, to pledge or margin my account, to write checks or
otherwise direct the withdrawal or payment of my funds from any such account in any amount for
my benefit or for any purpose herein provided; and TO HAVE FULL ACCESS TO ANY SAFETY
DEPOSIT BOX, AND CONTENTS OF MINE, IN ANY BANK OR BANKING INSTITUTIONS;
(6)
TO PAY ALL TAXES, city, county, State or Federal, including, but not
restricted to, real estate taxes, special assessments, personal property taxes, monies and credit taxes,
gift taxes, and income taxes, and to receive appropriate receipts thereof; to prepare, execute, file and
obtain from the Government, income and other tax returns, State and Federal, and other
governmental reports, applications, requests and documents; to take any appropriate action to
minimize, reduce or establish nonliability for taxes whether now or hereafter unlawfully or illegally
assessed against me; to receive or sue or take appropriate action for refunds of same; to appear for
me and to represent me before the Internal Revenue Service and/or United States Department ofthe
Treasury and/or any state tax commission, or any unit, division, agent or employee thereof, in
connection with any matter involving Federal or State taxes in which I may be a party; to do
everything whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in the premises and to receive refund
checks; and to execute waivers ofthe statute oflimitations and to execute closing agreements as fully
as I might do if done in my own capacity (and I hereby request and direct that all correspondence,
documents and other communications regarding any tax matters with respect to which my said
Attorney-in-Fact is hereby authorized to act be addressed to the said Attorney-in-Fact at the address
said Attorney-in-Fact directs);
(7)
TO ACT AS PROXY, with full power of substitution, at any corporate
meeting, and to initiate corporate meetings for my benefit as stockholder, in respect of any stocks,
stock rights, shares, bonds, debentures, or other investments, right or interest I may now or hereafter
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hold, as fully as I might do if personally present and acting in my own behalf, including, but not
restricted to, the right to join in or oppose any plans for changes in organization;
(8)
TO INVEST AND REINVEST, or exchange any existing assets, including
but not restricted to common and preferred stocks, annuities, and life insurance, in any incomeproducing contracts or property or securities, real or personal; and, not limited by the generality of
the foregoing, to take out life insurance upon my life or upon the life of anyone else in whom I have
an insurable beneficial interest, naming as beneficiary either me or the insured or the estate of any
insured; and to pay the premiums, assessments and proper charges for such investments or to
continue any existing plan of insurance or investment;
(9)
TO REASONABLY DELAY, DEFEND, BEGIN, PROSECUTE, SETTLE,
ARBITRATE, OR DISPOSE OF ANY LAWSUIT, or administrative hearings, claims, actions,
attachments, injunctions, arrests or other proceedings, or otherwise engage in or participate in
litigation in connection with the premises;
(10) TO CARRY ON A BUSINESS, or businesses of mine, in the discretion of
the Attorney-in-Fact, and for that purpose to retain and employ or increase therein the capital which
as of this date shall be employed therein; and to use fresh capital for any new enterprises; and to
incorporate, or to operate as a general partnership, or limited partnership, or sole proprietorship
under a trade name; to borrow on behalf of such business and to pledge business and/or personal
assets ofmine for such debt; to extend, modify, renegotiate or otherwise deal with any business debt;
to buy and sell business assets; to liquidate, merge or reorganize any business; to make ordinary or
extraordinary distributions of profits; to serve individually as employee, officer or director of such
business at reasonable compensation for each service rendered;
(11) TO EMPLOY professional and business assistants ofall kinds, including, but
not restricted to, attorneys, accountants, realtors, appraisers, salesmen, and agents;
(12) TO ACT IN THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY ESTATE, in which I have or may
have some interest or property due me and to protect, prosecute, and defend such interests; to
petition, apply for, or otherwise obtain original or ancillary letters of administration, or letters
testamentary; to receive and give acquittance for all sums ofmoney, debts and accounts whatsoever,
which are or shall become due, owing and payable to me; to appear, waive a bond or other security,
and to deduct reasonable expenses from any share due me;
(13) TO PURCHASE with the same effect as I could such United States Treasury
Bonds and securities as maybe redeemed, at par value (and accrued interest) in payment of Federal
estate taxes which I or my estate may owe (commonly called "Flower Bonds"), as well as any other
bonds available at a discount and redeemable at par at my death, and for the purposes thereof, to do
any and all things (including the borrowing of funds) which I could do if acting personally, in order
to effect the purchase and ownership of such bonds and securities for the purposes aforesaid;
(14) TO MAKE GIFTS outright, in trust, in a section 529 Plan or in custodianship
of any amount or amounts, of any real or personal property, or both (within the amount of the gift
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tax annual exclusion, including the full amount which can be given if my spouse consents to split
such gifts for gift tax purposes under section 2513 ofthe Internal Revenue Code, as amended) to the
natural obj ects ofmy bounty, including, without limitation, my spouse, my issue and the spouses of
my issue, so as to reduce the Federal estate taxes and state inheritance taxes payable at my death and
at my spouse's subsequent death, with full power of substitution ofjudgment in this regard; and
(15) TO CLAIM OR DISCLAIM any power, property or interest in property
(present or future) to be given, bequeathed, devised, passed by intestacy or distributed in any way
to me or any trust for my benefit, including without limitation homestead, renunciation or elective
share, dower or curtesy, in whole or in part, with full power of substitution of judgment in this
regard;
(16) TO WITHDRAW any and all amounts in any life insurance policy, annuity,
qualified or non-qualified retirement pension, profit-sharing or deferred compensation plan, benefit
or account of any kind, to the full extent of my ability to do so personally, and the insurance or
annuity company, trustee, fiduciary or other holder of such policy, annuity, plan, benefit or account
shall be released from all liability for complying with the instructions of my Attorney-in-Fact as to
such matters. To make any election available, in my Attorney-in-Fact's sole discretion, to take 5-year
averaging, 10-year averaging and/or capital gain treatment of any distribution from any qualified
plan.
(17) In the sole discretion of my Attorney-in-Fact, TO MAKE any election or
allocation of any exemption available against or under the generation-skipping tax imposed by
Chapter 13 ofthe Code, and to file such return or returns as shall be necessary to make such election
or allocation.
(18) (a)
TO CREATE AND FUND one or more revocable trusts for my benefit
and payable to my estate after death, with such trustee(s) and on such terms as my Attorney-in-Fact
shall deem appropriate, and to revoke, amend or withdraw from, any such trust. TO FUND the ***
REVOCABLE TRUST with any or all of my assets at any time and from time to time.
(b)
To exercise any rights I have retained under any revocable or
irrevocable trust on my behalf.
(c)
To alter, amend or revoke the *** REVOCABLE TRUST, and any
other trust under which either I or my Attorney-in-Fact holds such powers under the express trust
terms or applicable law (or under both).
(19) TO INDEMNIFY any third party and hold such third party harmless from
liability for accepting the authority ofmy Attorney-in-Fact, and to sue or otherwise charge any third
party which fails, declines or refuses to accept the authority of my Attorney-in-Fact.
(20) TO ESTABLISH AND FUND, in such amounts as my Attorney-in-Fact shall
deem advisable, one or more prepaid tuition plans and qualified tax-deferred tuition savings plans
(under Code section 529 or otherwise) for any ofthe natural objects ofmy bounty, including, without
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limitation, my issue; to designate the custodian ofany such plans, and to change such custodian from
time to time, to the extent pennitted by such plans; to designate the beneficiary of any such plans,
and to change such beneficiary from time to time, to the extent pennitted by such plans; to select
the state for establishment of any such plans, and to rollover any such plans from one state to another
state; and to withdraw the funds from any such plans from time to time, to the extent pennitted by
such plans.
I hereby give and grant said Attorney-in-Fact full power and authority to do and perfonn each
and every act, deed, matter and thing whatsoever in and about my property, person and affairs as
fully and effectually to all intents and purposes as I might or could do in my own proper person if
personally present, and hereby ratify all that said Attorney-in-Fact shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue thereof; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that nothing herein shall give or grant the power
to execute or change my Last Will and Testament.
I hereby waive any conflict ofinterest which my Attorney-in-Fact may have in exercising any
or all ofthe foregoing powers, and acknowledge and agree that my Attorney-in-Fact may deal with
himselfor herself(including making gifts) without limitation, absent bad faith or willful misconduct.
No third party need inquire as to whether any act of self-dealing by my Attorney-in-Fact is duly
authorized, and I indemnify all third parties from liability for allowing or facilitating any act of
self-dealing by my Attorney-in-Fact.
I further direct that this Power of Attorney shall take effect as below provided and shall be
irrevocable except as hereinafter otherwise expressly stated, and ifreal estate ofmine is involved and
this instrument has been recorded in a public office, this instrument, as to such real estate, shall not
be revocable, unless and until such time as there is filed of record a duly acknowledged revocation
of this instrument in the same public office in which the instrument containing this power is
recorded.
I hereby nominate my said Attorney-in-Fact as the conservator or guardian ofmy estate and
person if protective proceedings for either my estate or person (or both) are hereafter commenced.
This Power of Attorney shall become effective on the date of execution hereof, and shall
continue effective until it is revoked byme in writing. This power, as between said Attorney-in-Fact
and me, may be revoked at any time by prior written notice to said Attorney-in-Fact stating the date
on which such revocation shall be effective; BUT, as regards any revocation by me or by operation
oflaw, including death, anyone else in good faith relying upon the exercise ofthese powers by said
Attorney-in-Fact may rely upon this instrument for its continuing validity. This instrument may be
recorded in a public office but need not necessarily be so recorded.
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE DISABILITY OF
THE PRINCIPAL.
EXCULPAnON. My said Attorney-in-Fact shall not be liabIe for any loss sustained through
error ofjudgment made in good faith, but said Attorney-in-Fact shall be liable for willful misconduct
or breach of good faith.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2004, at Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky.

day of

***

Witness

Witness

Address

Address

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON

)
) SS:
)

I, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the State and County aforesaid, certify that on
the _ _ day of
, 2004, there appeared before me in said State and County, ***,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ and
, witnesses, who subscribed their names
to the above and foregoing Power of Attorney and acknowledged and delivered it to be and constitute their voluntary act and deed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, witness my signature and Notarial Seal hereunto affixed this
___ day of
, 2004.
My commission expires:

_

(SEAL)
Notary Public
I certify that I prepared the
foregoing Power of Attorney.

John R. Cummins, Esq.
Greenebaum Doll & McDonald, PLLC
3500 National City Tower
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 587-3602
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HIPAA Language for POA (M. Douglas Deitchler)

Language for PDA: Regardless of the time of commencement of the other powers granted my
agent by this document, I authorize and request any physician, health care professional, health
care provider, and medical care facility to provide to any designated agent in this document
information relating to my physical and mental condition and the diagnosis, prognosis, care, and
treatment thereof upon the request of any agent I have designated in this document. It is my
intent by this authorization for my designated agent to be considered a personal representative
under privacy regulations related to protected health information and for my designated agent to
be entitled to all health information in the same manner as if I personally were making the
request. This authorization and request shall also be considered a consent to the release of such
information under current laws, rules, and regulations as well as under future laws, rules, and
regulations and amendments to such laws, rules, and regulations to include but not be limited to
the express grant of authority to personal representatives as provided by Regulation Section
164.502(g) of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations and the medical information privacy
law and regulations generally referred to as HIPAA.
HIPAA -Trust Provisions (Pete Donahoe)

Authority to Release Certain Medical Information. Any trustee or successor trustee who accepts
their appointment as such with respect to any trust created under this Will, hereby authorizes the
release by any health care provider of medical information needed to make any medical
determination required by any such trust created under this instrument, including but not limited
to, a determination concerning such trustee's or successor trustee's capacity to serve as a trustee.
Definitions: "Incapacity" shall mean that a Trustee is so mentally or so physically incapacitated
that he or she is either unable or it is impractical to give prompt and intelligent consideration to
business affairs. The successor trustee shall determine whether the acting trustee lacks the
capacity to serve as Trustee and in making such determination the successor trustee may rely
upon the acting trustee's written request for the successor trustee to serve. If the acting trustee
has not made such a request or is incapable of doing so, the successor trustee shall consult with
the acting trustee's doctor when making such determination. In determining to serve or not, the
successor trustee shall regard a written medical opinion issued by the acting trustee's doctor that
he or she is incapable of serving as trustee as constituting conclusive proof of such fact.
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HIPAA Authorization Language to be added to a Healthcare POA (Bob Wolf, March 2004)

Effective immediately and continuously until my death or revocation by a writing signed by me
or someone authorized to make health care treatment decisions for me, I authorize all healthcare
providers or other covered entities to disclose to my agent, upon my agent's request, any
information, oral or written, regarding my physical or mental health, including, but not limited to,
medical and hospital records, including what is otherwise private, privileged, protected or
personal health information, including but not limited to, health information as defined and
described in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Public Law 104191, 110 Stat. 2024), the regulations promulgated thereunder and any other state or local laws
and rules. Information disclosed by a healthcare provider or other covered entity may be
redisclosed and may no longer be subject to the privacy rules provided by 45 CFR § 164.
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Michael L. Graham and Jonathan G. Blattmachr

This power of attorney authorizes my attorney-in-fact to make various property
related decisions on my behalf, some of which relate to my health care.
Accordingly, I confirm that in connection therewith, my attorney-in-fact shall be
treated as my personal representative for all purposes relating to my PHI, as
provided in 45 CFR 164.502(g)(2).
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Paul L. Basile, Jr., Los Angeles, California
Excerpted with permission from his article "HIPAA Privacy Rules: What's An Estate Planner
To Do?", California Trusts and Estates Quarterly (Spring 2004). Mr. Basile indicates that there
is some specific language in the document addressing California law issues, which would not be
germane outside California.

AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF
PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION
I hereby appoint _[NameJ_ I as my Personal Representative for health care disclosure
under the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Care Information (45 CFR
Parts 160 and 164) under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA") and the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act ("CMIA"). In the
event that _[NameJ_ is not reasonably available to act as my Personal Representative, I hereby
appoint _[Alternate 1J_ as my Personal Representative. In the event that _[Alternate 1J_ is
not reasonably available to act as my Personal Representative, I hereby appoint _[Alternate 2J_
as my Personal Representative.
My Personal Representative shall have the same access to Protected Health Information
as I would. In accordance with California Probate Code § § 4235, 4682 and 4690, the authority
granted to my Personal Representative in this paragraph shall be effective immediately and shall
not be dependent on a determination of whether or not I lack capacity.
I authorize the disclosure of all Protected Health Information, whether now existing or
hereafter created, related to my physical or mental ability to (a) perform the duties of a trustee of
a trust or administer a trust, (b) understand or be able to make or communicate decisions about
my property or financial or business affairs or the property or financial or business affairs of any
other person for whom I am an agent under a durable power of attorney, or (c) make informed
health care decisions regarding myself or any other person for whom I am an agent under an
advance health care directive or similar instrument.
This authorization shall apply to any physician or other health care provider who is
providing health care services to me at the time such Protected Health Information is sought by
my Personal Representative.

II prefer to name an individual as the person holding the power because I think the
physician or hospital will feel more comfortable in disclosing Protected Health Information to a
named individual without having to refer to another document in which the Personal
Representative may be named. Civil Code § 56.11 (f) allows the naming of a person or the
"functions of the persons or entities authorized to receive the medical information." One could,
therefore, refer to the successor trustees of a trust or agents under a durable power of attorney or
advance health care directive executed by the principal instead of a named individual.
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Such Protected Health Information shall be provided to my spouse, my lineal ancestors
and descendants, my Personal Representative, my and my Personal Representative's respective
attorneys, and any court or other governmental agency which may require such information in
connection with any proceeding before such court or governmental agency. My Personal
Representative may disclose such Protected Health Information to such other persons or entities,
such as trustees of trusts of which I am or have been a trustee or agents under durable powers of
attorney or advance health care directives executed by me.
This authorization shall remain in full force and effect until the earlier of (1) my written
revocation hereof_[list any exceptions to the right ofrevocation]_ or (2) my death. Any
written revocation of this authorization shall be delivered to my Personal Representative.
I understand that I have the right to receive a copy of this authorization. I also understand
that I have the right to revoke this authorization and that any such revocation must be in writing.
Dated: - - - - - - - - -

Signature of Principal
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EXHIBIT B - SAMPLE RELEASE FORMS
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Thomas J. Murphy

HIPAA Release Authority. I intend for my agent to be treated as I would be with
respect to my rights regarding the use and disclosure of my individually
identifiable health information or other medical records. This release authority
applies to any information governed by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (aka HIPAA), 42 USC 1320d and 45 CFR 160-164. I
authorize:

any physician, health-care professional, dentist, health plan, hospital, clinic,
laboratory, pharmacy or other covered health-care provider, any insurance
company and the Medical Information Bureau Inc. or other health-care
clearinghouse that has provided treatment or services to me, or that has paid for or
is seeking payment from me for such services,
to give, disclose and release to my agent, without restriction,
all of my individually identifiable health information and medical records
regarding any past, present or future medical or mental health condition, including
all information relating to the diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS, sexually
transmitted diseases, mental illness, and drug or alcohol abuse.
The authority given my agent shall supersede any prior agreement that I may have
made with my health-care providers to restrict access to or disclosure of my
individually identifiable health information. The authority given my agent has no
expiration date and shall expire only in the event that I revoke the authority in
writing and deliver it to my health-care provider.

C - 35

Larry J. Ferguson

AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE MEDICAL RECORDS
AND INFORMATION WAIVER OF PRIVACY
The undersigned,
states:
1.

, whose address is

_

Authorization. You are authorized to do the following:
a.

Disclose any and all information regarding my past and current medical treatment
and care;

b.

Provide copies of all documents and records in your possession regarding my
medical condition and treatment, at any time, including medical history and
findings, consultations, prescriptions, treatments, x-rays, radiology reports, special
consultation reports, diagnosis and prognosis, copies of all hospital, medical and
billing records.

2.

Provide Information To. The information identified in this document may be released,
provided to, or discussed with any of the following persons:

3.

When to Provide Information. You are authorized to provide the information identified
in this document at the request of the individual or individuals identified in paragraph 2
above.

4.

Expiration. This Authorization contains no expiration date.

5.

Authority to Revoke. The undersigned reserves the right to revoke this authorization. In
order to revoke this authorization, the notification must be written, signed by the
undersigned, and dated. The revocation will then become effective upon delivery to you.

6.

Redisclosure. I understand that the information disclosed by reason of this document may
be subject to re-disclosure by the recipient and therefore may no longer be protected
under state or federal law.

7.

Photostatic Copies. A photostatic copy of this Authorization shall be considered as
effective and valid as the original.

8.

Voluntary Action. I understand that I am not required to sign this document and I am
signing this document voluntarily.
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9.

Privacy Waiver. With regard to the disclosure ofinfonnation authorized in this
document, I waive any right of privacy that I may have under the authority of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law 104-191 (HIPAA), any
amendment or successor to that Act, or any similar state or federal act, rule or regulation
that might otherwise prevent any health care provider from providing access to my
medical records under this document, and I hold hannless from any claim of liability
under such act, rule or regulation, any medical provider who provides access to my
medical infonnation and records under this document.

10.

Durable Power. This power of attorney shall not be affected by my disability. The
authority of my agent shall be exercisable notwithstanding my later disability or
incapacity or later uncertainty as to whether I am alive.

Dated: - - - - - - - - - - - - Signature
PREPARED BY FERGUSON & WIDMAYER, P.C.
538 North Division
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
Print Name
734-662-0222
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HIPAA Form - Authorization for Release of Protected Health Information
(Moses & Singer)
I hereby authorize the use and/or disclosure of my individually identifiable health
information as described below. I understand that this authorization is voluntary and that if the
individual entity authorized to receive this infonnation is not a covered entity under federal
privacy regulations, the release of such infonnation may no longer be protected by federal
privacy regulations. I also understand that once this infonnation is used/and or disclosed
pursuant to this authorization it may be subject to re-disclosure by the recipient(s) and may no
longer be protected by federal privacy regulations.
Name of(Trustee) (Attorney in Fact):
Address:
Phone Number:
Soc. Sec. LD. #:
Person(s) or class of persons authorized to use and/or disclose the information:
Any physician. healthcare professional, dentist. health plan, hospital, clinic, laboratory, phannacy
or other covered health care provider, any insurance company, and the Medical Infonnation
Bureau Inc. or other health care clearinghouse that has provided treatment or services to me.
Person(s) or class of persons authorized to receive the information:
Any and all (Successor Trustees/Attorneys in Fact) under
(Trust Name)
) and the attorneys of Moses & Singer, LLP, 1301
(Power of Attorney dated
Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10019.
Description of the information that may be used and/or disclosed: (please state clearlv)
My medical records and all other individually identifiable health infonnation about me, whether
or not contained in my medical records, regarding any past or present medical or mental health
conditions. including but not limited to infonnation relating to a physical or mental disability and
infonnation relating to the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness, excluding psychotherapy
notes.
The information will be used and/or disclosed for the following purpose(s):
To detennine whether I am under a disability, mentally or physically incapacitated or lack
competency to act as Trustee under the above named Trust.
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The Trustee must read and initial the following:
1.

I understand that this authorization will expire on the earlier of
(Trust Name)
the date of termination ofthe
under the Trust agreement or revocation of this authorization as
stated below.

Initials

2.

I understand that I may revoke this authorization at any time in
writing by delivering it to the attorneys for the
(Trust Name), Moses & Singer LLP, 1301 Avenue of the
Americas, New York, NY, 10019, except to the extent that
action has been taken in reliance on this authorization.

Initials

3.

I also understand that in the event I do revoke this authorization,
it will not have any effect on actions taken by any Successor
Trustee prior to receipt of the revocation.

Initials

Name of (Trustee) (Attorney in Fact)

Date

Signature of (Trustee) (Attorney in Fact)
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I.

OVERVIEW.

The determination of the fair market value of an interest in property which is
being transferred, either by gift or at death, is the foundation upon which our federal estate and
gift tax system is built. The United States Supreme Court has often held that succession taxes,
inheritance taxes and estate taxes are constitutional levies by the federal government only if they
are applied in a manner that merely is an excise tax at the transfer of property at death. See, e.g.,
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); New York Trust v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
Therefore, only that property which is transferred as a result of a taxpayer's death or by gift
during the taxpayer's life can be subjected to taxation under the federal estate and gift tax
system. The tax cannot be a "wealth tax" or "property tax" on the intrinsic value of an asset to
the decedent or donor at the time the transfer occurs; rather, it must be a tax on the value of the
asset transferred. See I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2035-38, 2040(c), 2044 and 2501.
II.

BASIC VALUATION PRINCIPLES.

In determining the value of any asset that is transferred, the legal rights and
interests inherent in that property must first be determined under state law (unless federal law
supersedes state law). After that determination is made, federal tax law takes over to determine
how such rights and interests will be taxed. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); Morgan
v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Estate o/Nowell v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1239
(1999) (Cohen, C.J.). The valuation of property for transfer tax purposes is based upon the
"price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b); Treas. Reg. § 20.2512-1. "The standard is an
objective test using hypothetical buyers and sellers in the marketplace, and is a not personalized
one which envisions a particular buyer and seller." LeFrak v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. 1297,
1299 (1993). "All relevant facts and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date shall
be considered in every case." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b).
Because of this test, there are two primary components of federal estate and gift
tax valuation: (1) understanding the state law rights being transferred from the hypothetical
willing seller to the hypothetical willing buyer, and (2) determining the fair market value of the
transferred rights.
III.

FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ISSUES.

Beginning in early 1997, the Internal Revenue Service, through the issuance of
technical advice memoranda and private letter rulings, embarked on a frontal assault on the use
of family limited partnerships and other closely held entities for estate planning purposes. In
these pronouncements, the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service took the position that
an entity be completely disregarded for estate and gift tax purposes under various theories,
whether or not that entity was validly created and existing under state law. See, e.g.,
PLR 9736004 (June 6, 1997); PLR 9735043 (June 3, 1997); PLR 9735003 (May 8, 1997);
PLR 973004 (April 3, 1997); PLR 9725018 (March 20, 1997); PLR 9725002 (March 3, 1997);
and PLR 9723009 (February 24, 1997).
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A.

Dealing with the IRS's Arguments Regarding Family Limited Partnerships.
1.

The Murphy Argument.

The principal support for the National Office's position in each of its
pronouncements comes from the Tax Court's memorandum decision in Estate of Murphy v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1986), in which the Court valued a decedent's
49.65% common stock interest in a closely held corporation as a controlling interest because the
decedent had given her children a 1.76% block of stock only 18 days before her death. The
Court specifically found that "all concerned intended nothing of substance to change between the
time of transfer and the time of [the decedent's] death, and that nothing of substance did
change." Id. at 659. The Court stated that its position was "consistent with the established
principle that transactions with no purpose or effect other than to reduce taxes are disregarded for
federal tax purposes." Id. (emphasis added) Relying on this language in Murphy, the IRS
argues that if the primary purpose for creating the partnership was to reduce transfer taxes, the
IRS can ignore it for tax purposes.
The IRS relies on the Estate ofMurphy v. Commissioner, 160 T.C.M. (CCH) 645
(1990) for the proposition that should the formation of the entity (FLP) be intended primarily for
tax reduction purposes, then the entity can be ignored for Federal tax purposes. Murphy says no
such thing. The question in Murphy was whether a gift of corporate stock 18 days before
Mrs. Murphy's death should be recognized for estate tax purposes when the undisputed facts
demonstrated that the "sole motive" for the transaction was to obtain the minority interest
discount for the remaining 49% stock owned by Mrs. Murphy at the time of her death. The
Court in Murphy said because the "sole motive" for the transaction was to tax reduction, and that
nothing of substance changed in connection with the transaction, it could be ignored for a
transfer in tax purposes. 1 Even if Estate of Murphy can be characterized to allow the IRS to
disregard the existence of an entity (there is substantial doubt that the holding can be extended
that far in light of the fundamental principles of transfer tax law discussed above and the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Wheeler discussed below), Murphy does not allow the IRS to disregard the
existence of a validity created entity under state law for transfer tax purposes where valid
non-tax reasons for creating the entity exist. In other words, Murphy is a case where the sole
motive for the transaction was transfer tax savings. Contrary to the Service's position,
"taxpayers generally are free to structure a business transaction as they please, even if motivated
by tax avoidance considerations." Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.e. 449, 464 (1999).
Established judicial authority holds that the Service cannot disregard the existence
of a partnership if the partnership was formed for a business, financial, or investment reason or

Ironically, the National Office pronouncements virtually ignore the Tax Court's memorandum decision in
Estate of Frank v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2255 (1995), which involved facts substantially similar to
Murphy. In addressing a fact situation similar to that in Murphy, the Tax Court held that "as a general rule, we will
respect the form of the transaction. We will not apply substance over form principles unless the circumstances so
warrant." Id. at 2259.
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in fact did engage in a business, financial, or investment activity.2 Where any of these tests has
been met, the courts have not ignored the effect of partnership agreements on valuation, even
when valuation discounts approach 85%. 3 Moreover, the "intent" based argument asserted by
the IRS under its Murphy analysis is similar to the argument expressly rejected by the Fifth
Circuit in Wheeler v. United States, 116 F.3d 749 (5 th Cir. 1997). In Wheeler, the Government
argued, in connection with a purchase of a remainder interest in a trust, that "because the purpose
of § 2036(a) is to reach intrafamily interest transfers that amount to testamentary substitutes and
include the underlying asset's value in the gross estate, the adequate and full consideration for
intrafamily transfers-which are generally testamentary in nature because the interest passes 'to
the natural objects of one's bounty in the next generation'-must be measured against the entire
value of the underlying asset in order to accomplish § 2036(a)'s purpose." The Fifth Circuit
rejected the Government's argument, stating that "[i]t is safe to say that, with the possible
exception of gifts causa mortis, the present transfer tax scheme eschews subjective intent
determination in favor of the objective requirements set forth in the statutes ... Unless and until
Congress declares that intrafamily transfers are to be treated differently, see I.RC. §§ 2701-2704
(West Supp. 1996) discussed below, we must rely on the objective criteria set forth in the statute
and Treasury Regulations to determine whether a sale comes within the ambit of the exception
§ 2036(a)." Id. at 765-766. See also Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 35
(November 30,2000) (Ignoring the subjective intent of the parties in creating the partnership, the
Court stated that "the partnership had sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes. Its
existence would not be disregarded by potential purchasers of decedent's assets, and we will not
do so in this case.").
B.

I.R.C. § 2703 Argument.
1.

I.R.C. § 2703 Cannot Be Used to Completely Ignore the Existence of a
Partnership Validly Created and Existing Under State Law.

In each of the National Office pronouncements, the Service took the position that
I.RC. § 2703 allows the IRS to disregard the existence of a partnership under the theory that the
partnership agreement is a "restriction on the right to sell or use" the property of the partnership
which can be ignored under I.RC. § 2703 unless it meets the safe harbor provisions of I.RC.
§ 2703(b). In essence, the Service interprets the word "property" in I.RC. § 2703 to mean the
assets transferred to the partnership -- not the partnership interest transferred.
The Service has stated that I.RC. § 2703 can be used to completely disregard the
existence of a partnership validly created and existing under state law. This argument ignores
the fact, however, that the transfer tax is a tax on the "transfer of property." In essence, the
Service claims that the property "transferred" is the transferor's interest in the property of the
See Frank G. Lyon Co. v. u.s., 435 U.S. 561, 583-584 (1978); Estate of McLendon v. Commissioner,
66 T.C.M. (CCH) 946,962 (1993); Sparks Farm, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 464, 472-473 (1988);
Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306, 1309 (1987); Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 32, 39-41 (1977).
2

See Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 60 (1985), affd, 823 F.2d 483 (11 th Cir. 1987);
John R. Moore v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1128 (1991); Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1306 (1987); Harwoodv. Commissioner, 82 United States Tax Court Reports 239 (1984).
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partnership, and that the value of the "interest" for transfer tax purposes is the transferor's
proportionate share of the assets of the partnership. In the context of a decedent's estate, the
question of law is whether the term "property," as it is used in I.R.C. § 2033, Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-1(b), and I.R.C. § 2703, refers to the property owned and transferred by a decedent as
a result of his death (an interest in a partnership validly created and existing under state law and
federal tax law) or, as the Service contends, to property that was not owned or transferred by the
decedent as a result of his death (the property owned by the Partnership)? To determine this
issue, the fact-finder will need to determine (1) whether the term "property," as it is used in
I.R.C. § 2033 and Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), means the decedent's partnership interest; and
(2) whether the term "property," as it is used in I.R.C. § 2703, has the same meaning as the term
"property" as it is used in I.R.C. § 2033 and Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-I(b).4
A partnership interest is included in a decedent's estate for estate tax purposes
because of I.R.C. § 2033. Under that section, "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
I.R.C. § 2033 (emphasis added). As a general rule, "the value of every item of property
includable in a decedent's gross estate under §§ 2031 through 2044 [of the Code] is its fair
market value at the time of a decedent's death ... The fair market value is the price at which the
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (emphasis added).
I.R.C. § 2703 addresses the value of certain property included in a decedent's
estate under I.R.c. § 2033; it does not attempt to change the property interest being included. In
certain instances, however, I.R.C. § 2703 can exclude from consideration for valuation purposes
what would otherwise be relevant facts under the "willing buyer-willing seller" test for valuing
that property by allowing certain restrictions against the transfer or use of that property, which a
hypothetical buyer and seller would otherwise take into account in valuing that property. In no
event does I.R.c. § 2703 permit the Service to completely ignore what property is being
transferred by the decedent under I.R.C. § 2033. Specifically, I.R.C. § 2703 provides that:
Sec. 2703. Certain Rights and Restrictions Disregarded.
(a)
GENERAL RULE--For purposes of this subtitle, the value
of any property shall be determined without regard to-(I)
any option, agreement, or other right to acquire or
use the property at a price less than the fair market value of the
property (without regard to such option, agreement, or right), or
(2)
any restriction on the right to sell or use such
property.

The question is similar in the context ofa gift. I.R.C. § 2501,2512 and Treas. Reg. § 2512-1 are simply
substituted for I.R.C. § 2033 and Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b). For simplicity, the discussion below will relate to a
decedent's estate, except where noted.

4
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(b)
EXCEPTIONS--Subsection (a) shall not apply to any
option, agreement, right, or restriction which meets each of the
following requirements:
(1 )
It is a bona fide business arrangement.
(2)
It is not a device to transfer such property to
members of the decedent's family for less than full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth.
(3)
Its terms are comparable to similar arrangements
entered into by persons in an arm's length transaction.
I.R.C. § 2703 (emphasis added).
In its pronouncements, the Service appears to read the word "property" in I.R.C.
§ 2033, Treas. Reg. § 2031-1(b), and I.R.C. § 2703 to mean the proportionate share of the
property owned by the partnership that an owner of the partnership interest would receive if the
partnership liquidated. This interpretation ignores not only all terms of the partnership
agreement, but the very existence of the partnership under state and federal tax law. The
Service's interpretation is incorrect, for under state law a decedent generally has no right to
property of the partnership and no ability to transfer property owned by the partnership. See,
e.g., TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-l sec. 7.01 (Vernon Supp. 1997) ("A partner has no
interest in specific limited partnership property."). In other words, the "property" being
transferred by the decedent as a result of his death is not and cannot be the property of the
Partnership; rather, the property being transferred as a result of death is the decedent's
partnership interest. Id. Accordingly, the "property" to be valued in the decedent's gross estate
is his interest in the Partnership. That is precisely what the Tax Court held in Estate ofStrangi v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. No. 35 (November 30,2000) (where the legal interest transferred by the
decedent is an interest in a partnership, and not the assets of the partnership, I.R.C. § 2703 cannot
be used to disregard the existence of the entity). See also Church v. United States, 2000-1 U. S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,369; 85 A.F:T.R.2d (RIA) 804 (January 18,2000).5
2.

The Service's "New" I.R.C. § 2703(a) Position.

Since the IRS's attempt to disregard the existence of the entity using § 2703 has
been rejected, the IRS has raised a new argument using § 2703 in several cases in which I am
involved. Under the IRS's theory, all provisions in the partnership agreement are considered
provisions related to the "use" of a partnership interest. Similarly, any provision which requires
any level of consent of the other partners (i.e., does not allow a partner to act unilaterally) is a
"restriction" on the "use" of the partnership interest. 6 The IRS has erroneously asserted that the
An examination of the other estate tax "inclusion" provisions of the Code also demonstrates that the term
"property" as used in LR.C. § 2703 means the property owned by the decedent. See, e.g. LR.C. § 2034 ("The value
of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of the surviving
spouse ..."); LR.C. § 2035 ("[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has made a transfer ...").
6

Under this theory, the very existence of the Partnership is a restriction on the right to use the Partnership
interest, since a partnership by its nature implies joint action. But the IRS's attempt to use LR.C. § 2703 to
disregard the existence ofa validly created entity was rejected by the Tax Court in Estate afStrangi, 115 T.C. at 35.
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restnctlons on the use of a partnership interest under I.RC. § 2703(a) include provIsIOns
regarding the liquidation of the partnership, provisions regarding a partner's withdrawal,
provisions regarding the admission of new partners, provisions regarding a general partner's
discretion to make distributions, the term of the Partnership, the purposes of the partnership, and
even the existence of other partners.
The answer to the issue turns on what is meant by "any restriction on the right to
sell or use such property." IRC. § 2703(a)(2) (emphasis added). It is a question of statutory
construction.
The Court's function in the interpretation of the Code is to construe the statutory
language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress. Carlson v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 87 (2001);
Merkel v. Comm'r, 109 T.e. 463 (1997). When interpreting a statute, the court ordinarily first
looks to the plain meaning of the language used by Congress. Carlson, 116 T.C. 87. When a
statute does not define a term, the court generally interprets that term by employing the ordinary,
contemporary, and common meaning of the words that Congress used. Id. If the plain meaning
of the statute only supports one interpretation, the statute is not ambiguous. Id. However, where
the ordinary and common meaning of the statutory language supports more than one
interpretation, the statutory language is ambiguous, and the court will consult legislative history
and the reason for the statute's enactment to assist the court in interpreting the language in
question. Merkel, 109 T.C. 463; Carlson, 116 T.C. 87. When "the literal application of a statute
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters ... the intention of
the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 564 (1982).
Similarly, "use" is undefined in the Code for purposes of IRC. § 2703. Black's
Law Dictionary defines the term as (1) "[t]o make use of, to convert to one's service, to avail
one's self of, to employ;" and (2) "to leave no capacity with force or use in." Black's Law
Dictionary (5 th ed. 1979). In the context of an interest in an entity, such as an LLC or a
partnership, the word "use" is highly ambiguous. IRe. § 2703 applies to "property" transferred
by death or by gift. See Estate ofStrangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 35 (2000). With respect to the
Partnership, the transferred interest is an interest in the Partnership. Under Texas law,
"partnership interest" means a partner's interest in a partnership, including the right to receive
distributions of partnership assets and the right to receive allocations of income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit of the partnership. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-l sec. 1.02(11). A
partner, however, has no specific rights in partnership property, so the "use" to which I.Re.
§ 2703(a) refers cannot be the use of property of the Partnership. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art 6132a-l sec. 7.01 ("A partnership interest is personal property. A partner has no interest in
specific limited partnership property.")
How does a partner "use" his interest in the partnership? It might be argued that
the "use" of a partnership interest could consist of pledging the partnership interest as collateral
for a loan, or assigning the partnership interest to a third party (i.e., a buy-sell restriction). But
the IRS's interpretation of the word "use" stretches the definition beyond both its plain meaning
and Congressional intent.
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Congress never intended for the definition of "use" to be extended as far as the
IRS is trying to take it. A review of the legislative history of I.R.e. § 2703 demonstrates that by
passing this bill, Congress was focused on options and buy-sell agreements that Congress
believed to be abusive. It was never intended to be broadly interpreted to cover voting rights,
management rights, liquidation rights, or the term of the partnership agreement or LLC
regulations.
I.R.C. § 2703 is included in Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
Congress passed in 1990. Chapter 14 was intended as a replacement to the estate tax freeze rules
under I.R.C. § 2036(c) (repealed). Congress believed that because I.R.C. § 2036(c) had become
unworkable, an across-the-board estate and gift tax inclusion rule was an inappropriate and an
unnecessary approach to the valuation problems associated with the estate freezes. Thus, the
1990 Senate Report on the proposed revisions to the estate freeze rules, which is found at
136 Congressional Record S 15679-15683 (Daily Ed. October 18, 1990), states that "the
Committee bill generally substitutes for Section 2036(c), a series of targeted rules generally
designed to assure a more accurate determination of the value of the property subject to transfer
tax." 136 Congressional Record at 15680 (emphasis added).
The first portion of the Senate Report discusses the areas targeted by Chapter 14.
The analysis of the then "Present Law and Background" specifically addresses the estate tax
freeze concerns of Congress when it passed Chapter 14. Id. at 15679. Those areas of concern
included (1) preferred interests in corporations and partnerships, (2) trusts and term interests in
property, (3) options and buy-sell agreements, and (4) lapsing rights. With respect to options and
buy-sell agreements, the Senate Report discussed the Senate's concerns as follows:
Description: Under another common freeze device, a member of an
older generation grants a member of a younger generation an
option to purchase property at a fixed or formula price. Such an
option may be part of a buy-sell agreement under which the
survivor (or the corporation) has the right to purchase stock from
the estate of the first to die. An option may freeze the value of
property at the strike price which in tum may be below the fair
market value of the property at the date of death.
Estate tax consequences: A restriction upon the sale or transfer of
property may reduce its fair market value. Treasury regulations
issued in 1958 acknowledge that the existence of an option or
contract to purchase may affect the estate tax value of stock.
Those regulations provide that the restriction is to be disregarded
unless the agreement represents a bona fide business arrangement
and not a device to pass the decedent's stock to natural objects of
his bounty for less than full and adequate consideration.
Some courts have gone beyond the Treasury regulations and held
that the price contained in a buy-sell agreement will limit fair
market value for estate tax purposes if the price is fixed or
determinable, the estate is obligated to sell, the agreement contains
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restrictions on lifetime transfers, and there
purpose for the agreement.

IS

a valid business

In applying this standard, a number of courts have held that
maintenance of family control and ownership is a business purpose
that precludes the possibility that the agreement serves as a
testamentary device. Continuation of family ownership and
control has been found sufficient even when the "control" being
preserved is only the right to participate as a limited partner. It
also has been held sufficient when one party to the agreement has
already contracted a terminal illness.
In Saint Louis County Bank v. United States, 674 F.2d 1207
(8th Cir. 1982), the Eighth Circuit held that the maintenance of
family ownership and control of the business standing alone to be
an insufficient ground for giving effect to a buy-sell agreement.
Conceding that such purpose established the existence of a
business purpose, the court went on to consider whether the
agreement was a tax avoidance device. In finding evidence that
might establish a tax avoidance motive notwithstanding a business
purpose, the court considered the health of the decedent when the
agreement was made, the disparity of the sale price from fair
market value, and the enforcement of the agreement against other
parties.

Id. at 15680.
Under the heading "Reasons For Change - Repeal of section 2036 (c)," the Senate
Report discusses the reasons for the repeal of § 2036(c) and its replacement with Chapter 14.
The Senate Report states that
The committee believes that an across the board inclusion rule is
an inappropriate and unnecessary approach to the valuation
problems associated with estate freezes ... Moreover, the
committee is concerned that the statute's complexity, breadth, and
vagueness posed an unreasonable impediment to the transfer of
family businesses.
The Report goes on to state that "the committee bill generally substitutes for section 2036(c) a
series oftargeted rules generally designed to assure a more accurate determination of the value
of the property subject to transfer tax." Id. (emphasis added). The Report states that "in
developing a replacement for current section 2036(c), the committee sought to accomplish
several goals: (1) to provide a well defined and administrable set of rules; (2) to allow business
owners who are not abusing the transfer tax system to freely engage in standard intrafamily
transactions without being subject to severe transfer tax consequences; and (3) to deter abuse by
making unfavorable assumptions regarding certain retained rights." Id.
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With those stated goals in mind, the Senate Report discusses the concerns
regarding each affected area. Included among these concerns are options and buy-sell
agreements. Thus, under the heading of "Options and buy-sell agreements," the Senate Report
provides that
Options and buy-sell agreements
The Committee believes that buy-sell agreements are common
business planning arrangements and that buy-sell agreements are
generally are entered into for legitimate business reasons that are
not related to transfer tax consequences. Buy-sell agreements are
commonly used to control the transfer of ownership in a closely
held business, to avoid expensive appraisals in determining
purchase price, to prevent the transfer to an unrelated party, to
provide a market for the equity interest, and to allow owners to
plan for future liquidity needs in advance.
However, the
Committee is aware of the po!ential of buy-sell agreements for
distorting transfer tax value. Therefore, the Committee establishes
rules that attempt to distinguish between agreements designed to
avoid estate taxes and those with legitimate business agreements.
These rules generally disregard a buy-sell agreement that would
not have been entered into by unrelated parties acting at arm's
length.
Id. at 15681. After discussing the reasons the Senate felt the need to adopt Chapter 14, the
Senate Report includes an "Explanation of the Provisions" of Chapter 14. The "general
explanation" in the Senate Report for Chapter 14 provides that:

The bill repeals § 2036(c) retroactively and provides in its place
rules generally intended to assure more accurate gift tax valuation
of the initial transfer. These rules modify the valuation of specific
retained rights in corporations and partnerships, the valuation of
split temporal interests in property, the effect of buy-sell
agreements and options upon value, the transfer tax consequences
of lapsing rights, and the gift tax statute of limitations.
Id. (emphasis added).

This general explanation of the purpose of Chapter 14 can be traced specifically
to each section of the Code enacted in the Bill. The rules that "modify the valuation of specific
retained rights in corporations and partnerships" are contained in I.R.C. § 2701, which is entitled
"Special Valuation Rules in Case of Transfers of Certain Interests in Corporations or
Partnerships." The rules modifying "the valuation of split temporal interests in property" are
contained in I.R.C. § 2702, which is entitled "Special Valuation Rules in Case of Transfers of
Interests in Trusts." The rules modifying "the transfer tax consequences of lapsing rights" are
contained in I.R.C. § 2704, which is entitled "Treatment of Certain Lapsing Rights and
Restrictions." The provision modifying the "gift tax statute of limitations" is contained in I.R.C.
§ 6501(c)(9). Finally, the rules modifying "the effect of buy-sell agreements and options upon
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value: are contained in I.R.C. § 2703, entitled "Certain Rights and Restrictions Disregarded."
With respect to that provision, the Senate Report states:
Buy-sell agreements
The bill provides that the value of property for transfer tax
purposes is determined without regard to any option, agreement or
other right to acquire or use the property at less than fair market
value or any restriction on the rights to sell or use such property,
unless the option, agreement, right or restriction meets three
requirements.
These requirements apply to any restriction,
however created. For example, they apply to restrictions implicit
in the capital structure of the partnership or contained in the
partnership agreement, articles of incorporation, or corporate
by-laws or a shareholder's agreement.
The first two requirements are that the option, agreement, right or
restriction (1) be a bona fide business arrangement, and (2) not be
a device to transfer such property to members of the decedent's
family for less than full and adequate consideration in money or
money's worth. These requirements are similar to those contained
in the present Treasury regulations, except that the bill clarifies
that the business arrangement and device requirements are
independent tests. The mere showing that the agreement is a bona
fide business arrangement would not give the agreement estate tax
effect if other facts indicate that the agreement is a device to
transfer property to members of the decedent's family for less than
full and adequate consideration. In making this clarification, it
adopts the reasoning of Saint Louis County Bank and rejects the
suggestion of other cases that the maintenance of family control
standing alone assures the absence of a device to transfer wealth.
In addition, the bills adds a third requirement, not found in present
law, that the terms of the option, agreement, right or restrictions be
comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons in an
arm's length transaction. This requires that the taxpayer show that
the agreement was one that could have been contained in an arm's
length bargain. Such determination would entail consideration of
such factors as the expected term of the agreement, the present
value of the property, its expected value of the time of exercise,
and the consideration offered for the option. It is not met simply
by showing isolated comparables but requires a demonstration of
the general practice of unrelated parties. Expert testimony would
be evidence of such practice. In unusual cases where comparables
are difficult to find because the taxpayer owns a unique business,
the taxpayer can use comparables from similar businesses.
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The bill does not otherwise alter the requirements for gIvmg
weight to a buy-sell agreement. For example, it leaves intact
present law rules requiring that an agreement have lifetime
restrictions in order to be binding on death.

Id. at 15683.
The Conference Report on H.R. 5835, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, also makes clear that I.R.C. § 2703 was intended to deal with only options and buy-sell
agreements. Specifically, the discussion of the then present law focuses on six areas, (1) estate
tax inclusion related to estate freezes, (2) preferred interest in corporations and partnerships,
(3) gift tax statute oflimitations, (4) trusts and term interests in property, (5) options and buy-sell
agreements, and (6) lapsing rights. H.R. Rep. 101-964. Conference Report on H.R. 5835, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 1130-1138 (1990). Under
the heading "Buy-sell agreements," the Conference Report states that
The Senate amendment provides that the value of property is
determined without regard to any option, agreement, right· or
restriction, unless (1) the option, agreement, right or restriction is a
bona fide business arrangement, (2) the option, agreement, right or
restriction is not a device to transfer such property to members of
the decedent's family for less than full and adequate consideration,
and (3) the terms of the option, agreement, right or restriction are
comparable to those obtained in similar arrangements entered into
by persons in an arm's length transaction.

Id. at 1133. This is the identical language of I.R.C. § 2703(b).
The Conferees' agreement followed the Senate Amendment, with a few
exceptions. With respect to "buy-sell agreements and options," the Conference Report provided
that
The conferees do not intend the provision governing buy-sell
agreements to disregard such an agreement merely because its
terms differ from those used by another similarly situated
company. The conferees recognize that general business practice
may recognize more than one valuation methodology, even within
the same industry. In such situations, one of several generally
accepted methodologies may satisfy the standard contained in the
Conference Report.

Id. at 1137 (emphasis added).
The legislative history of Chapter 14 demonstrates that I.R.C. § 2703 was never
intended to allow the IRS to seek to disregard provisions other than buy-sell agreements or
similar options in valuing property. The IRS has interpreted the provisions of I.R.C. § 2703
without regard to its literal meaning or Congressional intent.
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The IRS may argue that the "right to sell or use" the interest in a partnership
includes the right to vote the interests (i. e., management rights) or liquidation rights associated
with the interests. As a practical matter, that is the only way the IRS can justify its position. But
the IRS's interpretation ofI.R.C. § 2703 is inconsistent with the clear legislative history set forth
above and statutory structure of Chapter 14. See Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 433
(9 th Cir. 2000) (looking to "plain language of the statute, as well as its legislative history" to
interpret I.R.C. §7431); Merkel v. Comm'r, 192F.3d 844,848 (9 th Cir. 1999) (turning to
legislative history for guidance on meaning of word "liabilities," given that term was not defined
in Code). The IRS's view of § 2703 would totally supplant the need for I.R.C. § 2704 (which
provides that certain voting rights and liquidation rights in an agreement may be disregarded
under certain circumstances). If I.R.C. § 2703 was intended by Congress to allow the IRS to
ignore voting rights and liquidation provisions in an entity for transfer tax purposes, there would
be no need to enact I.R.C. § 2704. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-964 at 1137-38. Stated differently,
the natural conclusion of the IRS's position is that Congress passed a meaningless statute when it
enacted I.R.C. § 2704.
The IRS has argued that the regulations under I.R.C. § 2704 explicitly exclude
transactions to which I.R.C. § 2703 applies, Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b), and that Congress
recognized that in a given case I.R.C. § 2703 and § 2704 may overlap. However, the IRS's
argument is meaningless, considering the fact that the Treasury Regulations were written by the
Department of Treasury, and not by Congress. Nowhere in the legislative history or the Code,
both written by Congress, is there any indication that Congress meant to explicitly exclude from
I.R.C. § 2704 transactions to which I.R.C. § 2703 applied. Our position is consistent with
Congress' stated intent for Chapter 14 to be a series of targeted rules intended to deal with
specific issues of concern to Congress.
In addition, the IRS has argued that testimony from Michael Graetz ("Graetz"),
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of Treasury, is somehow persuasive to
support its position that I.R.C. § 2703 was intended to apply to more than options and buy-sell
agreements. Estate Freezes-Hearing on "Discussion Draft" Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Agricultural Taxation and Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management, WIst Congo 153
(June 27, 1990) (statement of Michael Graetz, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy),
Department of Treasury). At the Senate Finance Committee June 27, 1990 hearing, Graetz
testified that he was of the opinion that I.R.C. § 2703 should apply to more than just contractual
arrangements and options. In support of his argument, he cited three cases: Estate ofHarrison v.
Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. 1306 (1987); Estate ofHall v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 312 (1989); and Estate of
Newhouse V. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 193 (1990). However, none of the cases cited by Graetz appear in
the legislative history for I.R.C. § 2703, which came out after Graetz testified at the hearing.
136 Congressional Record 15679-15680 (Daily Ed. Oct. 18, 1990). Harrison is cited in the
legislative history under I.R.C. § 2704 (and not § 2703), and neither of the other cases is
addressed under I.R.C. § 2703. The omission of Graetz's citations from the legislative history
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to expand the scope of the statute as broadly as
Treasury had requested, and supports our argument that I.R.C. § 2703 is not intended to be
applied as broadly as the IRS seeks to apply the statute.
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3.

I.R.C. § 2704(b).

Under I.R.C. § 2704(b), certain "applicable restrictions" must be disregarded in
determining the value of a transferred ownership interest if: (1) the transfer is made to a member
of the transferor's family; (2) the transferor's family controls the entity; and (3) there is an
"applicable restriction" which either: (a) lapses after the transfer; or (b) may be removed wholly
or partially after the transfer by the transferor or any member of his or her family, individually or
jointly.
If an applicable restriction is disregarded, the transferred interest which formerly
was subject to the restriction is valued as if the restriction does not exist and as if the rights of the
transferor are determined under state law.
The Treasury regulations define "applicable restriction" as a restriction which:
(a) is a limitation on the ability to liquidate the entity (in whole or in part); and (b) "is more
restrictive than the limitations that would apply under the state law generally applicable to the
entity in the absence of the restriction.,,7 Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b).
Even if an applicable restriction exists, that restriction will not be affected by
I.R.C. § 2704(b) if: (1) it arises as part of any financing or equity participation entered into by
the corporation or partnership with a person who is unrelated, as long as the restriction is
commercially reasonable; (2) it is imposed or required to be imposed by any federal or state law;
or (3) it is a restriction that is also subject to I.R.C. § 2703. See I.R.C. § 2704(b)(3) and Treas.
Reg. § 25.2704-2(b).
a.

When There Is a Restriction Against a Limited Partnership
Continuing Beyond Either a Certain Point in Time or the
Accomplishment of a Particular Undertaking, Is That an
"Applicable Restriction" Under I.R.C. § 2704(b)?

If the partnership with a fixed term instead were required to be treated as a
partnership at will because its required termination after a period of years is disregarded, then a
limited partner would be deemed under state law to have a right to withdraw and be paid "fair
value" after six-month's notice. As mentioned throughout this outline, however, the estate tax
and gift tax are excise taxes on the transfer of property, not direct taxes on what a transferor
could have derived from his interest in the partnership. Given that principle, there are five
separate methods of analyzing I.R.C. § 2704(b) under which it is clear that a substantial
"discount" from liquidation value is appropriate in measuring the transfer value of a transferor's
limited partnership interest.
(1)

A Fixed Term Is a Restriction on Not Liquidating.

Restrictions which require the consent of all partners before the limited
partnership may terminate before the end of its term and prohibiting an assignee or limited
partner's withdrawal before the definite time for dissolution are consistent with the restrictions
Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-2(b).
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that exist under the Uniform Revised Limited Partnership Act. See § 6.03 and 8.01 of the
Uniform Revised Limited Partnership Act. Thus, these restrictions are not "applicable
restrictions" since they are no more restrictive than state law. Of course, the restriction on the
partnership continuing beyond its fixed term is not an "applicable restriction," and cannot be
disregarded, because it is only a restriction on not liquidating.

b.

The Nature of an Assignee's Interest.

Even if I.R.C. § 2704(b) applies to these restrictions with respect to a limited
partnership interest, it does not cause the assigned limited partnership interest to be valued at its
liquidation value. Under Revenue Ruling 93-12, 1993-2 C.B. 202, fair market value is
determined by examining the rights transferred to the assignee, not the rights formerly held by
the assignor. In other words, even if the partnership agreement's restrictions on a limited
partner's ability to liquidate his limited partnership interest did not exist, any person buying the
transferred limited partnership interest would purchase it at a price based on the income value
approach or net asset value approach, not its liquidation value, because that person would only
be an assignee, not a partner. If the partnership agreement were silent on these matters, a
hypothetical buyer still would be concerned with the restrictions on an assignee under state law.
The mechanics of I.R.C. § 2704(b) do not require that the valuation be determined as if the
transferee's interest has a "put" right. It only requires that the valuation be determined as if the
applicable partnership agreement is silent with respect to liquidation restrictions. If the
governing investment is silent as to liquidation rights, one then must look to state law to
determine the result. Under state law, assignees do not have the right to force a liquidation of the
partnership or even the right to petition a court to force a liquidation.

(1)

Limited Partners Receive Only "Fair Value" on
Withdrawal.

Section 6.04 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act makes it clear that
under State law, even if I.R.C. § 2704(b) applies, a limited partner on withdrawal receives in
cash only "the fair value ofthat limited partner's interest in the limited partnership as of the date
of withdrawal." (emphasis added). The Act does not define "fair value," but the use of that
particular terminology is significant, especially when contrasted to the language used to define
what a limited partner receives when the partnership is wound up and liquidated. What is the fair
value of a limited partnership interest on the date of a limited partner's death under state law? It
should be what a willing buyer would pay to assume the rights inherent in that limited
partnership interest. The meaning a state legislature gives to the term "fair value" may be well
developed because of its use under the Model Business Corporation Act. See TEX. Bus. CORP.
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art. 5.12 (Vernon Supp. 1994). It is clear under relevant case law that "fair value" is not
liquidation value. 8

ACT

(2)

Legislative History Contemplates Normal Discounting.

The legislative history of I.R.C. § 2704(b) makes it clear that normal minority
interest discounts and other discounts are not to be disregarded. The general discussion portion
of the Conference Committee Report dealing with I.R.C. § 2704 states as follows: "These rules
do not affect minority discounts or other discounts available under present law." Thus, if the
transferee owns only a minority interest in a corporation, or owns only a limited partnership
interest as in the above example, and if under state law the minority corporate or limited
partnership interest does not have a "put" right or automatic liquidation right, then
fractionalization discounts will be applied. In other words, as the legislative history makes clear,
if a minority interest in a corporation or a limited partnership interest normally is valued on a
income approach or net asset value approach basis, then I.R.C. § 2704(b) will not affect that
result. Stated differently, if an entity having a limited term is interpreted as per se containing an
"applicable restriction," then the only entities that are not subject to I.R.C. § 2704(b) would be
perpetual corporations. No one can argue seriously that such a proposition represents
Congressional intent.

(3)

Kerr v. Commissioner.

The Tax Court's opinion in Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999) is the first
opinion addressing the IRS's broad interpretation of the provisions of Chapter 14 of the Internal
Revenue Code and Congress' intent with respect to those statutes. The Court held that I.R.C.
§ 2704(b) did not affect the valuation of limited partnership interests transferred by the taxpayers
because the restrictions on liquidation in the partnership agreements at issue were not "applicable
restrictions" under § 2704(b).
In 1993, the taxpayers and their children formed two family limited partnerships
in 1993 (KIL and KFLP). Mr. and Mrs. Kerr simultaneously, with the creation of KFLP,
transferred part of their general partnership in KFLP to their four children. Over one year later,
the taxpayers created separate grantor retained annuity trusts ("GRATs"), and each transferred
44.535% Class B interests in KFLP to the GRATs. The remainder interests in the GRATs
passed to generation skipping trusts pursuant to a formula. The trustees of the GRATs were not
formally admitted as limited partners -- no general partner other than the taxpayers consented to
the admission of the GRAT trustees as limited partners. The taxpayers also made gifts of
interests in KIL to their children. However, under the KIL partnership agreement, the children
See In Re Glosser Bros, 555 A.2d 129 (Pa. Super. 1989) (a court may consider any method of stock
valuation generally considered acceptable in the financial community); Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine,
535 N.E.2d 927 (151 Dist. Ill. 1988) (in determining fair value, the court is allowed to exercise its judgment after
considering all relevant factors such as investment value, dividend history, projected dividend policy, selling prices
of stock of like character, and the minority or illiquidity ofthe stock), and Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc., 486 N.Y.S.2d
341 (2d Dept. 1985), (the trier of fact may use three principal methods of stock valuation to determine fair value,
including: (1) net asset value; (2) investment value; or (3) market value. The value should be determined on the
basis of what a willing purchaser, in an arm's-length transaction, would offer for an interest in an operating, rather
than liquidating, business.).
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automatically received partnership interests because they were already partners
partnership.

III

the

In filing their federal gift tax returns for 1994 and 1995, the taxpayers computed
the fair market value of the interests transferred by applying valuation adjustments for minority
interest and lack of marketability. The IRS, however, determined that § 2704(b) barred any
adjustment for minority interest and lack of marketability in computing the fair market value of
the partnership interests. The IRS claimed that the provisions of the partnership agreements
which restricted the right of a limited partner to liquidate his limited partnership interest were
"applicable restrictions" which should be disregarded in determining the fair market value of the
interests transferred.
The IRS's argument had two components. First, the IRS claimed that the
provisions of the partnership agreements which stated that the partnership shall liquidate upon
the earlier of December 31, 2043, or the consent of all the partners, were restrictions on the
liquidation of the partnerships that constitute "applicable restrictions" within the meaning of
§ 2704(b) which must be disregarded in valuing the interests transferred. Second, the IRS
claimed that the provisions of the partnership which restricted a limited partner's right to
withdraw from the entity were "applicable restrictions" which must be disregarded in valuing the
interests transferred. The IRS thus claimed that because a limited partner in a partnership that
did not have a fixed term (i.e., December 31, 2043) had the right to withdraw his interest under
state law upon six months notice, that the fair market value of the interest is equal to the
proportionate pro rata net asset value of the partnership interest transferred.
After the case was put at issue in the Tax Court, the taxpayers filed a motion for
partial summary judgment arguing that § 2704(b) did not apply to the valuation of the transferred
interests because (1) the taxpayers could only unilaterally transfer assignee interests in KFLP, as
opposed to limited partnership interests (the IRS conceded in its brief that if the assigned interest
was an assignee interest § 2704(b) did not apply); (2) the restrictions on liquidation and
withdrawal in the partnership agreements are not "applicable restrictions" within the meaning of
§ 2704(b) because a limited partner under Texas law cannot withdraw until the end of a fixed
term; (3) the restrictions on withdrawal in the partnership agreements are not "applicable
restrictions" because under Texas law a limited partner can only withdraw in accordance with the
terms of the partnership agreement; and (4) the family did not have the unilateral right to remove
any restriction on liquidation or withdrawal because the University of Texas (who had been
given interests in the partnership), as either a limited partner or as an assignee under the terms of
each of the partnership agreements, had the right to block that withdrawal or the removal of any
such restriction.
As an initial matter, the Court found that the transferred interests transferred to the
GRAT trustees were limited partnership interests, and not assignee interests (regardless of the
fact that no general partner of KFLP other than the taxpayers consented to the trustees admission
as limited partners). Despite this finding, the Court held that § 2704(b) did not apply to the
valuation of the transferred interests. The Court's analysis focused on whether the partnership
agreements imposed greater restrictions on the liquidation of the partnerships than the limitations
that generally would apply under Texas law.
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Comparing the liquidation provisions in § 10.01 of the partnership agreements
with § 8.01 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act (TRLPA),9 the Court concluded that
§ 10.01 did not contain restrictions on liquidation that constitute "applicable restrictions" within
the meaning of § 2704(b). The Court reasoned that Texas law provided for the dissolution and
liquidation of a limited partnership pursuant to the occurrence of events specified in the
partnership agreement or upon the written consent of the partners. As such, the restrictions
contained in the partnership agreements were no more restrictive than the limitations that
generally would apply to the partnerships under Texas law. Stated differently, providing for a
fixed term when the partnership must liquidate, according to the Court, is not an "applicable
restriction."
Importantly, the Court rejected the IRS's argument that the restrictions in the
partnership agreements on withdrawal ofa limited partner should be compared with § 6.03 of the
TRLPA, which deals with a limited partner's right of withdrawal. 10 The Court found the IRS's
reliance on TRLPA § 6.03 was erroneous, stating that TRLPA § 6.03 sets forth limitations on a
limited partner's withdrawal from a partnership. The Court noted, however, that "a limited
partner may withdraw from a partnership without requiring the dissolution and liquidation of the
partnership. In this regard, the Court concluded that TRLPA § 6.03 is not a 'limitation on the
ability to liquidate the entity' within the meaning of § 25.2704-2(b)."
On June 10, 2002, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision that I.R.C.
§ 2704(b) does not apply, but on different grounds than the Tax Court. Section 2704(b)(2)(B)(i)
provides that "the transferor or any member of the transferor's family, either alone or
collectively, must have the right to remove the restriction" immediately after the transfer for the
restriction to constitute "applicable restriction." Because the University of Texas was a partner
in the partnership, the Court held that the Kerr family did not have the right to remove any
restriction unilaterally. The Court rejected the IRS's argument that the University of Texas
would not oppose the removal of liquidation restrictions if requested by the family because the
University wanted to convert its interest to cash as soon as possible. The Court noted that "the
Code provides no exception allowing us to disregard non-family partners who have stipulated
their probable consent to a removal of the restriction." The probable consent of the University
"cannot fulfill the requirement that the family be able to remove the restrictions on its own."
Because the Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision on other grounds, it did not to address the
basis for the Tax Court's holding that I.R.C. § 2704(b) did not apply.

9

Under § 8.01 of the TRLPA, a partnership shall be dissolved on the earlier of: (1) the currents of events
specified in the partnership agreement to cause dissolution; (2) the written consent of all partners to dissolution;
(3) the withdrawal of a general partner; or (4) the entry of a decree ofjudicial dissolution.
10

Under § 6.03 of the TRLPA which was in existence in 1994 and 1995, a limited partner could "withdraw
from a limited partnership at the time or on the occurrence of events specified in a written partnership agreement and
in accordance with that written partnership agreement. If the partnership agreement does not specify such a time
or event or define a time for the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership, a limited partner may
withdraw on giving written notice not less than six months before the date of withdrawal to each general partner."
(emphasis added).
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(4)

Drafting Around I.R.C. § 2704(b).

First, a family limited partnership should be designed to terminate after fixed term
of years or after a specific undertaking is accomplished. Under the default state law rules, if a
partnership is so worded, a limited partner cannot withdraw until the partnership terminates.
Second, there should be more than one general partner. If there is only one general partner,
however, the general partner's estate should not be given the power to liquidate the partnership
or the decedent's interest in the partnership.
4.

The Gift on Formation Argument.

The IRS's argument that a gift occurs when a partnership is created is based on
the notion that if the value of the partnership interest received by a partner is less than the value
of the assets contributed by the partner (under the fair market value definition of Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-1 (b», a gift has been made because someone must have received a gratuitous transfer
of the difference. In support of this argument, the IRS commonly relies on Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945), in which the Supreme Court stated that "[The gift tax statute by]
taxing as gifts transfers that are not made for 'adequate and full [money] consideration' aims to
reach those transfers which are withdrawn from the donor's estate." 324 U.S. at 307-308.
A donative transfer, by definition, requires the presence of a donor, a donee, and a
transfer having the quality ofa gift. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352,353 (10th Cir. 1947)
("[T]he [gift] tax cannot be sustained unless there was a transferor, a transferee, and an effective
transfer of title or other economic interest or benefit in property having the quality of a gift."). If
anyone of those three elements is missing, a taxable transfer has not occurred. As the Supreme
Court stated in Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 334 (1984):
The words "transfer ... by gift" and whether ... "direct or
indirect" are designed to cover and comprehend all
transactions ... whereby, and to the extent ... that, property or a
property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon another,
regardless of the means or device employed in its accomplishment.
465 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 27-28
(1932); S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1932).
The IRS's claim that a transfer occurred when a pro-rata partnership was created
ignores the fact that partnership interests in a pro-rata partnership are divided on a pro rata basis
between the partners based upon their contribution of assets. The creation of the partnership
does not confer a financial benefit on or increase the wealth of any partner. A gift does not
occur, and never can in the formation of a business entity in which each investor's interest is
proportional to the capital contributed. See Church v. United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH),-r 60,369; 85 F.T.R.2d (RIA) 804 (W.D. Tex. January 18,2000).
The Court of Claims' decision in Chanin v. United States, 393 F.2d 972 (Ct.
Cl. 1968), is instructive on this point. In Chanin, shareholders of a corporation made transfers to
the corporation on a pro-rata basis. The IRS claimed that a gift occurred because the increase in
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the value of each donor's shares was less than the value of the assets transferred by the donor.
The Court rejected the IRS's position, holding as follows:
Certainly when the gifts to the donee stockholders are to be
evaluated on this basis, it is fair and reasonable to determine the
related interest in the same manner. At least that is true, as here, in
the absence of any real fair market value, adequately ascertained.
The whole is thus made equal to the sum of its parts. Otherwise,
different standards would be applied on the "transferred" and
"received" sides of the equation. The donors were in a sense also
donees, except that it is illogical to say that a person can give
property to himself. But in lieu of being a donee, the donor has
"received" in the same sense that he had retained his proportionate
share of the overall gifts.
Id. at 980 (emphasis added). See also Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1956).

5.

A Gift Does Not Occur Where the Creation of the Partnership Was a
Bona Fide Arm's-Length Transaction That Was Free from Donative
Intent.

The "ordinary course of business" provision under Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 deems
a transaction to be for "adequate and full consideration" under I.R.c. § 2512(b), even if the
purported transferor receives less consideration than a hypothetical willing seller would receive.
A transfer is deemed to be for adequate and full consideration, and not subject to tax, if made "in
the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's-length, and free from
donative intent)." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8.
The creation of a mechanism to ensure family ownership and control of a family
enterprise has long been held by the Tax Court to constitute a bona fide and valid business
purpose. See Estate ofBischoffv. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32, 39-41 (1977); Estate ofReynolds
v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 172, 194 (1970), acq., 1971-2 C.B. 3; Estate of Littick v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 181, 187 (1958), acq. in result, 1984-2 C.B. 1; Estate of Harrison,
52 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1309 (holding that "[w]ith respect to business purpose, petitioner presented
convincing proof that the partnership was created as a means of providing necessary and proper
management of decedent's properties and that the partnership was advantageous to and in the
best interests of decedent"). Finally, the creation of a pro rata partnership for a valid business
purpose where the interests of each partner are based upon the value of the assets contributed to
the entity has been held as arm's-length and free from donative intent. See, e.g., Church v.
United States, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,369; 85 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 804 (W.D. Tex.
January 18,2000).

6.

A Partner Cannot Make a Gift to Herself.

The IRS's claim that a gift on formation of the Partnership occurred also suffers
from another fatal flaw -- a partner cannot not make a gift to herself. Assume that at formation,
Mrs. Jones owned a 90% partnership interest in the partnership, and other family members own
the rest. The partnership is pro rata and each family member received an interest in the
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partnership equal to the value of the assets contributed. The IRS would argue that because the
value of Mrs. Jones' interest in the partnership was worth less than the assets she contributed, she
has made a gift equal to the difference between the value of the assets received and the value of
the assets transferred. If a gift was made by Mrs. Jones, she was the recipient of 90% of that gift.
See Kincaidv. United States, 682 F.2d 1220,1225 (5 th Cir. 1982) (noting that the taxpayer could
not make a gift to herself when she transferred her ranch to a newly formed corporation that she
and her two sons owned all of the voting stock, the Court held that she had made a gift to each of
her sons of one-third of the total gift amount); Estate of Hitchon v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 96
(1965) (father's transfer of stock to a family corporation for no consideration constituted gift by
father of one-quarter interest to each of three shareholder sons).

7.

Shepherd v. Commissioner.

On the other hand, in a case where a father and his two sons created a partnership
and the father, at creation, transferred all of the assets to the partnership, and the sons made no
individual capital contribution, the Tax Court held that the father had made gifts of undivided
interests in the real estate and securities transferred to the partnership to the extent those
properties were attributed to his sons capital accounts. Shepherd v. Commissioner, 115 T.e.
No. 30 (October 26, 2000). The Court reasoned that because a partnership of one cannot exist,
the father made indirect gifts of the property transferred to the partnership, and not of the
partnership interests that the sons received. In language which should give some level of
comfort to creators of pro rata partnerships, the Tax Court stated that "obviously, not every
capital contribution to a partnership results in a gift to the other partners, particularly where the
contributing partner's capital account is increased by the amount of the contribution, thus
entitling him to recoup the same amount upon liquidation of the partnership." The Court also
held, however, that the transfer should be treated as separate transfers of 25% to each son, and
applied undivided interest discounts in determining the value of the gifts.

8.

Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner.

In Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. No. 35 (November 30, 2000), decedent formed a
family limited partnership with his children and transferred assets to the partnership in return for
a 99% limited partnership interest. The IRS argued that the decedent had made a gift when he
transferred property to the partnership and received in return a limited partnership interest of
lesser value. The Tax Court held that, because the taxpayer received a continuing interest in the
family limited partnership and his contribution was allocated to his own capital account, the
taxpayer had not made a gift at the time of the contribution. Although the Strangi court rejected
the IRS's gift on formation argument, it appeared to do so because the Tax Court did not believe
that the decedent gave up control of his assets. As the Court stated, "in view of decedent's
continuing interest in SFLP and the reflection of the contributions in his own capital account, he
did not transfer more than a miniscule proportion of the value that would be 'lost' on the
conveyance of his assets for the partnership in exchange for a partnership interest."

9.

Estate ofJones v. Commissioner.

The Tax Court dealt the IRS's gift on formation a significant blow in Estate of
Jones v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 11 (March 6, 2001). In that case, Mr. Jones formed a
family limited partnership with his son and transferred assets including real property in exchange
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for a 95.5389% limited partnership interest. He also formed a family limited partnership with his
four daughters and transferred real property to it in exchange for an 88.178% limited partnership
interest. The son contributed real property in exchange for general and limited partnership
interests in the first partnership, and the daughters contributed real property in exchange for
general and limited partnership interests in the second partnership. All of the contributions were
properly reflected in the capital accounts of the contributing partners. The IRS argued that
Mr. Jones made taxable gifts upon contributing his property to the partnerships. "Using the
value reported by decedent on his gift tax return, the IRS argues that, if decedent gave up
property worth $17,615,857 and received back limited partnership interests worth only
$6,675,156, decedent made taxable gifts upon the formation of the partnerships equal to the
difference in value." Id. at p. 11.
The Tax Court held that the contributions of property were similar to the
contributions in Estate of Strangi and distinguishable from the gifts in Shepherd. "Decedent
contributed property to the partnerships and received continuing limited partnership interests in
return. Although the contributions of property were properly reflected in the capital accounts of
decedent, and the value of the other partners' interests was not enhanced by the contributions of
decedent. Therefore, the contributions do not reflect taxable gifts." Thus, even though
Mr. Jones contributed most of the assets to the partnerships and received noncontrolling limited
partnership interests in return, the Court held that he did not make a taxable gift on the formation
of the partnerships because his contributions were properly reflected in his capital accounts when
the entity was created and the value of the other partners' interests was not enhanced by his
contributions.

C.

I.R.C. § 2036(a).

The primary area in which the IRS has experienced success in connection with its
challenges to family limited partnerships involved situations where the taxpayers failed to
respect the integrity of the entity. In these cases, the Tax Court has used I.R.C. § 2036(a) to
bring a value of the assets of the partnership back into the decedent's estate as a retained life
interest. Section 2036(a) provides as follows:
(a) GENERAL RULE-The value of the gross estate shall
include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he
has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death(l) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
the income from, the property, or

(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with
any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
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In Estate ofReichardt v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. No.9 (March 1, 2000), Judge
Colvin agreed with the IRS that the substance of the partnership transaction was that Mr.
Reichardt and his children had an implied agreement to allow Mr. Reichardt to continue to
substantively enjoy the property contributed to the partnership and retain the right to income
from the partnership assets during his lifetime in the same manner he had before the creation of
the partnership. The Court found that the transfers to the partnership did not affect Mr.
Reichardt's enjoyment of the property. Mr. Reichardt also continued to manage the property in
the same fashion that he had before. The Court also found that Mr. Reichardt commingled
partnership and personal funds, enjoyed the use of the personal residence, which was contributed
to the partnership, without paying rent, and that Mr. Reichardt was solely responsible for the
partnership's business activities.
In Estate of Schauerhamer v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997), the
Tax Court held that the value of assets transferred by decedent to three family limited
partnerships were included in the decedent's estate under I.R.C. § 2036 because she deposited
the income produced by the partnership assets in her personal checking account and did not
maintain separate records for partnership and non-partnership funds.

See also Estate of Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 (2002); Estate of Thompson, 84
T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (2002); Estate of Stone v. Commission, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551 (2003),
discussed at pp. 41, supra. Factors examined by the courts in deciding whether § 2036 applies
are case specific and continue to be developed through litigation and in the appeals of decisions
such as Strangi and Thompson. "Formation" facts looked at by the courts have included: (1)
whether the other partners made real contributions of property or services; (2) whether the
decedent had sufficient assets outside of the partnership to live on; (3) whether personal use
assets were placed in the partnership; (4) whether fiduciary obligations were negated in the
partnership agreement; (5) whether partners other than the decedent had the opportunity to
comment on and provide input with respect to the terms of the partnership agreement; (6)
whether partners other than the decedent had the opportunity to decide what assets would be
contributed to the partnership; and (7) the discretion regarding distributions provided to the
decedent general partner. "Operational" facts looked at by the courts include (1) whether
partnership assets were commingled with the decedent's personal assets; (2) whether
distributions were made in accordance with the terms of the partnership agreement; (3) whether
the entity was treated and respected as a separate entity; and (4) whether personal expenses of the
decedent were paid from the partnership or whether distributions were made for personal needs;
(5) whether estate taxes and administration expenses were paid from the partnership.
1.

The Partners Must Respect the Entity.

In order to facilitate the substance of the partnership formation being recognized,
the partners need to act like partners. Partnership bank accounts should maintained, which only
pay partnership expenses and do not pay personal expenses. When partnership distributions are
made, they should follow the partnership agreement. For instance, if the partnership is a pro rata
partnership, all distributions should be made on a pro rata basis. The partnership agreement
should make it clear that all partners are subject to normal partnership fiduciary duties. The
partnership agreement should also make it clear that an "ascertainable" standard exists for
making distributions based on a standard of reasonableness.
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IV.

RECENT CASE LAW.
A.

Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner.

In 1993, Mr. Strangi experienced health problems, and his son-in-law, an attorney
with an estate planning background, took over his affairs under a power of attorney. In 1994, the
decedent's son-in-law formed a family limited partnership with an LLC as its corporate general
partner. A certificate of limited partnership was filed with the Texas Secretary of State and
Mr. Strangi's assets were transferred under the power of attorney to the partnership in exchange
for a 99% limited partnership interest. All of the contributed property was reflected in Strangi's
capital account and had a fair market value of $9,876,929. Mr. Strangi's four children
(who were the residuary beneficiaries of his estate) acquired an interest in the corporate general
partner. Mr. Strangi owned 47% of the corporate general partner, and his children collectively
owned the remaining 53%. The son-in-law managed the day-to-day affairs of the entities.
Mr. Strangi died two months after the creation of the partnership. The estate valued the
decedent's interest in the entities at $6.5 million, applying combined discounts for lack of control
and lack of marketability of 43%.
The Estate claimed that the partnership was formed to (1) reduce executor and
attorney's fees payable at the death of decedent; (2) insulate decedent from an anticipated tort
claim and the estate from a will contest; and (3) to provide a joint investment vehicle for
management of decedent's estate. In the majority opinion,!! the Tax Court noted its skepticism,
based upon the facts of the case, of the Estate's claims of business purposes relating to the
creation of the partnership and noted that no active business was conducted by the partnership
following its formation. However, the Court specifically found that the partnership was validly
formed under Texas law and as a legal matter, changed the relationships between decedent and
his heirs and decedent and actual and potential creditors. The Court explicitly found that all
partnership formalities were followed, and the proverbial "i's were dotted" and "t's were
crossed." Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. No. 35 (2000) ("Strangi r). Ignoring the subjective
intentions of the parties in creating the partnership (i.e. the Tax Court's implied conclusion that
the partnership was formed primarily to reduce estate taxes), the Court held that "the partnership
had sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes. Its existence would not be
disregarded by potential purchasers of decedent's assets, and we do not disregard it in this case."
115 T.e. No. 35 at 16.
The majority also disregarded the IRS's claim that I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2) could be
used to completely disregard the existence of the entity. Section 2703(a) provides as follows:
Sec. 2703(a) General Rule -- for purposes of this subtitle, the value
of any property shall be determined without regard to II
Seven of the fifteen Tax Court judges agreed with the majority opinion (Judges Cohen, Chabot, Whalen,
Colvin, Halpen, Chiechi and Thornton). The concurrences and dissents in Strangi include the repudiation of the
economic substance test of entities in the transfer tax context (Judges Foley and Wells), a request for a more
stringent application of the economic substance doctrine (Judges Parr, Beghe, and Marvel), an argument that the
presence of an estate tax valuation discount virtually compels a finding of a gift on creation (Judges Reue, Parr,
Beghe, Gale, and Marvel),. and an estate depletion theory (Judges Beghe, and Parr). Although Judge Laro concurred
in the majority opinion, he did not sign on to any of the concurring opinions.
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(1)
any option, agreement, or other right to acquire or use the
property at a price less than the fair market value of the property
(without regard to such option, agreement, or right), or
(2)

any restriction on the right to sell or use such property.

The IRS argued that § 2703(a)(2) can be used to disregard the partnership for transfer tax
purposes because it is a "restriction on the right to sell or use the property of the partnership."
The majority, citing Kerr v. Commissioner (113 T.C. 449 (1999)), noted that Congress did not
intend, by the enactment of § 2703, to treat partnership assets as if they were assets of the estate
where the legal interest owned by the decedent at the time of death was a limited partnership or
corporate interest. 12 In essence, the Tax Court found that because the legal interest transferred
by Mr. Strangi at the moment of death was an interest in the partnership, and not the assets of the
partnership, I.R.c. § 2703 could not be used to disregard the existence ofthe entity.
The Tax Court also rejected the IRS's claim that the decedent made a gift when
he transferred property to the partnership and received in return a limited partnership interest of
lesser value. The Court noted that using the value reported on the estate tax return, if the
decedent gave up property worth in excess of $10 million and received a limited partnership
interest worth approximately $6.5 million in return, he appears to have made a gift equal to the
loss in value. But the Court held that no taxable gift occurred when the partnership was formed,
stating that "[i]n view of decedent's continuing interest in [the partnership] and the reflection of
the contributions in his own capital account, he did not transfer more than a minuscule
proportion of the value that would be 'loss' on the conveyance of his assets to the partnership in
exchange for a partnership interest." 115 T.C. No. 35 at 21.
In fact, the Tax Court signaled to the IRS that it would be receptive to an
argument that the partnership property should be included in Mr. Strangi's estate under I.R.C.
§ 2036 because of the level of control retained by Mr. Strangi's son-in-law as attorney-in-fact
(who held a 99% limited partnership interest and 47% stock ownership in the corporate general
partner). However, given the Court's holding that no donative transfer occurred upon creation of
the partnership, it is hard for this writer to see how I.R.C. § 2036 could apply with respect to the
creation of the partnership, since I.R.C. § 2036(a) requires "property ... of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth)."
The taxpayer's valuation expert applied a total discount of 43.75% in valuing the
decedent's partnership interest, but disregarded the relationship between the decedent's
99% limited partnership interest and his 47% interest in the stock of the corporate general
partner. The Tax Court was of the view that Mr. Strangi's interests must be examined together
in determining fair market value, and rejected the taxpayer's valuation.
The IRS's appraiser applied total discounts of 31% in valuing Mr. Strangi's
partnership interest (consisting of an 8% lack of control discount and a 25% lack of marketability
12

Citing Estate of Church v. United States, 85 AFTR2d 2000, 804, 200l-U.S.T.C. Par. 60,369 (W.D.
Tex. 2000).
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discount). The Court accepted the IRS's appraiser's determination of value, stating that it felt
"constrained to accept the evidence concerning discounts applicable to decedent's interest in the
partnership and in Stanco as of the date of death." The Court also stated that "we believe that the
result of the IRS's expert's discounts may be still be overgenerous to petitioner, but that result is
one that we must reach under the evidence and under the applicable statutes."
On June 17, 2002, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and
reversed in part, the Tax Court's decision. Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 279
(5 th Cir. 2002). The Court affirmed the Tax Court's findings that the partnership had a valid
business purpose and economic substance, as well as the Tax Court's holdings under I.R.C.
§ 2703 and gift on formation. The Court reversed the Tax Court's denial of the IRS's motion to
amend to add a claim alleging that under I.R.C. § 2036, the gross estate should include the value
of the partnership's assets. The Tax Court denied the motion to amend, which was made 52 days
before trial, because it considered the motion untimely. However, the Court held that because
the denial of the motion to amend was not based upon on any stated reason (such as prejudice or
delay), the Tax Court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. The Court remanded the
case to the Tax Court for consideration of the I.R.C. § 2036 issue.
On remand, the Judge Cohen addressed the application of I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(1)
and (a)(2) to the partnership in a memorandum decision. Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo 2003-145 (May 20, 2003)("Strangi 11'). The Court found that both applied. Relying on
the Court's prior decisions in Harper, Thompson, and other cases, Judge Cohen found that
§ 2036(a)(I) applied because Mr. Strangi had impliedly retained the right to the assets from any
income from the assets transferred to the partnership. The "bad facts" relied upon by Judge
Cohen included the fact that Mr. Strangi transferred a majority of his assets to the partnership,
leaving him with little assets to pay for his personal needs, his rent-free occupancy of the home
following its transfer to the partnership, and the payment of partnership funds to cover his
personal expenses, including medical expenses and taxes.
Judge Cohen also addressed the application ofI.R.C. § 2036(a)(2). This provision
requires inclusion of transferred property in which a decedent retained "the right, either alone or
in conjunction with any other person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom." The taxpayer argued that I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) did not apply,
primarily relying on United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972) for the proposition that
Mr. Strangi retained no legally enforceable rights and that his management powers were limited
by fiduciary obligation which did not cause estate inclusion. Judge Cohen found that Byrum did
not provide any basis for "presuming the fiduciary obligations would be enforced in
circumstances divorced from the safeguards of business operations in meaningful independent
interests or oversights." There were three primary reasons for the Court's opinion. First, there
was no third party control. Mr. Strangi, in Judge Cohen's view, retained control either through
his son-in-law's attorney-in-fact or alone. Second, Mr. Strangi was not constrained by any
business reality (that had been the case in Byrum) that would dictate decision-making. Third,
Strangi was not constrained in the exercise of control by any unrelated independent parties who
would be expected to enforce Strangi's fiduciary duties.
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B.

Knight v. Commissioner.

On December 28, 1998, Herbert and Ina Knight established a management trust, a
family limited partnership of which the management trust was the general partner, and trusts for
the benefit of each of their two adult children. The Knights transferred to the partnership three
parcels of real estate, including a ranch and two homes in which their two children lived rent
free, and financial assets. Petitioners each transferred a 22.3% interest in the partnership to each
of the children's trusts, retaining a 4.9% interest in the partnership as limited partners.
The IRS contended that the partnership should be disregarded for gift tax
valuation purposes, arguing that the fair market value of each of the gifts was equal to the pro
rata percentage of the real property and financial assets of the partnership, discounted for selling
expenses and built in gains. The taxpayer claimed that the partnership must be recognized for
federal gift tax purposes, and that the portfolio, minority and lack of marketability discounts
totaling 44% should apply.
The Tax Court rejected the IRS's argument that the partnership lacked economic
substance and failed to qualify as a partnership under federal law, holding that "[s]tate law
determines the nature of property rights, and federal law determines the appropriate tax treatment
of those rights." 115 T.C. No. 36 at 13, citing United States v. National Bank of Commerce,
472 U.S. 713, 722 (1985); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 683 (1983). The Court found
that the parties stipulated that the steps followed in the creation of the partnership satisfied all
requirements under Texas law, and that the partnership has been a limited partnership under
Texas law since it was created. The Court also rejected the IRS's claim that the form over
substance doctrine should be applied to the case, stating that "[w]e believe that the form of the
transaction here (the creation of the partnership) would be taken into account by a willing buyer;
thus the substance and form of the transaction are not at odds for gift tax valuations. The IRS
agrees that Petitioners created and operated a partnership as required under Texas law and gave
interests in that partnership to their children's trusts. Those rights are apparently enforceable
under Texas law." 115 T.e. No. 36 at 14-15. The Court also held that I.R.C. § 2704(b) did not
apply to the partnership agreement restrictions regarding (1) the 50-year term of the partnership
or dissolution by agreement of all the partners; and (2) the lack of withdrawal rights of limited
partners. The Court opined that the provisions contained in the partnership agreement were not
more restrictive than the limitations that generally would apply under Texas law.
As to valuation, the Tax Court concluded that the fair market value of the
partnership interest transferred should be determined based upon a 15% combined discount for
lack of control and lack of marketability. The Tax Court rejected the aggregate 44% discount
sought by the taxpayer (which consisted of a 10% portfolio discount [based on the thought that
no single buyer would be interested in all of the partnership's varying assets], a 10% minority
interest discount, and a 30% lack of marketability discount). The Court pointed out that the
taxpayer's experts' conclusions were unexplained or contrary to the evidence and that his
erroneous factual assumptions cast doubt on his objectivity.
C.

Estate ofJones v. Commissioner.

On January 1, 1995, WW Jones, II formed two family limited partnerships. The
first family partnership ("JBLP") was formed between Mr. Jones and his son. Mr. Jones
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contributed 100% of the surface rights in one ranch, along with cattle and certain personal
property. His son contributed a 20% undivided interest in another ranch. Mr. Jones received a
95.5% limited partnership interest for his contribution. His son received a 1% general partner
interest and a 3.5% limited partner interest. On the same day that JBLP was formed, Mr. Jones
gave his son an 83.1 % general partner interest and a 3.5% limited partner interest.
On the same day he created JBLP, Mr. Jones and his four daughters formed
AVLP, a Texas limited partnership. Mr. Jones contributed a ranch to the partnership, and each
of his daughters contributed a 25% undivided interest in another ranch. Mr. Jones held an
88.18% limited partnership interest, two of his daughters received a 2.95% limited partnership
interest, and the other two daughters received a 1% general partner interest and a 1.96% limited
partnership interest. As with JBLP, Mr. Jones' immediately gave 16.9% limited partnership
interests in AVLP to his daughters.
The IRS made two basic legal arguments: (1) that a gift on formation occurred
when Mr. Jones created partnerships with his son and daughters because the value of the interests
he received in each partnership were worth less, based upon the appraisals submitted by the
taxpayer, 66% less than the value of the property transferred to the partnerships; and (2) that
restrictions prohibiting the withdrawal of the partner before the end of the 35 year term of each
partnership should be disregarded for transfer tax purposes under I.R.C. § 2704(b).
The Tax Court rejected the IRS's gift on formation argument, holding that Mr.
Jones' contributions of property to partnerships were similar to the contributions in Estate of
Strangi. The Court noted that "decedent contributed property to the partnerships and received
continuing limited partnership interests in return. All the contributions of property were properly
reflected in the capital accounts of decedent, and the value of the other partners' interest was not
enhanced by the contributions of decedent. Therefore, the contributions do not reflect taxable
gifts." 116 T.C. at 11-12.
As to the I.R.C. § 2704(b) argument, the IRS argued that the fact that limited
partners were prohibited from withdrawing from the partnership during the partners' 35 year
term was an "applicable restriction" on liquidation that should be disregarded under I.R.C.
§ 2704(b). Although the argument is the same as the Tax Court specifically rejected in Kerr v.
Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449 (1999), the IRS made the argument as the basis of its claim that
Kerr was wrongly decided. Refusing to reconsider its decision in Kerr, the Tax Court ruled that
under Texas law the exercise of a limited partner's right to withdraw does not cause the
dissolution or liquidation of the partnership. Therefore, restrictions on withdrawal are not
applicable restrictions under § 2704(b).
The next question addressed by the Tax Court was whether Mr. Jones transferred
"limited partnership interests" or "assignee interests" in JBLP and AVLP. The Tax Court held
that limited partnership interests were in fact transferred, even though it was undisputed that the
consent required under both partnership agreements to have the transferees admitted as limited
partners was not obtained. The Tax Court based its decision on the following facts, among
others: (1) the transfer documents were titled "Gift Assignment of Limited Partnership Interests;"
(2) the transfer documents stated that after the transfers were complete, each newly held interest
would be a "limited partnership interest;" (3) the gift tax returns referred to the gifts as gifts of
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"limited partnership interests;" and (4) an affidavit filed by Mr. Jones' son described the interest
received as "limited partnership interests." Thus the Court held that, in substance and in form,
limited partnership interests were transferred.
The Tax Court's characterization of the transferred interests as limited partnership
interests, and not assignee interests, was very important in the Court's determination of the fair
market value of the JBLP partnership interest transferred. The taxpayer argued that the fair
market value of the 83.1 % limited partnership interest transferred should be determined using a
66% combined discount from net asset value. The discount was based on a 55% secondary
market discount, a 20% lack of marketability discount, and a 5% discount for built in capital
gains. But the IRS successfully argued that the holder of an 83.1 % limited partnership interest
had the right to liquidate the entity under the specific terms of the JBLP partnership agreement.
Because of this liquidation right, the Tax Court rejected the valuation evidence submitted by the
taxpayers' expert and applied only an 8% lack of marketability discount in valuing the JBLP
interest. The Court held that the 8% discount was sufficient to take into account the lack of
marketability imposed by any legal issues regarding the power to force liquidation. 13
In valuing the four gifts of AVLP in limited partnership interests, the IRS's expert
applied a 38% secondary market discount and a 7.5% discount for lack of marketability for each
16.9% interest. The taxpayer contended that the gifts should be valued by taking a 58%
combined discount from net asset value, based upon a 45% secondary market discount, a 20%
lack of marketability discount and a 5% built in capital gains discount. In determining value, the
Court applied a 40% secondary market discount and a lack of marketability discount of 8%, for a
combined 44% discount. However, the Tax Court rejected the application of the discount for
built in capital gains exposure under the theory that a buyer could avoid the built in gains
situation in a partnership context by somehow causing the partnership to make an I.R.C. § 754
election.
D.

Church v. Commissioner.

On January 18,2000, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas released its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case. Mrs. Church died on
October 24, 1993. Two days prior to her death, Mrs. Church and two other persons signed an
agreement entitled "Agreement of Sturnberg Ranch Partners, Ltd." Testimony established that
the purpose of the partnership was twofold: (1) the partners wished to consolidate their undivided
interests in a 23,000 acre family ranch to provide for centralized management of their interests
and preserve the ranch as an ongoing enterprise for future generations; and (2) Mrs. Church had
become concerned about protecting her substantial assets from judgment creditors in the event of
a catastrophic tort claim against her. In addition to her contribution of her undivided interest in
the ranch, Mrs. Church also contributed approximately $1 million in securities to the partnership.
The Certificate of Limited Partnership was not filed in the Office of the Texas Secretary of State
until October 26, 1993, two days after Mrs. Church's death. The corporate general partner of the

13

The IRS's liquidation argument could have been avoided by the transfer of less than 50% or less of the
limited partnership interests, for the Tax Court found that under the terms of the Partnership Agreement, partners
holding 51 % or more of the partnership interests had the power to liquidate the entity.
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partnership was not actually organized until March of 1994, several months after Mrs. Church's
death.
At the time that the partnership was formed, Mrs. Church had been previously
diagnosed with breast cancer. However, the Court factually concluded that Mrs. Church died
"suddenly and unexpectedly of cardiopulmonary collapse" and that the cause and timing of Mrs.
Church's death "is largely irrelevant to this case" and "unrelated to her cancer." (emphasis
added). The District Court specifically observed that the primary purpose of the partners in
forming the partnership was a desire to preserve the family ranching enterprise for themselves
and their descendants and "evidence of this motivation is concrete and persuasive." The District
Court also specifically found the following:
(i)

that the partnership had bona fide business purposes ...

(ii)
The partnership was not formed solely to reduce estate
taxes.
(iii)
There was no express or implied agreement between the
partners in the partnership that Mrs. Church could continue to use,
possess, or enjoy partnership property or retain the right to income
from the partnership property ...
(iv)
The partnership was a bona fide business arrangement and
not a devise to transfer property to Mrs. Church's family for less
than full and adequate consideration ...
(v)
The terms and restrictions in the partnership agreement
were comparable to similar arrangements entered into by persons
in arm's-length transactions.
The District Court also made specific findings as to valuation matters. The Court determined
that assets contributed by Mrs. Church to the partnership were valued at $1,467,748 and that the
fair market value of her limited partnership interest in the partnership was $617,591, a discount
in excess of 50%. The District Court noted that the "government chose not to present any
valuation evidence of its own."
The District Court made the following Conclusions of Law:
(i)
That the formation of the partnership was "in substantial
compliance in good faith with the Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act."
(ii)
That the partnership was a "valid Texas limited partnership
as of October 22, 1993."
(iii)
Under well established principles of Texas law, ownership
of property intended to be partnership property is not determined
by legal title, but rather by the intention of the parties.
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(iv)
That no taxable gift had been made in this case since "a
taxable gift must involve a gratuitous transfer, which by definition
requires a donee" and there was no donee in this case.
The District Court also rejected the government's allegations under I.R.C. §§ 2036 and 2038,
finding that there had been no gratuitous transfer and further rejected the government's
assertions that I.R.C. § 2703 could be interpreted to disregard the existence of the partnership.
The Justice Department appealed Church the issues regarding partnership formation to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It did not appeal the tax issues. The Fifth
Circuit's per curium opinion, which was filed on July 18,2001, was very brief:
The judgement of the district court is affirmed for the following
reasons:
The only issue of the estate's valuation is whether the transfer of
the assets was restricted at the time of Church's death. Different
legal theories have been argued during the course of this
proceeding, but that has always been the dispositive question - as it
was the basis for the different valuations given the assets by the
appraiser (not now questioned). Regardless of the status of the
limited partnership due to the certificate not being filed on that
date, the documents that Church had signed imposed restrictions
on the assets that necessarily caused their value to be discounted
even if no limited partnership was then formed.
We reject the government's argument that the 1999 revision of the
Texas statute made the filing of the certificate an absolute
prerequisite to the creation of a limited partnership and rendered an
agreement between the parties unenforceable until the time of
filing. A Texas court has held that a written partnership agreement
constitutes an enforceable contract and governs the rights of the
parties.
Hoagland v. Finholt, 773 S.W.2d 740, 742-43
(Tex.App.-Dallas, 1989, no writ). Further, the Bar Committee's
commentary to the 1999 revision of section 2.01 states that the
revision was not meant to overturn Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d
568 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas, 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which held
that an entity could operate as a limited partnership before filing a
certificate. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132a-l 2.01, Source and
Comment - Bar Committee (Vernon Supp. 2001).
The estate stated in its pleadings that the discounts for lack of
control applied without the formation of a limited partnership, and
in its refund claim it stated that it was entitled to a "discount for
lack of control and marketability." The IRS was apprised of the
nature of the refund action.
AFFIRMED
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E.

Adams v. Commissioner.

In Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 1173 (5 th Cir. 2000), the decedent died
owning a 25% general partnership interest in a Texas general partnership. The other 75% of the
partnership was owned equally by three of decedent's siblings. The partnership held and
managed several items of property inherited from the children's father, including ranch land,
marketable securities, mineral royalties and working interests. The government filed a motion
for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that the proper interest to be valued for
federal estate tax purposes is an assignee interest in a liquidating partnership. The estate did not
dispute that the relevant interest for federal estate tax purposes was an assignee interest, but
asserted that because "dissolution" of the partnership would not necessarily result in a "winding
up" or liquidation of that partnership, the government was wrong in contending that liquidation
of the partnership was inevitable. The district court agreed with the Estate finding that "[a]s an
alternative to liquidation, the remaining partners can continue the business of a dissolved
partnership provided they pay the deceased partner's Estate the value of her [assignee] interests
as ofthe date of the dissolution." But the court concluded that the relevant interests for estate tax
purposes is "most accurately described as an assignee interest in a dissolved, rather than
liquidating, partnership." Following a bench trial, the district court entered a memorandum
opinion in favor of the government, disregarding the discounts relied upon by the Estate and
accepting the government's expert appraisal.
The Fifth Circuit initially stated that while valuation of property for federal tax
purposes is a question of fact that the Court reviews for clear error, a different standard should be
applied in this case because "there is a pure question of law imbedded in the valuation calculus:
to arrive at a reasonable conclusion regarding the value of the property at issue in this case, one
must first determine the rights afforded to the owner of such property by the applicable state law.
More specifically, to appraise the value of a fractional assignee interest in a dissolved Texas
general partnership, one must consider whether, under Texas partnership law, the holder of such
an assignee interest has the right to force liquidation of the partnership or, alternatively, the right
to force the remaining partners to buyout his interest and, if so, for what value, i. e., for a pro rata
share of NAV undiscounted except for liquidation-related brokerage costs or for a fully
discounted share." The Court thus concluded that the legal conclusion regarding the rights
inherent in the property is a subject for the Fifth Circuit to review de novo. The Fifth Circuit
found that although it was likely that an assignee's interest in a partnership would be subject to
discounts in determining the fair market value, "we are firmly convinced that it is anything but
'well-established' that a partner's assignee has the right to receive a 25% share ofNAV." The
court stated that
[We discern] a very real possibility that, as a matter of law, the
holder of an assignee interest in the partnership could be stuck with
an unmarketable interest in a partnership that owns a poorly
diversified mix of assets and over which the assignee has no legal
control. If this proved to be the case, the fair market value of the
25% assignee interest would be substantially less than a straight,
ratable 25% share of the partnership's NAV, thereby reflecting
these undesirable characteristics. More to the point, the legal
uncertainty that obscures the extent, if any, to which an assignee
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has the right to provoke liquidation or, alternatively, to force a
straight pro rata redemption of his interests, suggests that any
effort to exercise such punitive rights would be met with strong
resistance from the remaining partners. This legal uncertainty -which raises the specter of costly litigation in addition to an
adverse result -- is itself a factor that must be taken into account
when appraising the fair market value of assignee's interest for
estate tax purposes.
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the government and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
On remand, the Federal District Court in the Northern District of Texas
determined that in valuing a 25% assignee interest in a Texas general partnership where the
rights of the assignee were not clearly defined under Texas law, discounts for lack of control
(20%), portfolio (10%), and lack of marketability (35%) should be applied. These combined
discounts resulted in an aggregate discount of approximately 54%. The assets of the partnership
consisted of ranch land, mineral royalties, working interests, and securities. Interestingly, the
taxpayers' expert in Adams was the same expert who testified for the taxpayer in Knight. The
results were substantially different. Adams v. Commissioner, 2001-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) ~ 60,418
(August 24,2001).

F.

Estate ofDailey v. Commissioner.

In Estate o/Dailey v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 710 (2001), the Tax Court
addressed the fair market value of limited partnership interests in Dailey Family Limited
Partnership transferred by Mrs. Dailey during her life and at her death. The assets of the
partnership consisted of $1,047,603 of marketable securities, primarily Exxon stock. The Tax
Court found the testimony of the IRS's expert, who applied discounts ranging from 13.51% to
15.72%, contradictory and unsupported. The Court concluded that an aggregate combined lack
of control and lack of marketability discount of 40%, as espoused by the Taxpayer's expert, was
warranted.
G.

Hackl v. Commissioner.

On March 27, 2002, the Tax Court issued its opinion in Hackl v. Commissioner,
118 T.C. No. 14 (2002) in which it held that interests transferred by gift in a closely-held limited
liability company that owned and operated tree farming property did not qualify for the gift tax
annual exclusion. The Tax Court based its decision on the restrictive nature of the LLC interests
transferred and its holding that the interests did not confer, in the court's opinion, substantial
presently realizable economic rights on the donees. Although this case is subject to review on
appeal, practitioners should anticipate that the IRS will attempt to apply Hackl to other transfers
of closely-held interests in LLCs and family limited partnerships.

1.

The Facts.

In 1995, AJ. Hackl created Treeco, LLC (the "LLC"), a limited liability company
designed to own and operated two tree farms with approximately 10,000 acres of property.
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Mr. Hackl's investment goal with respect to the tree farming business was long-term growth.
The tree farms had little or no existing merchantable timber. Mr. Hackl created a separate entity
to conduct his tree farming operations to shield his assets not related to the tree farming business
from potential liability associated with that business, to create a separate enterprise in which
family members could participate and to facilitate the transfer of ownership interests in the tree
farming business to his children, their spouses and his grandchildren. He selected an LLC to
obtain liability protection for members, to provide protection of assets inside the LLC from
members' creditors, to provide passthrough tax treatment and to provide for centralized
management for the operation of the family tree farming business.
The LLC operating agreement provided that the management of the company's
business was vested exclusively in the manager, and required the manager to perform his duties
under a fiduciary standard. Mr. Hackl was designated as the initial manager to serve for life, or
until his resignation, removal or incapacity. He also had the authority to name a successor
manager during his lifetime or by will.
With respect to distributions, the LLC agreement stated that the manager "may
direct that the Available Cash, if any, be distributed to the members, pro rata in accordance with
their respective percentage interests." Available Cash was defined as cash funds on hand after
payment of or provision for all operating expenses, all outstanding and unpaid current
obligations and a working capital reserve.
Prior to dissolution, no member had the right to withdraw his or her capital
contribution, except as approved by the manager. No member was entitled to transfer his or her
interest except with the prior written consent of the manager, and the manager's consent could be
withheld in the manager's sole discretion. However, if a transfer was made in violation of the
LLC agreement, the transferee would have no opportunity to participate in the business affairs of
the LLC or to become a member. Instead, the transferee would only be entitled to receive the
share of profits or distributions that otherwise would have been paid to the transferor. 14 The
entity was to be dissolved when the first of the following occurred: (1) while Mr. Hackl was the
manager, by his written determination that the company should be dissolved; (2) following his
tenure as manager, by a written determination by voting members owning not less than
80-percent of the voting units of the LLC; (3) a dissolution event such as the resignation,
expulsion, bankruptcy, death, insanity, retirement or dissolution of the manager if the company is
not continued by majority vote of the members within 90 days; or (4) or at such earlier time as
may be provided by applicable law.
In 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Hackl began glvmg interests in the LLC to family
members. They each transferred voting and nonvoting units to their eight children and to the
spouse of each child. In 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Hackl gave additional units to each of their children
and to their spouses. They also gave interests in trust for each of their 25 minor grandchildren.
Mr. and Mrs. Hackl timely filed gift tax returns for the 1995 and 1996 gifts, reporting these
transfers and electing to treat the gifts as being made one-half by each spouse under I.R.C.
§ 2513. In 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Hackl each sought to use 16 annual exclusions. In 1996, Mr. and
Mrs. Hackl each sought to use 41 annual exclusions.
14

The rights are similar to those possessed by an assignee of a partnership interest.
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The IRS disallowed the annual exclusions for the gifts.
2.

The Law.

I.R.C. § 2501 imposes a tax for each calendar year "on the transfer of property by
gift" by any taxpayer. However, I.R.C. § 2503(b) excludes from taxable gifts the first $10,000
"of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property) made to any person by the donor during
the calendar year." In other words, the donor is entitled to an annual exclusion of $10,000 per
donee for present interest gifts.
The Treasury Regulations under I.R.C. § 2503 state that a '''future interest' is a
legal term, and includes reversions, remainders and other interests or estates, whether vested or
contingent, and whether or not supported by a particular interest or estate, which are limited to
commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date or time." The Regulations
further state that "an unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession or enjoyment of property
or the income from property [such as a life estate or term certain] is a present interest in
property." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b).
3.

The Positions of the Parties.

Mr. and Mrs. Hackl argued that they made direct, outright transfers of the LLC
units, which are personal property separate and distinct under state law from the assets of the
LLC. They further argued that the units had a substantial and stipulated value (the IRS and the
taxpayers had stipulated to the fair market value of the interests before trial), that they placed no
restrictions on the donees' interests in the units and that the donees acquired all rights in and to
the transferred units, which were identical to those Mr. and Mrs. Hackl had in the units they
retained. Thus, the taxpayers claimed that the transfers involved no postponement of rights,
powers or privileges that would cause the gifts to constitute future interests.
The IRS argued that Mr. and Mrs. Hackl's transfers of units were gifts of future
interests in property and failed to qualify as gifts of present interests under I.R.C. § 2503. The
IRS argued that because of the restrictions contained in the LLC operating agreement, the
transfers did not confer on the donees immediate and unconditional rights to the use, possession
or enjoyment of the LLC units or the income from the LLC units. The IRS emphasized the
requirement of "present economic benefit," and contended that inability of the donees to freely
transfer the units or to compel distributions from the entity prevented them from receiving any
such benefit.
4.

The Court's Opinion.

The Tax Court stated that a taxpayer claiming an annual exclusion must establish
that the transfer in dispute conferred on the donee "an unrestricted and a noncontingent right to
the immediate, use, possession or enjoyment (1) of property or (2) of income from the property,
both of which alternatives in tum demand that such immediate use, possession or enjoyment be
of a nature that substantial economic benefit is derived therefrom."
The Tax Court initially and correctly stated that the property interests transferred
were ownership interests in the LLC itself, rather than indirect gifts of property contributed to the
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entity. In analyzing whether or not the gifts of LLC units constituted present interests in
property, the court focused on the rights and restrictions related to the LLC units contained in the
LLC operating agreement. The Tax Court found that the restrictive nature of the operating
agreement "foreclosed the ability of the donees presently to access any substantial economic or
financial benefit that might be represented by the units." The court based its opinion primarily
on the inability of an interest owner to withdraw and receive value for his interest and on the
court's view that the interest owner had no practical ability to unilaterally transfer his or her
interest for value. Although the court noted that a transfer of an interest could take place without
the manager's consent, "transfers subject to the contingency of manager approval cannot support
a present interest characterization, and the possibility of making sales in violation thereof, to a
transferee who would then have no right to become a member or to participate in the business,
can hardly be seen as a sufficient source of substantial economic benefit." Id. Thus, based on its
analysis of the provisions of the LLC agreement, the court concluded that the actual receipt of
the LLC interests themselves did not confer upon the donees the "use, possession or enjoyment"
ofthat property within the meaning ofI.R.C. § 2503(b) so as to qualify for the annual exclusion.
The next issue addressed by the court was whether the LLC units afforded the
donees the right to the use, possession or enjoyment of the income therefrom so as to qualify the
transfers as present interest. Relying on cases involving trusts, the court applied a three-part test
for ascertaining whether the rights to income satisfy the present interest requirement. The court
stated that the taxpayer must prove that: "(1) the trust will receive income, (2) some portion of
that income will flow steadily to the beneficiary, and (3) the portion of income flowing out to the
beneficiary can be ascertained." Id., citing L.J. Calder, 85 T.C. 713, Dec. 42,467 (1985). The
court opined that the first prong was not met because the parties had stipulated that the primary
business purpose of the LLC was to acquire and manage timberland for long-term income and
appreciation, that the entity would operate at a loss for a number of years and that none of the
members anticipated that the entity would make any distributions for a number of years after the
gifts. The court also noted that even if the first two prongs had been met, there was no showing
that any "ascertainable portion" of the income would flow to the donees since distributions were
to be made in the manager's discretion, thus making the timing and amount of distributions a
matter of speculation.

5.

Analysis.

The Tax Court's decision is troubling. Although the court correctly concluded
that the interests transferred were ownership interests in the LLC, the court relied primarily on
cases involving transfers of property by a donor to either a trust or a corporate entity in
determining that the transfer of LLC units did not convey a present interest. But where the
transfer of property is to a trust or an entity, the use, possession or enjoyment of the transferred
property is clearly postponed because that property is in the hands of either a trustee or the
corporation itself, and not the beneficiary or shareholder. See, e.g., E.F. Fondren, 45-1 USTC
~ 10,164, 324 US 18,65 SCt 499; L.J. Stinson Est., CA-7, 2000-1 USTC ~ 60,377,214 F3d 846.
The Hackl donees had both the immediate possession and the use of the LLC interests
transferred to them.
The LLC interests may not be the most desirable of assets, but the court
acknowledged that they could be sold to a third party. The court just believed that no one would
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be interested in acquiring the property. As to the stipulated value of the LLC units, the Tax
Court stated that "entity interest values can be based, as the facts and circumstances indicate is
the case here, on the worth of underlying assets and the future income potential they represent,
neither of which maybe presently reachable." Although a buyer could base his purchase price on
the present value of future cash flows, fair market value is demonstrative of the price at which
the interest would trade on the valuation date. IS By definition, the stipulated value was a current
realizable benefit, which should have, in this author's opinion, qualified for the annual exclusion.
Hackl was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Hackl v.
Comm'r, 7th Cir. No. 02-3093 (July 11, 2003). The Seventh Circuit stated, relying on Stinson
Estate v. United States, 214 F.3d 846 (7 th Cir. 2000), that "the sole statutory distinction between
present and future interests lies in the question of whether there is a postponement of enjoyment
of specific rights, powers, or privileges which would be forthwith existent if the interests were
present." The Court noted that Treeco's operating agreement foreclosed the donees' ability to
realize any substantial present economic benefit, and the fact Treeco might be set up like any
other limited liability corporation and that its restrictions on the alienability of its shares are
common in closely-held companies "does not mean that shares in such companies should
automatically be considered present interests for purposes of the gift tax exclusions."

6.

Avoiding the Hackl Problem.

In holding that the transfer of LLC units did not confer an immediate substantial
economic benefit, the court seemed particularly concerned with the inability of a donee to
withdraw from the entity, the restrictions upon sale and the lack of regular distributions. If any
of these three "defects" were not currently present, it is likely that the court would have held that
the LLC units qualified as present interests.
. As to the right of withdrawal, the entity agreement could include the right to
withdraw from the entity at "fair market value" (the same definition as used in the Treasury
Regulations). Fair market value could be defined to require the interest to be valued as though
the put right did not exist. The donee in that circumstance has the ability to realize immediate
value through withdrawal much like a beneficiary of a trust with a Crummey withdrawal
provision, and the annual exclusion should be allowed.
As to transfer restrictions, a provision allowing a family member the unrestricted
right of transfer of an interest in the entity to an outsider might not be palatable to most clients.
The desire to keep the assets in the family is one of the primary reasons many closely-held
entities are created. Rather than completely restricting the transfer, however, the entity or other
family owners could be given a right of first refusal so that if a family member desires to transfer
the interests for cash, the holder could exercise the right to purchase that interest before it is
transferred to the outsider, keeping the interest in the family.

15

But fair market value is determined at the date of the gift based on "the price at which such property would
change hands between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and
both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1.
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As to the lack of distributions, the court's requirement that the portion of income
flowing to the interest holder be "ascertainable" poses difficult problems. Clearly, a required
annual distribution of a specified amount should meet this requirement. However, many clients
may be reluctant to do so, preferring, as Mr. Hackl did, to allow the assets of the entity to grow
in value.
H.

Estate ofHarper v. Commissioner.

In Harper, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1641 (2002), the Tax Court held that property
contributed by an individual to a family limited partnership was includable in his gross estate
under I.R.C. § 2036(a) because he retained the enjoyment of the property during his lifetime.
Harper set up a living trust with a portfolio of assets which constituted the vast
majority of his net worth. During 1994, Harper formed a family limited partnership. His
children received a 1% general partnership interest, and the trust received a 99% limited
partnership interest. On July 1, 1994, the trust assigned a 24% interest to one child and a
36% interest to another child and reported the transaction as a gift. Harper died on February 1,
1995.
The IRS argued that the full fair market value of the assets contributed to the
partnership by the trust should be included in his estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a) because the facts
of the case demonstrated that although the assets were contributed to the partnership, Mr. Harper
retained the economic benefit of the assets and the right to use those assets during his lifetime.
The taxpayer argued that § 2036(a) should not apply because the trust transferred the assets to
the partnership and what was owned by Mr. Harper at the time of his death were interests in the
partnership, that the trust received full and adequate consideration for the transfer under I.R.C
§ 2036(a), and there was no agreement that Mr. Harper would retain the right to the control of, or
the income generated by, the property.
The Tax Court concluded that I.R.C. § 2036(a) applied to bring all of the assets
contributed by the trust into Mr. Harper's taxable estate. The Tax Court's analysis was centered
on the taxpayer's failure to respect the partnership as a separate entity. Specifically, the Court
noted that the partnership had a history of disproportionate distributions, funds of the partnership
were commingled with Mr. Harper's personal funds, and that a significant delay existed between
the date the partnership was formed and the date that the assets of the partnership were
transferred to it. In sum, the Court found "compelling indicia of an implied understanding or
agreement that the partnership would not curtail the decedent's ability to enjoy the economic
benefit of asserts contributed to the" partnership.
The Tax Court also rejected the estate's argument that § 2036(a) did not apply
because the trust received full and adequate consideration for the transfer. The Court held that
2036(a) does not apply "in the case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." The Court held that because the children did not transfer any assets
to the partnership upon formation, the decedent alone determined how the partnership would be
structured and operated, so there was no arm's length agreement. The Court referred to this as a
"pure recycling" of interests. The Court thus noted that the transfer was not an arm's length
transaction but rather a transaction within the context of § 2036 which was "testamentary" in
nature.
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I.

Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner.

In Estate of Tompson, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 374 (2002), Mr. Thompson formed a
family limited partnership with his daughter and son-in-law and a second partnership with his
son two years before his death. The partners also created two corporations to serve as the
general partners for each of the partnerships. Mr. Thompson contributed over $1.4 million in
securities and notes receivable to each ofthe partnerships, receiving a 95.4% and 62.27% limited
partnership interest in each partnership in return. During the two years before Mr. Thompson's
death, the partnerships collectively distributed nearly $100,000 to Mr. Thompson, which he used
to make gifts to family members and pay personal expenses. At trial one of the children testified
that she wanted to make sure that despite the creation of the partnership, Mr. Thompson could in
fact obtain funds from the partnership to make gifts to his children.
The IRS argued that under I.R.C. § 2036, the total value of the decedent's interest
in the partnership was equal to its pro rata net asset value. The Tax Court held that while the
partnerships had sufficient substance to be recognized for estate and gift tax purposes (observing
that the partnerships were validly created under state law), it found an implied agreement that the
decedent would retain the economic benefit of the contributed property, thereby requiring an
inclusion of those assets in his gross estate under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1). The Court noted that
because the decedent transferred assets to the partnerships that would have been required for his
support, there had been an implied understanding this his children would agree to his request for
money from the property that he contributed and that the partnerships were created primarily as
an alternative vehicle for implementing the decedent's estate plan. The Court further noted that
the decedent's transfer of assets to the partnerships was not a bona fide sale for adequate and full
consideration because the decedent's receipt of partnership interests was merely a "recycling of
value" and the contribution was not motivated by legitimate business concerns.

J.

Kimbell v. United States.

In Kimbell, 244 F.Supp. 700 (N.D. Tex 2003), the IRS successfully argued at the
district court level that a family limited partnership should be ignored under I.R.C. § 2036. In
this case, a family limited partnership was created when the principal contributor (Mrs. Kimbell)
was 96 years old. Before the partnership was created, the bulk of Mrs. Kimbell's assets were
held in a living trust of which she and her son served as trustees. The trust transferred the most
of its assets to the partnership in exchange for a 50% interest in the LLC (which was the
1% general partner of the partnership) and a 99% limited partnership interest in the partnership.
Mrs. Kimbell's son was a co-trustee of the trust and owned the other 50% interest in the LLC.
The son was also the manager of the LLC.
Mrs. Kimbell died within 2 ~ months after the partnership was created. The IRS
took the position during the audit that I.R.C. § 2036 operated to bring the assets contributed by
the trust into Mrs. Kimbell's gross estate. The estate paid the tax, and filed a claim for refund.
When the refund claim was denied, the estate filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas (Dallas Division).
Both the estate and the IRS filed cross motions for summary judgment regarding
the applicability of I.R.C. § 2036 to the case. Citing Harper v. Commissioner, the district court
held that I.R.C. § 2036 did apply to the case. Like the court in Harper, the district court found
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that the "bona-fide sale for an adequate and full consideration" exception under § 2036 had not
been met because "Plaintiff has produced no credible evidence that the formation of the
Partnership was the product of an arm's length transaction, i.e. a transaction 'between two parties
who are not related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly equal
bargaining power' . .. Indeed, one cannot even find two parties, much less two parties
conducting an arm's length negotiation leading to a bona fide sale." The court further found that
this partnership creation was nothing other than mere "value recycling" similar to that found in
Harper.
The district court then addressed the question of whether Mrs. Kimbell "retained
the enjoyment ofthe property transferred to the partnership." The court, focusing on the terms of
the limited partnership agreement, noted that Mrs. Kimbell, as a 99% limited partner, could at
any time remove the general partner and appoint herself or someone of her choosing to be the
general partner. Moreover, the court also found that the general partner had "sole discretion" to
decide on distributions of income from the partnership. The court thus found that Mrs. Kimbell
"retained the power to either personally benefit from the income of the partnership or to
designate the persons who would benefit from the income of the partnership, and thus runs afoul
of both I.R.C. § 2036 (a)(I) and (2)." The court rejected the estate's claim that the fiduciary
duties owed by the general partner prevented Mrs. Kimbell from having § 2036 retained rights,
holding that (1) U.S. v. Byrum was "distinguishable on its facts" and was "expressly overruled by
Congressional enactment of § 2036(b), and (2) regardless, the partnership agreement specifically
provided that the General Partner will not owe a fiduciary duty to the Partnership or to any
Partner."
In Kimbell v. United States, _ F.3d _,2004 WL 1119598 (5th Cir. May 20,2004)
(No. 03-10529), rev'g 244 F.Supp. 700 (N.D. Tex. 2003), the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's conclusion that § 2036 applied to the assets transferred by Mrs. Kimbell's trust to the
partnership, holding that the bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration exception
precluded the application of § 2036. In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit set forth an excellent
analysis of both the "bona fide sale" and the "adequate and full consideration" language of
§ 2036.
As to what constitutes a "bona fide sale" in the context of the creation of an
entity, the court held that "what is required for the transfer by Mrs. Kimbell to the Partnership to
qualify as a bona fide sale is that it be a sale where the decedent/transferor actually parted with
her interest in the assets transferred and the partnership/transferee actually parted with the
partnership interest in exchange." Id. at *6. The Fifth Circuit noted several "objective facts"
that supported the taxpayer's position that the transfer to the partnership was a bona fide sale.
Those facts included:
(1)
Mrs. Kimbell retained sufficient assets outside the partnership for
her support and there was no commingling of Partnership and her personal
assets;
(2)
Partnership formalities were satisfied and the assets contributed to
the partnership were actually assigned to the partnership;
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(3)
The assets contributed to the partnership included working
interests in oil and gas properties which require active management;
(4)
Other credible non-tax reasons for the formation of the partnership
that could not be accomplished via Mrs. Kimbell's trust, which included
protection from creditors, centralized management, keeping the assets in
an entity that would preserve the property as separate property for
descendents, establishing a vehicle to manage the assets if something
should happen to Mrs. Kimbell's son, and providing a dispute resolution
mechanism.

Id. at *8.
As to what constitutes full and adequate consideration in connection with the
creation of an entity, the court held that the proper focus is:
(1)
Whether the interests credited to each of the partners was
proportionate to the fair market value of the assets partner contributed to
the partnership;

(2)
Whether the assets contributed by each partner to the partnership
were properly credited to the respective capital accounts of the partners;
and
(3)
Whether on termination or dissolution of the partnership the
partners were entitled to distributions from the partnership in amounts
equal to their respective capital accounts.
!d. at *7.
K.

Lappo v. Commissioner.

In Lappa v Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 333 (2003), taxpayer made three
gifts of limited partnership interests in a partnership holding marketable securities (primarily
municipal bonds) and real estate. The April, 1996 gifts consisted of a 66.80917% limited
partnership interest to a trust, and four .6680917% limited partnership interests to grandchildren.
The July, 1996 gift was a 29.2184632% limited partnership interest to taxpayer's daughter.
The experts and the Court used the net asset value approach to determine the fair
market value of the transferred interests, and reduced the proportionate net asset value by
discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability. The parties disagreed as to the
appropriate size of the lack of control and lack of marketability discounts.
The lack of control discount was determined by the Court using a weighted
average of the individual discount factors for each category of assets owned by the partnership
(i.e., marketable securities and real estate). In determining the appropriate lack of control
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discount, both parties' experts applied the closed-end fund analysis in determining the
marketable securities component of the lack of control discount. The parties agreed to use the
IRS's slightly higher net asset values for the marketable securities. The IRS's expert determined
a 9.5% lack of control discount for this component. The taxpayer's expert determined a
7.5% discount for this component. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) stated that "fairness"
dictated that since the parties agreed to use the IRS's slightly higher NAVs for marketable
securities, that the IRS's 8.5% minority interest discount should be using in valuing in
determining the lack of control discount for this component.
In determining the lack of control discount for the real estate component of the
partnership portfolio, the taxpayer's expert relied on the discounts observed in the sales of
interests in real estate limited partnerships. The Court noted that none of the real estate
partnerships were comparable to the partnership's portfolio of real estate. Therefore, the Court
focused on the lack of control discount by reference to comparable real estate investment trusts.
Taking guidance from academic studies on private placement discounts, the Court concluded that
a 17.6% liquidity premium would be warranted in connection with real estate investment trusts,
resulting in a 19% minority interest discount for the partnership's real estate component.
Applying the weighted averages of the lack of control discount factors, the Court held that an
overall lack of control discount of 15% was appropriate in determining the value of the
transferred limited partnership interests.
In determining the appropriate lack of marketability discount, the Court relied on
private placement analyses prepared by Mukesh Bajaj and Hertzel & Smith (which the median
discount observed was 21 %) and concluded, based on partnership specific factors, that a
24% lack of marketability discount should be used to value the transferred interests. Applying
the lack of control and lack of marketability discount sequentially, the Court reduced the
proportionate net asset value by combined discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability
of approximately 35.4%.

L.

Peracchio v. Commissioner.

In Peracchio v Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 412 (2003) Taxpayer transferred
limited partnership interests in a family limited partnership to a family trust in two separate
transactions. In the first transaction, the taxpayer transferred a 45.47% limited partnership
interest by gift. In the second transaction, the taxpayer transferred a 53.48% limited partnership
interest to the trust in exchange for a promissory note in the amount of $646,764 (which taxpayer
believed was the fair market value of the transferred interest). The transactions occurred on the
same day. The taxpayer reported the fair market value of the transfers based upon a combined
40% discount from net asset value for lack of control and lack of marketability.
In the notice of deficiency, the IRS argued that the partnership lacked economic
substance and should be disregarded for gift tax purposes, the partnership agreement should be
treated as a restriction on the right to sell or use the property of the partnership which should be
disregarded under § 2703, that the provision in the partnership agreement restricting a limited
partner's ability to liquidate his interest should be treated as an applicable restriction under
§ 2704(b) which must be disregarded in determining the gift tax value of the transferred interests,
and that no discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability were warranted. At trial, the

D - 41

IRS abandoned the first three arguments and modified its position with respect to the valuation
argument to "allow" for a 4.4% discount for lack of control and a 15% discount for lack of
marketability based upon the IRS's experts' valuation opinion.
The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) found that the parties use of publicly traded,
closed-end mutual funds was an appropriate method by which to determine the lack of control
discount. The Court used the weighted mean discount from a representative sample of
closed-end funds and determined that a 6% lack of control discount was appropriate. The Court
also concluded that a 25% lack of marketability discount was warranted in valuing the interest
transferred, which represented the upper limit of the IRS's range of justifiable discounts. The
combined discount for lack of control and lack of marketability applied was 29.5%.
M.

Estate ofStone v. Commissioner.

In Estate ofStone v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 551 (2003), the Tax Court (Judge
Chiechi) held that § 2036 did not apply to two partnerships created by Mr. and Mrs. Stone and
their four children several months before Mr. and Mrs. Stone died. In Stone, five separate
limited partnerships were funded in April of 1997. The purpose of the partnerships was to create
a vehicle for managing Mr. and Mrs. Stone's assets, as well as help resolve ongoing disputes and
litigation among Mr. and Mrs. Stone's four children. Each child was a co-general partner of one
of four partnership holdings certain assets. A fifth partnership was also created with additional
assets. The children funded their capital contribution to the partnerships through assets given to
them by Mr. and Mrs. Stone. The gifts were disclosed on timely filed gift tax returns. Mr. Stone
died in May of 1997. Mrs. Stone died in 1998.
The IRS originally asserted various alternative arguments to essentially ignore the
existence of the partnerships. Those arguments included substance over form, lack of economic
substance, gift on formation and § 2036(a)(I). The arguments other than § 2036(a)(1) were
dropped before trial. In addressing the IRS's § 2036 argument, the Court opined that three
elements were required: (1) a transfer of property by the decedent; (2) the transfer was other
than a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth; and (3)
decedent retained possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property
transferred.
The Court's analysis focused on the second element of § 2036; that is, whether
the transfers of assets to the partnerships were other than a bona fide sales for an adequate and
full consideration. The Court distinguished this case from the prior decisions in Harper,
Reichardt, Thompson and Strangi. The Court noted that the Stone partnerships were created as a
results of arms-length negotiations in which each member of the Stone family (including the
parents) was represented by his or her independent counsel. The Court found that th'e transfers to
the partnerships "were motivated primarily by investment and business concerns relating to the
management of certain of the respective assets of Mr. Stone and Mrs. Stone during their lives
and thereafter and the resolution of the litigation among the children." The Court noted that each
of the partnerships had economic substance and operated as joint enterprises for profit though
which the children actively participated in the management. The Court thus held that transfers of
assets to the partnerships by Mr. and Ms. Stone did not constitute a circuitous "recycling of
value".
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In addition, the Court found that the initial transfers to the partnerships by
Mr. and Mrs. Stone did not result in gifts to the other partners. The Court noted that the
partnership interests received were proportionate to the assets contributed, the assets transferred
by each partner were properly credited to the partner's capital accounts, and upon termination or
dissolution, the partners were entitled to distributions equal to their respective capital accounts.
The IRS, on the other hand, argued that the partnership interests received by Mr. and Mrs. Stone
did not constitute adequate or full consideration after taking into account appropriate discounts in
the values ofthe partnership interest. The Court rejected this argument, stating:
Respondent's argument in effect reads out of section 2036(a) the
exception for a 'bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth' in any case where there is bona fide,
arms'-length transfer of property to a business entity (e.g., a
partnership or a corporation) for which the transferor receives an
interest in such entity (e.g., a partnership interest or stock) that is
proportionate to the fair market value of the property transferred to
such entity and the determination of the value of such an interest
takes into account appropriate discounts. We reject such an
argument by respondent that reads out of section 2036(a) with the
exception that Congress expressly rejected when it enacted the
statute. . .. Respondent's argument about the discounted value of
the partnership interest at issue also ignores the fact that each of the
five partnerships were created, funded, and operate as a joint
enterprise for profit for the management of its assets in which there
was a genuine pooling of property and services.
Thus, the Court held that IRC § 2036 did not apply because the bona fide sale for a full and
adequate consideration exception was met.

v.

DEFINED VALUE OR FORMULA TRANSFERS.

In an environment where the continued long-term existence of the federal estate
tax has become uncertain, estate planners are discovering that clients are becoming hesitant to
engage in transfer tax planning transactions that trigger a substantial gift tax. One of the
techniques increasingly used by planners to attempt to cap gift tax exposure with respect to a gift
or sale transaction involving a hard to value asset is a formula clause. These clauses are
designed to limit the transferor's gift exposure by either adjusting the value of the interest
transferred to the extent a different value is "finally determined for gift tax purposes" (a "value
adjustment clause") or specifying the dollar value of the interest transferred (a "defined value
clause"). 16

16

See, e.g., Moore, Attempting to Achieve Finality in Potentially "Open" Transactions, U. OF MIAMI INST. ON
EST. PLANNING 13 EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 83 (1988); Moore and Buchanan, Valuation and Readjustment Clauses:
What's Possible?, 45 TH NYU TAX INST. (1987); McCaffrey and Kalik, Using Valuation Clauses to Avoid Gift Taxes,
125 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 47 (Oct. 1986).
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In the typical valuation case, the taxpayer simply argues that the value determined
by the appraiser is correct. With a formula clause, the taxpayer possesses additional arguments
to avoid the imposition of transfer tax.

A.

Value Adjustment Clauses.

There are generally two types of value adjustment clauses. The first type of
clause provides that if it is finally determined for transfer tax purposes that the value of the
property transferred exceeds a specified dollar amount (e.g., by agreement with the IRS or by a
court decision), the size of the transferred interest is reduced so that the value of the property
transferred equals the specified dollar amount. The second type of clause, rather than adjusting
the size of the transferred interest, requires the transferor to give additional consideration to the
transferor equal to the difference between the value of the interest as finally determined for
transfer tax purposes and the specified dollar amount.
The IRS has taken the position that such clauses should be ignored for transfer tax
purposes, asserting that the clauses are against public policy because they are a condition
subsequent to the transaction that render any audit or litigation regarding value meaningless.
The IRS claims that the clauses waste both the IRS's and the court's time, because once a
determination is made that the value of the transferred property is higher than the taxpayer
believed, the formula clause kicks in to adjust the transaction so that no gift tax is owed.
Taxpayers assert that such clauses provide the taxpayer with certainty as to the tax they owe in a
given transaction, and are designed with the very admirable goal of avoiding valuation disputes
with the IRS. Over the years, several value adjustment clauses have been tested in the courts,
with the results generally favoring the IRS's position that the gift tax consequences of the
transfer should be determined without regard to the clause.
The validity of value adjustment clauses was first addressed in Comm 'r v.
Procter, 142 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1944). In Procter, the taxpayer transferred property and provided
in the transfer document that if it were determined by a final judgment of a court of last resort
that any part of the transfer was subject to gift tax, the property subject to gift tax would be
deemed excluded from the transfer and would remain the transferor's property. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the provision did not eliminate the taxable gift because it
imposed a condition subsequent that violated public policy. The court determined that the
provision would be "trifling with the judicial process" and would inhibit tax collection since
attempts to enforce the tax would defeat the gift. Moreover, the court held that giving effect to
the provision would obstruct justice because courts would have to pass on a tax issue that
became moot once the decision was rendered.
In Ward v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 78 (1986), the Tax Court held that a gift of shares of
stock of a closely-held corporation which the donor reserved the right to revoke the gift to the
extent the value of each share was "finally determined for federal gift tax purposes ..." to
exceed $2,000 would be disregarded for purposes of determining the amount of the gift. The
Tax Court opined that the transaction was a gift subject to a power of revocation exercisable
upon the occurrence of an event beyond the control of the donor. Because the donor had no
control over the possible revocation of the gift, the court determined that the donor parted with
all dominion and control over the transferred property and that there was a completed gift of the
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entire property. Moreover, the Tax Court also determined that the clause violated public policy
under the analysis set forth in Procter. The Tax Court also ignored valuation adjustment clauses
in Harwood v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 239 (1984), ajf'd, 786F.2d 1174 (1986), and Estate of
McClendon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 946 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 477
(5 th Cir. 1995).
Taxpayers, however, are not without a court victory upholding a value adjustment
clause. In King v. United States, 545 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1976), the taxpayer sold stock to trusts
for his children for $1.25 per share, a price the taxpayer believed to be equal to its then fair
market value. The sales agreements provided that "if the fair market value . . . as of the date
of ... [the agreement] is ever determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be greater than the
fair market value determined in the. . . manner described above, the purchase price shall be
adjusted to the fair market value determined by the Internal Revenue Service." The IRS took the
position that the shares were worth more than $1.25 per share, and that the price adjustment
clause was ineffective. The Tenth Circuit rejected the IRS's argument, holding that the taxpayer
had not made a taxable gift. The court distinguished the case from Procter since the sole
purpose of the Procter clause was to rescind the transaction in the event it was determined to be
a taxable gift. The King court stated that
Here, there was at no time or in any wayan attempt to alter or
negate the plain terms of the valuation clause and no attempt by the
trustees to reconvey the stock to King or to cancel the note in
anticipation of an unfavorable valuation ruling. Authorities relied
upon by the Government dealing with contingencies which, upon
fruition, alter, change or destroy the nature of the transaction do
not apply here. The proviso for adjustment of the purchase price
of the stock to equal its fair market value did not effect the nature
of the transaction.
Id. at 705. The Tenth Circuit found that the King clause had a proper purpose; that is, "an
attempt to avoid valuation disputes with the Internal Revenue Service agents by removing
incentive to pursue such questions is not contrary to public policy in the absence of a showing of
abuse."

B.

Value Definition Clauses.

Although value definition clauses have the same dispute avoidance goal as value
adjustment clauses, they operate very differently. Rather than adjusting the value of a gift after
an adverse determination, a value definition clause seeks to specify the value of the transferred
interests at the time of the transfer. For example, if a transferor desires to give a $1 million
interest in an entity to a child, the transfer document would specify that the transferor assigns to
his child that number of shares having a fair market value of $1 million on the date of the gift.
Until recently, the IRS has not focused on value definition clauses in the same manner that it
focused on adjustment clauses. But in FSA 200122011, the IRS took the position that value
definition clauses are also void against public policy under the same theories as set forth in
Procter, Ward, and their progeny.
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The application of Procter and Ward to value definition clauses is directly at issue
in McCord v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. No. 13 (May 14, 2003). In McCord, the taxpayers made a gift
of their 82% limited partnership interests to a group consisting of their sons, generation-skipping
trusts for the benefit of each son's family line, and two charities. The gift was made using a
value definition clause in which the taxpayers specified that their sons and the trusts,
collectively, had the right to receive that portion of the transferred interest having a fair market
value of $6.9 million with the remainder of the interests passing to the charities. The taxpayers
left it up to the donees to determine what portion of the 82% interest passed to the sons and the
trusts (i.e. what portion of the interest had a fair market value of $6.9 million), and what portion
passed to the charities. After the gift was made and after an appraisal was obtained, the donees
entered into an arm's length agreement as to the percentage interest each received in a document
entitled "Confirmation Agreement."
The partnership redeemed the charities' interests
approximately seven months after the gifts.
The IRS argued that the value of the partnership interests transferred by the
McCords was substantially greater than that set forth in the gift tax return. Relying on Procter,
the IRS also asserted that the defined value clause should be ignored. As to the value definition
clause, the taxpayers countered that the clause should be respected, asserting that the gift tax is
based upon the state law property rights transferred (see United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51
(1958).), and that the rights transferred to the sons and the trusts under the assignment agreement
were the right to receive, collectively, interests in the partnership having a fair market value of
$6.9 million. Thus, the value of the gift to the sons and the trusts was equal to $6.9 million.
The taxpayers also argued that clauses similar to the defined value clauses used to
transfer the 82% interest are commonly used in other areas and have been approved by the IRS.
Using such clauses, a donor can define the amount of a transfer that is subject to tax and ensure
that the remainder is either entitled to a deduction from such tax or is not subject to such tax.
See, e.g., Rev. Proc.64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682 (defined value formula for funding the marital
deduction). See also Treas. Reg. 25.2518-3(c) (defined value formula for pecuniary disclaimer).
Similarly, the treasury regulations specifically sanction using formula allocations of GST
exemption to ensure that a generation-skipping transfer is exempt frQm GST tax or that a
generation-skipping trust has an inclusion ratio of zero. See Treas. Reg. §§ 26.2632-1(b)(2),
26.2632-1(d)(I). Likewise, the regulations permit the use of formula clauses in determining the
amount passing to charity under a charitable trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(a)(l)(iii) (percentage of
initial fair market value as finally determined for federal tax purposes); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.664-3(a)(l)(iii) (adjustments in annuity amounts if incorrect determination of fair market
value has been made). See also Rev. Rul. 72-392, 1972-2 C.B. 340, 344, modified by Rev.
Rul. 80-123, 1980-1 C.B. 205; Rev. Rul. 82-128, 1982-2 C.B. 71. The IRS has even recognized
the validity of a value definition clause in its pronouncements. T.A.M. 8611004 (Nov. 15,
1985).
The taxpayer also distinguished Procter and its progeny because the cases
involved formula clauses that attempted to adjust the terms of a gift after the gift was made. In
those cases, assets were purported to be transferred in such a way that, if it was determined by
the IRS or the court that a portion of the transfer would be subject to gift tax, the transaction was
adjusted after-the-fact such that those portions were no longer subject to gift tax. See, e.g.,
Procter, 142 F.2d at 827; Ward, 87 T.C. at 114. Contrasting the case with Procter, the value of
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the interests transferred under the McCord defined value clause to the sons and the trusts were
readily determinable, and were not subject to change. The sons and the trusts were entitled,
collectively, to the first $6.9 million of transferred interests. The value of the transfer to the sons
and the trusts was unaffected by any determination by the court or by the IRS. The taxpayers
were simply trying to determine and establish with certainty, through the use of a formula clause
specifying the dollar value of the interest in the partnership passing to each donee, the amount of
gift tax that would result from the transfers. The taxpayers argued that the property rights
transferred by the taxpayers to the sons and the trusts -- the right to receive assignee interests in
the partnership with a fair market value of $6.9 million -- were clearly set forth in the assignment
agreement and should be given effect for purposes of calculating the taxpayers' gift tax. See
Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940).
As noted above, a formula clause will provide the taxpayer additional arguments
against the IRS in a valuation dispute involving a hard-to-value asset. In McCord, the value
definition clause provided the taxpayers with two arguments in addition to asserting that the
appraisal value was correct: namely, that (i) the fair market value of the gift was fixed by the
valuation adjustment clause; and (ii) since the best evidence of value is the price at which an
interest in the entity would change hands between a buyer and a seller in an arm's-length
transaction, the value agreed upon by the donee's when determining the interests each were
entitled to receive is the best evidence of value. Of course, the taxpayers argued that the value
determined by the taxpayers' appraiser was correct.
On May 14, 2003, the Tax Court issued its opinion in McCord v. Comm'r,
120 T.C. No. 13 (May 14, 2003). The Tax Court rejected the IRS's claim that the charitable
deduction should be limited by the amount that the charity received because either the substance
over form doctrine, public policy considerations, or the integrated transaction doctrine.
However, a majority of the Tax Court found that the charity received a specific partnership
interest equal to 5.1208888%, which was the amount that the charities received collectively in
the confirmation agreement signed between all of the donees (but not Mr. and Mrs. McCord)
several months after the partnership interests were transferred.
The majority's decision interpreted the assignment agreement under Texas law.
Specifically, the Court stated that
Whenever the concept of "property" is relevant for Federal tax
purposes, it is State law that defines the property interest to which
Federal tax consequences attach. E.g., United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274, 278-279 (2002) (Federal tax lien attaches to property
held, under State law, as tenants by the entireties). Thus, in order
to determine the Federal gift tax consequences that attach to
petitioners' assignment of the gifted interest, we look to applicable
State law to determine the extent of the rights transferred. Because
petitioners transferred interests in a Texas limited partnership,
Texas law governs our determination in that regard.
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· .. In essence, petitioners [donors] contend that because (l) they
transferred to CFT [the residual charity] a portion of the gifted
interest corresponding to the excess of the fair market value of that
interest over $7,044,933, and (2) we have determined the fair
market value of the gifted interest to be $9,883,832, it follows from
the maxim beginning this paragraph that they are entitled to a
charitable contribution deduction in the amount of $2,838,899 for
their gift to CFT. Because the assignment agreement does not
equate the term "fair market value" with the term "fair market
value as finally determined for Federal gift tax purposes,"
petitioners' [property law] argument must fail.

By way of the assignment agreement, petitioners transferred to
CFT the right to a portion of the gifted interest. That portion was
not expressed as a specific fraction of the gifted interest (e.g.,
one-twentieth), nor did petitioners transfer to CFT a specific
assignee interest in MIL (e.g., a 3-percent assignee interest).
Rather, CFT was to receive a fraction of the gifted interest to be
determined pursuant to the formula clause contained in the
assignment agreement. The formula clause provides that CFT is to
receive that portion of the gifted interest having a fair market value
equal to the excess of (1) the total fair market value of the gifted
interest, over (2) $7,044,933.
The formula clause is not
self-effectuating, and the assignment agreement leaves to the
assignees the task of (1) determining the fair market value of the
gifted interest and (2) plugging that value into the formula clause
to determine the fraction of the gifted interest passing to CFT.

The assignment agreement provides a formula to determine
not only CFT's fraction of the gifted interest but also the
symphony's and the children's (including their trusts') fractions.
Each of the assignees had the right to a fraction of the gifted
interest based on the value of that interest as determined under
Federal gift tax valuation principles. If the assignees did not agree
on that value, then such value would be determined (again based
on Federal gift tax principles) by an arbitrator pursuant to the
binding arbitration procedure set forth in the partnership
agreement. There is simply no provision in the assignment
agreement that contemplates the allocation of the gifted interest
among the assignees based on some fixed value that might not be
determined for several years. Rather, the assignment agreement
contemplates the allocation of the gifted interest based on the
assignees' best estimation of that value. Moreover, each of the
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assignees' percentage interests was determined exactly as
contemplated in the assignment agreement (without recourse to
arbitration), and none can complain that they got any less or more
than petitioners [donors] intended them to get. Had petitioners
[donors] provided that each donee had an enforceable right to a
fraction of the gifted interest determined with reference to the fair
market value ofthe gifted interest as finally determined for Federal
gift tax purposes, we might have reached a different result.
However, that is not what the assignment agreement provides.
Of course, the assignees' determination of the fair market value of
the gifted interest, while binding among themselves for purposes of
determining their respective assignee interests, has no bearing on
our determination of the Federal gift tax value of the assignee
interests so allocated...
The majority thus concluded that the donor was entitled to a charitable deduction
equal to $594,743. This amount was higher than the dollar figure the charities received when
their interests were redeemed six months after the assignment.
Judges Laro and Vasquez dissented, finding that under the IRS's common law
arguments they would have allowed a deduction for only the amount actually received by the
charity in the redemption.
Judges Chiechi and Foley concurred in part and dissented in part. They rejected
the majority's interpretation of the assignment agreement under Texas law. Both also found, in
separate concurring opinions, that the assignment agreement should govern the property rights
transferred to the donees and that under Texas property law, the value of the gift to the taxable
donees was $6,910,933 -- the amount specified in the assignment agreement.
McCord is now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

VI.

IRS ATTACKS ON SALES TO DEFECTIVE GRANTOR TRUSTS.

A favorite technique of estate planners in recent years involves the sale of
interests in a partnership or LLC to an intentionally defective grantor trust. A "defective"
grantor trust is not a poorly drafted trust agreement, but rather is an irrevocable trust in which the
trust income is taxed to the grantor instead of to the trust or its beneficiaries. See IRC The trust
assets, however, are not included in the grantor's taxable estate upon the grantor's death.
A gift to a defective grantor trust is subject to gift taxes. To avoid the payment of
gift taxes, many practitioners advise the grantor to sell closely-held interest to the defective
grantor trust for either a demand note or a term note. Most practitioners believe that if the
transaction is 90% leveraged by the note (e.g., the trust has $1 million in assets after the sale, but
owes the grantor $900,000 in the form of a note), there is an informal "safe harbor" and the sale
transaction and the notes will not be ignored. The note is often secured by the assets of the trust,
including the partnership interests sold. Since the grantor is considered to be the owner of the
assets of the trust, the sale is not considered an exchange, sale or disposition between separate
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taxpayers for federal income tax purposes and the grantor is not required to recognize gain or
loss on the sale. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (transfer of trust assets to the grantor in
exchange for the grantor's unsecured promissory note is not recognized as a sale for federal
income tax purposes).
There are two primary benefits to "defective grantor trust" treatment. First, since
the grantor is treated as the owner of the trust for income tax purposes, the grantor will be taxed
on the trust income. Although no one likes to pay income taxes, the technique allows the grantor
to transfer substantial value to the trust and its beneficiaries in the form of income tax payments
that would otherwise be borne by either the trust or its beneficiaries. 17 Second, to the extent that
the grantor makes a sale to the defective grantor trust, the grantor has essentially frozen the
transfer tax value of the assets transferred, except to the extent that the interest paid on a note
received in the sale transaction exceeds the income taxes the grantor pays on the trust income.
In conjunction with its recent attacks on the use of family limited partnerships and
LLCs for estate planning purposes, the I.R.S. has taken a closer look at transactions involving
sales to defective grantor trusts. In the recently filed Tax Court case of Karmazin v. Comm'r,
Tax Court Docket No. 002127-03, the I.R.S. has challenged a 1999 sale of interests in a family
limited partnership under a defined value formula clause to two defective grantor trusts in
exchange for promissory notes. The promissory notes were secured by the partnership interests
owned by the trust.
The I.R.S. challenged the existence of the partnership for transfer tax purposes
(and thus the lack of control and lack of marketability discounts used to value the interests in the
partnership) under a number of theories. First, the I.R.S. sought to disregard the partnership
under a lack of economic substance theory, alleging that there were no "legitimate negotiations
among the parties before the execution of the limited partnership agreement." Second, the I.R.S.
also claimed that the partnership lacked a valid business purpose, asserting that there was no
history of business activity and no "tax independent motivation." Third, the I.R.S. asserted that
the partnership should be disregarded under applicable state law because it lacked the business
purpose required under the law of the state in which the partnership was organized. Fourth, the
I.R.S. argued that I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2) could be applied to ignore the partnership. With the
exception of the state law argument, the Tax Court has rejected similar attempts to disregard the
existence of the entity in its decisions in Strangi I and Knight v. Comm 'r.
As to the promissory notes, the I.R.S. asserted that the debt was, in reality, equity
in the partnership and should be treated as such, resulting in the imposition of additional gift
taxes. The I.R.S. based its argument on its claim that (1) there was no personal guaranty from
17

The I.R.S. has taken the position in at least of one its pronouncements that the grantor trust treatment can
result in gift tax liability to the grantor if the trust does not contain a provision requiring the trustee to reimburse the
grantor for income taxes paid on the trust income that exceeded the income actually received by the grantor. See
PLR 9444033 (August 5, 1994). Most practitioners, however, do not believe that this position is consistent with the
law in this area because there is strong authority against it. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Hogle, 165 F.3d 352 (10th Cir.
1947) (trust income attributable to the grantor cannot be the basis for gift tax liability, noting that there can only be a
gift when there is a transfer). See also, Comm'r v. Beck, 129 F.2d 243 (2 nd Cir. 1941) (grantor could not reduce the
value of transfer to trust for gift tax purposes by the amount of income taxes he was required to pay on the trust's
income).
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the beneficiaries of the trust on the 100% financing, (2) the partnership's cash flow was
incapable of servicing the debt obligation, and (3) the partnership agreement provided
preferential distribution rights to the trusts to service the promissory note payments.
The I.R.S. also argued that as a result of the sale transaction, the taxpayer kept
"applicable retained interests" as defined under I.R.C. § 2701 18 in the form of promissory notes
that should be reclassified as equity. But see PLR 9535026 (Service determined that notes issued
by defective grantor trusts were debt and retained interests). The I.R.S. claimed that the notes
had special preferential "distribution rights" under the partnership agreement that were not a
"qualified payment right" under § 2701 and the distribution right was in fact "an extraordinary
payment right" which constituted a right to receive preferential distribution rights in cash flow
and liquidation under I.R.C. § 2701. Finally, the I.R.S. argued that the sale of partnership
interests for a note was in essence a gift with a retained life estate which was not a "qualified
interest" under I.R.C. § 2702. 19 The taxpayer challenged the I.R.S. 's position by filing a petition
in the Tax Court on February 10, 2003. Shortly before trial, the IRS conceded the issues
regarding the valuation of the partnership and the notes, and settled the valuation at less than 5%
of the original asserted deficiency.
The attacks to the sale transactions are not limited to the Karmazan case. In
several cases I have currently pending at I.R.S. Appeals, the Service has sought to ignore the
existence of promissory notes issued by defective grantor trusts in exchange for interests in a
partnership. In those cases, the I.R.S. has asserted that the "economic realities of the
arrangement ... do not support a part sale," and that a gift occurred equal to the value of the
interests in the partnership transferred, unreduced by the consideration received by the grantor in
the form of a fully secured promissory note. Of course, the I.R.S. ignored Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-a, which provides that the federal gift tax only applies to "sales, exchanges and other
dispositions of property for consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred
by the donor exceeds the value in money or money's worth of the consideration given therefor."
In several cases the Tax Court has outlined the factors to be considered in
determining whether a promissory note will be considered a bona fide transaction and, thus,
respected for tax purposes. In Estate of Deal v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 730 (1958), the Court found
that whether the transfer of properties was a gift or sale depends upon whether, as part of
18

Under I.R.C. § 2701, an "applicable retained interests" is any interest in a corporation or partnership if the
interest provides the holder with either (1) a distribution right, but only if the transferor and the transferor's
applicable family members control the entity immediately before the transfer, or (2) a liquidation, put, call, or
conversion right, whether or not the transferor and applicable family members hold control of the entity. A
"distribution right" is (a) a right to distributions from a corporation with respect to its stock, or (b) a right to
distributions from a partnership with respect to a partner's interest in the partnership, in each case other than a right
to distributions with respect to an interest of an equity class that is the same or subordinate to the transferred
interests, and other than a right to receive a guaranteed payment within the meaning of I.R.C. § 707(c) of a fixed
amount. Debt is not included as an applicable retained interest.
19

Section 2702 provides the method for valuing a gift in trust when a gift is to or for the benefit of a member
of the transferor's family and the donor or an applicable family members retains an interest in the gifted property.
Section 2702(a)(2) provides that, in general, the value of any retained interest that is not a qualified interest shall be
treated as being zero. Thus, since the note was deemed not to be a qualified interest, the value of the gift was equal
to the fair market value of the partnership interests transferred, less zero.
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prearranged or preconceived plan, the donor intended to forgive the notes that were received at
the time of the transfer. See alsoFSA 1355722 (1992) (a finding of preconceived intent to
forgive the notes relates to whether valuable consideration was received and, thus, whether the
transaction was in reality a bona fide sale or disguised gift. In Estate ofHolland v. Comm'r, 73
T.C. (CCH) 3236 (1997), the Tax Court stated that the determination of whether a transfer was
made with the real expectation of repayment and an intention to enforce the debt depends on "all
facts and circumstances including whether: (1) there was a promissory note or other evidence of
indebtedness, (2) interest was charged, (3) there was security or collateral, (4) there was a fixed
maturity date, (5) a demand for repayment was made, (6) any actual repayment was made,
(7) the transferee had the ability to repay, (8) any records maintained by the transferor and/or
transferee reflected the transaction as a loan, and (9) the manner in which the transaction was
reported for Federal tax is consistent with the loan." The factors are not exclusive, and no one
factor controls. The courts look to the various factors to provide a legal basis upon which it
makes its factual determination of whether a bona fide indebtedness existed.
Although the positions taken by the I.R.S. in Karmazin and in my cases involve,
in my opinion, a real stretch of the facts and the law, these cases illustrate the fact that the I.R.S.
is beginning to challenge sales of closely-held interests to defective grantor trusts under a
number of alternative theories. Despite these I.R.S. challenges, the sale of closely-held interests
to a defective grantor trust continues to be an effective estate planning tool. However, to avoid
any attempt by the I.R.S. to challenge the sales and recharacterize the notes issued by the trust in
the transaction, practitioners should keep the following thoughts in mind: (1) the trust should
have sufficient assets to make principal and interest payments when due; (2) although the cash
flow to be received from the interest can be a source of principal and interest payments, greater
expected distribution can effect the value of the interests transferred; (3) make sure that the client
understands that the existence of the notes should be reflected on financial statements and that
interest income and expense must be properly reported; (4) although not necessary, I prefer to
see the notes fully secured; (5) make sure that there is no agreement, explicit or otherwise, that
the taxpayer and the trustee have any intention of treating the notes as anything other than
binding obligations. In sum, the more the transaction mirrors those entered into by parties in
arm's-length deals, the more likely the transaction is to be respected by the I.R.S. and the courts.

VII.

VARIOUS VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS.
A.

Minority Interest and Lack of Marketability.

Most individuals involved in the valuation process are familiar with the standard
minority interest and lack of marketability adjustments which are applied when valuing partial
interests in property. A minority interest discount reflects the fact that the shareholder or owner
of a partial interest who owns less than a majority cannot control managerial decisions, impact
future earnings, control efforts for growth, or establish executive compensation. A lack of
marketability discount is influenced by the speed and efficiency with which an investor can buy
and sell an investment. The value of an interest in a privately held company is not directly
comparable to the value of a similar publicly traded interest because privately held companies
and minority interests in those companies are not actively traded on a stock exchange as are
shares of publicly traded companies. Therefore, the fair market value of an interest in a private
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company is adjusted to reflect its lack of liquidity and lack of a ready market.
Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 217 (1990).

Estate of

Both the minority interest discount and the lack of marketability discount are
factual determinations. Critical to this determination is an appreciation of "the fundamental
elements of value that are used by the investor in making his or her investment decision."
Mandelbaum v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2852, 2864 (1995), affd without opinion,
91 F.3d 124 (1996).
In Estate of Brown v. Commissioner (Tax Court Docket Nos.7492-95 and
14899-96), I asked the IRS to admit through discovery that certain factors the IRS utilized in a
partnership valuation case (Robertson v. Commissioner, Tax Court Docket Nos. 26090-95,
26091-95, and 12782-96) were appropriate for determining the amount of a discount for minority
interest and lack of marketability in determining the value of a limited partnership interest in
another tax court valuation case. In Robertson, the IRS used a 70% combined discount for the
minority interest and lack of marketability in valuing a limited partnership interest which was
purchased by parents from one of their children. The primary asset of the partnership was
non-income producing ranch land. Because the parents paid an amount equal to pro rata net
asset value for the interest, the IRS claimed the parents had made a gift. The case settled shortly
after trial for no deficiency, the IRS apparently deciding that it was not in its best interest to have
a published decision in which it claimed that such a steep discount should be applied. However,
in response to informal discovery in Robertson, the District Counsel of the IRS identified the
following factors which should be considered in determining the fair market value of a minority
interest in a partnership:
The IRS admits that a discount of 70% was used in valuing the
6% limited partnership interest. The IRS believes that there are
many considerations that enter into evaluation of a partnership
interest. Those consideration (sic) include lack of lack of (sic)
marketability and minority interest. The IRS also believes that in
valuing interest in family limited partnerships, such as the
6% interest in [Robertson family partnership], considerations must
be given to other additional factors, including, but not limited to:
management risk, asset risk that arise due to concentration of asset
in one class/or geographic region, limited cash distributions to
partners, limited liquid assets for making distributions, expected
returns, lack of an active organized secondary market for interest,
restrictions on the transfer of interest by partners, concentration of
control over the partnership, the economic outlook for the business
or geographic area the partnership operates in, the partnership's
position in the industry, the partnership's historical profitability,
and expectation of future profitability, values of comparable
interest traded on secondary markets and restrictions on
transferability.
In Brown, I requested that the IRS admit that the considerations set forth above were proper
factors for an appraiser to consider in determining the fair market value of the partnership
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interests owned by Mrs. Brown at the time of her death. The Service responded to my request as
follows:
Admits, but denies any implication that such a listing encompasses
the universe of appropriate factors to consider.
B.

Discounts Applied to Majority Ownership Interests.

Discounts can and do exist in the context of controlling interests. The existence
of the discount for a controlling interest depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case. See Estate of Trenchard v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2164 (1995)
(discount applied to interest in a corporation in which decedent owned 60.92% of voting power);
Estate ofLuton v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994) (lack of marketability discount
of 20% for stock of a corporation owned 78% by the decedent); Estate of Bennett v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1816 (1993) (15% lack of marketability discount for real estate
management company with varied, illiquid assets held in a corporate shell); Estate ofDougherty
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 772 (1990) (25% discount applied to a 100% interest in
corporation that owned real estate, securities, fixed assets and other long term investments).
Various factors may be relevant in determining whether a valuation adjustment is
applicable to controlling interest in a closely held entity. For example, a buy/sell agreement
contained in the corporate charter may restrict the ability of a shareholder to transfer her
interests, creating "a chilling effect on prospective investors." Mandelbaum, 69 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 2866 (1995). Furthermore, the presence of environmental problems may impact marketability.
See Estate ofDesmond v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. 1529 (1999); but see Estate ofPillsbury v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 294 (1992).
A diverse asset mix of assets owned within the controlled entity may affect
marketability (whether it is called a lack of marketability or portfolio discount), since the entire
entity would not likely interest anyone particular buyer. See, e.g., Estate of Bennett v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1816, 1826 (1993) ("We think some discounting is necessary
to find a buyer willing to buy Fairlawn's package of desirable and less desirable properties.");
Estate ofDougherty, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) at 780-81 (Court applied a 10% discount for incremental
management costs and 25% discount for lack of marketability because the assets of the
Corporation were so varied, consisting of real estate and other non-liquid assets); Estate ofLuton
v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994) (decedent owned 78% of a passive real estate
corporation, yet the court still allowed a 20% marketability discount); Estate of Simpson v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2938 (1994) (decedent owned 100% of an investment holding
corporation and the court allowed a 30% marketability discount).
Finally, the existence of the corporate shell itself may affect value (when the
corporation is valued on a net asset basis), since purchasers as a general rule would prefer to
purchase the corporation's assets directly rather than the stock. Such a direct purchase would
avoid hidden corporate liabilities, tax issues involving the corporation, and the need to deal with
the minority interest holders. See, e.g., Bennett, 65 T.C.M. at 1825 ("The corporate form cannot
simply be ignored as the IRS would have us do. The benefits and burdens of corporate form are
often the very reasons upon which the decision to apply or to not apply a discount for lack of
marketability is based."); Gal/un v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1316 (1974) ("[W]e
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believe that the IRS's witness erred in refusing to discount the value of the stock to account for a
corporate entity intervening between the investment assets and the owner of Gallun stock.").
C.

Unrealized Capital Gains.

In Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530 (1998), the Tax Court
recognized the real liability represented by the built-in capital gains tax associated with
appreciated capital assets held in a C corporation for the first time since the repeal of the General
Utilities doctrine. At issue in Davis was the gift tax value of two 25 share blocks of stock (of the
total of 97 shares) of A.D.D. Investment & Cattle Company ("ADDIC") to each of two sons.
ADDIC was a family owned holding company, the assets of which included over 1% of the
issued and outstanding common stock of Winn-Dixie, listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
and assets related to ADDIC's cattle operations. ADDIC assets had a total built-in capital gains
tax liability of $26.7 million, about 96% of the gain being attributable to its Winn-Dixie stock.
The Court allowed a $9 million adjustment for built-in capital gains tax, representing
approximately 1/3 of the total capital gains tax liability on all of the corporate assets. The
petitioner's two experts and the IRS's expert (but not the IRS) believe that an adjustment was
warranted -- that is, awilling buyer and a willing seller would have taken the built-in tax liability
into account in arriving at a purchase price for the stock. The dispute was over the amount of the
adjustment. The Court found that the full amount of built-in tax liability could not be taken as a
discount when there was no evidence that ADDIC planned to liquidate or sell its assets. The
Court concluded that a $9 million discount was properly included as a part of the lack of
marketability discount to be applied in value in the two blocks of stock.
Following quickly on the heels of the Davis decision was the Second Circuit's
decision in Eisenberg v. Commissioner, 155 F.3d 50 (2 d Cir. 1998), reversing a memorandum
decision of the Tax Court. The Appeals Court found that the Tax Court erred in not considering
the built-in capital gains tax as a liability and remanded the case back to the Tax Court to decide
on the amount ofthe liability. This reversal is the last nail in the coffin of the notion that built-in
capital gains taxes should not be considered in valuing C corporations. The IRS has acquiesced
in Eisenberg "to the extent that it holds that there is no legal prohibition against such a discount."
AOD 1999-001.
In Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1383 (1999), the Tax
Court again allowed a discount for unrealized capital gains. In Jameson, the decedent owned a
97% interest in a closely held corporation which had as its primary asset 5,405 acres of
timberland in Louisiana. The fair market value of the timber property was $6 million. Its tax
basis was approximately $200,000. Citing Estate ofDavis, the Court allowed a built-in capital
gains discount. In discussing this opinion, Judge Gayle stated
We may allow the application of a built-in capital gains discount if
we believe that a hypothetical buyer would have taken into account
the tax consequences of built-in capital gains when arriving at the
amount he would be willing to pay for decedent's Johnco stock.
Because Johnco's timber assets are the principal source of the built
in capital gains and, as discussed infra, are subject to special tax
rules that make certain the recognition of the built in capital gains
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over time, we think it is clear that a hypothetical buyer would take
into account some measure of Johnco's built in capital gains in
valuing decedent's Johnco stock.
The Court concluded that since capital gains taxes would be incurred as Johnco's
timber was cut and sold, recognition of the gain was certain to occur independently of any
liquidation that a hypothetical willing buyer of decedent's Johnco stock "would take into account
Johnco's built in capital gains, even if his plans were to hold the assets and cut the timber on a
sustainable yield basis." However the court limited the discount "an amount reflecting the rate at
which they [the capital gains taxes] will be recognized, measured as the net present value of the
built in capital gains tax liability that will be incurred over time as timber is cut."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision. Estate of
Jameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 366 (5 th Cir. 2001). The Court noted that the Tax Court had
"deviated from several criteria of fair market value analysis, including assuming that a buyer was
a strategic buyer who would continue to operate the corporation for timber production,
peremptorily denying a full discount for the accrued capital gains liability based upon the
erroneous assumption that the purchaser would engage in long range timber production." The
Court also noted that the Tax Court had internally inconsistent assumptions, assuming that a
hypothetical purchaser of the stock would engage in long range timber production earning a
14% gross annual rate of return while requiring a 20% rate of return. Since the buyer would be
earning less than his required rate of return, the buyer would either lower the purchase price or
sell the interest quickly and re-deploy the proceeds elsewhere. The Fifth Circuit remanded the
case back to the Tax Court for valuation analysis consistent with its opinion.
In Estate ofDunn v. Commissioner, 301 F.3d 339 (5 th Cir. 2002) the Fifth Circuit
applied a dollar-for~dollar discount for unrealized capital gains when determining the value of a
63.96% interest in a closely-held Texas corporation under an asset-based approach.
At her death, Mrs. Dunn owned 62.96% of Dunn Equipment was family-owned
and operated company in the business of renting heavy equipment to refinery and petrochemical
businesses. Reversing the Tax Court, the Fifth Circuit held, as a matter of law, the $7.1 million
built-in capital gains tax liability of Dunn Equipment's assets must be considered as a
dollar-for-dollar reduction when calculating the asset-based value of Dunn Equipment. 2o The
Court opined that the very definition of the asset-based approach contemplates the
consummation of the sale of the asset being valued, triggering the built-in capital gains tax. The
holding makes rational sense, and should be applied in any asset-based valuation of a
C corporation since the asset-based approach assumes that the buyer is paying for the stock of
the entity based upon the price the buyer could realize for the assets of such entity. Before the
buyer can realize such value, however, the corporate level capital gains tax must be incurred.
D.

Blockage/Market Absorption.

The blockage discount applies to large blocks of property which cannot be placed
on the market at the valuation date without depressing the price. The adjustment would apply to
2020

It did not apply the same reduction when detennining value under the income-based approach.
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any large number of a particular type of asset being valued and which cannot be disposed of in a
short period of time without depressing the market price. The discount has been applied to real
estate, stock, and artwork. The basis for the discount was summarized in the Tax Court
Memorandum decision in Estate ofGrootemaat v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 198 (1979):
Absorption is a price depressant caused by the disposition of the
parcels of land in a short period of time creating competition
among the parcels that might not otherwise exist. ..
The record is clear that the 302 acres owned by GLC in November
of 1971, if valued as a whole, would have a different value than if
the values of the individual parcels were totaled. The disposition
of all of the parcels of land owned by GLC within a reasonably
short period of time would result in the different parcels (or their
subdivisions) being in direct competition with each other. An
abrupt increase in supply would, assuming demand remains
constant, reduce the price for which these parcels or subdivisions
would sell. This element of competition, a price depressant, is not
taken into account in valuing the parcels individually. We
therefore believe the discount for absorption is appropriate.
38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 203. See also Carr v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 507, 513 (1985)
("We agree with Petitioners that a discount [for market absorption] is necessary in order to
reflect the absence of time within which to make an orderly disposition of the property"), and
Estate of Grootemaat v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 198 (1979).
Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2031-2(e).
The discount for market absorption is well recognized in the context of real estate.
Estate ofRogers v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1831 (1999) ("In the case of real estate, the
principles of supply and demand may warrant application of an absorption discount. That is
because the disposition within a reasonable period of time of similar real properties would result
in those being in direct competition with each other and other similar real properties in the
marketplace."); Estate of Folks v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 427, 434 (1982) ("In
simplistic terms, blockage refers to an immediate oversupply of goods which demand (the
market) will not absorb at optimum prices. It is not unreasonable that placing 5 lumberyards on
the market simultaneously in a limited geographical area would depress prices 20 percent");
Brocato v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1999-424 (December 29, 1999) (20% fractional interest and
11 % blockage discount applied in valuing undivided interest in apartment projects).
A discount for blockage has long been recognized in the valuation of publicly
traded securities. See DuPont v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 246, 253, 257 (1943) (finding that
blockage discount of approximately 12% applied for block of 52,900 shares of stock representing
8.48% in the company where average trading volume was 2,323 shares for the month before the
valuation date); Adair v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 705, 711 (1987) (finding that
increasing the market trading by 20% over a six-month period "would certainly have some effect
upon the market").
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E.

Undivided Interests in Real Estate.

The IRS has often asserted that the only discount which should be applied when
determining the fair market value of undivided interests in real property are the costs and
expenses associated with a partition of that property. See PLR 9336002 (May 28, 1993). The
Tax Court has consistently recognized, however, that IRS reliance on partition costs as the sole
basis for the discount is misplaced.
In Estate of van Loben Sels v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 731 (1986), the
Tax Court addressed the question of whether a fractional interest discount should be applied in
valuing the decedent's undivided interests in 79,755 acres of timberland in California. The IRS
contended that no discount was warranted. Id. at 740. Rejecting the IRS's contention, the Court
held that "a discount from the value determined by reference to the fee value is warranted
because of the disabilities associated with decedent's undivided interest. The disabilities include
lack of marketability, lack of management, lack of general control, lack of liquidity, and
potential partitionment expenses." Id. at 742. The Court held that because of the disability
associated with owning an undivided interest in the properties, "a minority discount of 60% is
reasonable in this case." Id. at 743. See also Estate ofForbes v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 2001-72
(March 23, 2001) (30% discount allowed for undivided 42% interest in 5,354 acres of real
property); Williams v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1758 (1998) (44% discount for
undivided interest applied to a one-half undivided interest in approximately 4,600 acres of timber
property in Florida); LeFrak v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1297, 1308-10 (1993) (holding
that a 20% minority interest and 10% lack of marketability discount applied for undivided
interest in New York apartment and office buildings).
In Estate ofBaird v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 666 (2001), the Tax Court
applied a 60% discount in valuing undivided interests in 16 non-contiguous tracts of Louisiana
timber property. In Mr. Baird's estate tax return, the estate claimed a 25% fractional interest
discount. The return was later amended to assert a 50% undivided interest discount.
Mrs. Baird's estate tax return included a 50% undivided interest discount, and was later amended
to assert a 60% discount. At trial, both estates claimed discounts of 60%. One expert of the
taxpayer based his discount upon comparable sales and concluded that a discount of "at least
50% was appropriate." The second expert also relied on comparable sales and concluded that a
55% discount was appropriate. The third expert, James Steel of Monroe, Louisiana, made a
living through buying and selling fractional interests. His report asserted that the discount
should be at least 55%. At trial, he opined that the subject interest should be discounted by 90%.
The Tax Court opined that a 60% discount was appropriate. The Tax Court primarily relied
upon Mr. Steel's "personal knowledge and experience in the marketplace under consideration."

F.

Control Premium.

The rationale for a control premium is that a controlling shareholder has the
power to elect the board of directors, influence corporate policy and directly affect corporate
decision-making. The controlling shareholder may be able to unilaterally direct corporate action,
decide the amount of distribution, rearrange the corporation's capital structure, and decide
whether to liquidate, merge or sell assets. Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.M.
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(CCH) 193,217 (1990). For these reasons, a control premium is usually warranted in evaluating
controlling interests.
In Estate of Salsbury v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1441 (1975), the court
identified the following powers that an owner has in a controlling stock interest: (1) the owner
could elect the entire board of directors; and (2) the owner could, through the power to control
the board, control the business and affairs of the corporation, elect and remove all of the officers,
fix their salaries and control the declaration of dividends. Accordingly, the Court applied a
38.1% control premium to the value of the decedent's shares which constituted a 51.8% voting
interest.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the Tax Court's decision in
Estate ofSimp/ot v. Commissioner. In Estate ofSimp/ot v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 130 (1999),
the Tax Court applied a control premium to the valuation of Class A voting stock in l.R. Simplot
Co., a closely held corporation. At the time of the decedent's death, he owned 23% of the
outstanding shares of voting stock and approximately 2.8% of the non-voting stock. The ratio of
voting shares to non-voting shares was 1 to 1,848. The Tax Court applied a control premium
equal to 3% of Simplot's equity value to the transferred voting shares on the theory that "one day
(but not on the valuation date) the voting characteristics associated with them could have "swing
vote" potential if the hypothetical buyer combined his 18 Class A voting shares with other family
members' "shares" to form a control group."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court's decision on the
grounds that the Tax Court's swing vote theory erroneously ap~lied the willing buyer, willing
seller test. Estate ofSimp/ot v. Commissioner, 249 F.3d 1191 (9t Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit
determined that "the facts applied by the Tax Court were imaginary scenarios as to who a
purchaser might be, how long the purchaser would be willing to wait without any return on his
investment, and what combinations the purchaser might be able to effect with Simplot children
or grandchildren and what improvements in management of a highly successful an outside
purchaser might suggest. 'All of these factors,' i.e., all of these imagined facts, are what the Tax
Court based its 3% premium upon. In violation of the law the Tax Court constructed particular
possible purchasers."
The Ninth Circuit also found that the Tax Court erred by
(1) proportionately applying a control premium to the estate's minority interest in voting stock
based upon a premium applied to all of the voting stock, and (2) failing to show that a purchaser
of the voting stock would be able to use control to an increased economic advantage. The Court
stated "in Richard Simplot's hands at the time of transfer his stock was worth what a willing
buyer would have paid for the economic benefits presently attached to the stock. By this
standard, a minority holding Class A share was worth no more than a Class B share."

G.

Tax Affecting S Corporation Earnings.

In Gross v. Commissioner, 272 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's valuation a minority interest in the stock of a Pepsi Cola
bottling company, an S corporation, which made substantial distributions to its shareholders. In
determining the fair market value of the transferred shares, the Tax Court agreed with the IRS
expert's opinion that no tax should be imputed on the earnings of the S corporation under the

D - 59

discounted cash flow method applied by the expert. The Tax Court also applied the
25% discount for lack of marketability determined by the IRS's expert.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed the Tax Court's
OpInIOn. The majority held that the Tax Court did not commit clear error when it valued the
stock in a manner consistent with the opinion of the IRS expert. The Court opined that the Tax
Court weighed the testimony of the two competing experts and did not clearly err in accepting
one expert's opinion over the other. The majority determined that tax affecting the stream of
income under the facts of the Gross case was not required because of the disagreement among
professional appraisers as to the propriety of employing such a procedure. The Court also opined
that the Tax Court's refusal to tax affect the stock was not unfair to the donors, because (1) the
donors were not justified in relying on internal IRS policy manuals concerning S corporation
stock valuation; (2) there was no evidence that the corporation would lose its sub-chapter S
status; and (3) the IRS was not precluded from taking the approach it did even if tax affecting
had been used in previously approved returns.
The dissent believed that it was error not to tax affect the corporation's stream of
income in determining the fair market value. The dissent focused on the fact that the IRS's
appraiser did not know whether or not (1) real buyers and sellers, and (2) appraisers tax affected
S corporation earnings in 1992 (the year in which the transfer occurred). The dissent also found
persuasive the IRS's pronouncements regarding tax affecting of S corporation earnings and the
treatment of prior gifts made by the donor.
In Estate of Adams v. Commissioner, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (2002), the Tax
Court did not allow of the income stream computed under a discounted cash flow approach to be
adjusted for imputed income taxes on the S corporation's income when determining the fair
market value of a 61.59% interest in a closely-held insurance agency. The Tax Court stated that
"we disagree that [the taxpayer's expert's] estimates of WSA's perspective net cash flows are
before corporate tax because it is appropriate to use a zero corporate tax rate to estimate net cash
flows when the stock being valued is stock of an S corporation."
H.

Tiered Discounts.

The IRS often takes the position that successive or tiered discounts should not be
applied in determining the value of an interest in an entity which in turns owns an interest in
another entity. But both the Tax Court and other courts have recognized the existence of "tiered
discounts" when valuing an interest in a closely held entity. See, e.g., Gow v. Commissioner,
79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1680 (2000) (the court applied combined discounts for lack of control and lack
of marketability in valuing the stock of the top tier entity for 1989 and 1990, respectively, of
44% and 51 %, and 41 % in valuing the interest in the second tier entity); Kosman v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2356 (1996); Dean v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 281
(1960); Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710 (D. Conn. 1954).
VIII. PRIVILEGES IN THE ESTATE PLANNING CONTEXT

Beginning in early 1997, the Internal Revenue Service, through the issuance of
technical advice memoranda and private letter rulings, embarked on a frontal assault on the use
of family limited partnerships and other closely held entities for estate planning purposes. In
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these pronouncements, the National Office of the Internal Revenue Service took the position that
an entity could be completely disregarded for estate and gift tax purposes under the Service's
interpretation of the Tax Court's memorandum decision in Estate of Murphy v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 1990-472 and I.R.C. § 2703. See, e.g., PLR 9736004 (June 6, 1997); PLR 9735043
(June 3, 1997); PLR 9735003 (May 8, 1997); PLR 973004 (ApriI3, 1997); PLR 9725018
(March 20, 1997); PLR 9725002 (March 3, 1997); PLR 9723009 (February 24, 1997). In each
of these pronouncements, the Service took the position that it could completely disregard the
existence of the applicable entity - whether or not that entity was validly created and existing
under state law. In other words, the Service claims that because, in its opinion, the entity at issue
was formed primarily for estate planning purposes, the Service can completely disregard for
federal estate and gift tax purposes the existence of a legal entity in determining the fair market
value of the assets subject to the transfer taxes - regardless of the fact that the asset transferred
was an interest in a closely held entity validly created and existing under state law.
Because of these attacks, IRS requests for documents at the audit level and in
estate tax litigation increasingly include requests for communications with counsel and other
persons involved in the estate planning process seeking to determine the motives for creating the
entity. This is particularly true in the area of buy-sell agreements, family limited partnerships,
and closely-held corporations, where the IRS has become more aggressive in seeking to have
entities ignored for estate tax purposes on the grounds that the entity lacks "business purpose" or
was created solely as a "device" to avoid estate taxes. Attached as Exhibits 1 through 4 are
examples of IRS document requests that have been served on taxpayers over the last several
years in audits involving closely held entities. The requests are extremely intrusive and cover
every aspect of the estate planning and entity administration process.

A.

Preparation for the Transfer Tax Audit or Dispute Begins at the Estate
Planning Level- Anticipate Your Potential Audience.

The typical knee-jerk reaction to a request for documents or correspondence
(particularly documents in a lawyer's file) is to assert all applicable privileges and refuse to
produce the documents. However, the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product
privilege may not protect all contents in your file. More importantly, the production of carefully
drafted estate planning correspondence or similar documents in response to such a request can
actually help you state your case with the examiner or in litigation. With that goal in mind, as
you are working on a client's estate plan, assume that every document prepared by the estate
planning lawyer, the client, the accountant, or any other person involved in the estate planning
process may be reviewed by an IRS agent, appeals officer, district counsel, or ultimate finder of
fact in tax litigation.
Preparation for the transfer tax audit or dispute truly begins at the estate planning
level. When writing letters or internal memoranda, think about how that document will look to
an IRS agent, an appeals officer, or the ultimate finder of fact in tax litigation. Have you focused
on all relevant reasons for the transaction or just the estate and gift tax savings that might be
achieved through the transaction? Advise your client and the client's advisors, such as
accountants or stockbrokers who are involved in the estate planning process, that their
correspondence and their files may also be subject to production in a tax audit or in litigation.
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B.

Understand the IRS's Broad Subpoena Power.

The IRS has broad subpoena powers that can be used to subpoena documents or
compel testimony from a taxpayer, the taxpayer's representative, or a third party. For the
purpose of "ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been
made, or determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax," the IRS is
authorized (i) to examine any books, papers, records, or other data that may be relevant or
material to such inquiry and (ii) to summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the
act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or
required to perform the act, or any other person the IRS may deem proper to produce such books,
papers, records, or other data. I.R.C. § 7602(a).
Subject to any applicable privileges, the IRS can summon the taxpayer, the
taxpayer's attorney, the taxpayer's accountants, and other third parties to produce books, papers,
records, or other data and to testify on matters relevant or material to the IRS's inquiry. This
summons power includes lawyers, accountants, and others involved in the estate planning
process. It also includes doctors or other health care providers. The range of discoverable
documents is also very broad and generally includes all documents in any form (including, for
example, computer files and emails).
1.

Enforcement of Summons.

To enforce a summons, the IRS must show that the summons: (1) was issued for a
legitimate purpose; (2) seeks information relevant to that purpose; (3) seeks information that is
not already within the IRS' possession; and (4) satisfies all administrative steps required by the
United States Code. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). However, the IRS's
broad summons power remains subject to traditional privileges and limitations. United States v.
Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714 (1980). Thus, if the attorney-client privilege attaches to documents
requested by the IRS, the IRS has no right to issue a summons to compel their production.
C.

Understand and Preserve All Privileges.

As noted above, the IRS's subpoena power is limited to nonprivileged material.
Whether or not a privilege exists in the context of an IRS examination is a question of federal
law. Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I (1996); Fed. R. Evid. 501. There are three types of privileges
that may apply to a lawyer's file and correspondence: (i) the attorney-client privilege; (ii) the
attorney work product privilege; and (iii) the tax practitioner's privilege. With respect to
medical records, the doctor/patient privilege and psychotherapist/patient privilege may also come
into play. None of the privileges is as broad as most lawyers believe.
1.

The Attorney-Client Privilege.
a.

What the Privilege Covers.

The attorney-client privilege generally protects the disclosure of confidential
communications between estate planning counsel and the client made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of legal advice. The attorney-client privilege also protects "an
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attorney's advice in response to such disclosures." In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d
1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992).
In addition, "[t]he attorney-client privilege applies to
communications between lawyers and their clients when the lawyers act in a counseling and
planning role, as well as when the lawyers represent their clients in litigation." United States v.
Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1996). Communications with third parties, such as
accountants or financial advisors, that are made to "assist the attorney in rendering advice to the
client" are also generally protected. See United States. v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1499 (2 d Cir.
1995). ("The privilege would extend to an accountant hired by the attorney to assist the attorney
in understanding the client's financial information.")
A privileged communication is "any expression through which a privileged
person ... undertakes to convey information to another privileged person and any document or
other record revealing such an expression." See, e.g., Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 119 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996). Documents protected by the privilege include
those that consist of or reflect communications between the lawyer and the client, as well as the
advice given to the client. Likewise, internal memoranda between attorneys in the same office
representing the same client are covered by the attorney-client privilege. Cedrone v. Unity Sav.
Ass 'n, 103 F.R.D. 423, 429 (RD. Pa. 1984) ("[I]t is inconceivable that an internal memorandum
between attorneys in the same office concerning the representation of a client, utilizing
confidential information provided by that client, could be anything but protected by the
privilege."); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 285 F. Supp. 868, 869
(D. Kan. 1968) (holding that interoffice memorandum between lawyers and communications and
consultations between attorneys representing same party were covered by attorney-client
privilege). Even an attorney's billing records, expense reports, and travel records that reveal
particular areas of research or that reveal the nature of the services provided are protected under
the privilege. In Re: Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that bills,
ledgers, statements, time records, and the like that reveal "the nature of the services provided"
should be privileged).
Courts generally define "client" broadly, even extending the privilege to include
prospective clients who reasonably believe that they are seeking legal advice. The Supreme
Court has also extended the privilege to all corporate employees of a represented taxpayer if the
communications at issue were made by corporate employees to counsel for the corporation
acting as such, at the direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice from counsel
and the "employees ... were aware that they were being questioned so that the corporation could
obtain legal advice." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981).
The attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client. Swindler & Berlin v.
United States, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4214 (June 5, 1998).

b.

What the Privilege Does Not Cover.

Communications with nonclient family members, stock brokers, accountants, or
other third parties that are not made to "assist the attorney in rendering advice to the client" are
generally not privileged. Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1499. "What is vital to the privilege is that the
communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.
If what is sought is not legal advice but only accounting service ... or the advice sought is the
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accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no privilege exists." Id. at 1499, citing United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
Work papers of the attorney that do not constitute or contain communications
from the client, drafts of documents, and correspondence with third parties do not fall within the
attorney-client privilege. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (holding that the
privilege did not attach to "memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by
counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings
which reflect an attorney's material impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories").
In addition, advice rendered in connection with tax return preparation is generally
not privileged. See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496,500 (1999). The Frederick Court's
refusal to apply the attorney-client privilege in the context of return preparation is based on the
theory that return preparation is "accountant's work," whether performed by an accountant or a
lawyer. For lawyers who prepare estate and gift tax returns for estate planning clients, Frederick
is a must read case.
In Frederick, an attorney/accountant claimed the attorney-client privilege for
work papers prepared in the process of preparing tax returns for his individual clients and their
closely held corporations. The Court held that the lawyer's "legal cogitations borne out of his
legal representation" that appeared in the work sheets for the preparation of the tax return would
not be privileged, because of their use in tax return preparation. Id. at 501. Under the Seventh
Circuit's analysis, disclosures made by a client during tax planning might lose their privileged
status if incorporated in any way in work papers leading to the preparation of a tax return by the
same representative.
The situation in Frederick was particularly complex because the attorney knew
that the IRS was investigating the taxpayers and their company with regard to other tax years,
and the attorney was representing the taxpayers' interests in connection with the investigation as
well as preparing their current tax returns. Id. at 501. The tax return work papers could contain
privileged information related to the years under investigation and could have dual purposes litigation preparation and return preparation. The Court held that the "dual purpose" documents
prepared for both tax return preparation and litigation were not privileged because of their
relationship to the tax return.
In addition, the Court dealt with the question of whether documents prepared in
connection with a tax audit are privileged. The Court viewed the audit as "both a stage in the
determination of tax liability, often leading to the submission of revised tax returns, and a
possible antechamber to litigation." Id. at 502. In its original opinion, the Court treated all audit
representation the same way - as not qualifying for the privilege. However, the Court amended
its opinion to provide that if the audit primarily concerns "verifying the accuracy of a return,"
then the audit representation is "accountant's work" whether done by an accountant or a lawyer.
If the taxpayer's lawyer attends the audit "to deal with issues of statutory interpretation or case
law that the revenue agent may have raised" in the audit, then the "lawyer is doing lawyer's work
and the attorney-client privilege may attach." Id.
If the client retains an accountant to deal with verification and an attorney to do
the "lawyer's work," then separating privileged communications from unprivileged
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communications during the audit is easy. Such separate representation is rarely practical. Any
tax practitioner or court trying to separate privileged communications from unprivileged ones in
a tax audit may face a very difficult process of sorting matters out after Frederick.
c.

Waiver.

Beware: even if a document is privileged, that privilege can be waived.
Disclosing otherwise privileged communications between a lawyer and client to third parties
may cause those communications to lose their privileged status. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
Moreover, under the doctrine of subject matter waiver, other communications
related to the disclosed materials may lose their privileged status. Note that communications
with accountants or other advisors, when made "to assist the attorney in rendering advice to the
client," are protected under the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1499;
Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921-24 (holding that privilege may be properly invoked by accountant if
communications were made pursuant to consultative role to attorney and at attorney's direction);
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2 d Cir. 1989) ("Information provided to an
accountant by a client at the behest of his attorney for the purposes of interpretation and analysis
is privileged to the extent that it is imparted in connection with the legal representation."). As
with other communications sought to be protected by the privilege, to invoke the privilege, the
client must establish that the communication with the third party was made "in confidence for
the purpose of obtain legal advice." United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297,298 (9 th Cir, 1973).
In a dispute we handled over whether the Service's summonses were enforceable
in light of privilege issues, a taxpayer argued that a holding of waiver in the context of
communications to and from the client's financial advisors for the purpose of rendering legal
advice to the client in forming a business entity would be contrary to the logic of the principle of
the attorney-client privilege. Segerstrom v. Us., 2001 WL 263449 (N.D. Cal. 2001). In a rare
decision, the Court granted the taxpayer's request to quash summonses, given the facts disclosure to third parties was shown to meet standard if privilege/disclosure.
Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9 th Cir. 1954), would appear to stand for
the contrary proposition. However, such a conclusion ignores the factual setting of Olender,
where the Court found that the only purpose for which the attorney in question there was hired
was to prepare net worth statements and tax returns. Id. at 806. In the estate planning context,
"[t]he attorney-client privilege applies to communications between lawyers and their clients
when the lawyers act in a counseling and planning role, as well as when the lawyers represent
their clients in litigation." United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1501 (9 th Cir. 1996). According
to the Ninth Circuit, "[c]alling the lawyer's advice 'legal' or 'business' advice does not help in
reaching a conclusion [as to whether the communication is protected by the attorney-client
privilege] ... What matters is whether the lawyer was employed with or without 'reference to his
knowledge and discretion in the law' to give his advice." Id. at 1502.

d.

The IRS's View on the Privilege.

In a recent speech at the Texas Federal Tax Institute, B. John Williams, Jr.,
former Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, offered his thoughts on the attorney-client
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privilege and what the Service considers that the privilege does not cover. B. John Williams, Jr.,
Speech to Texas Federal Tax Institute, 2002 TNT 110-29 (June 6, 2002). In the Service's view,
the attorney-client privilege does not cover communications from the advisor unless the
communications from the advisor would reveal confidential client communications.
In addition, the Service considers that any information communicated to an
attorney that will be incorporated into a tax return is not privileged, given that it is intended to be
disclosed to the IRS. According to Mr. Williams, in this regard the privilege does not cover, for
instance, information appearing on a K-1.
Finally, the Service posits that the attorney-client privilege does not protect
preexisting facts, documents, or intra-corporate communications unrelated to the seeking of legal
or tax advice. In this regard, the Service believes that the privilege does not protect the existence
of an attorney-client or practitioner-client relationship or the fees paid, communications made in
connection with providing non-legal services such as accounting or tax preparation activities or
for non-legal advice such as business or accounting advice.

D.

The Attorney Work Product Privilege.

Many lawyers believe that the attorney work product privilege absolutely protects
their file from disclosure to third parties. The work product privilege is actually much narrower;
it only shields from disclosure materials prepared "in anticipation of litigation" by a party or the
party's representative, absent a showing of substantial need. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The
purpose of the doctrine is to establish a zone of privacy for strategic litigation planning and to
prevent one party from piggybacking on the adversary's preparation. See United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
There is no bright line test to determine whether a document has been prepared
"in anticipation of litigation." In the estate planning process, however, it will be difficult to
argue that an estate planning attorney's internal memos or work papers were prepared "in
anticipation of subsequent litigation" with the IRS. See United States v. Adleman, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
85,682 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to apply the work product privilege to an accountant's
memorandum analyzing the "legal ramification of a proposed transaction to determine whether,
despite a likely challenge, the legal risk was acceptable," and holding that "[t]he primary purpose
of these documents was not to prepare for litigation; the primary purpose was to decide whether
or not to go through with a multimillion dollar transaction"). But see, e.g., Adlman, 68 F.3d at
1500-02 (nothing that there is no bar to "application of work product protection to documents
created prior to the event giving rise to litigation").
One court has even held that the power of the IRS to investigate the records of
taxpayers makes doubtful the relevancy of the work product privilege enunciated in Hickman to
a proceeding for the enforcement of an IRS summons. United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174,
176 (5th Cir. 1967) (reasoning that the IRS summons power is broad because all facts are in the
taxpayer's hands).
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1.

The Tax Practitioner's Privilege.

In the Internal Revenue Restructuring Act of 1998, Congress added I.R.C. § 7525,
which extends the attorney-client privilege to confidential communications between taxpayers
and practitioners that would protect the same "communication[s] between a taxpayer and an
attorney." The privilege, however, is limited to (1) "non-criminal tax matters before the Internal
Revenue Service" and (2) "non-criminal tax proceedings in federal court brought by or against
the United States." I.R.C. § 7525. Because the work product doctrine is separate from the
attorney-client privilege, the new privilege provision does not grant the work product privilege to
non-attorney advisors.
Frederick was the first case to address the tax practitioner privilege. The
Frederick court took I.R.C. § 7525 into account in reaching its decision in concluding that,
because the audit services rendered by the lawyer would not have qualified for the attorney-client
privilege before enactment of the new privilege, the new privilege would not apply to the audit
services rendered. Frederick, 182 F3d at 502. Therefore, any information included in the
documents involved in preparation of a tax return or involved in verification of a tax return
during audit may lose either the attorney-client privilege or the new tax practitioner's privilege.

The First Circuit recently reinforced the Frederick court's construction of I.R.C.
§ 7525 in Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F3d 236 (1 st Cir. 2002). In Cavallaro, the First
Circuit upheld the granting of enforcement of summonses issued by the IRS given that
information was disclosed to accountants in a merger deal, and the accountants were providing
accounting services, not facilitating communication of legal advice. The First Circuit reasoned
that an attorney does not render client communications to an accountant privileged merely by
engaging the accountant.
a.

The IRS's View.

According to Mr. Williams, the tax practitioner privilege does not protect details
about a transaction necessary for the IRS to determine whether a significant tax avoidance
purpose exists. Nor does it cover a tax opinion that is marketed to more than one client,
particularly if the opinion is not based on facts supplied by a client, or where hypothetical facts
not used by the client are used to formulate the tax opinion. The Service's rationale is that
because the facts in such an opinion are hypothetical, there is no client communication to be
protected.
2.

The Physician-Patient Privilege.

IRS requests for information increasingly seek access to medical records of a
decedent and interviews with treating physicians. Under state law, a doctor-patient privilege
often protects such information. However, where the IRS is seeking to enforce a summons
issued under federal statutory authority, federal privilege rules generally apply. See, e.g., United
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States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992).21 The Fifth Circuit has held that there is no
physician-patient privilege under federal law. Id. No other circuit has adopted the privilege.
The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the issue.
However, in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether federal courts should recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege under
Rule 501. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court held that confidential communications between a
licensed psychotherapist and a patient in the course of diagnosis or treatment are protected from
compelled disclosure under Rule 501. In reaching its holding, the Court noted that:
Like the spousal and attorney-client privileges, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is "rooted in the imperative need
for confidence and trust." Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51,63 L. Ed. 2nd
186, 100 S.C. 906. Treatment by a physician for physical illness
can often proceed successfully on basis of a physical examination,
objective information supplied by the patient, and the results of
diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast, depends
upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is
willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the
problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists,
disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling
sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace.
Id. at 9. While the Jaffee Court did not rule on the applicability of a physician-patient privilege,
the cited language shows that medical records based primarily upon physical examination and
other objective information supplied by the patient or that result from diagnostic tests may not be
considered privileged.

E.

Put Your Client in a Position to Produce Correspondence or Documents in
Your File if It Is in the Client's Best Interest to Do So.

The assertion of the privileges at the audit or tax court level lead to an inference
that the taxpayer is hiding something. Arguing that a document should be shielded from
discovery by an examining agent or district counsel because it is either subject to the attorney
client privilege or was prepared in anticipation of litigation may have evidentiary implications.
See, e.g., Estate of Shoemaker v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1462, 1464 n.7 (1984) ("Prior to
trial, respondent sought discovery of estate planning files of Mr. Parsons' law firm pertaining to
decedent. The attorney-client privilege was asserted and sustained by us, although we invited
attention to the possibility that an unfavorable inference could be drawn from this assertion of
the privilege.").
2\

When Congress adopted the final version of the new Federal Rules Evidence in 1975, it rejected the nine
enunciated privileges in the proposed rules (which included a physician-patient privilege) in favor of a single rule
authorizing federal courts to apply "common law principles - in the light of reason and experience" in detennining
whether a privilege exists under the common law. The Senate Report accompanying the adoption of the Rules
indicates that Rule 50 I "should be understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a
confidential relationship ... should be detennined as a case by case basis." S. Rep. No. 93-1277, p. 13 (1974).
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In cases where the IRS has questioned the motive of a decedent, the best evidence
often comes from the correspondence prepared in connection with the transaction at issue.
Well-drafted contemporaneous correspondence outlining the business and financial reasons (i.e.,
the nontax reasons) for the transaction being challenged, such as a buy-sell agreement or the
creation of a family limited partnership or corporation, serve as wonderful evidence to rebut an
argument from the IRS that an entity was created as "a device solely to avoid estate taxes" or
lacks "business purpose." See, e.g., John J Wells, Inc. v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1114, 1116
(1984). ("While obviously the true facts can never be known with complete certainty by an
outsider. . .. We base our conclusion upon our view of the spoken testimony and how that
testimony, coupled with the documentary evidence, comports with human experience.").
1.

The IRS's View.

Interestingly, it is the Service's view that asserting a reasonable cause and good
faith defense under Section 6664 waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to any opinion
used to establish reasonable cause, as well as for communications and other tax advice relating to
the transaction. In the Service's opinion, the taxpayer has put at issue his mental state or
knowledge regarding the transaction and thus the privilege is waived with regard to all
information in that regard.
Unfortunately, the Service's approach in this regard was bolstered by the Tax
Court's decision in Johnston v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. No.3 (August 8,2002). In Johnston, the Tax
Court held that the taxpayer impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege by raising a claim that
could be effectively disproven only through discovery of privileged information. The Johnstons
rebutted fraud penalties with the defense of reasonable reliance on qualified experts in preparing
income tax returns. Relying on Hearn v. Raf' 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975), the
Johnston court acknowledged four approaches2 to implied waiver analysis, and focused on the
three factors of the Hearn test to determine whether the privilege had been impliedly waived:
(1) assertion of the privilege must be the result of an affirmative act - in other words, the
privilege is implicated in the context of an affirmative defense; (2) as a result, the privileged
information has been put at issue by the person asserting the privilege by making it relevant to
the case; and (3) upholding the privilege would deny the opposing party access to information
vital to his defense (sometimes termed a "sword and shield" approach). For a discussion of the
"sword and shield" analysis, see Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9 th Cir.
1992).
F.

The Effect of Asserting the Privilege on the Burden of Proof in Disputed
Cases.

In certain cases, the taxpayer can shift the burden of proof in transfer tax cases
from the taxpayer to the government in the Tax Court. See I.R.C. § 7491. Section 7491
provides:
22

The other three approaches were: (1) the automatic waiver rule - whereby a party automatically waives the
privilege by asserting a claim or defense to which otherwise privileged material is relevant; (2) a balancing test weighing the need for discovery against the underlying rationale for the privilege; and (3) a more protective waive
theory whereby the privilege is waived only if the party directly injects an attorney communication into issue.

D - 69

(a) burden shifts where taxpayer produces credible evidence.(1) GENERAL RULE.-If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer
introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue
relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax
imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of
proof with respect to such issue.
(2) limitations.(A)
the taxpayer has complied with the
requirements under this title to substantiate any item;
(B) the taxpayer has maintained all records
required under this title and has cooperated with
reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses,
information, documents, meetings, and interviews; and
(C) in the case of a partnership, corporation, or
trust, the taxpayer is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).
Subparagraph (C) shall not apply to any qualified revocable trust
(as defined in section 645(b)(1)) with respect to liability for tax for
any taxable year ending after the date of the decedent's death and
before the applicable date (as defined in section 645(b)(2)).
COORDINATION.- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to
(3)
any issue if any other provisions of this title provides for a specific
burden of proof with respect to such issue.
I.R.C. § 7491 (emphasis added).
To shift the burden of proof, the taxpayer must have complied with the
substantiation requirements and kept the required records. In addition, the taxpayer must have
cooperated with "reasonable requests" by the IRS for "witnesses, information, documents,
meetings, and interviews" and must present "credible evidence" in court on the factual issue
before the burden shifts. If the taxpayer asserts the privilege in response to an IRS request for
information, the IRS will obviously argue that the taxpayer has not cooperated fully enough in
providing information and should not be able to shift the burden of proof. The question yet to be
addressed by the courts is whether a request that seeks privileged information can ever be
"reasonab1e."
G.

Privilege versus Penalty.

Ironically, the price of asserting the privilege in particular cases may be the loss
of other rights that would otherwise be available to the taxpayer or to the tax preparer. For
instance, claiming the privilege may prevent taxpayers from showing that they have had
substantial authority for a return position to avoid an accuracy related penalty, or prevent tax
preparers from protecting themselves from tax preparer penalties.
Specifically, I.R.C. § 6662(a) imposes an accuracy related penalty in an amount
equal to 20% of the portion of any underpayment to which the section applies. The section
applies to, among other items, the portion of an underpayment attributable to negligence or
disregard ofmles or regulations. I.R.e. § 6662(b)(I). Negligence has been defined as the lack
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of due care or failure to do what a reasonable and ordinary prudent person would do under the
circumstances. Neely v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985). Negligence includes the failure to
make a reasonable attempt to comply with the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 6662(c).
One defense to an underpayment penalty is that the underpayment of tax was
made in good faith and due to reasonable cause. Whether an underpayment of tax is made in
good faith and due to reasonable cause will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. Treas. Reg. 1.6664-4(b). However, reliance on the advice of professional accountants or
attorneys in preparing tax returns constitutes reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the
circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Id. See, e.g.,
Schauerhamer v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997). In order to demonstrate reasonable
reliance, the taxpayer may need to disclose what might otherwise be privileged information.
Accordingly, each case should be looked at on its own merits to determine whether or not the
client will benefit by disclosure.
H.

Privileges in the Appraisal Process.
1.

The Estate Planning Professional Should Hire the Appraiser.

Working with appraisers is an everyday event for most estate planning
professionals. On the other hand, working with appraisers can be something of a rarity for most
clients, many of whom have dealt with appraisers only in the purchase of their home. In
addition, many clients do not enjoy working with appraisers. Although they are necessary, they
are also expensive and can slow transactions down.
In most cases, the estate planner, not the client, should hire the appraiser for an
estate planning transaction. The estate planning professional can offer guidance both to the
client and the appraiser as to how similar transactions have been handled in the past by the IRS
and the courts. In addition, the estate planning professional often can obtain a lower fee from the
appraiser because of an existing relationship and repeat business. Doing so will also provide the
taxpayer with an argument that any unused reports or correspondence are privileged, as the
appraisal I s intended to assist the attorney in rendering legal advice. As noted above, this
argument is not as strong in the "planning" stage - but is much stronger in the litigation stage.
2.

Anything Committed to Writing May Be Discoverable.

Any document in the appraiser's file, including correspondence, notes, and drafts
of an appraisal can be discovered during the audit process or in subsequent litigation.
Experienced appraisers should know this; however, it never hurts to remind them. Once again,
consider who your audience may ultimately be and understand that the appraiser's file may be
reviewed by the examining agent, appeals officer, district counsel, or the ultimate finder of fact
in tax litigation.
3.

Discuss the Methodology and Results of the Appraiser's Work With
the Appraiser Before the Appraiser Drafts the Report.

Hiring a qualified appraiser is only the first part of the job. Examine the
underlying assumptions, analysis, and conclusions of the appraiser and ensure that they are
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logical. Appraisers can and do make mistakes. Discuss with the appraiser his or her
methodology of his or her examination before the appraiser commits the findings to writing.
This doesn't mean you should "coach" the appraiser or tell the appraiser the answer that you
want; it does mean that you should satisfy yourself that the appraiser's assumptions and analysis
are correct. If you have questions or concerns regarding the appraiser's assumptions or analysis,
you should discuss those concerns with the appraiser before the appraiser begins drafting the
report. If your concerns cannot be satisfied, consider choosing another appraiser. If you decide
to engage a second appraiser before the first appraiser has reduced his findings to writing, there
will be no documents from that appraiser to produce in response to an examining agent's request
for "copies of all appraisals."
I.

Where Are We Now?

Recent opinions have dealt a significant blow to the lack of economic substance,
lack of business purpose, I.R.C. § 2703, I.R.C. § 2704(b) and gift on formation positions taken
by the IRS in the family limited partnership area. As a general rule, if a partnership is valid
under applicable state law and the entity is respected by the partners, the Tax Court will
recognize that entity for transfer tax purposes. Moreover, the provisions I.R.C. § 2703 and
2704(b) were never intended to allow the IRS to disregard the existence of a validty existing
entity. In fact, the primary cases where the IRS has successfully disregarded the existence of an
entity is where the Tax Court has found that the partners have not respected and treated the
partnership as a separate legal entity for state law purposes.
In light of these decisions, the IRS is primarily left arguing over the value of the
partnership interest or, in cases where the entity has not been respected or where the Decedent
retained a significant amount of control, an argument that the entity should be ignored under
I.R.C. § 2036. In dealing with the IRS at the audit level and in litigation, I have seen the IRS
increase its focus on the actual operations of the partnership. The IRS routinely requests the
opportunity to examine the books and records of the partnership, the partnership's bank
statements, and the documents conveying assets into the partnership. If distributions were made,
were they made in accordance with the terms of the partnership agreement? Was the partnership
operated as a separate legal entity, or merely a second bank account for the decedent? The IRS
is inquiring, as did Judge Cohen in the Estate ofStrangi opinion, whether the proverbial "i's are
dotted and t's are crossed?" The IRS attacks on partnership based valuation discounts can be
thwarted with careful planning, documentation and operation of the entity. This includes
ensuring that the partners respect the entity and that qualified, supportable, and well reasoned
appraisals are obtained when valuing the transferred interests.
Valuation discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability are real. A
person acquiring an interest in a family limited partnership, particularly a non-controlling
interest, lacks the ability to dictate how the partnership will be run and how distributions will be
made. There is no established market on which the interest can be traded.
As can be seen from the table set forth below, taxpayers have sustained
substantial valuation discounts in cases where the Court found their expert's valuation testimony
more persuasive than the valuation testimony presented the government. Practitioners must
remember that the valuation report is the most important piece of evidence in a transfer tax
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dispute. Because the valuation filed with the transfer tax return constitutes an "admission" of
value by the taxpayer, it is important for the taxpayer to obtain well-reasoned appraisals from a
qualified appraiser when the return is filed.

Case

Assets

Discount from NAV

Strangi I

securities

31%

Knight

securities/real estate

15%

Jones

real estate

8%;44%

Dailey

securities

40%

Adams

securities/real estate/minerals

54%

Church

securities/real estate

63%

McCord

securities/real estate

32%

Lappo

securities/real estate

35.4%

Perraccio

securities

29.5%
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Department

Internal Revenue Service

of

the

Treasury

In Reply Refer to:

Date:

Person to Contact:
Contact Telephone Number:
Fax Number:
Re:

U.S. Gift Tax Return Form 709

Dear
The United States Gift Tax Return you filed for the year 1996 is being
audi ted by this office.
We need the information listed below furnished or
made available for our inspection within the next three (3) weeks:
1.
Copies of donor's Federal Income Tax Returns (1040) for
before, the year of and the year after the gift referenced above.

the

year

2.
Copies of all 709' s filed with with appraisals, acts of donation and
other supporting documentation. This includes 709's filed by your spouse.
3.
If any assets subject to any of the above referenced gifts have been
sold or agreements to sell have been entered into subsequent to date of
donation please provide complete details, including contracts, deeds and
closing statements.
4.
A list of donations of any kind, other than customay holiday and
birthday gifts of small value, made during your life time regardless of
whether a Gift Tax Return Form 709 was filed.
5.
If the object of any of the above donations was an interest in any
closely held corporation, partnership, limited liability company or other
business organization, we need the following:
a)

b)
c)
d)
e)

f)

All documents relating to the creation of the entity (including
bills)
from any attorney,
accountant or firm involved in
recommending the creation of the entity or in drafting the
necessary documents.
If a claim is made that any of these
documents are privileged, identify each privileged document by
date, source, audience, and reason for the privilege.
Articles of organization and operating agreement,
with any
amendments.
All documents that were prepared to meet state law requirements
on the formation and operation of the entity.
All financial statements and tax returns prepared and/or filed
since inception.
All of the entities' bank and other records (i.e., general
ledger,
cash
receipts
and
disbursements
journals,
check
registers, etc.) which reflect the amount and nature of all
deposits
and
distributions,
including
distributions
to
owner/members, for the period since the entity was formed to the
current period.
Minutes of all meetings; if none, indicate the dates of all
meetings and the business discussed.
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Evidence showing how the value of each entity asset was arrived
at as of the date:
1.
it was contributed to the entity;
2.
of each gift of a interest in the entity;
provide all appraisals and supporting workpapers.
Evidence as to how the entity was valued as a whole as well as
h)
fractional interest.
Provide all appraisals if not already
furnished.
Evidence to substantiate all initial and subsequent capital
i)
contributions and the source of all contributions by owners other
than the donor.
j)
For any entity asset that has been sold or offered for sale since
the formation of the entity, provide evidence which documents the
sale or attempted sale (i.e., sales agreement, listing agreement,
etc.) .
k)
For each entity asset, explain/provide:
1.
evidence that the entity owns the asset;
2.
when the donor acquired the asset;
3.
how the asset was used by the donor since its acquisition
and how the entity has used the asset since; and
4.
who managed the asset prior to and after its contribution,
explain in detail what management consisted of and how it
changed after the entity was formed.
1)
Brokerage statements reflecting the ownership and activity of the
securities and mutual funds contributed to the entity for the
period beginning one year prior to the formation of the entity
and continuing through the current date, and copies of any other
tax returns and financial statements which reflect the activity
of the entity's assets, if different from the foregoing.
m)
For each gift or transfer of an interest, provide:
1.
evidence that the interest was legally transferred under
state law and under the terms of any agreement among the
owner/members.
2.
any assignment of any interest along with the terms of the
assignment;
3.
the amount and source of any consideration paid along with
an explanation as to how the amount was arrived at.
Provide the following with respect to the donor, all other
n)
original members and any recipients of gifts or transfers of
interests:
1.
date of birth;
2.
education and occupation;
3.
experience and expertise in dealing with real estate,
financial affairs and investments;
4.
extent of the donor's investments as of the date of the
formation of the entity, including a summary of assets that
were not contributed to the entity;
provide tangible
evidence thereof; and
5.
any personal financial statements and credit applications
which were prepared in connection with loan applications
after the LLC was created.
0)
Indicate whether the entity is currently in existence, and, if
so, provide the current ownership interests.
p)
Provide a summary of any other transfers of business interests
not reflected in the gift tax returns filed.
q)
A statement describing the donor's state of health at the time of
the formation of the entity and for the six month period prior
g)
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r)
s)

t)

thereto,
including a description of any serious illnesses.
Please also provide the names, addresses and telephone numbers of
all doctors who would have knowledge of the donor's state of
heal th during this period to the present date and provide these
doctors with authorization to respond to the Service's future
requests for information,
including a copy of the medical
records, in necessary.
A copy of the Donor's will, revocable trust, and any executed
power of attorney, if not submitted with the return.
A statement indicating the identity of the parties recommending
the use of the LLC or partnership, when the recommendations were
made, and the reasons set forth in support of using such an
entity.
Names,
addresses,
and
current
telephone
numbers
of
the
representatives of the Donor/Estate, all donees/beneficiaries,
all
partners
or
members,
accountants/bookkeepers,
and
brokers/investment advisors.

Each item should be responded to either by furnishing the requested
documentation; a written response, if called for, under the signature of the
donor or a written explanation as to why the information will not be
provided.
Should you have any questions call or write to me at he above number and
address.
A Form 2848 is enclosed for for your execution if you wish to
appoint your attorney or CPA to represent you.
Very truly yours,

Enclosures:
IRS Publication 1
Form 2848 Power of Attorney

D -76

EXHIBIT "A"
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION - ESTATE TAX EXAMINATION OF LTD PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
Except for any of the below listed items that may be deleted, please provide
the following:
1.
Copy of partnership agreement, with all exhibits.
If the current
agreement has been amended, include a complete copy of all prior agreements.
2.
Partnership income statements and balance sheets for five years before
the gift, or for the period of existence if less than five years.
3.
Copies of all appraisals of the partnership,
interests transferred, in the year of transfer.

and

of

partnership

4.
Copies of all appraisals of assets transferred into the partnership at
the time of formation of the partnership.
5.
List o£ the partners both at the time of the formation of the
partnership and at the date of death, and their relationship to the decedent.
6.
Copies of all trust agreements for trusts that have either received
partnership interests, or have transferred assets to the partnership.
7.
List of all securities owned by the partnership, and all CUSIP numbers
for those that are publicly traded.
8.
Copy
of
all
community
property
partition
agreements
partnership assets, with a list of the assets themselves.

affecting

9.
Copy of all documents used to execute and record the transfer of the
partnership units that are the subject of the gift, e. g. "assignments of
gifts," or "gift directives;" include a copy of the partnership transfer
record.
10.
A statement regarding the health of the decedent at the time of the
formation of the partnership.
11.
A list of all physicians seen by the decedent in the three years prior
to the formation of the partnership, and the authorizations for those
physicians to release information to the Internal Revenue Service.
12.
A list of all hospitals in which the decedent was hospitalized in the
three years prior to the formation of the partnership, and authorizations for
the hospitals to release information to the Internal Revenue Service.
13.
A statement signed by the executor describing the bona fide business
arrangement for the formation of the limited partnership.
14.
A statement signed by the executor affirming the fact that the
formation of the partnership was not a device to transfer property to the
natural object of the decedent's bounty for less than full and adequate
consideration in money or money's worth.
15.
A statement signed by the executor affirming the fact that the
partnership the decedent became part of is under the terms of the partnership
agreement,
comparable to similar business arrangements entered into by
persons in an arm's length transaction.

EXHIBIT 2
D -77

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE-ESTATE & GIFT TAX
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
Donor:
Gift Tax Year:
Name of Partnership:
Name of Trust(s)

The following information
examination of the above-captioned
information by

is requested in connection with the
donor.
Please submitted complete

Provide a complete statement describing all of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the creation and operation of the above captioned
partnership. Include the following items:
1.
A description of the
partnership captioned above

purpose

for

establishing

the

A description of the purpose for establishing the two
trusts captioned above
2.
An explanation as to why the purpose (s) in A could
not be achieved equally as well through outright gifts of
the property.
What was the unique advantage of the partnership form
which compelled its use in this case?
What was the unique
advantage of the trusts which compelled their use in this
case?
3.
Identify all of the parties recommending the use of
the family limited partnership arrangement and trusts.
4.
With regard to 3, provide documentation (letters,
memos,
written
communications)
to
show
when
the
recommendations were made and the reasons set forth to the
client for the use of the family limited partnership and
trust arrangement.
5.
A statement with documentation
return)
to show where the fees
for
partnership and trusts were deducted.
6.
Provide a copy of the
Intervivos Trust and a copy of her will.
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(include complete
creation of the

Revocable

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE-ESTATE & GIFT TAX
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
7.
Provide exact dates and supporting documentation to
show when the transfer of the property to the limited
partnership occurred.
8.
Provide exact dates and supporting documentation to
show when the transfer of the partnership interests to the
Family Trust occurred.
9.

Provide

the
ages
of
the
beneficiaries
of
the
Family Trust at the time of the gifts.
Provide the educational background of each and provision,
if any.
10.
Describe who managed the assets prior to the transfer
of the assets to the partnership.
11.
Identify
his
relationship
to
and his fiduciary duties, if any, to
Mrs.
Provide his educational background and
the partnership.
profession, if any.
12.
Provide
a
copy of
the
certificate
of
limited
partnership filed with the Secretary of State for the State
of Florida.
13.
Provide the age of Mrs.
of the formation of the partnership.
as to the educational background of
and her profession, if any.

at the time
Provide a statement
Mrs.

14.
Provide a statement as to the expertise needed by the
general partner to manage the partnership.
15.
List the specific duties
general partner.

actually performed by the

Provide a statement regarding the state of health of
16.
at the
time the partnership was
Mrs.
created. Be specific.
17.
Have you or a member of your firm lectured to any
group on the advantages of family limited partnerships? If
so, identify the person and provide information, including
dates and lecture materials regarding same.
18.
Have you, your firm, or any accounting firm used by
your firm marketed family limited partnership to your
client through the use of general mailings? If so, provide
copies of the general mailings.
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INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERVICE
Estate Tax Group E:1105 HOU
STOP 4308 SANW

Re:

United States Estate Tax Return, Form 706,

Dear
The above referenced estate has been assigned to me for examination and
we need to Schedule an opening conference.
Enclosed is some literature relating to your rights, Publication 1, Your
Rights as a Tax Taxpayer (12/98), and Notice 619, Privacy Act Notice (6/99).
I am dedicated to providing to you a courteous, professional examination that
is completed within a reasonable period of time, six months from now. If at
any time you perceive that you are not receiving those things, I invite you
to bring the matter to my attention so that I may have an opportunity to
consider and deal with your concerns.
Please contact me by November 16, 1999 to schedule our opening conference,
and have available at that conference the documents and information requested
below.
A.

B.

Re general background:
1.
Decedent's history from 1988 to 1998,
a.
describe Decedent's standard of living and where she lived;
b.
identify source and application of Decedent's
(1)
income,
(2)
funds used to purchase major assets, if any,
(3)
balances of cash on hand and in bank,
(4)
loans made or repaid, if any;
2.
identify by a family tree the natural objects of Decedent's
bounty; and
3.
explain who kept and how financial records were organized 19881998.
Re administration of estate:
l.

2.

3.
4.

describe any significant developments generally;
indicate whether there are/were any appraisals of estate assets
other than those furnished with Form 706;
resolution of litigation, if any, pending at time 706 was filed;
and
were/are there any previously unreported assets, deductions,
gifts.
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c.

Please state whether Decedent transferred any interest in titled
property (e.g. real estate, securities, financial accounts) to family
members since 1976.

D.

Please furnish copies of:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
7.
8.
9.

10.

Forms 1040 for 1992-98 plus all attachments/enclosures together
with any examination reports;
checks or other evidence of payments made of Form 1040 federal
income tax for the tax year 1998;
Forms 1041 for this estate;
Estate records of receipts and disbursements, starting at date of
death;
copy of original power (s) -of-attorney granted by Decedent since
1983;
copy of any and all fiduciary accounting records/reports for the
period 1988-1998;
copy of any/all applications to any court made under a POA since
1982;
copy of all documents related to loan, proceeds of which were
used to pay federal estate and state death taxes;
copy of all guardianship application documents;
completed Power of Attorney, Form 2848, to include both United
States Estate Tax Return, Form 706, and all periods for which
United States Gift Tax Return, Form 709, have been filed, if any,
for the period ended December 31 1997 (the year in which the
family partnership was formed), and for periods ended December 31
of all years in which family partnership interests were gifted or
otherwise transferred by this Decedent; and
furnish completed Notice of Fiduciary Relationship, Form 56.

In addition, attached are lists E-J of requested information and documents
related to both the bona fides of the formation and operation of the family
limited partnership, and related to its valuation.
I would appreciate written responses to my request for information because it
is difficult for me to listen and reduce to writing accurately and completely
mere verbal responses. For your convenience, I have spread out the questions
over several pages, making them into worksheets which, if you so choose, you
may use to prepare your responses. Handwritten responses are acceptable so
long as they are legible. However, if, after making a reasonable attempt to
respond, you find the process too burdensome, or you perceive or encounter
any other problems in responding to a request for either information or
documents, please contact me as soon as possible so that we can discuss
alternatives, if any.
The major issue(s) identified at this time include ascertaining:
I.

II.
III.

the federal estate and gift tax effect of a power-of-attorney
holder for Decedent subjecting substantially all of her assets to
a family limited partnership in 1997 for a term of 49 years in
exchange for partnership interests valued by this estate at
significantly less (40%) than net fair market value of those
assets;
to what extent, if any, the amount claimed as deduction for
interest expense is allowable;
whether there were previously unreported assets, deductions or
gifts.
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Please be aware that it may be necessary for me to contact third parties,
such as the Probate Court, Clerk of Court, Central Appraisal District, or
other agencies. I may also need to contact appraisers, financial, medical or
other
record keepers,
or other persons.
Please
see
Notice 1219,
Notification of Potential Third Party Contact (1/99). The extent to which I
need to contact third parties will depend, at least in part, upon the
information sought, whether you possess the information sought, and whether
you can and do timely furnish that information to me.
After giving consideration to the information which I gather, and listening
to any concerns you might have, I plan to discuss with you, or your
representative, my proposed determination so as to identify and resolve, if
possible, any differences. I will furnish a written report of proposed any
adjustments, and can discuss them with you, or with your representative, as
needed. In the event we are unable to reconcile any differences, then I can
provide to you an explanation of both your appeal rights (Publication 5,
Appeal Rights and Preparation of Protests for Unagreed Cases (1/99) and
Publication 556, Examination of Returns, Appeal Rights, and Claims for Refund
(2/99)) and the collection process (Publication 594, The IRS Collection
Process (01/99)). If paying an agreed amount of additional tax poses a
problem, please ask and I can explain to you either installment payment (IRC
6166) or extension of payment (IRC 6161) relief provisions.
Since you or your representative possess the records and information related
to this matter, only your full cooperation (as exhibited by full and timely
responses to my information requests) will permit me to meet the target of
completing this examination within six months from now.
If you have any questions in this matter, please feel free to call me at the
number shown above.
Sincerely,
Copy:
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INFORMATION re CREATION

E.

Re the FLP, Please furnish the following INFORMATION related to the
CREATION of the partnership:
1.
state whether the partnership was created in conjunction with
estate planning, if so, explain;
2.
state whether creation of the partnership was a negotiated
transaction, and if so, identify the parties and describe the
negotiation process;
3.
identify at whose suggestion the partnership was created;
4.
explain why the FLP was created and why at that particular time;
5.
state whether the idea of the partnership originated with the
Decedent, if not, identify with whom;
6.
describe the advice decedent or his/her family sought, and
describe the qualifications of advisor(s);
7.
describe
what
advice
decedent
and
other
parties
to
the
partnership received, and identify by whom they were advised;
8.
state how many meetings were held regarding the formation of the
partnership before it was created, and identify who attended each
meeting;
9.
identify what, if any, notes were kept at such meetings, identify
who took those notes, and identify where those notes are now;
10.
summarize the factors discussed or considered regarding
a.
who would run the partnership,
b.
the decision as to who would be a partner,
c.
the decision as to who would be a general partner,
d.
the decision as to who would be a limited partner,
e.
responsibility of general partner,
f.
liability of general partner,
g.
whether general partner should be a corporation, trust or
individual,
h.
the extent of each partner's interest in the partnership
i.
the fiduciary duty of a general partner and the impact of
that on the limited partners,
j.
the ability of creditor or bankruptcy trustee to reach
partnership assets,
k.
the rights and duties of limited partners,
1.
when to make gifts of limited partnership interests,
m.
the circumstances under which limited partnership interests
could be sold,
n.
the
circumstances
under
which
limited partner
could
withdraw,
o.
what assets should be used to fund the partnership,
p.
what would be the reporting position regarding income
taxation of the partnership,
q.
what would be the reporting position regarding gift and
estate taxation of the partnership interests,
r.
what would be the reporting position regarding discounts
for purposes of gift and estate taxation of partnership
interests,
s.
how income from the partnership would be divided,
t.
family problems
(such as
sibling rivalry)
among the
partners,
u.
sources of funds to be used to buy a partner's interest in
a partnership under any buy-sell provision,
v.
what was the understanding of the meaning of the term "fair
value", and
w.
whether the understanding of the meaning of the term "fair
market value" was before or after any discount;
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

29.
30.

31.

identify Decedent's heirs using a family tree, state their years
of birth, and explain how the existence of those persons affected
Decedent's decision to form the partnership;
identify the benefits of the partnership perceived by Decedent or
her POA, and by whom was she so advised;
identify who represented the Decedent and each of the other
partners;
state whether the partnership was a prepackaged transaction, if
so, identify the provider/vendor;
identify decedent's prior history of gift giving, if any;
identify what portion of Decedent's assets she subjected to the
partnership agreement;
identify the origin of partnership assets by category;
identify what assets were retained by decedent, not subjected to
the partnership agreement;
identify nonfamily members, if any, having independent knowledge
of decedent's mental and physical state during all or part of the
period
1983-1998,
and
furnish
their
names,
addresses
and
telephone numbers;
identify the source of partnership contributions by partners
other than decedent;
describe by category how the partnership assets (e.g. cash,
securities, real property) were historically managed prior to
being subjected to the partnership agreement, and explain why
that could no longer continue;
identify who historically managed the assets prior to their being
subjected
to
the
partnership
agreement,
describe
his/her
qualifications to manage, the amount of time devoted to such
management, and schedule of fees charged, if any;
state the business purposes for the creation of the partnership,
and identify by what facts and documentation they are supported;.
explain how, if at all, management of the assets changed as a
consequence
of
their
being
subjected
to
the
partnership
agreement;
state whether the partnership issued certificates of limited
partnership;
identify what factors each partner considered in agreeing to each
restriction on his or her interest in the partnership;
identify the subjective intent of the parties to the partnership
other than this decedent, indicate whether they were concerned
about decline in value of their property as a consequence of
subjecting it to the partnership agreement, and explain their
thinking either way;
identify who, if any, of the partners have initiated/completed
divorce, filed bankruptcy, or been sued since they received their
partnership interest, and, if there has been a will contest of
any partner, provide the identity of the court and cause number,
and furnish copies of pleadings, judgements, etc.;
if there has been a divorce, bankruptcy, law suit or will contest
of any partner,
then describe how the court treated the
partnership interest in resolving the issues;
to the extent the partnership has been appraised other than by
HFBE, indicate for what purpose, by who it was appraised, and for
HFBE and others identify who each appraiser(s) contacted in
connection with his appraisal;
state whether each partner in fact physically transferred from
their own accounts to an account of the partnership the capital
contribution allocated to them, if so furnish evidence of those
transfers;
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32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.

identify the extent to which, if any, each partner's capital
contribution had its origin in Decedent;
identify the date after 1982 when Decedent executed any will or
codicil and explain what prompted/motivated her to do that then;
explain to what extent property subjected to FLP came to rest in
hands of same persons as would have received it upon Decedent's
death had the property not been subjected to FLP;
identify the person who drafted or was responsible for drafting
the Decedent's will, the partnership agreement, and documents of
transfer of assets made subject to the partnership agreement;
state whether Decedent or her POA received counseling on the
disposition of Decedent's wealth and planning for the disposition
of her estate, if so, by whom;
briefly describe the state of decedent's mental and physical
health for the period 1988-1998, especially as of date of
execution of the partnership agreement;
furnish all detailed information/documents related to decedent's
medical status for the period 1988-1998 (the period), including,
a.
statements by persons having personal knowledge of the
facts wherein they describe Decedent's physical and mental
heal th for the period, noting especially her condition as
of date of formation of the FLP, and as of dates of any
intervivos gifts, and identify medical conditions for which
she sought/received medical treatment within that period,
b.
the name, address, telephone and dates of occupancy by
Decedent in any nursing home(s) or other care facility,
c.
the identity of all medical providers
(e.g. doctors,
nurses, facilities, agencies), if any, from whom Decedent
sought or received treatment during the period, and furnish
their name, address, telephone and city,
d.
identify what, if any, medical treatment Decedent received
during the period, and what was the objective of that
treatment,
e.
indicate the dates, if any, when the Decedent was perceived
by anyone (e.g. heir, doctor, nurse, aide, attorney) to be
other
than
competent,
and
identify
such
perceiving
person(s), if any (please do diligent inquiry),
f.
copies of the admission and dismissal summaries that show
dates hospitalized during the period, the symptoms at time
of admission, her medical/social history, and the final
diagnosis,
g.
state whether Decedent suffered pain,
whether it was
progressively severe, to what extent it was ameliorated by
medication, and to what extent he/she did not tolerate the
pain medication,
h.
provide
information
regarding
what
was
the
expected
probability of Decedent's survival as of date of formation
of the FLP for 6mo, for 1yr, for 18mo, for more than 18mo,
i.
identify who,
besides
Decedent,
was
aware
of
those
expectations, and
j.
furnish completed Forms 4452, Authorization to Disclose
Medical Information; and
indicate to what extent you,
as POA for
Decedent sought and or received court approval for subjecting
Decedent's assets to the family limited partnership.
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DOCUMENTS re CREATION

F.
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Re the FLP, please provide the following DOCUMENTATION related to the
CREATION of the partnership:
a copy of the taxpayer's financial statement/net worth shortly before
creation of the partnership;
copies of all correspondence between the taxpayer or her POA and the
firm forming the partnership regarding creation of the partnership;
copies of any/all engagement letters with the firm that was engaged to
form the partnership, and copies of that firm's time slips, and billing
statements;
copies of any/all powers of attorney granted by the taxpayer during the
formation of the partnership;
copies of all reports, analyses and computations prepared prior to
formation of the partnership regarding the benefits of its creation;
if different than the one filed with Form 706, a copy of the family
limited partnership (FLP) agreement as filed with the state;
indicate whether the written agreement represented the entire agreement
between the parties, or whether there was any unwritten understanding,
agreement or commitment regarding retained control of assets either by
Decedent or by other partners, and if so provide copies of any such
side agreements;
if there was a divorce of any partner after formation of the
partnership, please furnish copies of any property settlements and predivorce agreements;
a copy of any amended Certificate of Partnership, showing the date it
was filed with the state of Secretary of State;
all notes taken by Decedent's POA and other partners or their
representatives regarding creation of the partnership;
all correspondence, including e-mail, among the partners/parties to the
partnership and or Decedent's representatives regarding creation of the
partnership;
all
correspondence,
meeting
notes,
and
e-mail,
among
the
representatives of the partners/parties regarding creation of the
partnership;
all reports or analyses prepared prior to creation of the partnership
that were generated by the partners, or their representatives;
copies
of
all
appraisals
of
any partnership
assets,
including
appraisals of securities, plus supporting documentation of the data,
reasoning and analyses of Mr. Richard T. Hudgins regarding the realty;
copies of any partnership agreements of any other partnership of which
the decedent is a partner;
documents
indicating whether,
when
forming
this
family
limited
partnership, the parties considered the general practices of unrelated
parties in forming partnerships;
documents or financial
statements indicating decedent's financial
condition and net worth shortly prior to formation of the family
limited partnership;
documents or financial statements indicating the financial condition
and net worth of parties/partners other than Decedent shortly prior to
formation of the family limited partnership;
documentation showing transfer of assets subjected by Decedent and
others to the family limited partnership;
copy of each partner's certificate/unit of limited partnership.
copies of any reports or analyses regarding the restrictions on the
partners' interests in the partnership;
copies of each partner's calendar of records of events for the time
during which formation of the partnership was under consideration;
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24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

30.

copies of any powers of attorney granted by decedent that were in
effect during the period that the partnership was formed;
copies of any assignments of partnership interest, if any, other than
those filed with Form 706;
copies of any appraisals of partnership interests, if any, other then
that by HFBE,
copies of all information which was furnished to any appraisers
(including HFBE) to enable them to prepare their appraisals;
regarding the real property appraisal, copies of all of Mr. Hudgins'
supporting documentation
(e.g. comparable sales information, maps,
etc.)
retained in his files concerning the data,
reasoning, and
analyses of his appraisal, see his transmittal letter at page 1;
in regards the person who drafted or was responsible for drafting the
Decedent's will or the partnership agreement, please furnish copies of
each drafting person's fee bills and identify where that person's fees
for creating the partnership and transferring the assets were deducted,
if at all for purposes of federal income tax; and
copies of applications, orders, or other documents, if any, related to
court approval of subjecting Decedent's assets to the FLP agreement.
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INFORMATION re OPERATION

G.

Re the FLP,
please furnish the following INFORMATION regarding
OPERATION of the partnership:
1.
describe how,
from an economic standpoint,
the partnership
operated;
2.
describe how, if at all, there was a joining in the common
conduct of a business by the family members;
3.
describe in what trade or business transactions, if any, the
partnership engaged, in particular whether the real property was
leased to tenants or operated by the partnership;
4.
describe
how
the
Decedent's
relationship
to
the
property
(subjected to the partnership agreement) and its income changed,
if at all, as a result of the partnership;
5.
state whether the partnership filed suit or was otherwise
involved in litigation;
6.
indicate to what extent, if any, the partnership,
a.
purchased,
conveyed,
leased,
mortgaged or disposed of
property,
b.
voted or dealt in shares of other interests or entities,
c.
subscribed or otherwise acquired notes or obligations of
another entity,
d.
owned,
held,
sold,
loaned or
otherwise
disposed of
obligations of another entity,
e.
borrowed money or otherwise incurred debt,
f.
loaned money and received a security interest in property
as security for repayment,
g.
was a promoter, partner, or manager of another entity.
h.
has an office, if so furnish address/location,
i.
hire employees or agents,
define their
(employees or
agents) duties, fixed their compensation, or established
pension plans or other employee benefit plans,
j.
made contributions, or
k.
indemnify anyone,
1.
marketed or sold any of the real property;
7.
indicate the extent to which each partner was involved in or
consulted in the operation of the partnership;
8.
describe specific circumstances whereby, if at all, the partners
held themselves out as partners to third parties;
9.
describe how, if at all, the partners concealed the partnership
or themselves as partners from third parties, and identify from
whom and explain why;
10.
indicate whether any partnership interests were sold, exchanged,
or otherwise liquidated in the time since partnership agreement
was executed;
11.
state whether the other partners view themselves as partners;
12.
describe how partnership books and records were kept;
13.
identify the persons who make entries into the partnership books
and records, and furnish their addresses and telephone numbers;
14.
to the extent entries in the partnership books and records are
not made by a partner, identify at whose direction entries are
made;
15.
explain how the transaction was treated for income tax purposes
and for state law purposes;
16.
indicate any charitable deduction taken for any partnership
interests transferred to any qualified organization; and
17.
identify who provided investing information and made investment
decisions, both before and after creation of the partnership, and
provide a copy of schedule of fees charged, if any.
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DOCUMENTS

H.

re OPERATION

Re the FLP, please provide the following DOCUMENTATION related to
OPERATION of the partnership.
1.
copies (which show the date filed) of any corrected certificates
partnership or cancellation filed with the Secretary of State;
2.
full and complete (i. e. including depreciation schedules, K-1,
etc) copies of the partnership financial statements and income
tax returns, Forms 1065, for the periods 1997-1999;
3.
copies of all correspondence, meeting notes, and e-mail among the
partners,
or
their
representatives,
regarding
partnership
operation;
4.
all reports or analyses prepared regarding partnership operation;
5.
copies of any written waivers of any restrictions imposed on the
partners with respect to their partnership interests;
6.
copies of all partnership financial accounts, including account
checks, account deposit tickets and related third party checks or
transfer slips, and signatory cards for those accounts from 19971999;
7.
copies of all securities account records, including copies of all
correspondence with the broker or other third party record keeper
from anyone
(e.g.
taxpayer,
taxpayer's attorney,
taxpayer's
accountant) relating to the FLP account (please have complete and
unedited correspondence file sent directly to me by the broker),
all account statements, and all account transaction or transfer
slips;
8.
copies, if any, of partnership equivalent of corporate minutes;
9.
copies of bookkeeping records, particularly capital accounts, of
partnership; and
10.
copies of all assignments of partnership interest other than
filed with Form 706.
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INFORMATION re VALUATION

I.

J.

Re the FLP,
please furnish the following INFORMATION regarding
VALUATION of the partnership:
1.
state the fair market net asset valuation of partnership
assets/liabilities (and show the computation thereof) as of
a.
the legal date of creation of partnership,
b.
the dates of any intervivos gifts, and
c.
date of death;
2.
state the valuations (and show the computation thereof) of all
partnership interests as of
a.
date of creation of partnership
b.
the date
of any
intervivas
gifts by Decedent's
of
partnership interest, an~
c.
as of date of death;
3.
state the valuations
(and show the computation thereof) of
partnership interests if restrictions per agreement or state law
on its sale or use were disregarded under IRC 2703(a) (1)
a.
as of the date of creation of partnership,
b.
the
date
of any
intervivas
gifts by Decedent's of
partnership interest, and
c.
as of date of death; and4.
state the valuations
(and show the computation thereof) of
partnership interests if restrictions per agreement or state law
on its sale or use were disregarded under IRC 2704(b)
a.
as of the date of creation of partnership,
b.
the date
of any intervivas
gifts by Decedent's of
partnership interest, and
c.
as of date of death.
DOCUMENTS re VALUATION
Re the FLP, please furnish the following DOCUMENTATION regarding
VALUATION of the partnership:
1.
copies of all information furnished to any appraiser to enable
him to prepare his appraisal;
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WORKSHEET
INFORMATION re CREATION

E.

Re the FLP, Please furnish the following INFORMATION related to the
CREATION of the partnership:
1.
state whether the partnership was created in conjunction with
estate planning, if so, explain;

2.

state whether creation
transaction, and if so,
negotiation process;

of the partnership was a negotiated
identify the parties and describe the

3.

identify at whose suggestion the partnership was created;

4.

explain why the FLP was created and why at that particular time;

5.

state whether the idea of the partnership originated with
Decedent, if not, identify with whom;

the

6.

describe the advice decedent or his/her
describe the qualifications of advisor(s);

sought,

and

7.

describe
what
advice
decedent
and
other
parties
to
partnership received, and identify by whom they were advised;

the

8.

state how many meetings were held regarding the formation of the
partnership before it was created, and identify who attended each
meeting;

9.

identify what, if any, notes were kept at such meetings, identify
who took those notes, and identify where those notes are now;
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family

10.

summarize the factors discussed or considered regarding
a.
who would run the partnership,

b.

the decision as to who would be a partner,

c.

the decision as to who would be a general partner,

d.

the decision as to who would be a limited partner,

e.

responsibility of general partner,

f.

liability of general partner,

g.

whether general partner should be a corporation,
indi vidual,

h.

the extent of each partner's interest in the partnership

i.

the fiduciary duty of a general partner and the impact of
that on the limited partners,

j.

the ability of creditor
partnership assets,

k.

the rights and duties of limited partners,

1.

when to make gifts of limited partnership interests,

m.

the circumstances under which limited partnership interests
could be sold,
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or

bankruptcy

trustee

trust or

to

reach

11.

n.

the
circumstances
withdraw,

under

o.

what assets should be used to fund the partnership,

p.

what would be the reporting
taxation of the partnership,

q.

what would be the reporting position regarding
estate taxation of the partnership interests,

r.

what would be the reporting position regarding discounts
for purposes of gift and estate taxation of partnership
interests,

s.

how income from the partnership would be divided,

t.

family
problems
partners,

u.

sources of funds to be used to buy a partner's interest in
a partnership under any buy-sell provision,

v.

what was the understanding of the meaning of the term "fair
value", and

w.

whether the understanding of the meaning of the term "fair
market value" was before or after any discount;

(such

as

which

limited

position

sibling

partner

regarding

rivalry)

could

income

gift

among

and

the

identify Decedent's heirs using a family tree, state their years
of birth, and explain how the existence of those persons affected
Decedent's decision to form the partnership;
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12.

identify the benefits of the partnership perceived by Decedent or
her POA, and by whom was she so advised;

13.

identify who
partners;

14.

state whether the partnership was a
so, identify the provider/vendor;

15.

identify decedent's prior history of gift giving, if any;

16.

identify what portion of Decedent's assets
partnership agreement;

17.

identify the origin of partnership assets by category;

18.

identify what assets were retained by decedent,
the partnership agreement;

19.

identify nonfamily members, if any, having independent knowledge
of decedent's mental and physical state during all or part of the
period
1983-1998,
and
furnish
their
names,
addresses
and
telephone numbers;

20.

identify the source
other than decedent;

represented

of

the

Decedent

partnership
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and

each

of

the

other

prepackaged transaction,

if

she subjected to the

not subjected to

contributions

by

partners

21.

describe by category how the partnership assets (e.g. cash,
securities, real property) were historically managed prior to
being subjected to the partnership agreement, and explain why
that could no longer continue;

22.

identify who historically managed the assets prior to their being
subjected
to
the
partnership
agreement,
describe
his/her
qualifications to manage, the amount of time devoted to such
management, and schedule of fees charged, if any;

23.

state the business purposes for the creation of the partnership,
and identify by what facts and documentation they are supported;

24.

explain how, if at all, management of the assets changed as a
of
their
being
subj ected
consequence
to
the
partnership
agreement;

25.

state whether
partnership;

26.

identify what factors each partner considered in agreeing to each
restriction on his or her interest in the partnership;

27.

identify the subjective intent of the parties to the partnership
other than this decedent, indicate whether they were concerned
about decline in value of their property as a consequence of
subjecting it to the partnership agreement, and explain their
thinking either way;

28.

identify who, if any, of the partners have initiated/completed
divorce, filed bankruptcy, or been sued since they received their
partnership interest, and, if there has been a will contest of
any partner, provide the identity of the court and cause number,
and furnish copies of pleadings, judgements, etc.;

the

partnership
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issued

certificates

of

limited

29.

if there has been a divorce, bankruptcy, law suit or will contest
of any partner,
then describe how the court treated the
partnership interest in resolving the issues;

30.

to the extent the partnership has been appraised other than by
HFBE, indicate for what purpose, by who it was appraised, and for
HFBE and others identify who each appraiser(s) contacted in
connection with his appraisal;

31.

state whether each partner in fact physically transferred from
their own accounts to an account of the partnership the capital
contribution allocated to them, if so furnish evidence of those
transfers;

32.

identify the extent to which, if any,
contribution had its origin in Decedent;

33.

identify the date after 1982 when Decedent executed any will or
codicil and explain what prompted/motivated her to do that then;

34.

explain to what extent property subjected to FLP came to rest in
hands of same persons as would have received it upon Decedent's
death had the property not been subjected to FLP;

35.

identify the person who drafted or was responsible for drafting
the Decedent's will, the partnership agreement, and documents of
transfer of assets made subject to the partnership agreement;

36.

state whether Decedent or her POA received counseling on the
disposition of Decedent's wealth and planning for the disposition
of her estate, if so, by whom;
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each

partner's

capital

37.

briefly describe the state of decedent's mental and
health for the period 1988-1998, especially as of
execution of the partnership agreement;

physical
date of

38.

furnish all detailed information/documents related to decedent's
medical status for the period 1988-1998 (the period), including,
a.
statements by persons having personal knowledge of the
facts wherein they describe Decedent's physical and mental
heal th for the period, noting especially her condition as
of date of formation of the FLP, and as of dates of any
intervivos gifts, and identify medical conditions for which
she sought/received medical treatment within that period,

b.

the name, address, telephone and dates of occupancy
Decedent in any nursing home(s) or other care facility,

c.

the identity of all medical providers
(e.g.
doctors,
nurses, facilities, agencies), if any, from whom Decedent
sought or received treatment during the period, and furnish
their name, address, telephone and city,

d.

identify what, if any, medical treatment Decedent received
during the period, and what was the objective of that
treatment,

e.

indicate the dates, if any, when the Decedent was perceived
by anyone (e.g. heir, doctor, nurse, aide, attorney) to be
other
than
competent,
and
identify
such
perceiving
person(s), if any (please do diligent enquiry),

f.

copies of the admission and dismissal summaries that show
dates hospitalized during the period, the symptoms at time
of admission, her medical/social history, and the final
diagnosis,
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by

39.

g.

state whether Decedent suffered pain,
whether it was
progressively severe, to what extent it was ameliorated by
medication, and to -what extent he/she did not tolerate the
pain medication,

h.

provide
information
regarding
what
was
the
expected
probability of Decedent's survival as of date of formation
of the FLP for 6mo, for lyr, for 18mo, for more than 18mo,

i.

identify
who,
besides
expectations, and

Decedent,

j.

furnish completed Forms
Medical Information; and

4452,

aware

Authorization

indicate to what extent you,
sought and or received court approval for
assets to the family limited partnership.
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was

of

to

those

Disclose

as POA for Decedent
subjecting Decedent's

WORKSHEET
INFORMATION re OPERATION

G.

the
FLP,
please
furnish
Re
OPERATION of the partnership:
1.
describe how,
from an
operated;

the

following

economic

INFORMATION

standpoint,

the

regarding
partnership

2.

describe how, if at all, there was a joining
conduct of a business by the family members;

3.

describe in what trade or business transactions, if any, the
partnership engaged, in particular whether the real property was
leased to tenants or operated by the partnership;

4.

describe
how
the
Decedent's
relationship
to
the
property
(subjected to the partnership agreement) and its income changed,
if at all, as a result of the partnership;

5.

state whether the partnership
involved in litigation;

6.

indicate to what extent, if any, the partnership,
a.
purchased,
conveyed,
leased,
mortgaged or
property,

filed

suit

in

or

the

was

common

otherwise

disposed

b.

voted or dealt in shares of other interests or entities,

c.

subscribed or otherwise
another entity,

d.

owned,
held,
sold,
loaned
obligations of another entity,
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acquired notes

or

or

otherwise

obligations

disposed

of

of

of

e.

borrowed money or otherwise incurred debt,

f.

loaned money and received a
as security for repayment,

g.

was a promoter, partner, or manager of another entity.

h.

has an office, if so furnish address/location,

i.

hire employees or agents,
define their
(employees or
agents) duties, fixed their compensation, or established
pension plans or other employee benefit plans,

j.

made contributions,

k.

indemnify anyone, or

1.

marketed or sold any of the real property;

7.

indicate the extent to which each partner was involved in
or consulted in the operation of the partnership;

8.

describe specific circumstances whereby, if at all, the
partners held themselves out as partners to third parties;

9.

describe how,
if at all,
the partners concealed the
partnership or themselves as partners from third parties,
and identify from whom and explain why;
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security interest in property

10.

indicate whether any partnership interests
exchanged,
or otherwise liquidated in the
partnership agreement was executed;

11.

state whether
partners;

12.

describe how partnership books and records were kept;

13.

identify the persons who make entries into the partnership
books
and
records,
and
furnish
their
addresses
and
telephone numbers;

14.

to the extent entries in the partnership books and records
are not made by a partner, identify at whose direction
entries are made;

15.

explain how the transaction was treated
purposes and for state law purposes;

16.

indicate any charitable deduction taken for any partnership
interests transferred to any qualified organization; and

17.

identify who provided investing information and made
investment decisions, both before and after creation of the
partnership,
and provide a copy of schedule of fees
charged, if any.

the

other
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partners

view

were
time

sold,
since

themselves

for

income

as

tax

WORKSHEET
INFORMATION re VALUATION

I.

Re the FLP,
please furnish the following INFORMATION regarding
VALUATION of the partnership:
1.
state the fair market net asset valuation of partnership
assets/liabilities (and show the computation thereof) as of
a.
the legal date of creation of partnership,

2.

b.

the dates of any intervivos gifts, and

c.

date of death;

state the valuations (and show the computation thereof)
partnership interests as of
a.
date of creation of partnership

gifts

by

of all

b.

the date
of any
intervivas
partnership interest, and

Decedent's

of

c.

as of date of death;

3.

state the valuations (and show the computation thereof) of
partnership interests if restrictions per agreement or
state law on its sale or use were disregarded under IRe

a.

as of the date of creation of partnership,

b.

the date
of any intervi vas
partnership interest, and

c.

as of date of death; and

2703 (a) (1)
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gifts

by

Decedent's

of

4.

state the
partnership
on its sale
a.
as of

valuations
(and show the computation thereof) of
interests if restrictions per agreement or state law
or use were disregarded under IRe 2704(b)
the date of creation of partnership,

b.

the date
of any
intervivos
partnership interest, and

c.

as of date of death.
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gifts

by

Decedent's

of

No Other Distributions. Except as provided in this Article, the Partnership shall make no
distributions of cash or other property to any Partner until its liquidation as provided in Section
10.05.
Distributable Cash. Distributable Cash includes only that cash held by the Partnership at the end
of a Fiscal Year after reasonable reserves of cash have been set aside by the Partnership
Management, subject to the duties imposed by Section 3.07, for working capital and other cash
requirements, including current and reasonably projected expenses, current and reasonably
projected investment opportunities, and reasonably anticipated contingencies. For purposes of
this Section, any of the Partnership Assets that are contributed to the Partnership by the Partners,
any borrowed funds, and any cash generated upon the sale of any of the Partnership Assets,
including Partnership Assets that are purchased with borrowed funds and including the cash
attributable to appreciation in value, shall be considered as necessary for investment purposes.
Operating Distributions. From time to time during each Fiscal Year, the Partnership may
distribute any part or all of the Distributable Cash proportionately to each of the Partners based
on their Percentage Interests; provided that no more than sixty days after each Fiscal Year, the
Partnership shall distribute all of the Distributable Cash proportionately to each ofthe Partners
based on their Percentage Interests. No distributions under this Section shall have the effect of
changing any of the Percentage Interests. In addition, from time to time during each Fiscal Year
and during the sixty-day period after the end of a Fiscal Year, the Partnership may distribute
additional cash and Partnership Assets in kind and proportionately to the General Partners and
Limited Partners based on their Percentage Interests; provided that, within sixty days after the
end of each Fiscal Year, distributions of Partnership Assets and cash from the Partnership to the
General Partners and Limited Partners shall not aggregate more than four percent (4%) of the net
fair market value of the Partnership Assets as of the beginning of that Fiscal Year. No
distributions under this Section shall have the effect of changing any of the Percentage Interests.
Income Tax Distributions. Regardless of the amount of Distributable Cash, the Partnership shall
distribute during the course of each Fiscal Year an amount of cash to each Partner that would be
sufficient for each Partner to pay the Partner's federal and state income taxes attributable to
profit and loss allocations by the Partnership at the highest marginal income tax rate and also
would be sufficient to allow the Partner to make estimated tax payments on a quarterly basis
without incurring any penalty; provided that any such distributions shall reduce the amount to
which the recipient Partner thereafter is entitled under Section 7.03 as if the distributions were an
advance on the Partner's distributive share.
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MISTAKE NO.1:

FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ASSETS TO
FUND A CREDIT SHELTER SHARE
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FUNDING THE CREDIT SHELTER SHARE IN A
MANNER THAT RESULTS IN "SHRINKAGE"

F-2

FAILURE TO KEEP AN ESTATE PLAN CURRENT
WITH TAX LAW CHANGES

F-4

FAILURE TO PERMIT THE DEFERRAL OF
RETIREMENT PLAN AND IRA BENEFITS
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MISTAKE NO.5:

FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE UPJOHN PROVISION
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FAILURE TO CHOOSE THE APPROPRIATE
TAX CLAUSE
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FAILURE TO CHOOSE THE BEST MARITAL
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FAILURE TO ALLOCATE GST EXEMPTION OR
FAILURE TO OPT OUT OF AUTOMATIC
ALLOCATION
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MISTAKE NO.2:

MISTAKE NO.3:

MISTAKE NO.4:

MISTAKE NO.8:

MISTAKE NO.9:

MISTAKE NO. 10: FAILURE TO DEFINE RESPONSIBILITIES WITH
THE CLIENT
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Estate planning attorneys must be aware of all of the "moving parts" of a
client's estate plan when designing and implementing a new plan. Estate planners must
consider how one change to a client's plan will cause ripple effect throughout the entire plan.
Considerations include a host of tax systems, federal and state, as well as non-tax, personal
considerations.
In many instances, the personal considerations outweigh the tax
considerations. However, in naming the top ten mistakes in estate planning, this article
concentrates on the tax considerations and attorneys' common errors in integrating parts of a
complex estate plan to make a cohesive and functional plan for the client. In some cases,
the mistakes may result in tax disasters; in others, the errors may merely be missed
opportunities. In either case, the mistakes are avoidable, and a vigilant eye and careful
consideration are keys to avoiding them.

Mistake No. 1
Failure to provide sufficient assets to fund a credit shelter share.
The most common general estate plan for married individuals involves division

of assets into a credit shelter share and marital share at the death of the first spouse to die.
By segregating the credit shelter share in a trust, those trust assets may benefit the surviving
spouse (and other family members or other beneficiaries) for the remainder of the surviving
spouse's lifetime and may be excluded from the surviving spouse's estate for estate tax
purposes at such spouse's death. An attorney may prepare estate planning documents,
including wills and/or revocable trust agreements, that may implement this plan, but if the first
spouse to die does not have sufficient assets available to fund the credit shelter share, the
plan is useless.
Many married individuals hold a significant amount of assets in joint title with
the right of survivorship. At the death of the first-to-die, those assets pass to the surviving joint
tenant. A qualified disclaimer of such property is rarely possible. The Internal Revenue Code
("Code") and regulations thereunder specify that a disclaimant may not have received any
interest in the property prior to making a qualified disclaimer. Usually, both joint tenants
enjoyed the property during their joint lifetime, and in such instance, a qualified disclaimer
may not be used to shift more assets to the credit shelter share.
Spouses who wish to take advantage of the credit shelter plan at the death of
the first-to-die should retitle assets in their individual names or divide them and place them in
their respective revocable trusts. Tenancy-in-common is also an alternative, and it may be
particularly attractive for real estate. Practitioners should be advised that a transfer of assets
to a person within one year prior to his or her death may succeed in funding the decedent's
credit shelter share, but may not result in a step-up in basis for such property if at the death
the property is returned to the transferor.
At times, dividing assets between spouses may be accomplished as simply as
retitling bank or brokerage accounts. In other instances, real estate transfers may be
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advisable, particularly if only one spouse is employed full time, and such employment
includes significant benefits such as employer-sponsored life insurance coverage and
retirement benefits. Obviously, employer-sponsored benefits may not be transferred to the
non-employee spouse during lifetime, so cash, securities, real estate or other property provide
other sources to boost the value of the non-employee spouse. Transfer of real estate from
joint name to one spouse may be accomplished fairly easily with a quitclaim deed.
Changing the beneficiary of life insurance or retirement plan assets payable to
the surviving spouse to the client's estate may help fund the credit shelter share, but caution is
advised. Life insurance proceeds received by a decedent's estate are subject to the claims of
the decedent's creditors. However, insurance proceeds received by designated individual
beneficiaries or the decedent's revocable trust are probably outside the reach of the creditors.
Kentucky inheritance tax should be a consideration as well. Life insurance proceeds payable
to the decedent's estate are subject to Kentucky inheritance tax and, unless the distributive
shares of the estate are payable to Class A beneficiaries, inheritance tax must be paid. If the
insurance is payable to named individual beneficiaries or a trust (including the decedent's
revocable trust), Kentucky inheritance tax will not apply.
Retirement benefits payable to the estate present the same creditor
considerations as life insurance. In addition, designating the client's estate as beneficiary of
tax-qualified retirement benefits or individual retirement accounts (IRAs) reduces post-mortem
options for income tax planning as designation of the estate as the beneficiary will usually
curtail the ability of the beneficiary to defer recognition of taxable income and a spousal
rollover of the benefits. Since it is difficult to determine the optimal beneficiary designation
until the client's death, it may be advisable for the client to designate the spouse as primary
beneficiary and the client's revocable trust or testamentary credit shelter trust as contingent
beneficiary so that the spouse may claim the benefits or disclaim them to the contingent
beneficiary if the spouse finds it advisable.

Mistake No.2
Funding the credit shelter share in a manner that results in Ilshrinkage."
Since practitioners work so hard to develop a cohesive and workable plan to
preserve and fund a credit shelter share at the first death for a married couple, any event
which diminishes that share should be avoided. Diminution or "shrinkage" occurs when that
share must recognize taxable income. Often the credit shelter share is set aside and retained
in a trust following the client's death.
Practitioners should anticipate and avoid two events which may result in
shrinkage: allocation of income in respect of a decedent (IRD) to the credit shelter share and
the distribution of trust accounting principal which may carry out distributable net income
(DNI) to a credit shelter trust. IRD is difficult to define but consists of a receipt of property
follOWing death for which the recipient must recognize taxable income even though such
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receipt may be properly allocable to trust accounting principal. Examples include retirement
benefits and IRA balances (other than the decedent's after-tax contributions), installment notes
which include a portion attributable to capital gain, dividends not received at death but for
which the ex-dividend date has passed and accrued income on fixed income securities such
as bonds. If a credit shelter trust receives such IRD items, the trust must recognize taxable
income. If the trustee must allocate the IRD to trust accounting principal, it is likely that the
income tax will be borne at the trust level, thereby reducing trust principal directly. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 compressed federal income tax brackets for estates and trusts, so estates
and trusts reach a maximum income tax bracket at approximately $9,000 in taxable income
annually. Hence, a large receipt of IRD to fund a credit shelter trust may have a significant
impact on the value of the principal in a credit shelter trust.
Distribution of other assets (other than IRD) to fund a credit shelter trust may
result in shrinkage of trust assets, although perhaps not as severely. A distribution of assets
from the decedent's estate or revocable trust to a credit shelter trust carries out DNI in most
instances. Preservation of the credit shelter share is advisable since such share is sheltered
from estate tax at the death of the surviving spouse. Taxable income not carried out by
distributions to beneficiaries is taxed at the trust level. When tax is "trapped" at the trust level,
the trust must pay the tax, and in accordance with the Uniform Principal and Income Act,
taxes attributable to trust accounting principal are paid out of trust accounting principal. At
one time, "trapping distributions" were encouraged as trusts were usually in a lower marginal
income tax bracket than trust beneficiaries. That is rarely the case now, and payment of
income tax at the trust level, which also shrinks the principal sheltered from estate tax, can be
a tax disaster.
Planning can avoid or ameliorate the shrinkage problem. Occasionally, the
planning opportunities arise after the decedent's death.
Such post-mortem planning
techniques include judicious selection of the timing of distributions to the credit shelter trust.
If such distributions occur in a year in which the gross income is minimal, the tax impact on
the credit shelter trust will also be minimal.
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Mistake No.3
Failure to keep an estate plan current with tax law changes.
While practitioners have not seen a wholesale revision of the federal estate tax
system since the early 1980s, there have been significant revisions to the federal and state
transfer tax systems which affect the estate plans of many clients. Most notable (and recent)
are the changes brought about by EGTRRA in 2001. Among other changes, EGTRRA (1)
increased the credit shelter equivalent for estate tax steadily, leading to an elimination of
estate tax in 2010, (2) created different (although unified) exclusions for gift tax and estate
tax, and (3) eliminated the credit for state death tax subject to a phase-out period. Below is a
chart which illustrates the differences between the gift tax exclusion and estate tax exclusion
over the years anticipated in EGTRRA:

Year

Lifetime Gift
Tax Threshold

Estate Tax
Exemption Amount

Highest Estate &
Gift Tax Rate

2001

$675,000

$675,000

55% (+5% surtax)

2002

$1 million

$1 million

50%

2003

$1 million

$1 million

49%

2004

$1 million

$1.5 million

48%

2005

$1 million

$1 .5 million

47%

2006

$1 million

$2 million

46%

2007

$1 million

$2 million

45%

2008

$1 million

$2 million

45%

2009

$1 million

$3.5 million

45%

2010

$1 million

Repealed

Max gift tax rate =
max inc tax rate

2011

$1 million

Reinstate $1 million

55% (+5% surtax)

Prior to EGTRRA, due to uncertainty within the federal estate tax system, many
clients put their estate planning decisions on hold. Now, although practitioners expect further
legislation which will affect at least the exemption equivalent, practitioners should review
estate plans to make sure those plans still fit their clients' needs and desires. The increase in
the exemption equivalent had an immediate impact. Practitioners who advised clients when
the exemption equivalent was $600,000 in the 1990s should revisit those plans since the
exemption equivalent for persons dying in 2004 is $1,500,000.
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Consider the example of a blended family in which husband and wife each
have children by a prior marriage or relationship. If husband adopted an estate plan which
left the credit shelter amount directly to his children and the marital share in a qualified
terminable interest property (QTIP) trust for his wife, his wife's share may be insufficient now
to provide for her needs following his death. By extension, if the plan remains as written and
the estate tax is repealed in 2010, the client's children may receive the entire estate, and no
assets pass into the QTIP trust for the wife's benefit. Surely, the husband did not intend such
a consequence when he and his attorney developed the estate plan just a few years ago.

Mistake No.4
Failure to permit the deferral of retirement plan and IRA benefits.
Everyone is familiar with the great advantage of tax-deferred compounding
within a defined contribution plan or IRA. If such assets are not needed at the current time,
deferral of benefits from such plans and the consequent growth opportunities are advisable.
Careful designation of beneficiaries of retirement plans and IRAs and the appropriate
structuring of IRAs can allow the benefits to grow exponentially well after the original owner's
death.
Distributions from tax-qualified retirement plans and IRAs are generally
governed by Code Section 401 (a)(9) and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The latest
regulations, issued in 2002, significantly simplified what was an unnecessarily complex system
of determining the minimum distributions which a participant must receive each year from
retirement plans and IRAs to avoid excise taxes and additional income taxes. A thorough
discussion of planning for retirement benefits and distributions is beyond the scope of this
outline and, indeed, is covered elsewhere in the materials for the Estate Planning Institute.
Nevertheless, a few general rules may help the estate planning practitioner avoid mistakes.
Since deferral of retirement plan or IRA distributions is a general objective, a
practitioner should be wary of any retirement vehicle which restricts the ability of a participant
or beneficiary to stretch out the benefits. Most employer-sponsored retirement benefits are
designed with ease of the ymployer's administration in mind. It also makes sense that an
employer would like to distribute benefits of a terminated or deceased participant as soon as
possible to cut the costs of administering the retirement plan. Consequently, the plan may
offer no alternative to a lump sum distribution in such event. On the other hand, IRA
sponsors such as banks, securities brokers and mutual fund companies, acting through their
trust company affiliates, would like to retain clients' resources for as long as pOSSible to
generate goodwill and earn revenue. An estate planning client may be well advised to roll
the benefits from his employer-sponsored retirement plan at separation of service (due to
retirement or other event) into an IRA so that he will have more distribution options during his
lifetime or following his death. A trustee-to-trustee transfer is usually preferable to a true
rollover as it avoids the issuance of a Form 1099-R and the resulting confusion at income tax
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preparation time, and it avoids recognition of taxable income if the participant does not
complete the rollover within the allotted time.
Another area in which mistakes frequently occur involves designating the
client's estate as the beneficiary of retirement benefits. A client may wish to divide his
retirement assets among many beneficiaries or may wish to combine retirement assets with
other assets, all of which will be divided as part of an integrated estate plan. Despite the
taxpayer-friendly 2002 regulations, designation of the client's estate remains inadvisable as it
forestalls deferral by the beneficiaries over a period which might otherwise extend over the
beneficiaries' individual life expectancies. Designation of individual beneficiaries is generally
preferable, and designation of the client's revocable trust may also present a solution.
A third common mistake in planning for distribution of retirement benefits
occurs when a client wishes to benefit both a charity and individual beneficiaries. Again,
despite the taxpayer-friendly regulations issued in 2002, naming both charitable and noncharitable beneficiaries for the same retirement plan or IRA will jeopardize the ability of the
non-charitable beneficiaries to stretch payments over their life expectancies. Let's say a father
has three sons. He wants to designate 25% of his IRA benefits to pass to each son and 25%
to charity. By dividing the IRA into two separate IRAs and designating his sons as equal
beneficiaries of one and the charity as the beneficiary of the other, he will insure his sons'
rights to elect to receive the IRA benefits over their life expectancies. Most IRA sponsors
would, under the latter plan, allow the IRA to be divided into three shares at the father's death
and would allow each son to make independent decisions about how much to withdraw each
year (subject to the minimum distribution requirements of Code Section 401 (a)(9) and each
son's life expectancy).

Mistake No.5
Failure to include the UPiohn provision.
Situations arise in estate plans in which a parent or legal guardian may serve in
a fiduciary capacity for a child or other dependent. On such occasions, the fiduciary may
have the authority to use or direct trust assets in a way which could discharge the fiduciary's
support obligation for such minor or dependent. Code Sections 678 and 2041 may cause
unforeseen tax results for such fiduciary.
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If a fiduciary distributes trust income and such distribution discharges a support
obligation which the fiduciary owes to the beneficiary, the fiduciary will be treated as the
owner of such trust under the grantor income tax provisions of the Code. The fiduciary must
recognize such income in the fiduciary's individual capacity and not the trust's. As the person
serving as fiduciary is probably in a higher income tax bracket than the beneficiary, most
persons serving as fiduciary would not want to be tagged with the taxable income.
The estate tax consequences of holding a power which may be used to
discharge a support obligation are even more severe. Trust assets which may be used to
discharge a support obligation must be included in the fiduciary's gross estate even if the
f;duciary never used such assets to discharge the obligation. Restricting the fiduciary's
discretion over principal to an ascertainable standard such as health, maintenance, support
or education will not alleviate the problem. It is obvious that this situation is to be avoided
through the nomination or appointment of fiduciaries who would not have a legal obligation
to support a trust beneficiary or by judicious drafting of the trust document.
The most common way to avoid the adverse income and estate tax
consequences of support obligation is the inclusion of the "Upjohn" provision in documents.
The Upjohn language restricts the fiduciary's ability to discharge his or her support obligation
by expressly prohibiti"ng it. An example of such language follows:
Any of the foregoing provisions of this document to the contrary
notwithstanding, Trustee shall make no discretionary distribution
or expenditure of either trust income or trust corpus if such
distribution or expenditure would discharge the legal obligation
of any person to provide for the health, support, maintenance
and education of the beneficiary or if such distribution or
expenditure would discharge any other legal obligation
(including, without limitation, a contractual obligation) of any
person other than the beneficiary.
Use of such a provision in estate planning documents has proven to be
Still, many practitioners do not
effective to eliminate the adverse tax consequences.
anticipate that a fiduciary may be nominated or appointed to serve with respect to the
fiduciary's own children or other dependents, and the Upjohn provision is frequently
overlooked. A relatively simple way to address the problem is to insert the provision in the
standard trustee's powers of all estate planning documents.
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Mistake No.6
Failure to anticipate a disclaimer.
Donees of inter vivos gifts and beneficiaries of assets which pass at death are
never forced to accept a gift, bequest or devise. Rather, recipients may execute a disclaimer,
which is a right afforded them under state law. If a disclaimer meets the criteria under Code
Section 2518, it will be a "qualified disclaimer." The person making a qualified disclaimer
will not be treated as receiving a gift and making a corresponding gift for transfer tax
purposes. Instead, the property is deemed to have passed from the original owner directly to
the ultimate recipient.
Disclaimers are used frequently in the post-mortem context to alter transfer tax
consequences of unplanned or unforeseeable events. Such events may include the good or
bad fortune of estate or trust beneficiaries, deaths out of the expected order, beneficiaries'
generosity, special needs of beneficiaries, and changes in the laws and regulations which
govern gift, estate and income taxes.
For a disclaimer to be a qualified disclaimer, the property must pass, as a
result of the disclaimer, as if the disclaimant had not survived the decedent. Thus, in the case
of property passing by beneficiary designation, a primary beneficiary may disclaim so that the
contingent beneficiary will receive the property. The decedent's surviving spouse is the only
beneficiary who may execute a qualified disclaimer and still receive a benefit in the
disclaimed property as the result of the disclaimer. Savvy practitioners plan for the possibility
of disclaimer by recommending a client designate the spouse as the primary beneficiary of life
insurance proceeds or retirement benefits and recommending the client's revocable trust or
credit shelter trust as the contingent beneficiary. Then, after a death, if the surviving spouse
feels he or she has sufficient assets in his or her sole name and if it is advantageous from an
estate tax perspective, the spouse may disclaim the outright interest in the insurance proceeds
or retirement benefits but may still receive benefits from assets passing into the credit shelter
trust. Planning for disclaimers adds flexibility to the estate plan, but such flexibility must be
weighed with the client's confidence in the spouse to make a decision within the limited
disclaimer period which will benefit the family as a whole.
In anticipating the possibility that a client's child may disclaim so that property
may pass directly to the client's grandchildren, additional issues present themselves.
Obviously, generation-skipping transfer tax may be generated. Also, the needs and resources
of a grandchild should be considered and whether additional assets may disqualify the
grandchild from government assistance and scholarship opportunities. Finally, if disclaimed
assets pass into trust for a grandchild and the grandchild's parent is to serve as trustee, the
Upjohn language should be included and (presuming the client so wishes) surety should be
waived on the trustee's bond or other arrangements made.
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Mistake No. 7
Failure to choose the appropriate tax clause.
Absent a provision in the governing instrument, Kentucky law dictates that
beneficiaries of an estate individually bear the burden of estate and inheritance taxes on their
respective shares.
However, most practitioners include in wills and revocable trust
agreements a provision which directs the fiduciary to pay most (if not all) estate, inheritance
or other transfer taxes out of the general probate estate or out of the reSiduary share. Such a
direction to pay taxes "off the top" of the probate estate may skew benefits dramatically. The
disparity may become greater as the popularity of non-probate assets continues to grow.
Joint property and property passing by beneficiary designation may constitute a large portion
of the gross estate for tax purposes, and if the taxes on such property are paid out of the
probate estate, the probate estate could be exhausted to the detriment of legatees and
reSiduary beneficiaries.
Consider the situation of a young executive who has employer-sponsored life
insurance, tax-qualified retirement benefits and miscellaneous supplement benefits such as
salary continuation, vacation pay, unpaid sick leave and deferred compensation
arrangements. Such benefits comprise the vast majority of assets passing at the executive's
death. All of such benefits typically pass by a beneficiary designation at the executive's death.
If the executive directs all taxes generated by reason of her death to be payable from her
probate estate, her wishes regarding the division of assets may be thwarted.
In choosing the appropriate tax clause, a practitioner must also gain full
knowledge of the client's assets including those held in trust and any expectancy which can be
anticipated. In addition to joint property and property passing by beneficiary designation, the
practitioner must also consider powers of appointment the client may possess (both general
and limited), QTIP elections, generation-skipping transfer tax trusts (both exempt and nonexempt), and the rights of reimbursement which may be afforded an estate for taxes assessed
against property passing outside the estate.
Still, if a client's integrated estate plan benefits the same individuals under the
client's will, trust agreement, beneficiary designations and joint tenancy, the practitioner may
choose a tax clause which directs payment out of the general probate estate or residue. Such
a general tax provision is usually the easiest to administer as the personal representative has
control over the assets to be used to pay the tax. The personal representative may anticipate
the cash needs of the estate and may liquidate assets in a timely manner to insure the
personal representative has cash at the tax filing deadlines. An apportionment of taxes
among beneficiaries such as the default provision under state law may force a personal
representative to contact beneficiaries of non-probate assets to contribute or "cough up"
cash, an unpleasant and sometimes next-to-impossible task.
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Mistake No.8
Failure to choose the best marital deduction provision.
As stated earlier, the most common general estate plan for married individuals
involves setting aside the credit shelter share at the first death and taking advantage of the
unlimited marital deduction for the remaining assets. Such marital share may pass outright to
the surviving spouse or in a trust which qualifies for the marital deduction such as a general
power of appointment trust or a QTIP trust. Volumes have been written on the subject of
choosing the best marital deduction given the client's personal situation, net worth and the
types of assets the client holds. Another presentation at the Estate Planning Institute will
explore this subject thoroughly. Mistakes occur when practitioners fail to acknowledge that
one formula will not fit all clients' needs.
Some marital deduction formulas which may be included in a client's will or
revocable trust agreement include the following:
1.

Pecuniary Credit Shelter Lead Bequest
•

2.

3.

Date of distribution funding

Pecuniary Marital Lead Bequest
•

Date of distribution funding

•

Minimum worth funding

•

Ratable sharing funding

Fractional Shares for Credit Shelter and Marital

The primary tax dangers of choosing the wrong marital deduction formula are
recognition of capital gain upon funding of a share and recognition of taxable income when
the right to receive IRD is allocated to a share. Some of the considerations may be
unforeseeable at the time the estate plan is developed, such as whether the assets held in the
estate will increase in value (a rising market) during the period of estate administration or
whether they will drop in value. Others, such as built-in gain on a decedent's installment
note, significant retirement benefits or other forms of IRD are foreseeable, and the practitioner
should plan accordingly so that the personal representative will not be forced to recognize
otherwise deferrable taxable income during the course of estate administration.
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Generally, the situations to be avoided are as follows:
1.

Recognition of capital gain upon funding certain pecuniary shares with
appreciated property; and

2.

Recognition of income when the right to receive IRD is allocated in satisfaction
of a pecuniary amount.

I defer further discussion of the marital discussion to my colleague on the panel.

Mistake No.9
Failure to allocate GST exemption or
failure to opt out of automatic allocation.
Before Congress passed EGTRRA, gift tax return preparers sometimes missed
opportunities with respect to GST allocations. Since a proper GST allocation for inter vivos
transfers, including transfers in trust, are properly made on a federal gift tax return (Form
709), the practitioner must alert the gift tax return preparer to use a client's exemption where
it is intended. Although late allocations were possible, late allocations frequently did not yield
the most efficient use of the GST exemption. The automatic allocations in Code Section
2632{c), added by EGTRRA, are intended to "save" taxpayers from failure to allocate GST
exemptions when it is advisable. Code Section 2632 also provides a taxpayer with an
opportunity to "opt out" of the automatic allocation on a timely-filed gift tax return.
Unfortunately, the automatic allocation is sometimes over-inclusive, resulting in
allocation of the GST exemption in situations that are not beneficial for the taxpayer. For
instance, life insurance trusts may contain provisions which trigger automatic allocations every
time the insured contributes to the trust to enable the trustee to pay premiums on the
insurance. Consequently, a taxpayer who wants to avoid wasting GST exemption must opt
out of the automatic allocation on a timely-filed gift tax return. Some estate planning
authorities suggest reserving the GST exemption by opting out anytime the taxpayer is unsure
of the best allocation. Such an attitude may be called "when in doubt, opt out." A late
allocation will be beneficial in some circumstances, such as when the value of trust assets
have declined in value. However, a late allocation is risky, and if trust assets increase
substantially in value, a late allocation may be costly for the taxpayer.
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Mistake No. 10
Failure to define responsibilities with the client.
Preparation and execution of the estate planning documents do not constitute
the entire estate plan. Often, there is much work to be completed after the client leaves the
attorney's office with signed wills and trust agreements. Such tasks include retitling or
transferring assets, preparing beneficiary designations, transferring ownership of life insurance
policies, communicating with insurance companies, securities brokers and transfer agents,
filing of deeds, preparation of Crummey notice letters, and tax elections such as S
corporation elections, qualified sub S trust (QSST) and electing small business trust (ESBT)
elections. Gift tax returns may be necessary, and the proper preparation may include the
allocation or opt-out of GST exemption and the election of the marital deduction for an inter
vivos QTIP trust.
Only in unusual circumstances should an attorney take on responsibility for all
tasks necessary to complete the estate plan. Such acts may cause the attorney to act out of
the sphere of his or her knowledge, and generally clients don't wish to pay attorneys to
perform non-legal work. It is easy to see how an attorney, even acting with a complete
knowledge of all relevant facts, may omit or neglect part of such duty.
It is a much better practice to define with the client the limited scope of the
attorney's responsibilities extending after the estate planning documents are signed. Of
course, an attorney's communication with the client regarding such responsibilities is best if
made in writing so that a copy will remain in the attorney's file.
An attorney may use a standard memorandum to the client, handed to the
client when documents are executed or mailed to the client shortly thereafter, which specifies
the legal names for suggested primary or contingent beneficiaries for life insurance,
retirement benefits and IRAs and suggests retitling assets. The memorandum or letter may
also remind the client of the obligation to file a gift tax return and that elections consistent
with the estate plan should be made. Finally, the memorandum or letter should remind the
client if the attorney is not undertaking responsibility of preparing the gift tax return and the
due date for filing same.

* * * *
Common themes run throughout this list of common mistakes.
Those themes are the absolute necessity for client communication and for integration of all
aspects and considerations of an estate plan. As the estate plan is comprised of many
"moving parts," knowledge and understanding of all component parts and the effect which
each decision has on the remaining parts is essential.
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A.

OVERVIEW
1. The Statutory regime

Medicaid financial eligibility requirements are codified generally within the maze of
regulations set out within Title 42 of the United States Code, and Title 20 in the Code of
Federal Regulations. The program is jointly administered by the Health Care Finance
Administration ("HCFA") and local state governments. HCFA has published the so-called
State Medicaid Manual which establishes all federal rules and policy pertaining to the
Regulations.
In Kentucky, the Regulations pertaining to financial eligibility are generally set out at
Chapter 907 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations. The Kentucky Department for
Medicaid Services ("OMS") is the primary agency responsible for implementation of the
Medicaid program. OMS contracts with the Department for Community Based Services
("DCBS") which has generated a manual to provide guidance to caseworkers. This
Manual, known as the Field Services Operation Manual (the "manual") contains very
specific provisions as to how a particular set of facts should be interpreted.
2. Why is it important to know about Medicaid?
Medicaid is the only program of governmental financial assistance by which an
individual's long term institutional care is paid. Medicare only pays in limited
circumstances, and then for a limited period of time. In that nursing home expenses in
Louisville currently approach an average of $5,000 per month, a basic understanding of
these rules is an important component of any practitioners knowledge to provide effective
estate planning advice to elderly clients.
B.

OVERVIEW OF ESSENTIAL RULES

1. The Transferred Resource Factor Rule
(a)

Basic concept

Medicaid Planning Techniques
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Since a fundamental component of long-term institutional care Medicaid
eligibility requires the would-be applicant to be within resource limits ($2,000 of
counted resources for a single person, 1/2 counted resources, not more than
$92,760 (and not less than $20,000) in 2004, and as adjusted in later years for a
couple), consideration of transferred funds is always relevant.
(1)

The rule - Funds transferred for less than fair market value (gratuitous
transfers) to the recipient will trigger a penalty which is expressed in terms of
an ineligibility period, or length of time from date of gratuitous transfer until
the transferor may become eligible for benefits.

(2)

Transfers considered - There is a 36 month "lookback rule" which
establishes the time parameter during which transfers are considered. The
lookback period extends to 36 months for outright transfers preceding the
month an individual is institutionalized and an application for Medicaid is
made. For transfers to trust, the lookback is increased to 60 months from
the date all ,or a portion of, the trust is not available to the transferor.

(b)

Transfer penalty
Once it is learned that there was a transfer made for less than fair value during
the lookback period, a transfer penalty is determined. Each transfer is assessed
a penalty in a process by which the transfer is divided by the so-called
"transferred resource factor" in the year of Medicaid application.

In 2004, in

Kentucky, that is $2,614.
(1)
(2)
(3)

Thus, a transfer of $26,000 is divided by $2,614, resulting in 9.9464.
Figures to right of decimal are disregarded.
The result is the number of months of Medicaid ineligibility starting with and
subsequent to the month of transfer, with the month of transfer being
regarded as the first month.

(4)

See Medicaid Manual Volume IVA, Section 2080 (0) for illustrations, and
examples of multiple transfers. Multiple transfers which do not overlap are
treated separately.

(5)

Transfers made further back in time than the reach of the lookback period
are generally irrelevant.

(c)

Planning with transfers
(1)

Rule of halves - Typically, transfers of all resources are inadvisable since the
larger the transfer the larger the penalty, and funds will be necessary to pay
for the cost of care until the penalty expires and a Medicaid bed is available.
Thus, transfer planning must take into account cost of care during the
ineligible interval.
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Example: Mother has $100,000. A transfer of all funds will mean that she
will not be able to apply to be eligible for benefits for 3 years.
$100,000 divided by $2,614

=

Why?

38 months. In the meantime nursing home

expenses will need to be paid. Instead of transferring $100,000, consider a
gift of half. $50,000 divided by $2,614 will result in a transfer penalty of 19
months of the $50,000 retained; that would mean that $2,614 per month
would be available to pay the facility, along with mother's Social Security.
Consideration of expenses and also income must be factored into
determining the amount required, and it is wise to adjust the gift
accordingly.
If mother's Social Security is $1,200 per month, and facility costs run $5,000
per month, the shortfall is $3,800 per month. Provision for the difference
between this amount and the ineligibility period must be considered.
(2)

Rolling transfers - May shorten ineligibility period. For instance, a transfer
of $5,200 per month will, in a year when the transfer factor is $2,614, result
in a 1.989, or 1 month, penalty. Thus, $20,000 may be transferred in
monthly increments at $5,200 per month, with only a 4 month penalty,
whereas a transfer of $20,000 outright in 1 month will result in a 7 month
penalty.

Again, be sure that penalties do not overlap, and there were no

other gifts during the ineligibility period which may produce an overlap.

2. Planning for Couples - The Community Spouse Allowances
Spousal Impoverishment
Until the passage of the Medicaid Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), in
situations where one spouse was institutionalized (the "institutionalized spouse") and
another spouse remained at home (or in the community, known as the "community
spouse"), since the only financial resource exclusion was limited to $2,000 per spouse,
the cost of care for an institutionalized spouse frequently brought about the
impoverishment of not only the institutionalized spouse, but also the community spouse.
Stated differently, the community spouse was required to contribute of his or her
resources to support the institutionalized spouse until the resources of both spouses had
been reduced to the exclusion amount.
The MCCA, however, provided some relief to the community spouse at least with respect
to individuals who entered an institution on or after September 30, 1988. Basically the
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rules provide that the community spouse may retain a much higher level of assets than
was allowed previously.
(a) Determination of Community Spouse RESOURCE Allowance
The Community Spouse Resource Allowance ("CSRA") is determined as follows:
(1) Aggregate countable resources. All non-exempt resources of both spouses must
be counted together, regardless of their character, and regardless of whose name
appears on the title of the resources. Such non-exempt resources are pooled, and
the total value is calculated.
(2) Segregate community spouse's allowable share.

The community spouse is

entitled to her or his CSRA, determined as follows:
(i)

Effective June 1, 2003 in Kentucky the CSRA is a minimum of $20,000,
or one-half of the value of the pooled counted resources, whichever is
greater, up to a maximum of $92,760.

(ii)

Both the base amount and the maximum is adjusted for federal cost of
living adjustments as evidenced by the Consumer Price Index.

(iii)

The other one-half of the spousal resources, or, if greater, the amount of
those resources which exceed the CSRA maximum amount (in 2004 that
is $92,760) count as resources of the institutionalized spouse, which will
either disqualify that spouse for Medicaid until either "spent down," that
is, applied towards the cost of that spouse's care in the institution,
converted to excluded resources, given away followed by the conclusion of
the ineligibility period, or a combination thereof.

(iv)

Note that only counted resources are factored in to determine CSRA.
Thus, for instance the residence, retirement plans and excluded vehicles
of the spouses are not considered in determining the CSRA.

(b) Inter-spousal Transfers
Since the transfer of resource rules (discussed more fully below) are not applicable
with respect to transfers to or for the benefit of an individual's spouse, the
institutionalized spouse (or his or her attorney-in-fact with sufficient authority to
transfer resources on his or her behalf) may transfer resources to a community
spouse without penalty in order to bring the community spouse up to the maximum
CSRA allowance.
It should be noted by the practitioner that in Kentucky all resources owned by both

spouses at the time the institutionalized spouse applies for Medicaid are counted
even if there is a pre-nuptial agreement which purports to maintain assets for the
exclusive use of the community spouse.
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(c) Preserving the CSRA maximum under new rules.
(1)

Post May 31, 2003 rules differ substantially from pre-June 1 rules.
(i)

CSRA is now limited to 1/2 of resources, up to the annual maximum.
Thus, if spouses own $90,000 when application is made, the CSRA is
$45,000. The institutionalized spouse may keep $2,000, and thus the
couple exceeds limits by $43,000.

(ii) In all cases where the couple has more than $20,000, there will be a
potential eligibility problem unless a "Resource Assessment" precedes
application to establish the amount of resources, set the CSRA, and
determine excess resources which must be spent, transferred or
converted by the time the application is made.
(iii) It should finally be noted that under present policy starting after the
month in which Medicaid eligibility is established as to the
institutionalized spouse, the resources of the community spouse are no
longer considered. Thus, once the institutionalized spouse is Medicaid
eligible, should the community spouse acquire additional resources, the
community spouse will not be required to contribute such excess
resources towards the cost of care of the institutionalized spouse unless
the institutionalized spouse goes off Medicaid and a new application is
made.

(d) Income rules between spouses - The Community Spouse INCOME Allowance
Since the MCCA was enacted, the community spouse has been permitted to retain
not only more substantial assets, but also a much higher level of income. Basically,
the income of the community spouse is no longer required to be used to help pay for
the cost of the institutionalized spouse. Unlike the rule with respect to assets, the
income of each spouse is considered owned by the spouse in whose name it is paid.
Income paid in both names is considered to be owned by each spouse as to one-half
of the amount of such income.
(1) There is more to the income rule, however, than meets the eye. A very important
aspect of the income rule is that the income and assets of the institutionalized
spouse are available to the community spouse if necessary in order to bring the
Community Spouse's Income Allowance ("CSIA").
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In Kentucky, the CSIA is

$1,515 per month for year 2004.

This amount may be increased by court

ordered support, or by certain "shelter expenses".
(2) What this means is the following:
(i)

The community spouse may draw against the institutionalized spouse's
income (which may include the institutionalized spouse's Social Security) to
the extent necessary in order to bring the community spouse's income up to
the $1,515.

(ti)

In Kentucky, the CSIA may be increased by documented monthly "shelter
expenses" - basically monthly rent or mortgage, home insurance, utility
expenses, telephone - but only that portion of such items in excess of a
shelter standard of, in year 2004, $455 per month. The CSIA may also be
increased by Court Order.
Example: Shelter expenses come to $755 per month. The extra $300 is
added to the $1,515 allowance.

Thus, the community spouse will be

permitted to draw on the institutionalized spouse's income to bring her
income up to $1,815 per month.

C.

PLANNING TECHNIQUES
1. Converting Assets to Income - The Private Annuity

(a) CAVEAT
Recently, although this author believes erroneously, the Kentucky Department
for Medicaid Seroices ("DMS") has begun challenging annuities acquired close
in time to Medicaid application date. The reader is advised to proceed with
caution in using this technique. Under policy adopted late in 2003, all
annuities must be reviewed by DMS staff in Frankfort which has begun to deny
eligibility where annuities were acquired on the eve of Medicaid application.
Thus, this technique, although philosophically sound, may nonetheless be
denied by a DMS regime which seems to be shooting down any effort to save
resources.

Thus, the reader is cautioned that this technique is not presently

recommended, but may be useful if Kentucky policy were to clarify under what
circumstances (if any) that can be protected.
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(i)

In certain instances, if time is of the essence and there are no other alternatives,
a private annuity may be advisable, depending on the client's risk sensitivity.
The reader will recall that the transfer of resource rule triggers a penalty period of
ineligibility in connection with a transfer made for less than full and adequate
consideration.

Although this rule operates generally to attach a penalty period to

most transfers, transfers for adequate consideration are thus not subject to a
penalty.

Perhaps the most effective device to utilize the "adequate consideration"

option is the Private Annuity, which is nothing more than a transfer of assets in
exchange for a paYment of income... a conversion of assets to income

Such a

transfer, properly structured, should enable the transferor to become eligible for
Medicaid benefits immediately, without any penalty period whatsoever, so long as the
transfer results in the transferor receiving annuity paYments which are "actuarially
sound" as deemed by the Kentucky Medicaid regulations.

In effect, the technique

should be viable in that the property transferred in exchange for the annuity is
transferred for consideration (i.e., the annuity paYment) which is worth an amount
precisely equal to the value of the property transferred.
(b) Life expectancy tables have been set forth in the HCFA regulations, and such tables
must be taken into account in determining the amount of the annuity payout. The
tables are set out at Manual Section 1890 and 1900.
Example: Mrs. Smith, age 72, is institutionalized and has been told that a
Medicaid bed is available to her. Under the HCFA regulations, she has a life
expectancy of 13.99 years. Thus, paYments under a private annuity cannot
be established under a fIXed term of years which will extend significantly
beyond her life expectancy, or the arrangement will be deemed to be not
actuarially sound. If not actuarially sound, adequacy of consideration will be
questioned, and a possible gift element will be involved.
(c) Let's take a closer look at the Private Annuity structure.
(1) Mechanics - Those familiar with the estate planning utility of a Private Annuity
know that the arrangement is a means of converting assets into income, whereby
the individual transferring assets (known as the "annuitant") transfers assets to
another individual (the "obligor") in exchange for the obligor's commitment to
make paYments back to the annuitant, either for life, a term certain, or a term of
years as determined by reference to the annuitant's life expectancy, the last of
which is known as a "Private Annuity for Term of Years" or "PATY." Essentially,
the Private Annuity operates just like a commercial annuity purchased through
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an insurance company, or other financial institutions offering annuities; however,
the difference is that the private annuity arrangement is between individuals not
normally engaged in the business of providing annuities, typically family
members. Thus, the arrangement is referred to as a "Private Annuity."
(2) The way it works is as follows.
(i)

Transfer of assets - the annuitant irrevocably transfers assets to the
obligor.

Upon transfer, the transferred assets then belong to the

obligor.

For reasons discussed below, clients should earmark a

specific account, or portfolio, where the transferred assets can be
segregated from other assets of the obligor.
(ii)

The annuity agreement sets forth the obligation - A written agreement
should be prepared to recite and set forth the annuity obligation,
specifying the amount of the payout, the term of the annuity, and the
disposition in the event of the death of the obligor. Some key points
are as follows:
a) Investment element - For the transaction to hold water insofar as
Medicaid eligibility is concerned, not only is there a requirement that
the term of the annuity be actuarially sound, but the payment must
reflect a return on investment which is reasonable.
b) Purpose - starting with the post-June 2003 rules,

Kentucky

bureaucrats have been - this author believes without proper authority
- looking at the purpose of the annuity: was it to gain Medicaid
eligibility? If so, even a properly structured transaction may,
depending on circumstances, be disrespected, with the result that
resources so transferred may be considered subject to transfer of
resource penalty; or the funds may be considered to be a "resource."
A. This approach to denial of eligibility should, as a technical
matter, be baseless. Even HCFA, speaking of "purpose" states
that it must be viewed in light of actuarial soundness. If DMS'
theory is correct - that a transfer is deemed as having
occurred, what is it that has been transferred when the
annuity is actuarially sound? Where is the failure of fair
market value? If the transfer is disregarded altogether, Le. the
funds are considered a "resource", what of the fact that the
funds are not available? These are troubling questions have
been blithely disregarded by DMS bureaucrats intent on
denying eligibility.

Medicaid Planning Techniques

G-8

(iii)

Disposition at death - Typically, at death the annuity obligor's
payment obligation would simply cease, and the assets transferred
pursuant to the obligation would remain with the obligor.

As an

alternative, the annuitant may set forth a beneficiary designation in
the private annuity that directs the disposition of any payment
obligation which may survive him or her.
(iv)

Power to amend - As of this writing, as is true with regard to trust
amendatory powers, it is prudent to authorize the obligor (not the
annuitant) to collapse the annuity and return funds to the annuitant
should either the arrangement cause the annuitant to lose eligibility
for Medicaid benefits for any reason, or if the funds transferred are
regarded as available to the annuitant.

A collapse should give the

obligor power to commute the remaining payment obligation to its
present value.

Note that the annuitant must NOT have a power to

access the principal.
(vI

Why it should work - "actuarial soundness" - In theory, the annuitant

no longer has a resource to the extent of funds transferred, but an
income stream that will result in consumption of the asset so
transferred based on the individual's life expectancy_
(d) Tax consequences - The tax consequences which flow from the arrangement are as
follows:
(1) Income tax aspects - The obligor will receive taxable income with respect to a
fraction of the payments, since a portion represents a return on investment, and
a portion represents a return of contributed capital. A discussion of the income
tax aspects of annuities is beyond the scope of this outline, however, the
practitioner is referred to Section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code. Basically, the
practitioner should determine the expected payout over the life of the annuity,
divide this by the amount contributed, and determine a return of contribution,
and anticipated return on investment. This results in a fractional share which
should be multiplied by each annuity payment to arrive at the amount which is
taxable income for the year.
(i) It should be noted that regardless of whether the amount transferred is
invested by the obligor in a tax free obligation, the annuitant nonetheless
must report his or her return on investment as determined in Section 72.
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Typically, in the context of individuals interested in Medicaid eligibility
planning, this will be a fairly small amount, and generally will be immaterial
since the annuity payment will be applied toward the cost of long term health
care, and therefore tax deductible at any rate.
(ii) Where assets other than bank deposits, certificates or deposit, or cash

equivalents are part of the arrangements, the obligor will receive the
annuitant's basis in the assets, with some adjustment, as determined by
applicable IRS basis rules under Section 1014 and 1015 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
Caution: The annuity may be structured so that any unpaid amounts at the
annuitant's death will be paid by the obligor to named beneficiaries. Where
large amounts are involved, if the annuitant dies before receiving all
payments, if the obligor simply keeps the funds transferred and is relieved of
the annuity obligation, there may be taxable income to the obligor in the year
of the annuitant's death to the extent of the unpaid annuity amount.
Revenue Ruling 55-119.

See

Having the unpaid balance paid by way of a

beneficiary designation or general testamentary power of appointment
retained by the annuitant may, properly designed, cause the annuity to be
includable in the annuitant's estate and thus pass to heirs from the
annuitant, possibly avoiding income taxability to the obligor.
(2) Gift tax aspects - Structured properly, the transaction is a sale of assets for
valuable consideration, and not a taxable gift.
(3) Inheritance tax aspects - Depending on how it is structured, the annuity may
avoid estate taxation.

If the

assets were acquired during lifetime for

consideration of the annuity promise, the obligor should receive the assets at the
death of the annuitant free from Kentucky inheritance tax, or, where applicable,
federal estate tax.

The latter will rarely, if ever, be involved, except in those

unusual instances where the annuitant has already used up his or her unified
credit, and enters into a private annuity transaction and dies with a payment
obligation outstanding. Such an annuity should not be covered by Section 2039
of the Internal Revenue Code, and in this author's view is not required to be
reported on IRS Form 706 under the IRS instructions.
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(e) Uses and limitations
1) Generally - A private annuity in the context of estate conservation planning is
quite useful in two very important respects. The first is that the arrangement is a
means of taking a Medicaid bed when offered when transferred resources would
preclude making a Medicaid application. Secondly, the structure is a means of
slowing down the dissipation of resources.
2) Limitations - The arrangement may not provide the family with the perfect
financial solution to the cost of care, since the annuity income will, with some
small allowances (notably personal monthly needs and the cost of health
insurance), be regarded as patient liability, and thus turned over to the nursing
home.

Over a long period of time, the transferred funds will, in fact, be

dissipated. Yet, in situations where there is no time to plan, and assets will be
consumed in any event, the private annuity can give the family a chance to
receive an inheritance. Even in smaller estates where a Rule of Halves transfer
will facilitate eligibility in a relatively short period of time, there will still be a

waiting period before eligibility can be established.
eliminate the waiting period.

A private annuity can

As a rule of thumb, this technique will provide

maximum benefits where the client is on the relatively younger end of the elder
client spectrum, especially where the annuitant's actual life expectancy is not
very long. A payout of fourteen years with good investment performance can slow
down the rate of consumption of $100,000 assets to $8,000 per year, versus
$30,000.
(f) Why not a commercial annuity?

For several reasons a private annuity offers advantages over a commercial annuity.
(1) No sales load - typically, insurance companies charge a hidden fee which is
built into the return.
(2) Flexibility - since the transferred funds remain in the family, if the annuitant
ever needs more money, there is a pool of assets which can be used for him or
her. This may especially be critical if the annuitant is on Medicaid for a while,
but then goes off the program, returning to personal care or independent living.
With an irrevocable commercial annuity (remember, to be effective the
arrangement must be irrevocable) that flexibility is not there.
(3) Opportunity for growth - if the family gets good investment performance, it is
possible that the yield on transferred assets will result in growth, rather than
consumption.

In low interest times where the applicable federal rate is low,

funds may be able to generate the payout on earnings alone, thus preserving
the principal for the family.
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(g) Annuities in current environment
In light of adversarial perspective of current DMS policy makers, and fact that all
annuities must now be reviewed by DMS before case can be approved, commercial
annuities can be either salvific or punishing. Indiana has a statute that only
recognizes commercially issued annuities.
(1) Salvific - commercial annuities may be more defensible in that annuitant will
NOT be able to access funds, whereas familial transfers may be set aside.
(2) Punishing - if even commercial annuities are disallowed, problem is that family
can NOT access funds. Thus, can be "damned if you do, damned if you don't.»
2. THE HOMESTEAD (PERSONAL RESIDENCE) IN THE WAKE OF 9-1-03 RULES

fa) Overview
(I)Under law in effect prior to September 1, 2003, the homestead was not counted as
a resource. This was true regardless of whether the Medicaid recipient could ever be
expected to return home, and in fact whether he or she ever even set foot in the
home. Under pre-September 1 rules, excess resources could be used to improve or
buy a bigger residence, and thus converted into an excluded resource.
fb)Post-August 31,2003 Rules
(I)Under new rules, the homestead will in many cases lose the protection of the old
rules even for existing cases upon recertification. The result will be that the new laws
may apply.
In cases where residential property was jointly owned prior to the effective date of
the new law, so long as Co-owners refuse to relinquish their portion and thus
facilitate a sale, the property may continue to be excluded at least for cases where
the recipient's eligibility was prior to 9/1/2003.
This may be a "Pyrrhic victory" however. Eligibility may be maintained, but the
recipients' interest in the property may be subject to estate recovery.
(2)The homestead will even under the new rules continue to be excluded in the
following cases -
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(i) For the first six (6) months of the recipient's institutionalization;
(ii) For up to the 1st recertification where the recipient has signed a statement
to the effect that he or she intends to return home within a specified time
(possibly even longer depending on the facts and circumstances);
(iii) The home has been owned by, or transferred to, a specified class of
individuals under 907 KAR 1:650 Section 2a) the recipient's spouse;
b) a child under age 21
c) a caretaker child who has resided with the recipient for two years prior
to

institutionalization

and

who

provided

care

to

prevent

institutionalization;
d) a disabled child of the recipient.
e) A sibling of the individual who has an equity interest in the home and
who has lived with the institutionalized individual for one year prior to
institutionalization.
(c)What to do ?
(1) Transfer house as advance plan when health care seas are calm.
(2) In situations where there is not sufficient time, it may be advisable to sell all, or a
portion of, the house to children for assessed value which may be less than market
value.
(i) It maybe advisable to sell for less than assessed value - this would trigger a
gift penalty.
( 3) Retain life estate; transfer remainder.
(i) This technique will permit a reduction in value of what has been sold. The
manual has tables at Section 2056 which establish the value of a life estate and
remainder interest.
a) Example: An 80 year old woman has a house which is tax
assessed at $100,000. She retains a life estate and sells the
remainder to her children. Her life interest under the tables is
worth 43.66% of the property, or $43,660.
b) The children purchase the remainder interest for $56,340.
Through a combination of gifts and private pay spend down,
assume she consumes $6,000 per month. In 10 months she is
eligible because the funds are gone
c)

Same example, but children purchase the remainder for half, or
$28,000. There has been an uncompensated transfer (gift) of
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$28,000. Assume the transfer factor was $2,800 in the year of
application. Transfer penalty will be 10 months.
d) Assume children pay nothing. Penalty will be 20 months. Query:
how will 20 months cost of care be paid? May need to retransfer
property and start over. See HCFA Regulation 3258.10 for "curing"
prohibited transfer penalities.
(d)Income tax considerations.
(1 )Where property must be sold, consider sale of property in recipients' name for capital
gains tax exclusion where recipient has lived at property for at least 1 of previous five
years, which is required to exclude as "personal residence" under Internal Revenue
Code Section 121(d)(7).
(2 )If property is transferred to children who then sell, children will pick up recipient's
adjusted basis, which often is quite low relative to current market, thus
creating current tax liability to children.
(3) Property may be transferred to individuals who plan to live there without tax concerns if
it becomes their residence with requisite holding period.
(4) Query as to whether property which is subject to retained life estate will enable heirs to
receive stepped up basis under Code Section 1015 based on includibility in estate
under Code Section 2036.
leI Estate recovery - under post-August 31, 2003 rules, estate recovery is no longer limited to the
recipient's "estate" as defined for purposes of state probate law, but purports to embrace any and all
interest which the recipient owned at death. Thus, even survivorship property, property in trusts,
and - amazingly - life interests are to be made subject to new estate recovery rules.
(1) It is difficult to see what transfer occurs at the death of a life tenant. The
retention of a life tenancy is an excluded resource under Manual Section 2055,
with the result that the remainder interest is regarded as having been
transferred. At the deceased recipient's death, the life estate simply terminates
and there is no "transfer".
(2) Transfers to avoid estate recovery may be advisable even if transferor goes off
Medicaid.
(i) Example: Recipient owns property in joint survivorship with children in a
pre-September 1, 2003 deed for a pre 9/1/2003 approved case. Assume the
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property is worth $200,000. Son purchases remainder interest of mother's
half of the property for $56,340, mother goes off Medicaid as per above
example for 9 months. If half property subjected to estate recovery at death,
son could lose $100,000 to estate recovery claims instead.
3. THIRD PARTY SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPORT TRUSTS

(a) Overview
An important exception to the available resource rules applies in the context of a
trust created for the benefit of a potential Medicaid recipient other than the individual
who is the grantor, or his or her spouse.

Where the funds utilized in the

establishment of a trust have originated with the Medicaid applicant, his or her
transfer is generally going to be either disregarded and the trust funds counted as
available, or the transfer will constitute a transfer of resources which will result in a
period of ineligibility, as determined by the look-back rule unless the special needs
trust exception applies. See 907 KAR 1: 645 for treatment of trusts and transfer of
resource policy. Trusts created for oneself that may receive special exclusionary
treatment are not the subject of this section, but are discussed more fully in Section
5, below.
The third party trust referred to in this section contemplates a trust agreement which
is created by the third party (Le., one other than the prospective Medicaid recipient)
with assets which have originated at all times with the third party. In other words,
this section will focus on trusts established by a third party which, at the time a
Medicaid application is made, are not regarded as having been created by the
Medicaid applicant, and where the trust assets are not regarded being available
resources to the Medicaid applicant.
Example:

Father creates a trust for his daughter, a handicapped individual. The

trust will be funded with the father's assets. The trust is, as to the daughter, a third
party trust.
In particular, at this point consideration will be with the need for responsible family
members to take into account how to best plan for those who may be dependent
upon funds which will be set aside either for dependent survivors at the death of the
third party; or be set aside for dependent individuals who are categorically eligible for
benefits, and resource eligible based on their own resources, but the third party
wishes to establish a source of supplemental support as to such individual in such a
manner as to not preclude public assistance benefits from being available to such
person, referred to herein as the "disabled person."
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In all events, planning will emphasize the need for structuring the funds so set aside
in order that such funds constitute only a "supplemental source of income," of the
disabled person with the result that any funds as to that individual will not be
regarded as available resources, subject to spend down limitation rules as a condition
to the disabled person's continuing eligibility for Medicaid benefits, or anticipated
eligibility for such benefits.

Thus, the primary issue relating to third party trusts

centers on whether the trust assets are "available" to the disabled person/Medicaid
applicant.
(b) "Supplemental Support" Trusts
The key to understanding the rules of third party trusts is that such trusts must be
written in such a way that at all relevant times, the assets and/or income therefrom
will not be available to meet the disabled person's basic cost of care, including
institutional care, or generally the type of services which are normally covered by
public assistance programs.
A "special needs trust" or "supplemental support trust" can take two forms: (1) a
"pure" supplemental support trust; and (2) a so-called "trigger trust."
Included among the definition of items which go towards a disabled person's "special
needs" or "supplement support" are those items which are not necessary to provide
for the disabled person's basic needs, including room and board in an institution or
other facility, or under circumstances where governmental benefits are payable.
Special needs would include such items as entertainment, vacations, travel, audio
and visual entertainment, non-essential clothing, and generally all other items which
may provide for a beneficiary's enjoyment of life but which are not among the
beneficiary's essential needs.
(1) "Pure" supplemental support trust - This is a trust which, by its terms, is at all
times limited to making disbursements which are strictly to provide for a
beneficiary's supplemental support or special needs. The trust does not authorize
distributions for a beneficiary's general health, maintenance, and support, even
where such distributions are discretionary with the trustee.

Such a trust is

normally confined to circumstances where a beneficiary is already disabled and
receiving public assistance.

Neither the trust corpus nor income of such a trust

would be considered available to the beneficiary in the determination of his or her
eligibility for benefits.
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(2) Trigger Trust - is a type of trust which provides that the trustee may, in the
trustee's sole and absolute discretion, apply so much of the trust income and/or
principal as the trustee deems advisable to provide for the beneficiary's reasonable
health, maintenance, and support. However, upon a beneficiary's application for
public assistance benefits to be applied towards the cost of providing for the
beneficiary's institutionalization or other care of a sort for which governmental
benefits for the beneficiary's health care become and remain, payable,then, at that
time, the trustee shall no longer have the authority to distribute to or for the trust
beneficiary any amounts from the trust income or principal which may supplant or
displace public assistance benefits. Thus, the Medicaid application(or eligibility, as
the case may be) triggers the restrictive supplemental support provisions of the
trust, where no distributions may be made other than for the purpose of providing
for a beneficiary's special needs, or supplemental support, during any period where
benefits through a program of public assistance are, and remain, payable.
(i)

Under the current regulatory system, a third party special needs trigger trust
will generally not negatively affect a beneficiary's eligibility for public assistance,
provided that::
a) the Trustee is never required to distribute income or corpus to be applied
toward the beneficiary's health, maintenance or support;
b) the Trustee's power to even make discretionary disbursements for health,
maintenance and support is shut down upon the application for public
assistance benefits. So long as benefits are paid, the Trustee has no power
to make disbursements which supplant or displace same. Some flexibility
may be inserted in the language of trust such that "insubstantial" public
assistance benefits, (usually small cash assistance payments such as SSI)
may be disregarded if the beneficiary has needs which are not being met by
those benefits, and the trust fund could meet those needs;
c) The potential special needs beneficiary should not have a definable interest
in the trust;
d) Ideally (but often this is not practical) a person who has a support
obligation to the special needs beneficiary should not

be trustee, if

someone else is available.
(c) Comparison of Trusts
(1) This author tends to favor third party trigger trusts over pure supplemental
support trusts, as the former are much more flexible to a given set of facts. Such
trusts require more intensive management, particularly as the Medicaid
beneficiary's situation changes, so as to not make a prohibited distribution
during a relevant time.

Medicaid Planning Techniques

G -17

(a) Even should such a distribution be made, if spent before that month end, the
Medicaid rules of "administrative feasibility" may not necessarily result in a
disqualification.
(2) Trigger trusts can be adapted to a class of beneficiaries, including non-disabled
beneficiaries, thus facilitating broadly permissible support distributions to some
beneficiaries, while restricting distributions to others.
(3) A trigger provision is commonly utilized where a beneficiary does not at present
have a life situation which requires the beneficiary's institutionalization or other
long term care, but in order to be responsive to circumstances which, by virtue of
the passage of time, and a change in life situation, the need for estate planning
and trust administration can become compellingly important. A typical example
may be a trust which is testamentary in character.
(d) Special Needs Provision
(1) Override Provision
For the above reasons, an override provision in the trust document may be
advisable.
(2) Indirect distributions
Whether the trust is a pure, special needs or trigger trust, some other technical
aspects of the trust should be drafted for.

Included among the special needs

language, should be a proviso that any beneficiary who is eligible for public
assistance benefits will never receive payments directly from the trust. Thus,
distributions from a special needs trust should preferably be paid to third· parties
on behalf of the beneficiary and limited to those expenditures that cannot be
considered to be, or converted to, food, shelter, utilities, or essential clothing.
(i) Note that in-kind and indirectly paid support items will reduce SSI payments
generally up to a maximum reduction in SSI by 1/3.
(3) Trust agreement vs. testamentary trust
(i) OBRA '93 specifically sanctioned a third party testamentary trust for the
. benefit of a spouse. This should not be relevant for a disabled non-spousal
beneficiary. Query as to whether an inter vivos trust agreement created by a
third party can provide supplemental support for a beneficiary and come
within the protection of the statute.

Does this mean that revocable trusts

should be collapsed at death and poured over to a testamentary trust? At
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this point, the solution which is advocated is the grant of authority via
specific powers given to the executor to create a testamentary trust and
receive such a distribution from an inter-vivos Trustee, even if that means reopening the estate, if necessary.
(ii) In cases where the trust beneficiary is not the spouse of the trust creator, the

trust should not present problems.

Where the surviving spouse is

beneficiary, arguably the exception to transfer penalty under Manual Volume
IV A Section 201O(B) (2) may not apply to a living trust versus a testamentary
trust, since that section appears to limit the exemption for trusts for a spouse
to trusts created "by will." This exemption should be construed to apply to
trusts which create benefits upon death of a spouse, as opposed to benefits
while the non-applicant spouse is living.
(ill) If the government is stingy and refuses to cover inter-vivos trusts which come

into effect after the death of the creator spouse, perhaps the most compelling
argument is with the fact that the trust was not created for the purpose of
gaining Medicaid eligibility. The transfer occurred upon and came into being
by reason of the spouse's death, which was not motivated by Medicaid
eligibility reasons.

See also Manual Volume IV A, Section 2105 for an

analogous situation.
(e) Transfers to disabled beneficiaries to benefit the transfer.
(l)The plan here is to utilize the exception under Medicaid Manual Volume IVA,
section 2070(E)under which transfers to a disabled child of the transferor are
exempt from transfer of resource considerations.
(a) Usefulness: This can be of value to an individual who is institiutionalized and
who is looking for Medicaid eligibility for himself or herself and has assets
that, if transferred, would potentially result in a penalty. Funds transferred
to a disabled child - of any age - are excluded.
(b) Example: Mother has a house and $100,000 in cash. She transfers all to her
disabled son.
(i)

Penalty as to mother - none.

(ii) Consequences to son.

b) If he is on SSI or Medicaid he will become ineligible unless he
transfers funds to a disable person's (NOT third party) trust
discussed below.
c) If disabled, but not on Medicaid or SSI, this will not be an issue.
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4. SELF-CREATED "INCOME ONLY" TRUST

Because of the change in the law brought about by OBRA '93, any trust established after
August 10, 1993, will be considered under the new transfer of resource rules applicable
with respect to self-settled trusts. Self-settled trusts generally entail a 60 month lookback period, which commences with the date at which no distributions of all, or only a
specified portion, of the trust can be made to the beneficiary, even if such distributions
are made only in the discretion of an independent trustee. It would seem that it would be
a rare circumstance where a self-settled trust would be a desirable planning technique,
since such a trust entails a longer waiting period than an outright transfer, and affords
the trust grantor/beneficiary/prospective Medicaid applicant little beneficial enjoyment of
the trust property other than a potential income interest.
Of course, even a gift made in trust is "penalized" based on the transfer of resource
factor, which in 2004 is $2,614. Thus, the trust rule only extends the lookback period
from 36 to 60 months. Whether the transfer will result in an extended penalty depends
on the amount of transferred funds.
(a) Specifics
(1) Usefulness
The Income Only Trust is usually compared against a direct gift of assets to
children or other heirs.

Generally speaking, where an individual has been

fmancially independent, and is healthy, he orshe may like to retain some but not

all, rights to his or her their assets and independence. With an outright gift, the
funds are gone. If the individual wants money, he or she has to ask the donees.
Also, when an outright gift has been made, the gifted funds would generate
income to the donees which would be reported on the donees income tax return.
(2) Tax Features
With an Income Only Trust, the income from the assets would be paid from the
trust to the

trust creator ("the Grantor"), and is not taxed to the donees,

presumably.
(3) Limitations
With an Income Only Trust, by definition the Grantor's rights would be limited to
income, and he or she would not have an interest in the trust principal. If the
document permits, the Trustee could have the power to distribute principal to
persons other than the Grantor, which could then, if the distributees desire, be
gifted back to him or her, or used to pay his or her bills.
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(a) This may although it should not, create problems as to issue of availability of
principal funds as to the grantor.
(4) Security to Grantor
Before leaving the subject, consider the potential dangers of gifts made directly to
children.

For example, should a child run into creditor problems, the gifted

assets might be subject to the claims of a child's creditors. Additionally, should
the child predecease the trust Grantor, then the funds that have been given to
the child might be subject to claims of a surviving spouse of the child, or would
generally be available to the creditors or other claimants of a child through the
child's probate estate. In this regard, if the Grantor wishes to restrict access to
principal, the Income Only Trust offers him or her the additional security that his
or her money still remains available to provide for him or her, and no one else.
(5) Medicaid Effect
As to the second point, the creation of an Income Only Trust starts the Medicaid
waiting period from the time assets are transferred into the trust.

Upon the

expiration of no more than five years from the date of the establishment of the
trust, the trust principal should no longer be considered available to the Grantor
and if he or she requires long-term care, the trust assets should not thereafter
prevent him or her from being eligible for Medicaid benefits.

In other words,

through the creation of the trust mechanism, the Grantor would be starting the
time period of which, upon expiration of five years at the longest, would mean
that he or she would be "resource eligible" for Medicaid benefits should he or she
require long-term institutional or home health care for which Medicaid benefits
are normally payable. The five year period should be the maximum. As stated
earlier, the ineligibility period will depend on amount of transfer.
(a) Given the current low yield interest rate environment, such trusts may not be
popular. If rates were to rise there may be a renewed interest.
(b) Tax Implications
(1) Estate and Gift Tax
The establishment of the trust can or cannot be a completed gift for gift tax
purposes, depending on what is decided. If the Grantor's estate is less than $1.5
Million, (in 2004) it may be advisable that he or she retain a general testamentary
power of appointment over the trust assets which may be exercised in his or her
Will. Basically, that just means that the Grantor retains the power to say who
gets what at death.

The advantage to the transfer to the trust's not being
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considered a completed gift is with the fact that where the gift becomes complete
upon death, then the trust assets will receive a stepped up basis equal to date-ofdeath value. This would enable the trustee to liquidate the trust assets at that
time without realizing capital gains tax.
The trade off for deferring the completion of the gift to the time of death is that the
assets would be includable in the taxable estate.

As mentioned, the federal

estate tax will only apply to estates which exceed (in 2004) $1.5 million dollars.
In other words, if there is no estate taxation in any event, it would be better to get
the step up in basis. One must select one or the other.
Generally, where it is believed that a taxable estate not will be an issue, it is
advisable to complete the gift at death which would afford the heirs with the
ability to eliminate capital gains tax. If it is believed that the estate will exceed
the projected estate tax exemption in the year of death, then it may be advisable
to complete the gift now.

The federal gift tax exemption is $1 million.

If the

transfer to trust is a completed gift at the time of transfer, then that would lock in
the heirs to the Grantor's basis in the property which may trigger the potential for
significant capital gains.
(a) Caution may be advisable to avoid exposure to estate recovery.
(2) Income Taxation
From an income tax point of view, as stated earlier the trust should be taxed to
the Grantor under the grantor trust sections of the Internal Revenue Code, IRC §§
671-679. Where the Grantor retains a right to income for life, he or she will be
taxed on the income generated by the trust assets.
This is an advantage in that a trust is normally taxable at more highly
compressed brackets than is an individual. Of course, the trustee can control the
extent of income generated, and the Trustee will not normally (in a well-drafted
trust agreement) be limited by any requirement to make the trust assets
productive of income. Thus, should the trustee design an investment portfolio
which contains primarily growth securities which do not pay dividends and there
are few income paying securities, income flow can be minimized or maximized as
needs require.
(a) The trust could be established to generate higher income first which could
later be minimized at such time as the Grantor applies for Medicaid benefits.
Reason: Where the grantor goes on Medicaid, his or her income must be paid to
the facility.
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5. DISABLED PERSON'S ("SELF-SETTLED") TRUSTS

(a) Overview
In August 1993, OBRA'93 specifically sanctioned the use of a special needs trust
established for the benefit of a disabled individual who is under 65 years of age even
if that individual's own assets are used to create the trust. The grantor must be the

disabled person's parents, grandparents, legal guardian, or a court.

In certain

instances, a non-profit organization can establish a trust pooling arrangement.
A so-called "disabled person's trust" is authorized under 42 USC 1396p(d)(4)(A) and
1396p(d)(4)(C), and is a means of qualifying a disabled individual who otherwise has
excess resources and is thus not eligible for public assistance benefits. Such trusts
are exempt from transfer of resource penalty.
(b) Special applications
The trust beneficiary qualifies for available Medicaid benefits as soon as the funds are
transferred into the trust and not used for the beneficiary's support. Note: Unlike the
issue regarding third party funds (discussed in Section 3, above) what is involved
here is the disabled beneficiary's own funds which, once placed in the trust, are
excluded from consideration. Thus he or she can immediately receive governmental
benefits. As to this type trust, there is no waiting period. The trust may thus be
established either well in advance of the time participation in a public assistance
program is offered, or the day before.
(1) The technique can be used to shelter from spend down requirements personal
injury awards as, for instance, where the person sustained his or her disabling
injury in an act which was the source of a settlement or damage award.
(a) Similarly, funds which a person receives by way of an inheritance can be
protected through use of the trust.
In addition to qualifying a disabled individual for Medicaid, such a trust can
qualify a disabled beneficiary for Social Security benefits during a certain
phase, (so long as principal is not available at the beneficiary's demand; Le.,
the trust is Trustee discretionary for health, maintenance and support) while
containing a "trigger" provision that will qualify the disabled person for
Medicaid benefits by shutting down all basic support discretion at such time
as a care facility, group home, or other arrangement offers participation in a
Medicaid program to the beneficiary.

For instance, a trust can contain a

purely discretionary provision authorizing certain payments on behalf of a
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developmentally disabled beneficiary so as to render the beneficiary eligible
for a monthly Medicaid card to cover that beneficiary's hospitalization and
other health care benefits even though participation in a long term care
program might be deferred until a future date. Then, at the future date when
participation is available to the beneficiary, the trigger provision can scale
back the trust to provide more restrictive benefits (Le., supplement support
only) to complete this important estate conservation technique. In particular,
individuals who are awaiting eligibility in the "Supports in Community Living"
program (the "SCL program") may find such a trust to be quite helpful on
both a short and long term basis.
(c) Qualification requirements
(1) Payback requirement
In order to qualify the individual for Medicaid, the trust must contain a
mandatory state reimbursement provision. The provision must specifically state
that at death of the disabled person the trust property passes to the state to
reimburse the state for medical assistance furnished the beneficiary during his or
her lifetime.
(2) Substantive requirements
The other qualification requirements relate to the substantive or dispositive
provisions of the trust: i.e., non-availability to the trust beneficiary except as
discretionary with the third party trustee.

The terms can generally track the

guidelines previously discussed with reference to the third party supplemental
support trusts.
a) As of this writing, the statutory language authorizing a disabled person's trust
does not contain any guidance with regard to what happens in the event the
disabled individual recovers from his or her disability and returns to
independent living while assets remain in the trust. There is a question as to
whether the disabled person may receive unrestricted principal benefits from
the trust at that time, or thereafter, which will cause a substantial depletion
or dissipation prior to such individual's death, thus cutting down or
eliminating a state's right of recovery.
(3) Age limitation
The trust can only be established for disabled individuals under age 65, and may not
be added to after that age.
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(d) Subrogation
Counsel preparing disabled person's trusts will often work with personal injury
lawyers.

In this regard, it is important to determine whether there may be an

outstanding Medicaid subrogation claim against assets which are contemplated for
placement in the trust. The matter of subrogation rights is not clear under Kentucky
law, and it is possible under the so-called "made whole" theory of tort law that even in
the wake of a large subrogation claim, the Plaintiffs lawyer may negotiate a reduced
payment. Nonetheless the practitioner is alerted to KRS 205.629.
Although

Special Needs Trust legislation facilitates

future

benefit eligibility

subsequent to receipt of funds from a settlement or judgment, there may well be an
obligation to repay Medicaid for benefits advanced prior to receipt of funds, even
where the injured party never receives funds that are conveyed into trust. Failure to
report funds may trigger harsh Medicaid penalties with respect to future or ongoing
benefits. This matter should be reviewed with the client and personal injury attorney
for guidance and risk evaluation.
(e) Qualifying Income Trust Compliance?
In an interesting recent intepretation (some might say "misinterpretation") of the law,
OMS staff have sought to apply QIT rules (discussed in the next section) to Special
Needs Trusts. Thus, even though SNTs are specifically authorized under 42 USC
Section 1396(p)(O)(4) which sets out the requirements, OMS has sought to engraft
further requisites on the Congressional statute passed in 1993, with the result being
that SNTs which do not comport with QIT rules may be rejected by Frankfort.
The author believes that OMS theory is simply wrong. QIT rules are intended to
provide a framework whereby individuals with income in excess of the income
standard ( in 2004, $1,692 per month) must place their excess income in a QIT. The
federal regulations on such matters, HCFA Transmittal 64, makes it clear that only
income "of the individual" is subject to QIT rules. As to SNTs, so long as the income
is that of the trust, and not the individual, QIT rule are inapposite.
6. QUALIFYING INCOME TRUSTS

In 2003 Kentucky joined the ranks of a handful of "income cap states". This means
that individuals with income above a certain ceiling are not eligible for Medicaid,
regardless of whether they are resource eligible.
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(a) Definition - A "qualifying income trust" ("QIT") is a trust agreement which is
established to receive income of Medicaid applicants/recipients whose income
exceeds the income standard applicable under Kentucky's income qualification
rules which changed on September 1, 2003. QITs are not

a planning device as

much as a compliance requisite. In effect, any individual whose income exceeds t1?-e
annual income standard (in 2004 it is $1,692 per month) must place his or her
income in excess of this amount in the QIT, and by so doing the individual will no
longer be income ineligible.
(I)Note that resource eligibility is still required.
(b) Requirements - Under 907 KAR 1:650 Section 3(5)(a)-(g), a QIT must contain the
following provisions (1) All income over the resource standard will be regarded as "patient liability" and
thus must be distributed currently toward the patient's cost of care unless
under the relevant facts use of funds for allowable deductions such as
dependency deductions (Le. community spouse ) is allowed by the DeBS
caseworker.
(2) The trust must be irrevocable.
(3) Only income above the annual income standard must be placed in the trust.
a. Thus, in cases where income is $1,992 per month, only $300 must be
placed in trust. The first $1,692 can keep coming in to the same source as
always.
(4) At the death of the recipient, any income which has not been paid must be paid
to the state.
(5) The trust must terminate only at the recipient's death.
a) Query as to what happens if the patient recovers? This is not addressed
under the regulations. Presumably the recipient's income would then be
directed away from the trust.
(6) The trust must be notarized. This requirement is not set out in the regulations,
but it has been a strict requirement of DMS policy makers.
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1.

BACKGROUND

1.1.

Philanthropy in the United States
1.1.1. "In works of beneficence, no country has surpassed, perhaps none

has equaled the United States," James Bryce, British Journalist,1888.
1.1.2. In 2002, private giving by individuals, corporations and
foundations was $240.9 Billion. Foundation Yearbook: Facts and Figures on
Private and Community Foundations, 2003 Edition.
1.1.3. In that year there were 61,800 grant making foundations giving an
aggregate of $30.3 Billion. Id.
1.1.4. These 61,800 foundations held $476.8 Billion in assets. Id.

1.2.

Charities
1.2.1. A Charity is any organization that is exempt from tax under

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. (All references to the "Code"
shall mean the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended).
1.2.2. There are two broad categories of charities, public charities (or
Code §509(a)(1) - (a)(4) charities) and private foundations. By definition, private
foundations are any charity other than a public charity. Private foundations also
have two broad categories: Operating Foundations and Non-Operating
Foundations. Operating Foundations perform an exempt function. That is, the
assets of the operating foundation are expended in direct performance of a
charitable activity. Non-Operating Foundations in contrast, invest assets and make
grants to other charities, typically public charities or operating foundations, which
will use the grants to directly perform charitable activities.

1.2.2.1.

Private Foundations More Specifically - To

elaborate on the statement made in 1.2.2, above, a private foundation is
any 501(c)(3) organization other than:
1.2.2.1.1.

A church or a convention or association of

churches;
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1.2.2.1.2.

A school;

1.2.2.1.3.

An organization operated for the benefit of

certain state and municipal colleges and universities;
1.2.2.1.4.

A hospital;

1.2.2.1.5.

A medical research organization operated in

conjunction with a hospital;
1.2.2.1.6.

A governmental unit;

1.2.2.1.7.

A publicly supported charity; and

1.2.2.1.8.

An organization that is organized and

operated to test for public safety.
1.2.3. All charities are capable of receiving deductions that are deductible
by the donor for federal income tax (Code §170), federal estate tax (Code §2055)
and federal gift tax (Code §2522) purposes. But there are many differences
between private foundations and public charities.

1.2.4. Some ofthe Differences:
1.2.4.1.

One difference between public charities and non-

operating private foundations is the extent to which a donor can deduct a
contribution for income tax purposes. Generally, donors can deduct each
year contributions made to public charities up to 50% ofthe donor's
adjusted gross income. Donors to private foundations can deduct up to
30% of the donor's adjusted gross income. Operating foundations are
generally treated as public charities in this respect. Note that these
limitations apply only for purposes of income tax deductions. It makes no
difference whether the charity is public charity or private foundation for
purposes of gift or estate tax.
1.2.4.2.

Another difference between public charities and

private foundations is the excise taxes. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
private foundations have been subject to excise taxes intended, for the
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most part, to regulate the conduct of the private foundations. One of the
excise taxes, the tax on investment income, was implemented in order to
pay for the investigation of private foundations and enforcement of the
private foundation excise taxes. The excise taxes will be discussed later in
this outline.
1.2.4.3.

Finally, the practical difference between public

charities and private foundations is the amount of control exercised by the
persons establishing the organization. Typically public charities receive
the bulk of their funding from the general public on a continuous basis.
This reliance on the public for operational financing results in the public
charity being accountable to the public; hence the policing of public
charities is, in many respects, undertaken by the public. St. John's
Orphanage, Inc. v. U.S.,89-1 USTC ~9176 (Cl. Ct. 1989).
In contrast, private foundations are typically formed with a large
infusion of cash or property, the endowment, from a single person or
family who control the operations of the foundation. As the operations of
the private foundation are typically funded by the earnings on the initial
endowment, a private foundation is not accountable to the public. Id.
While these characteristics make the private foundation uniquely suited in
many cases to meet the philanthropic desires of wealthy individuals, these
same characteristics resulted in Congress implementing the excise tax
scheme of regulation, and enforcement thereof, through the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.
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2.

ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION- FORMATION NUTS AND BOLTS.

2.1.

Form ofEntity
2.1.1. "Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation"

may qualify under Code § 501(c)(3) as an exempt organization. Neither the Code
nor the Treasury Regulations ("Regs. ") define "community chest, fund or
foundation". Thus, it appears that trusts and corporations (or LLCs that elect to be
taxed as corporations) are the forms in which an exempt organization may
operate.
2.1.1.1.

In keeping with the "generally" theme, single

member LLCs which are disregarded for income tax purposes have been
growing in popularity as a means of segregating risk within a charity. For
example, where a donor wishes to contribute real estate to a charity, the
charity may decide to accept that contribution through a single member
LLC. The LLC provides state-law liability protection, without creating a
separate entity subject to tax reporting requirements. See PLRs
200249014;200304036.

2.2.

The Application Process
2.2.1. Forms to be Filed:
2.2.1.1.

Specifically Required for Exemption: Form 1023,

Application for Recognition of Tax Exempt Status
of the Internal Revenue Code, Form 8718 - User Fee;
2.2.1.1.1.

Included with the Form 1023 must be

conformed copies of the organizational documents in order to
show satisfaction of the organizational test discussed below. A
conformed copy is one that agrees with the document it purports to
copy and is accompanied by a declaration, signed by an officer
authorized to sign for the organization, that it is a complete and
correct copy of the document it purports to copy. Rev. Proc. 68-14.
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Articles of Incorporation must be "stamped filed" by the Secretary
of State. Rev. Proc. 90-27.
2.2.1.2.

Required for Entities Generally: Form SS-4-

Application for Employer Identification Number.
2.2.1.3.

Not Required, but Recommended: Form 2848-

Power of Attorney. Allows the IRS to discuss exemption issues of the
applicant with the attorney-in-fact.
2.2.2. Timing. An organization's exempt status generally commences on
the date of the filing of Form 1023, unless the Form 1023 is filed on or before the
end of the 15th month following the end of the month in which the organization
was formed. Regs. 1.508-1 (a)(2)(i). If the application cannot be filed within the
15 month period, a 12 month extension will be automatically granted if the
application states: "Filed Pursuant to § 301.9100-2" across the top ofthe
application. Regs. §301.9100-2.
2.2.2.1.

An organization is formed as of the date the

organizational instrument is recorded in the proper state or local office
where instruments are required to be filed. Rev. Rut 75-290.
2.2.2.2.

The application for exemption is deemed filed on

the date that a "substantially complete" Form 1023 is postmarked or, if
there is no postmark, on the date it is stamped "received" by the Internal
Revenue Service. Rev. Rut 77-114.
2.2.2.3.

If the IRS determines that the organization must

change its activities or its organizational documents in substantive way,
the organization's exemption is effective as of the date of the change. Rev.
Proc.90-27.
2.2.3. Content of Form 1023. In order to be exempt under Code §
501 (c)(3), the organization must show through its Form 1023 and its attachments
that it: (i) meets the organizational test; and (ii) meets (or will meet once
operations commence) the operational test. Regs. § 1.50l(c)(3)-l(a).
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2.2.3.1.

Organizational Test Generally: The organizational

test is focused upon the content of the Articles of Organization of the
entity seeking exemption. "Articles of Organization" include the trust
instrument, the corporate charter, the articles of association, or any other
written instrument by which an organization is created. Regs. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2).
2.2.3.1.1.

The Articles of Organization must: (i)

restrict the permissible activities of the organization "exclusively"
to certain enumerated purposes; and (ii) contain a provision (either
explicitly or by operation of law) requiring the organization to
dedicate its assets to one or more exempt purposes. An
organization's assets will be deemed to be dedicated to exempt
purposes if, on its dissolution, the assets are required to be
distributed for one or more exempt purposes or to the Federal
government, or to a State or local government, for a public
purpose, or would be distributed by a court to another organization
to be used in such manner as in the judgment of the court will best
accomplish the general purposes for which the dissolved
organization was organized. Regs. § 1.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(l).
2.2.3 .1.2.

Exempt Purposes: Religious, Charitable,

Scientific, Testing for public safety, Literary, Educational, or
Prevention of cruelty to children or animals. Exempt purposes
include the activities of a private foundation, e.g. to receive
contributions and pay them over to organizations which are
described in section 501(c)(3) and exempt from taxation under
section 501(a). Rev. Rut 64-182.
2.2.3.1.3.

The Articles of Organization may not

expressly empower the organization to: (i) engage in activities
which are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes other
than as an insubstantial part of its activities Regs. § 1.50l(c)(3)-
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l(b)(l)(iii); (ii) to devote more than an insubstantial part of its
activities to attempting to influence legislation Regs. § 1.50l(c)(3)l(b)(3)(i); (iii) directly or indirectly to participate in, or intervene
in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any
political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate
for public office. Regs. § 1.50l(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii).
2.2.3.2.

Organizational Test - Specific Provisions for Private

Foundations. A private foundation will not qualify under Code §501(c)(3)
unless its Articles of Organization require its income for each taxable year
to be distributed at such time and in such manner as not to subject the
foundation to tax under Code §4942 and prohibit (i) the foundation from
engaging in any act of self-dealing (as defined in Code §4941 (d», (ii)
from retaining any excess business holdings (as defined in Code
§4943(c»; (iii) from making any investments in such manner as to subject
the foundation to tax under Code §4944; (iv) and from making any taxable
expenditures (as defined in Code §4945(d»; Code §508(e).
2.2.3.3.

Operational Test In order to satisfy the operational

test, an organization must operate exclusively for one or more exempt
purposes. An organization will be regarded as "operated exclusively" for
one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities
which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in
section 501(c)(3). Reg. §1.50l(c)(2)-1(c)(l). How an organization will
satisfy the operational test is what the Form 1023 seeks to elicit from an
applicant.
2.2.3.4.

No part of the organization's net earnings may inure

to the benefit of any private individuals or shareholders;
2.2.3.4.1.

No substantial part of the activities of the

organization may be carrying on propaganda or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation; and
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2.2.3.4.2.

It must not participate or intervene in any

political campaign on behalf of, or in opposition to, any candidate
for public office.

2.3.

Protest ofAdverse IRS Determinations; Administrative Remedies. If an

organization applies for tax-exempt status and receives an adverse determination letter,
the organization will be advised of its right to protest the determination by requesting
Appeals Office consideration. Reg. §601.201(n)(5). The organization must sent its
protest to the District Director within 30 days from the date of the adverse determination
letter and must state whether it wishes an Appeals conference.

2.4.

Appeals Office Consideration. The protest to the Appeals Office should

be filed with the district office considering the application. The protest must contain the
following information:
2.4.1. the organizations name, address and employer identification
number;
2.4.2. A statement that the organization wants to protest the
determination;
2.4.3. The date and symbols on the determination letter;
2.4.4. A statement of facts supporting the organization's position in any
contested factual issue.
2.4.5. A statement outlining the law or other authority the organization is
relying upon; and
2.4.6. A statement as to whether a conference at the Appeals Office is
desired. If a conference is requested it will be held at the Appeals Office, unless
the organization requests that the meeting be held at a district office convenient to
both parties. IRS Publication No. 557, Appeal Procedures.
The statement of facts provided under 2.4.4 above must be declared true
under penalties of perjury. This can be done by adding to the protest the
following signed declaration "Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have
examined the statement of facts presented in this protest and in any accompanying
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schedules and statements and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true,
correct and complete." Signed.
If the organization's representative submits the protest, a substitute
declaration must be included, stating: (a) that the representative prepared the
protest and accompanying documents and (b) whether the representative knows
personally that the statements of fact contained in the protest and accompanying
documents are true and correct. Id.
After considering the organization's protest and the information presented
in any conference, the Appeals Office will notify the organization of its decision
and issue a determination letter. An adverse decision may be appealed to the
courts.
2.5.

National Office Consideration. The Appeals Office must request

technical advice from the National Office on any issue concerning qualification for
exemption or foundation status for which there is no published precedent or for which
there is reason to believe that nonuniformity exists. Reg. §601.201(n)(5)(iv). If an
organization believes that its case involves such an issue, it should ask the Appeals Office
to request technical advice. Any determination letter issued on the basis of technical
advice from the National Office may not be appealed to the Appeals Office for those
issues which were subject of the technical advice.
2.5.1. If an application is referred to the National Office for issuance of a
ruling and an adverse ruling is issued, the organization will be informed of the
basis for the conclusion, its right to file a protest within 30 days, and its right to
have a conference at the National Office.

2.6.

Administrative Remedies. In the case of an application under Code

§501(c)(3), the following actions, called administrative remedies, must be completed
before an unfavorable ruling or determination letter can be appealed to the courts:
2.6.1. The filing ofa substantially completed application Form 1023 or
the filing of a request for a determination of foundation status;
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2.6.2. In the case of a late-filed application requesting relief under Treas.
Reg. § 301.9100 regarding applications for extensions oftime for making an
election or application for relief from tax;
2.6.3. The timely submission of all additional information requested to
perfect an exemption application or request for determination of private
foundation status; and
2.6.4. Exhaustion of all administrative appeals available within the IRS.
2.6.5. These actions will not be considered completed until the IRS has
had a reasonable time to act upon the appeal or protest.
2.6.5.1.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. An

organization will not be considered to have exhausted its administrative
remedies before the earlier of: (i) the completion of the steps listed above
and the sending by the IRS of a notice of final determination by certified
or registered mail, or (ii) the expiration of the 270-day period in which the
IRS has not issued a notice of final determination that the organization has
taken in a timely manner, all reasonable steps to secure a ruling or
determination.

2.7.

Appeal to Courts. Ifthe IRS issues an unfavorable determination letter or

ruling and all of the administrative remedies have been exhausted, the organization may
seek judicial remedies. The option are: filing a refund suit in the U.S. District Court or
Court of Federal Claims, or Petition the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
the U.S. Tax Court of the Court of Federal Claims for a Declaratory Judgment.

2.7.1. Filing Suit. If the organization has paid the tax resulting from the
unfavorable determination and met all other statutory prerequisites, it can file suit
for a refund in a U.S. District Court or in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
Alternatively, if the organization has elected not to pay the tax deficiency
resulting from the unfavorable determination and met all other statutory
prerequisites, it can file suit for the redetermination of the tax in the U.S. Tax
Court.
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2.7.2. Declaratory Judgment. The organization may file suit for
declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims or the U.S. Tax Court. Declaratory Judgment is
available only if the organization received an adverse notice of final
determination on its initial or continuing qualification or classification as an
exempt organization. Code §7428(b)(2). This adverse notice of final
determination is a ruling or determination letter that the organization is either not
described in Code §501(c)(3) or Code §170(c)(2), is a private foundation or is a
public charity described in a part of Code §509 or §170(b)(1 )(A) other than the
part under which the organization requested classification. Code §7428(a)(I).
2.7.3. The exempt status claim must be as: (i) An organization qualifying
under Code § 501(c)(3); (ii) an organization to which a deduction for contribution
is allowed under Code § 170(c)(2); (iii) an organization other than a private
foundation under Code § 509; or (iv) a private operating foundation under Code §
49420)(3).
3.

MAINTAINING

3.1.

Annual Report For Foundations. Foundation managers of private

foundations having at least $5,000 of assets at any time during the tax year must file
Form 990-PF. Regs. §1.6033-3(a). Ifthe private foundation is subject to any excise
taxes on foundation expenses, the private foundation must also file Form 4720 with the
990-PF. Excise Taxes will be addressed later.

3.1.1. Public Inspection. Prior to March 13,2000, a private foundation
was required to publish in a newspaper of general circulation a "Notice of
Availability" of its Form 990-PF. This is no longer required. Current regulations
provide that Section 501(c)(3) organizations must make their application (Form
1023) and the three most recent annual returns (Form 990 or Form 990-EZ)
available to the public, upon request and without charge (except for a reasonable
charge for copying). The IRS also makes these documents available for public
inspection and copying. These documents must be made available at the
organization's principal office during regular business hours. Upon request, an
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organization must furnish copies of the application and the three most recent
annual returns. The requests may be made in person or in writing.
The organization may charge a reasonable fee for providing copies. It can
charge no more for the copies than the per page rate the IRS charges for providing
copies. That rate is stated in section 60l.702(f)(5)(iv)(B) ofthe regulations. (As of
June 2001, the rate was $1.00 for the first page and 15 cents for each additional
page.) The organization can also charge the actual postage costs it pays to provide
the copies.

3.1.2. Exceptions to Copying Rules
3.1.2.1.

Making applications and returns widely available.

An exempt organization does not have to comply with requests for copies
of its annual returns or exemption application if it makes them widely
available. However, making these documents widely available does not
relieve the organization from making its documents available for public
inspection. The organization can make its application and returns widely
available by posting the application and returns on a World Wide Web
page. Regs. 301.6l04(d)-2(b).
If the organization has made its application for tax exemption
and/or annual returns widely available, it must inform any individual
requesting a copy where the documents are available, including the
address on the World Wide Web, if applicable. If the request is made in
person, the notice must be provided immediately. If the request is made in
writing, the notice must be provided within 7 days.
3.1.2.2.

Harassment campaign. If the tax-exempt

organization is the subject of a harassment campaign, the organization
may not have to fulfill requests for information. Regs. 301.6104(d)-3. A
tax-exempt organization may apply for a determination that it is the
subject of a harassment campaign by submitting a signed application to
the district director for the key district where the organization's principal
office is located. The application must consist of a written statement
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giving the organization's name, address, employer identification number,
and the name, address and telephone number of the person to contact
regarding the application. The application must describe in detail the facts
and circumstances that the organization believes support a determination
that the organization is subject to a harassment campaign. The
organization may suspend compliance with respect to any request for a
copy of its documents based on its reasonable belief that such request is
part of a harassment campaign, provided that th~ organization files an
application for a determination within 10 business days from the day the
organization first suspends compliance with respect to a request that is
part of the alleged campaign.
Harassment is defined as "[a] group of requests for an
organization's application for tax exemption or annual information returns
is indicative of a harassment campaign if the requests are part of a single
coordinated effort to disrupt the operations of a tax-exempt organization,
rather than to collect information about the organization." Regs.
§301.6104Cd)-3Cb). Whether a group of requests constitutes such a
harassment campaign depends on the relevant facts and circumstances.

3.2.

Other Returns

3.2.1. Unrelated Business Returns. Form 990-T must be filed by every
organization exempt under Code § 501(a) if the unrelated trade or business gross
income is $1,000 or more.

3.2.2. Employment Tax Returns. Every employer who pays wages to
employees is responsible for withholding, depositing, paying and reporting
federal income tax, social security tax, FICA and FUTA unless that employer is
specifically excepted by law or the taxes do not apply. Form 941E, Quarterly
Return of Withheld Federal Income tax, is used by tax-exempt organizations that
do not report social security taxes to the IRS as to employee wages and annuity
payments.

H·13

3.2.3. Estimated Tax Payments. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
private foundations subject to the net investment income excise tax imposed by
IRC 4940 were required to pay these taxes annually with their returns. For
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1986, private foundations are required
to make estimated tax payments through deposits to the Federal Tax Deposit
(FTD) system. Each payment must be accompanied by a Federal Tax Deposit
Coupon (Form 8109). Due dates for estimated tax payments are on the 15th day
ofthe fourth, sixth, ninth, and twelfth months of the taxable year.

3.2.4. Estimated Tax Payments.
3.2.5. Donee Information Return. If an organization receives a
contribution of charitable deduction property and sells, exchanges or otherwise
disposes of the property within two years after its receipt, the organization must
file Form 8282, Donee Information Return (Sale, Exchange or other Disposition
of Donated Property). It must be filed within 125 days after the disposition. A
copy of Form 8282 is to be given to the donor. Penalties apply if the organization
does not file the return.
3.2.5.1.

Charitable Deduction Property is any property

(other than money or publicly traded securities) for which the organization
signed as donee must provide an appraisal.
3.2.5.2.

The donor must obtain a qualified appraisal for

contributions of property (other than money or publicly traded securities)
the claimed value of which is more than $5,000.
3.2.5.3.

The donor must attach Form 8283, Noncash

Charitable Contributions, to the return on which the deduction is shown.
The person who signs for the donee must be an official authorized to sign
the donee's tax or information returns or a person specifically authorized
to sign by that individual. The signature does not represent the donee's
agreement with the appraised value, it represents receipt of the property.
In addition, the donee's signature indicates knowledge of the reporting
requirements. A copy of Form 8283 must be given to the donee.

H -14

4.

ADVISING

4.1.

Excise Taxes. As mentioned briefly above, private foundations (both

operating and non-operating) are subject to certain excise taxes. These are:
4.1.1. Excise tax on net investment income (§4940);
4.1.2. Excise tax on self-dealing transactions (§4941);
4.1.3. Excise tax on failure to distribute income (§4942);
4.1.4. Excise tax on excess business holdings (§4943);
4.1.5. Excise tax on jeopardy investments (high risk) of foundation assets
(§4944); and
4.1.6. Excise tax on taxable expenditures of foundation funds (§4945).

4.2.

Excise tax on net investment income (§4940)
4.2.1. This is an annual tax paid by almost all private foundations. It is a

2% tax measured by the net investment income of the foundation.
4.2.2. The exception: Exempt Operating Foundations. An exempt
operating foundation is a private operating foundation that: (l) has been publicly
supported for at least 10 tax years; (2) has a governing body that, at all times
during the tax year, consists of individuals at least 75 percent of whom are not
disqualified individuals and is broadly representative of the general public; and
(3) does not have an officer who is a disqualified individual at any time during the
tax year. Code §4940(d). (Note - These are a subset of Private Operating
Foundations.)
4.2.2.1.

"Disqualified Individual". The term "disqualified

individual" means, with respect to any private foundation, an individual
who is (i) a substantial contributor to the foundation; (ii) an owner of more
than 20 percent of (x) the total combined voting power of a corporation,
(y) the profits interest of a partnership, or (z) the beneficial interest of a
trust or unincorporated enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the
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foundation; (iii) a member of the family of any individual described in
clause (i) or (ii). Code §4940(d)(3)(B).

4.2.3. Net investment income. Net investment income is gross investment
income and net capital gain, less expenses paid or incurred in earning the gross
investment income. Code §4940(c). Tax-exempt interest on governmental
obligations and related expenses are excluded. Code §4940(c)(5).
4.2.3.1.

Gross investment income means the gross amount

of income from interest, dividends, rents, and royalties that is received by
a private foundation from all sources, unless the income is taxable as
unrelated business income.
All of the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred for the
production or collection of gross investment income or for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the
production of such income are deductible.
If any expenses are incurred for both investment purposes and
exempt purposes, they must be allocated between the investment activities
and the exempt activities. RegS. §53.4940-1(e)(l)(ii). Expenses paid or
incurred for exempt functions are not deductible in figuring net investment
mcome.
Capital gains are fully included in the base for the net investment
income tax (Code Sec. 4940(c)(4). Losses from sales or other dispositions
of property are allowed only to the extent of gains from such sales (there
are no capital loss carryovers).

4.3.

Excise tax on self-dealing transactions (§4941)
4.3.1. SelfDealing Defined. Acts of self-dealing between a private

foundation and a disqualified person are:
4.3.1.1.

The sale, exchange, or leasing of property;

4.3.1.2.

Lending money or other extensions of credit;
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4.3.1.3.

Providing goods, services, or facilities;

4.3.1.4.

Paying compensation or reimbursing expenses to a

disqualified person;
4.3.1.5.

Transferring foundation income or assets to, or for

the use or benefit of, a disqualified person, and
4.3.1.6.

Certain agreements to make payments of money or

property to government officials.
4.4.

Disqualified Person. The term "disqualified person" means, with respect

to a private foundation, a person who is:
4.4.1. A substantial contributor to the foundation;
4.4.2. A foundation manager;
4.4.3. An owner of more than 20 percent of
4.4.3.1.

the total combined voting power of a corporation;

4.4.3.2.

the profits interest of a partnership, or

4.4.3.3.

the beneficial interest of a trust or unincorporated

enterprise, which is a substantial contributor to the foundation,
4.4.4. A member of the family of any individual described above;
4.4.5. A corporation of which persons described above own more than 35
percent of the total combined voting power;
4.4.6. A partnership in which persons above own more than 35 percent of
the profits interest; and
4.4.7. A trust or estate in which persons described in above more than 35
percent of the beneficial interest. Code § 4946(a).
4.4.8. A "substantial contributor" is any person who contributes more
than $5,000 to a private foundation if it amounts to more than two percent of the
total contributions and bequests received by the foundation for its tax year. Once a
person becomes a substantial contributor, he or she will always be a substantial
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contributor as to that private foundation. Code § 4946(a)C2), referring to Code
§507(d).

4.5.

Per Se SelfDealing. Leasing property to or from a disqualified person for

any amount of rent, and paying any amount of compensation to a disqualified person are
acts of self dealing irrespective of the amounts involved.

4.5.1. Exceptions. The following transactions between a private
foundation and a disqualified person are not considered self-dealing.
4.5.1.1.

Providing goods, services, or facilities by a private

foundation to a disqualified person is not self-dealing if the goods,
services, or facilities are made available to the general public on at least as
favorable a basis as they are made available to the disqualified person and
the goods, services, or facilities are functionally related to the exercise or
performance by a private foundation of its exempt purpose. The term
"general public" includes those persons who reasonably would be
expected to use the foundation's goods, services, or facilities.
4.5.1.2.

Payment of compensation or reimbursement of

expenses by a private foundation to a disqualified person for personal
services that are reasonable and necessary to carry out the exempt purpose
of the private foundation is not considered an act of self-dealing if the
compensation or reimbursement is not excessive.
4.5.1.3.

Leases. The leasing of property by a disqualified

person to a private foundation is not an act of self-dealing if the lease is
without charge. The lease will be considered without charge even though
the foundation agrees to pay for janitorial expenses, utilities, or other
maintenance costs it incurs as long as payment is not made directly or
indirectly to a disqualified person.
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4.6.

Taxes on Failure to Distribute Income Code §4942
4.6.1. Private non-operating foundations are required to annually

distribute, as a "qualifying distribution" an amount at least equal to its
"distributable amount". Code § 4942(a).
4.6.2. A qualifying distribution includes: (1) distributions to unrelated
public charities and to private operating foundations (not other private
foundations, but see exceptions below); (2) direct expenditures (including
administrative expenses) for charitable purposes; (3) expenditures for assets to be
used for charitable purposes; and (4) in many cases, amounts set aside for a
specific charitable project. Code §4942(g). The distributable amount must be
fully distributed by the end of the tax year following the tax year for which it is
calculated. That is, for example, by the end of 2005 the distributable amount
determined on the 2004 990-PF must be distributed.

4.6.3. Definitions.
4.6.3.1.

The distributable amount is equal to the

organization's minimum investment return for the year, reduced by any net
investment income tax paid under Code §4940 for the taxable year.
4.6.3.2.

A Foundation's minimum investment return is equal

to 5% of the aggregate fair market value of all of the Foundation's assets
reduced by acquisition indebtedness thereon.

4.6.4. Exceptionsfor Related Charities and Private Foundations.
Qualifying distributions can be made to related charities and to non-operating
foundations so long as the recipient makes a qualifying distribution of the amount
it received by the end of the calendar year following the year it was received.
Code §4942(g)(3). The second qualifying distribution must be treated as being
made out of corpus. Id. The foundation making the initial distribution must
receive sufficient evidence from the recipient private foundation that the flow
through has been made. Id. A related charity is one that is controlled by the
foundation, or by a disqualified person with respect to that foundation.
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4.7.

Taxes on Excess Business Holdings Code §4943
4.7.1. Generally, a foundation generally cannot own more than 20% of a

corporation, partnership, joint venture or other business enterprise without being
subject to this excise tax. For this purpose, the interests in a business enterprise
that are owned by a disqualified person with respect to the foundation are treated
as owned by the foundation. So, the aggregate amount a foundation together with
its disqualified persons can own in any business enterprise is 20%.
4.7.2. A business enterprise is the active conduct ofa trade or business
other than: (i) a functionally related business (defined below); or (ii) a trade or
business at lest 95 percent of the gross income of which is derived from passive
sources such as interest, dividends, rent, royalties and capital gains. Code
§4943(d)(3).
4.7.3. A functionally related business is:
4.7.3.1.

A trade or business the conduct of which is

substantially related (aside from the mere provision of funds for the
exempt purpose) to the exercise or performance by the private foundation
of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the
basis for its exemption;
4.7.3.2.

A trade or business in which substantially all the

work is performed for the foundation without compensation,
4.7.3.3.

A business carried on by the foundation primarily

for the convenience of its members. students, patients, officers, or
employees;
4.7.3.4.

A business that consists of the selling of

merchandise, substantially all of which has been received by the
foundation as gifts or contributions; or
4.7.3.5.

An activity carried on within a larger combination

of similar activities or within a larger complex of other endeavors that is
related to the exempt purposes of the foundation (other than the need to
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simply provide funds for these purposes). Code Sec. 49420)(4; Regs.
§53.4942Ca)-2(c)(ii).
4.7.4. For example, a cafeteria operated by a museum for the
convenience of its members, employees, and visitors is a functionally related
business. IRS Publication 578, Tax Informationfor Private Foundation and

Foundation Managers.

4.8.

Taxes on Investments which Jeopardize Charitable Purposes Code

§4944

4.8.1. Generally, if a private foundation makes any investments that
would financially jeopardize the carrying out of its exempt purposes, both the
foundation and the individual foundation managers may become liable for taxes
on these jeopardizing investments.
4.8.1.1.

Jeopardizing investments generally are those that

show a lack of reasonable business care and prudence in providing for the
long and short-term financial needs of the foundation for it to carry out its
exempt function. Reg. §53.4944-1(a)(2)(i). No single factor determines a
jeopardizing investment. No category of investments is treated as an
intrinsic violation, but careful scrutiny is applied to:
4.8.1.1.1.

Trading in securities on margin;

4.8.1.1.2.

Trading in commodity futures;

4.8.1.1.3.

Investing in working interests in oil and gas

4.8.1.1.4.

Buying "puts," "calls," and "straddles";

4.8.1.1.5.

Buying warrants; and

4.8.1.1.6.

Selling short. Id.

wells;

In deciding whether the investment of an amount jeopardizes the
carrying out of the exempt purposes, the determination must be made on
an investment-by-investment basis taking into account the foundation's

H - 21

portfolio as a whole, it is pennissible for the foundation managers to take
into account expected returns, risks of rising and failing prices, and the
need for diversification within the investment portfolio. Id. But to avoid
the tax on jeopardizing investments, a careful analysis of potential
investments must be made and good business judgment must be exercised.
Whether an investment jeopardizes the foundation exempt purposes is
detennined at the time of making the investment. if is investment is proper
when made, it will not be considered a jeopardizing investment even if it
later results in loss. Id.

4.8.2. Exceptionfor Program Related Investments
4.8.2.1.

Program-related investments are not subject to the

tax on jeopardizing investments. Program-related investments are those in
which:
4.8.2.1.1.

The primary purpose to accomplish one or

more of the foundation's exempt purposes,
4.8.2.1.2.

Production of income or appreciation of

property is not a significant purpose, and
4.8.2.2.

Influencing legislation or taking part in political

campaigns on behalf of candidates is not a purpose. Reg. §53.49443(a)(l).
Investments, to be program related, must significantly further the
foundation's exempt activities. Reg. §53.4944-3(a)(2). They must be
investments that would not have been made except for their relationship to
the exempt purposes. Id. The investments include those made in

functionally related activities (described in the discussion of the Tax on
Excess Business Holdings) that are carried on within a larger combination
of similar activities related to the exempt purposes.
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The following are some typical examples of program-related
investments:
1)

Low-interest or interest-free loans to needy

students,
2)

High-risk investments in nonprofit low-income

housing projects.
3)

Low-interest loans to small businesses owned by

members of economically disadvantaged groups, where
commercial funds at reasonable interest rates are not
readily available,
4)

Investments in businesses in deteriorated urban

areas under a plan to improve the economy of the area by
providing employment or training for unemployed
residents, and
5)

Investments in nonprofit organizations combating

community deterioration.
See Regs. §53.4944-3(b), Examples 1-8.

If a foundation changes the form or terms of an investment,
and if the investment no longer qualifies as program-related, it then
must be determined whether or not the investment jeopardizes
carrying out its exempt purposes.
Once an investment is determined to be program-related, it
will continue to qualify as a program-related investment so long as
changes in the form or terms of the investment are made primarily
for exempt purposes and not for any significant purpose involving
the production of income or the appreciation of property. Reg.
§53.4944-3(a)(3)(i).
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4.9.

Taxes on Taxable Expenditures Code §4945
4.9.1. Taxable Expenditure. Generally, a taxable expenditure is an

amount paid or incurred to: 1) carryon propaganda or otherwise attempt to
influence legislation, 2) influence the outcome of any specific public election or
carryon any voter registration drive, unless certain requirements are satisfied, 3)
make a grant to an individual for travel, study, or other similar purposes, unless
certain requirements are satisfied, 4) make a grant to an organization (other than
an organization described in section 509(a)(l), (2), or (3) or an exempt operating
foundation), unless the foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with
respect to the grant, or 5) carry out any purpose other than a religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purpose, the fostering of national or
international amateur sports competition or the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals. Regs. §53.4945-2(a)(l).

4.9.2. Influencing Legislation. A taxable expenditure includes amounts
used to attempt to influence legislation: 1) by affecting public opinion ("grass
roots"), or 2) by communicating with any member or employee of a legislative
body, or with any other government official or employee who may participate in
formulating the legislation ("direct lobbying"). Reg. §53.4945-2(a)(l) referring to
Reg. §56.4911-2.
"Legislation" includes action by Congress, any state legislature, any local
council or similar governing body, or the public by way of referendum,
constitutional amendment, or the like. Id.; Reg. §46.4911-2(d)(l)(i). The term
"action" includes the introduction, enactment, defeat, or repeal of legislation.
Reg. §56.4911-2(d)(2).
4.9.2.1.

Exceptions.
4.9.2.1.1.

Non-Legislative Action. Actions by

executive, judicial, or administrative bodies are not legislation.
Reg. §56.4911-2(d)(3). Therefore, expenditures made to influence
action by these bodies are not attempts to influence legislation.

H - 24

4.9.2.1.2.

Exception for nonpartisan analysis, study,

and research. Engaging in nonpartisan analysis, study, or research
and making the results of this work available to the general public
or to governmental bodies, officials, or employees is not carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.
Code §4945(c); Reg. §53.4945-2(d)(i1)(ii). Nonpartisan analysis,
study, or research means an independent and objective exposition
of a particular subject matter, including activities that qualify as
educational activities. Reg. §53.4945-2(d)(i)(ii). Nonpartisan
analysis, study, or research may advocate a particular position or
viewpoint as long as there is a sufficiently full and fair exposition
of the relevant facts to enable the public or an individual to form
an independent opinion or conclusion. !d. However, a mere
presentation of unsupported opinion does not qualify as
nonpartisan analysis, study, or research. Id.
4.9.2.1.3.

Exception for technical advice or assistance.

Amounts are not taxable expenditures if they are paid or incurred
in connection with providing technical advice or assistance to a
governmental body, a government committee, or a subdivision of
either, in response to a written request. Reg. §53-4945-2(a)(2)(i).
Under this exception, the request for assistance or advice must be
made in the name of the requesting governmental body,
committee, or subdivision rather than an individual member Id.
Similarly, the response to the request must be available to every
member ofthe requesting body, committee, or subdivision. Id.
4.9.2.1.4.

Exception for decisions affecting the

powers, duties, etc., of a private foundation. Taxes on lobbying
activities, discussed earlier, do not apply to any amount paid or
incurred in connection with an appearance before, or
communication with, any legislative body on a possible decision of
the body that might affect the existence of the private foundation,
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its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deductibility of
contributions to the foundation Reg. §53-4945-2(d)C3)(i). Under
this exception, a foundation may communicate with the entire
legislative body, committees, or subcommittees of the legislative
body, individual congressmen or legislators, members of their
staffs, or representatives of the executive branch, who are involved
in the legislative process if the communication is limited to the
prescribed subjects. Id. In addition, the foundation may make
expenditures to initiate legislation if the legislative concerns only
matters that might affect the existence of the private foundation, its
powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deductibility of
contributions to the foundation. Id.
4.9.2.1.5.

Exception for examinations and discussions

of broad social, economic, and similar problems. Expenditures for
examinations and discussions of broad social, economic, and
similar problems are riot taxable expenditures even if the problems
are the type the government would be expected to deal with
ultimately. Reg. §53.4945-2(d)(4).

4.9.2.2.

Influencing elections and carrying on voter

registration drives. Taxable expenditures include amounts paid or
incurred by a private foundation to influence the outcome of any specific
public election or to carry on, directly or indirectly, any voter registration
drive. Code §4945(d)(2). Activities that are considered participation or
intervention in a political campaign include, but are not limited to: 1)
publishing or distributing written or printed statements or making oral
statements on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate, 2) paying salaries
or expenses of campaign workers, and 3) conducting or paying the
expenses of conducting a voter registration drive limited to the geographic
area covered by the campaign. Regs. §43-4945-3(a)(2).
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4.9.2.3.

Exceptions. This rule does not apply to nonpartisan

activities carried on under all the following conditions: 1) the organization
making the expenditure is described in section 50 1(c)(3) and is exempt
from tax, 2) its activities are nonpartisan, are not confined to one specific
election period, and are carried on in at least 5 states, 3) the organization
spends at least 85% of its income directly for the active conduct of the
exempt purposes or functions for which it is organized and operated, 4)
the organization receives at least 85% of its support (other than gross
investment income) from exempt organizations, the general public,
governmental units, or any combination of these; it does not receive more
than 25% of its support (other than gross investment income) from any
one exempt organization; and it does not receive more than 50% of its
support from gross investment income, and 5) contributions to the
organization for voter registration drives are not subject to conditions that
they may be used only in specified states or other localities of the United
States, or that they may be used in only one specific election period.
Regs. §43.4945-3(b).
In determining whether the organization meets the support test in
item (4) for a tax year, the support received during the tax year and the 4
immediately preceding tax years of the organization is taken into account.
Regs. §53.4945(b)(3)(i).. For organizations with less than 4 years of
operational experience, the support test may be determined by taking into
account all available years the organization has been in existence.

4.9.3. Grants to individuals. Grants to individuals for travel, study, or
other similar purposes are taxable expenditures, unless the following conditions
are met: 1) the grant must be awarded on an objective and nondiscriminatory
basis under a procedure approved in advance by the Service; and 2) it must he
shown to the satisfaction of the Service that one of the following requirements is
met--
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4.9.3.1.

The grant is a scholarship or fellowship and is to be

used for study at an educational institution that normally maintains a
regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly organized
body of students in attendance at the place where the educational activities
are carried on. Code §4945(g)(l).
4.9.3.2.

The grant qualifies as a prize or award under Code

§74(b), ifthe recipient is selected from the general public. For this
purpose, the recipient may keep the prize or award, and need not authorize
the foundation to transfer the prize or award to a governmental unit or to
another charity. Code §4945(g)(2).
4.9.3.3.

The grant's purpose is to achieve a specific

objective, produce a report or similar product, or improve or enhance a
literary, artistic, musical, scientific, teaching, or similar capacity, skill, or
talent of the grantee. Code §4945(g)(3).

4.9.3.4.

Advance approval ofgrant-making procedure. The

grant-making procedure, to be approved in advance by the Internal
Revenue Service, must provide the following:
4.9.3.4.1.

The group from which the grantees are

selected must be reasonably related to the purposes of the grant,
and the group must be large enough to constitute a charitable class
(unless, taking into account the purposes of the grant, only a few
individuals are qualified to be grantees, as in the case of scientific
research). Reg. §43.4945-4(b)(2).
4.9.3.4.2.

The criteria used in selecting grant recipients

from the potential grantees should be related to the purpose of the
grant. Reg. §53.49455-4(b)(3). For example, proper criteria for
selecting scholarship recipients might include (but are not limited
to) the following: past academic performance, performance on
tests designed to measure ability and aptitude for college work,
recommendations from instructors, financial need, and the
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conclusions the selection committee might draw from personal
interviews. Id.
4.9.3.4.3.

The person or persons who select recipients

of grants should not be in a position to receive a private benefit,
directly or indirectly, if certain potential grantees are selected over
others. Reg. §53.4945-4(b)(4).
4.9.3.4.4.

Periodic progress reports must be made to the

foundation, at least once a year, to determine whether the grantees have
performed the activities the grants are intended to finance. Reg. §53.49454(c)(3).
4.9.3.4.5.

When these reports are not made or there are other

indications that the grants are not being used as intended, the foundation
must investigate and take corrective action. Reg. §53.4945-4(c)(4).
4.9.3.4.6.

The foundation must keep all records relating to all

grants to individuals, including-- a) information obtained to evaluate
grantees, b) identification of grantees, including any relationship of the
grantee to the foundation sufficient to make the grantee a disqualified
person, c) amount and purpose of each grant, and d) follow-up
information, including required annual reports and investigation of
jeopardized grants. Reg. §53.4945-4(c)(6). However, no single procedure
or set of procedures is required. Reg. §53.4945-4(c)(1). Procedures may
vary depending upon such factors as the size of the foundation, the amount
and purpose of the grants, and whether one or more recipients are
involved. Id. Requests for approval of grant-making procedures should
be sent to the District Director of the IRS office servicing your area. Reg.
§53.4945-4(d)(2). If, by the 45th day after a request for approval of grant
procedures has been properly submitted, the foundation has not been
notified that the procedures are unacceptable, they may be considered
approved from the date of submission until receipt of actual notice from
the Service that they do not meet the requirements. Payments of
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remaining installments of fixed-sum grants awarded during the period the
foundation's procedures were considered approved, after the foundation is
notified that the procedures are unacceptable, are not taxable expenditures.

Id.
4.9.3.5.

Renewals. A renewal of a qualified grant will not be

treated as a grant to an individual subject to the requirements of this chapter if:
4.9.3.5.1.

The grantor has no information indicating

that the original grant is being used for any purpose other than that
for which it was made,
4.9.3.5.2.

The reports due under the terms of the grant

have been provided, and
4.9.3.5.3.

Any additional criteria and procedures for

renewal are objective and nondiscriminatory. Reg. §53A9454(a)(3 )(iii).

4.9.3.504.

Any extension of a period over which a

grant is to be paid will not by itself be regarded as a grant or a
renewal of a grant.

4.904. Grants to Organizations. Grants to organizations (including loans
and program-related investments) are taxable expenditures, unless the recipients
are public charities described in section 509(a)(1), (2), or (3), or unless the private
foundation exercises expenditure responsibility with respect to the grant. Code
§4945(d)(4).
Expenditure responsibility means that the foundation exerts all reasonable
efforts and establishes adequate procedures: 1) to see that the grant is spent only
for the purpose for which it is made, 2) to obtain full and complete reports from
the grantee organization on how the funds are spent, and 3) to make full and
detailed reports on the expenditures to the IRS. Reg. §53A945-5(b)(1).

4.904.1.

Pre-grant inquiry. If expenditure responsibility must be

exercised, the foundation should conduct a limited inquiry concerning the
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potential grantee before the grant is made. Reg. §53.4945-5(b)(2). The inquiry
should deal with matters such as the identity, past history and experience,
management, activities, and practices of the grantee organization, and should be
complete enough to give reasonable assurance that the grantee will use the grant
for the purposes for which it is made. ld.
4.9.5. Terms of grants. To meet the expenditure responsibility
requirements, each grant must be made subject to a written commitment signed by
an appropriate officer, director, or trustee of the grantee organization. Reg.
§53.4945-5(b)(3). This commitment must include the following agreements by
the grantee: 1) to repay any amount not used for the purposes of the grant, 2) to
submit full and complete annual reports to the grantor foundation on the manner
in which the funds are spent and the progress made in accomplishing the purposes
of the grant, 3) to keep records of receipts and expenditures and to make its books
and records available to the grantor at reasonable times, and 4) not to use any of
the funds to influence legislation, to influence the outcome of elections, to carry
on voter registration drives, to make grants to individuals or other organizations,
or to undertake any nonexempt activity, when such use of the funds would be a
taxable expenditure if made directly by the foundation. !d.
4.9.5.1.

Terms of program-related investment. To meet the

expenditure responsibility requirements in making a program-related
investment, a private foundation must require that each investment be
made subject to a written commitment signed by an appropriate officer,
director, or trustee of the recipient organization. Reg. §53.4945-5(b)(4).:.
The commitment should specify the purpose of the investment and should
contain an agreement by the organization: 1) to use all amounts received
from the private foundation only for the purposes of the investment and to
repay any amount not used for those purposes, provided that, for equity
investments, the repayment is within the limitations concerning
distributions to holders of equity interests, 2) to submit, at least once a
year, a full and complete financial report ofthe type ordinarily required by
commercial Investors under similar circumstances and a statement that it
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has complied with the terms of the investment, 3) to keep adequate books
and records and to make them available to the private foundation at
reasonable times, and 4) Not to use any of the funds to carry on
propaganda, influence legislation, influence the outcome of any public
elections, carryon voter registration drives, or, when the recipient is a
private foundation, to make grants that do not comply with the
requirements regarding individual grants or expenditure responsibility.
Reg. 53.4945-5(b)(4).
4.9.5.2.

Reports from grantees. The granting private

foundation must require reports on the use of the funds, compliance with
the terms of the grant, and the progress made by the grantee toward
achieving the purposes for which the grant was made. Reg. §53.49455(c)O). The grantee must make an annual accounting ofthe funds at the
end of its accounting period and must make a final report on all
expenditures made from the funds in addition to the progress made toward
the goals of the grant. Id.
4.9.5.3.

Reliance on information supplied by grantee. A

private foundation, exercising expenditure responsibility with respect to its
grants, may rely on adequate records or other sufficient evidence supplied
by the grantee organization showing the information that the grantor must
submit to the IRS.
4.9.5.4.

Recordkeeping requirements. In addition to the

information required when filing a return, the granting foundation must
make available to the IRS at its main office each of the following items: 1)
a copy of the agreement covering each expenditure responsibility grant
made during the year, 2) a copy of each report received during the tax year
for each grantee on any expenditure responsibility grant, and 3) a copy of
each report made by the grantor's personnel or independent auditors of any
audits or other investigations made during the tax year on any expenditure
responsibility grant. Reg. §53.4945-5(d)O).
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4.9.5.5.

Violations of expenditure responsibility

requirements. Any diversion of grant funds for a use not specified in the
grant may result in that part of the grant being treated as a taxable
expenditure. Reg. §53.4945-5-(e)(1). If the use of the funds is consistent
with the purpose of the grant, the fact that a grantee does not use any funds
as indicated in the original budget projection is not a diversion of funds.
If a grantor foundation determines that any part of the grant has
been used for improper purposes and the grantee has not previously
diverted grant funds, the foundation will not be treated as having made a
taxable expenditure if it: 1) takes all reasonable and appropriate steps
either to recover the grant funds or to ensure the restoration of the diverted
funds and the dedication of the other grant funds held by the grantee to the
purposes of the grant, and 2) withholds any further paYments to the
grantee, after being made aware that a diversion of funds may have taken
place, until it has received the grantee's assurance that future diversions
will not occur and required the grantee to take extraordinary precautions to
prevent further diversions from occurring. Reg. §53.4945-5(c)(1)(iii).
4.9.5.6.

Grantee's failure to make reports. A failure to make

the required reports by the grantee will result in the grant being treated as
a taxable expenditure by the grantor unless the grantor: 1) awarded the
grant according to the expenditure responsibility requirements discussed
earlier, 2) complied with all the reporting requirements, 3) made a
reasonable effort to get the required reports, and 4) withholds all future
paYments on this grant and on any other grant to the same grantee until the
report is provided. Reg. §53.4945-5(e)(2).
4.9.5.7.

Violations by the grantor. In addition to the

circumstances discussed earlier concerning taxable expenditures, a
granting foundation will be treated as making a taxable expenditure if it:
1) fails to make a pre-grant inquiry, 2) fails to obtain the required written
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commitments described earlier, or 3) fails to make reports to the IRS as
discussed earlier. Reg. §53.4945-5(e)(3).
4.9.5.8.

The reports to the Internal Revenue Service by the

foundation on each expenditure responsibility grant must be made each
year that any part of the grant remains unexpended by the grantee at any
time during the year. Reg. §53.4945-5(d)(l). The required reports must
be submitted with the organization's annual return (Form 990-PF or Form
5227).
4.10.

Expenditures for Non-Charitable Purpose.

4.10.1. Grants to noncharitable organizations. A private foundation
cannot make a grant for a purpose not described in section 170(c)(2)(B). Code
§4945(d)(5). Permitted purposes are religious, charitable, scientific, literary or
educational purposes, fostering national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of the activities involve providing athletic
facilities or equipment), and preventing cruelty to children or animals. Code
§170(c)(2)(B). Section 501(c)(3) describes organizations that are organized and
operated exclusively for these purposes. Grants for nonpermitted purposes are
taxable expenditures.
Accordingly, a private foundation may not make a grant to an organization
that is not described in section 501(c)(3) unless, making the grant itself is a direct
charitable act or a program-related investment, or the grantor is reasonably
assured that the grant will be used exclusively for the purposes of an organization
described here. Reg. §53.4945-6(c)(l).
4.10.2. Exceptions. Examples of expenditures ordinarily not treated as
taxable expenditures include: 1) expenditures to acquire investments that generate
income to be used to further the purposes of the organization, 2) reasonable
expenses related to acquiring these investments, 3) payment of taxes, 4) expenses
that qualify as allowable deductions in figuring the tax on unrelated business
income, 5) any payment that is a qualifying distribution, 6) any deduction allowed
in arriving at taxable net investment income, 7) reasonable expenditures to
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evaluate, acquire, modify, and dispose of program-related investments, and 8)
business expenses of the recipient of a program-related investment.
However, payment of unreasonable administrative expenses, including
wages, consultant fees, and other fees for services performed, ordinarily will be
taxable expenditures unless made by the foundation in the good faith belief that
the amounts were reasonable and were consistent with ordinary business care and
prudence.

4.11.

Unrelated Business Income Tax Code §§ 511- 514.
4.11.1. Definition. Unrelated business income is the income from a trade

or business that is regularly carried on by an exempt organization and that is not
substantially related to the performance by the organization of its exempt purpose
or function, except that the organization uses the profits derived from this activity.
4.11.1.1.

Trade or business. The term "trade or business"

generally includes any activity carried on for the production of income
from selling goods or performing services. Reg. 1.513-1Cb). An activity
does not lose its identity as a trade or business merely because it is carried
on within a larger group of similar activities that may, or may not, be
related to the exempt purposes of the organization. Id. For example, the
regular sale of pharmaceutical supplies to the general public by a hospital
pharmacy does not lose its identity as a trade or business, even though the
pharmacy also furnishes supplies to the hospital and patients of the
hospital in accordance with its exempt purpose. Id. Similarly, soliciting,
selling, and publishing commercial advertising is a trade or business even
though the advertising is published in an exempt organization's periodical
that contains editorial matter related to the organization's exempt purpose.

Id.
4.11.1.2.

Regularly carried on. Business activities of an

exempt organization ordinarily are considered regularly carried on if they
show a frequency and continuity, and are pursued in a manner similar to
comparable commercial activities of nonexempt organizations. Reg.
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§1.513-lCc)(l). For example, a hospital auxiliary's operation of a
sandwich stand for 2 weeks at a state fair would not be the regular conduct
of a trade or business. The stand would not compete with similar facilities
that a nonexempt organization would ordinarily operate year-round. Reg.
§1.513-lCc)(2). However, operating a commercial parking lot every
Saturday, year-round, would be the regular conduct of a trade or business.

Id.
4.11.1.3.

Not substantially related. A business activity is not

substantially related to an organization's exempt purpose if it does not
contribute importantly to accomplishing that purpose (other than through
the production of funds). Reg. §1.513-lCd)(2). Whether an activity
contributes importantly depends in each case on the facts involved. Id. In
determining whether activities contribute importantly to the
accomplishment of an exempt purpose, the size and extent of the activities
involved must be considered in relation to the nature and extent of the
exempt function that they intend to serve. Reg. §1.513-1(d)(3). For
example, to the extent an activity is conducted on a scale larger than is
reasonably necessary to perform an exempt purpose, it does not contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of the exempt purpose. Id. The part of
the activity that is more than needed to accomplish the exempt purpose is
an unrelated trade or business. Id.
Also in determining whether activities contribute importantly to
the accomplishment of an exempt purpose, the following principles apply.
4.11.1.4.

Selling of products of exempt functions. Ordinarily,

selling products that result from the performance of exempt functions is
not an unrelated trade or business if the product is sold in substantially the
same state it is in when the exempt functions are completed. Regs.
§1.513-lCd)(4)(ii). Thus, for an exempt organization engaged in
rehabilitating handicapped persons (its exempt function), selling articles
made by these persons as part of their rehabilitation training is not an
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unrelated trade or business. Id. However, if a completed product resulting
from an exempt function is used or exploited in further business activity
beyond what is reasonably appropriate or necessary to dispose of it as is,
the activity is an unrelated trade or business. Id. For example, if an
exempt organization maintains an experimental dairy herd for scientific
purposes, the sale of milk and cream produced in the ordinary course of
operation of the project is not an unrelated trade or business. Id. But if
the organization uses the milk and cream in the further manufacture of
food items such as ice cream, pastries, etc., the sale of these products is an
unrelated trade or business unless the manufacturing activities themselves
contribute importantly to the accomplishment of an exempt purpose of the
organization. Id.
4.11.1.5.

Dual use of assets or facilities. If an asset or facility

necessary to the conduct of exempt functions is also used in commercial
activities, its use for exempt functions does not, by itself, make the
commercial activities a related trade or business. REg. §1.513-lCd)(4)(iii).
The test, as discussed earlier, is whether the activities contribute
importantly to the accomplishment of exempt purposes. For example, a
museum has a theater auditorium designed for showing educational films
in connection with its program of public education in the arts and sciences.

Id. The theater is a principal feature of the museum and operates
continuously while the museum is open to the public. Id. If the
organization also operates the theater as a motion picture theater for the
public when the museum is closed, the activity is an unrelated trade or
business. Id.
4.11.1.6.

Exploitation of exempt functions. Exempt activities

sometimes create goodwill or other intangibles that can be exploited in a
commercial way. Reg. §1.513-lCd)(4)(iv). When an organization exploits
such an intangible in commercial activities, the fact that the income
depends in part upon an exempt function of the organization does not
make the commercial activities a related trade or business. Id. Unless the
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commercial exploitation contributes importantly to the accomplishment of
the exempt purpose, the commercial activities are an unrelated trade or
business. Id.
4.11.2. Exceptions.
4.11.2.1.

Volunteers. Any trade or business in which

substantially all the work is performed for the organization without
compensation is not an unrelated trade or business.
4.11.2.2.

Sale of Contributed Property. Any trade or business

which consists of selling merchandise substantially all of which has been
received by the organization as a gift.
4.11.3. Calculating Unrelated Business Taxable Income. The term
"unrelated business taxable income" generally means the gross income derived
from any unrelated trade or business regularly carried on by the exempt
organization, less the deductions directly connected with carrying on the trade or
business. Code §512(a)(l). If an organization regularly carries on two or more
unrelated business activities, its unrelated business taxable income is the total of
gross inyome from all such activities less the total allowable deductions
attributable to all the activities. Regs. §1.512(a)-1 (a). In computing unrelated
business taxable income, gross income and deductions are subject to
modifications and special rules. Id. Whether a particular item of income or
expense falls within any of these modifications or special rules must be
determined by all the facts and circumstances in each specific case.
4.11.4. Partnership Distributive Share. An organization may have
unrelated business income or loss as a member of a partnership, rather than
through direct business dealings with the public. If so, it must treat its share of the
partnership income or loss as if it had conducted the business activity in its own
capacity as a corporation or trust. Reg. §1.512(c)-1. No distinction is made
between limited and general partners. Rev. Rut 79-222. Thus, if an organization
is a member of a partnership regularly engaged in a trade or business that is an
unrelated trade or business with respect to the organization, the organization must
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include in its unrelated business taxable income its share ofthe partnership's gross
income from the unrelated trade or business (whether or not distributed), and the
deductions attributable to it. Code §512(c). The partnership income and
deductions to be included in the organization's unrelated business taxable income
are figured the same way as any income and deductions from an unrelated trade or
business conducted directly by the organization.
4.11.4.1.

Example. An exempt educational organization is a

partner in a partnership that operates a factory. The partnership also holds
stock in a corporation. The exempt organization must include its share of
the gross income from operating the factory in its unrelated business
taxable income, but may exclude its share of any dividends the partnership
received from the corporation.
4.11.5. Income that is not Unrelated Business Income.

4.11.5.1.

Dividends, interest, annuities and other investment

income. All dividends, interest, annuities, payments with respect to
securities loans, income from notional principal contracts, and other
income from an exempt organization's ordinary and routine investments
that the IRS determines are substantially similar to these types of income
are excluded in computing unrelated business taxable income. Code
§512Cb)(l).
4.11.5.2.

Royalties. Royalties, including overriding royalties,

are excluded in computing unrelated business taxable income. Code
§512Cb)C2).
4.11.5.3.

Rents. Rents from real property, including elevators

and escalators, are excluded in computing unrelated business taxable
income. Code §512Cb)(3)CA)(i). Rents from personal property are not
excluded. Code §512(b)(3)CA)Cii).
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4.11.5.4.

Gains and losses from disposition of property. Also

excluded from unrelated business taxable income are gains or losses from
the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property. Code §512(b)(5).
4.11.6. Debt Financed Property. Investment income that would otherwise
be excluded from an exempt organization's unrelated business taxable income
must be included to the extent it is derived from debt-financed property. Code
§512(b)(4). The amount of income included is proportionate to the debt on the
property. Code §514(a)(1).
4.11.6.1.

Debt-Financed Property. In general, the term "debt-

financed property" means any property held to produce income (including
gain from its disposition) for which there is an acquisition indebtedness at
any time during the tax year (or during the 12-month period before the
date of the property's disposal, if it was disposed of during the tax year).
Code §514(b)(l). It includes rental real estate, tangible personal property,
and corporate stock.
4.11.6.2.

Acquisition Indebtedness. For any debt-financed

property, acquisition indebtedness is the unpaid amount of debt incurred
by an organization: 1) when acquiring or improving the property, 2) before
acquiring or improving the property if the debt would not have been
incurred except for the acquisition or improvement, and 3) after acquiring
or improving the property if:
4.11.6.2.1.

The debt would not have been incurred

except for the acquisition or improvement, and
4.11.6.2.2.

Incurring the debt was reasonably

foreseeable when the property was acquired or improved. Code
§514(c)(1 ).
4.12.

Termination ofPrivate Foundation Status
4.12.1. Voluntary termination. To voluntarily terminate under section

507(a)(I), the organization must send a statement to its District Director of its
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intent to terminate its status under section 507(a)(1). Code §507(b)(l). The
statement must provide, in detail, the computation and amount of tax imposed
under section 507(c). Reg. §1.507-l(b)(1 ). Unless the organization requests
abatement, it must pay the tax at the time the statement is filed. Id. The
organization may request abatement of all the tax imposed under section 507(c),
or it may pay part of the tax and request abatement of the unpaid part. Id.
However, if the organization's request for abatement is denied, the organization
must pay the tax in full when notified by the Service that the tax will not be
abated. Id.
4.12.1.1.

Termination of private foundation status under

section 507(a)(1) will not relieve the foundation, or any disqualified
person, of any liability for excise taxes. Reg. §1.507-1(b)(2).
4.12.1.2.

If an organization that has terminated its private

foundation status under section 507(a) continues in operation and wishes
to be treated as a charitable, educational, religious, scientific, etc.,
organization, it must apply for appropriate exemption recognition. Reg.
§ 1.507-1 (b)(3).

4.12.1.3.

Notice to the public. The Internal Revenue Service

will publish in the Internal Revenue Bulletin any notice it receives of
voluntary termination under section 507(a)(1). Reg. §1.507-Hb)(5).
4.12.1.4.

Non-Terminating Distributions. No termination can

take place under section 507(a)(1) if the private foundation transfers all or
part of its assets to another private foundation or to one or more private
foundations and to one or more section 509(a)(1), (2), (3), or (4)
organizations, under a liquidation, merger, redemption, recapitalization, or
other adjustment, organization, or reorganization. Reg. §1.507-1 (b)(6).
4.12.2. Transferee liability. A termination under section 507(a) does not
result from either a transfer of all its assets or a significant disposition of its assets
(defined later) by a private foundation unless it chooses to terminate under section
507(a)(1 ), or an involuntary termination occurs. Reg. §1.507-l(b)(7). If a private
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foundation incurs any liability for the excise taxes before or in connection with
the transfer, transferee liability may be applied against the transferee organization
for payment of those taxes. Reg. §1.507-1(b)(8). Liability for excise taxes is
considered to be incurred on the date the act or failure to act occurs that gives rise
to the initial tax liability. Id.
4.12.3. A private foundation that transfers all of its net assets must file
Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation. Reg. §1.507-1(b)(9). However,
neither a private foundation nor its managers are required to file this form for any
tax year after the tax year in which the last transfer occurs if during those later
years the foundation has neither legal nor equitable title to any assets nor engages
in any activity. Id.
4.12.4. Section 507(c) tax. The tax imposed under section 507(c) on the
termination of a private foundation is the lesser of:
4.12.4.1.

The combined tax benefit resulting from the section

501 (c)(3) status of the organization, or .
4.12.4.2.

The value of the net assets of the organization.

Code §507(c).
4.12.5. The combined tax benefit resulting from the section 501 (c)(3)
status of any private foundation is the sum of: 1) the combined increases in
income, estate, and gift taxes that would have been imposed on all substantial

contributors if deductions for all contributions made by those contributors to the
foundation had been disallowed, and 2) the combined increases in income tax that
would have been imposed on the private foundation's income if a) the foundation
had not been tax exempt, and b) in the case of a trust, its charitable deduction had
been limited to 20% of its taxable income, and in figuring the combined increases
in tax under (1), all deductions for a particular contribution for income, estate, or
gift tax purposes must be included. Code §507(d)(l). For example, if a
substantial contributor had taken income tax and gift tax deductions for a
charitable contribution to the foundation, the amount of each deduction must be
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included. The combined tax benefit may be more than the fair market value of the
property transferred.
4.12.5.1.

Substantial Contribution.

4.12.5.2.

The value of the net assets of the organization is

the greater of: 1) the value on the first day action was taken to terminate
private foundation status, or 2) the value on the date the organization
ceased to be a private foundation. Code §507(e). The valuation date in
(1) is the date the organization gave notice it was terminating private
foundation status.

4.12.6. When tax is imposed. These same dates determine when liability
for the section 507(c) tax is imposed because a transfer of assets by a private
foundation is involved. Code §507(f).

4.12.7. Abatement ofsection 507(c) taxes. The unpaid part of section
507(c) tax can be abated by the IRS if: 1) the private foundation distributes all of
its net assets to one or more charitable organizations described in section
509(a)(1) that have been in existence and so described for at least 60 months,
Code §507(g)(l); Reg. §1.507-9(aO(l) or 2) The Service receives effective
assurance through corrective action taken in state proceedings that assets
dedicated to charitable purposes will, in fact, be used for charitable purposes.
4.12.7.1.

Corrective action in state proceedings. The section

507(c) tax may be abated by the IRS if, within a year from the date of
issuing a notice of deficiency for that tax, an appropriate state officer
certifies that corrective action has been initiated under state law under
court order or approval. Reg. §1.507-9(b)(2). Corrective action is the
vigorous enforcement of state laws sufficient to assure implementation of
the excise tax provisions and to insure that foundation assets are preserved
for charitable purposes. Reg. §1.507-9(b)(3).

4.13.

Involuntary termination. An organization's status may be involuntarily

terminated if the IRS notifies the organization that, because of willful, flagrant, or
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repeated acts or failures to act giving rise to the Chapter 42 excise taxes, the organization
is liable for section 507(c) tax. Code §507(a)(2). Willful repeated acts are at least two
acts or failures to act which are voluntarily, consciously, and knowingly committed in
violation of the excise tax provisions, and which appear to a reasonable person to be a
gross violation ofthese provisions. Reg. §1.507-Hc). The act or failure to act may result
in termination of the foundation's status even though the tax is imposed on the
foundation's managers rather than on the foundation itself. Reg. §1.507-Hc)(3).
Furthermore, the failure to correct the act or acts (or failure or failures to act) that gave
rise to excise tax liability may cause involuntary termination of the private foundation.
Reg. §1.507-1(c094). No motive to avoid legal restrictions or incur tax is necessary to
make the act or failure to act willful. Reg. §1.507-1(c)(5). However, a foundation's act
or failure to act is not willful if the foundation or its manager, if applicable, does not
know that the act or failure to act is an act of self dealing, a taxable expenditure, or other
act or failure to act giving rise to liability for excise taxes. Id. In the case of an
involuntary termination, section 507(c) tax is computed in the same manner as for
voluntary terminations. Reg. §1.507-7(b)(2). However, in determining the value of net
assets of the foundation on the first day action was taken to terminate private foundation
status, the valuation date is the date a willful and flagrant act, failure to act, or series of
repeated acts or failures to act first occurred. Id. Although the section 507(c) tax
resulting from an involuntary termination may be abated, this is not true for any excise
tax liability attributable to the acts or failures to act that caused the involuntary
termination.
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SECTION I

FLEXIBLE TRUSTS AND ESTATES FOR
UNCERTAIN TIMES

Jerold I. Horn
June 23, 2004

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty abounds, particularly from the perspective of an owner of property who
is addressing the disposition of his or her estate. The uncertainty extends to births and
deaths, to marriages, to health, to abilities and personalities, to resources and needs
and, not least, to a system of law of which the only constant is unpredictable, and
perhaps revolutionary, change. What is the owner to do? Although not a solution, per se,
flexibility at least offers the possibility of solutions.
The writer suggests and analyzes provisions and systems that are designed to
enhance flexibility, and to define its limits, in the planning of trusts and estates.
Although subtly in some cases, all of the book relates to flexibility.
Some of the forms
(~, Form 3.1 through Form 3.4) preclude flexibility and are included solely for
purposes of comparison.
Some (~, Form 3.6 and Form 3.7) are formulae that show that
flexibility is important even if no one is to possess any discretion. Others (~, Form
14.6, Form 14.15 and Form 14.16) are drafted in terms of the outer limits of flexibility
and are intended to enhance the ability of a power holder to operate within those limits.

1.01

OBJECTIVES

The primary objectives of planning relate to enjoyment, management, protection
against creditors, control, tax efficiency and investment efficiency. The objectives are
not necessarily consistent. Accomplishment of one or more of them might necessitate the
sacrifice of one or more others, in whole or in part. Tensions particularly exist between
control and enjoyment, between control and protection against creditors and between
control and tax efficiency. The property owner must select the desired balance.
*Copyright 2004.

Jerold I. Horn.

All rights reserved.

The writer expressly disclaims (i) all warranties, express and implied, including, without
limitation, of merchantability and fitness for any particular purpose, and (ii) all other
responsibility for all consequences of use of this material.
'

l.Ol(a)

Enjoyment

Provide such (and only such) enjoyment as the property owner desires, often, as a
practical matter, such enjoyment as a beneficiary desires.
l.Ol(b)

Management

Provide management for any beneficiary who needs or wants it.
l.Ol(c)

Protection Against Creditors

Avoid claims of creditors, spouses and former spouses.
l.Ol(d)

Tax Efficiency

Prevent attribution of property, for transfer tax purposes, to any person except to
any extent that the person becomes entitled to receive the property or becomes entitled as
a beneficiary to exercise a general power to appoint the property or wants the attribution
in order to avoid another, more onerous tax.
Prevent attribution of property, for income tax purposes, to any person except to
any extent that the person becomes entitled to receive the income or the person wants the
attribution in order to avoid recognition or to deflect tax liability from another person.
l.Ol(e)

Control

Maximize control, consistently with the tax objectives, if
(1)

one or more beneficially interested persons, solely by themselves, are to
possess any nonfiduciary powers and

(2)

(a)

one or more independent trustees, solely by themselves, are to possess
any fiduciary powers (see the illustrations at 1.02, Column A) or

(b)

one or more beneficially interested persons, solely by themselves, are
to possess any fiduciary powers (see the illustrations at 1.02, Column
B) or

(c)

one or more independent trustees, solely by themselves, are to possess
any fiduciary powers that beneficially interested persons cannot
possess consistently with accomplishment of the tax objectives, and
either
(i)

(ii)

one or more independent trustees and one or more beneficially
interested persons are to share any fiduciary powers that
beneficially interested persons can possess consistently with
accomplishment of the tax objectives or
one or more beneficially interested persons, solely by
themselves, are to possess any fiduciary powers that
beneficially interested persons can possess consistently with
accomplishment of the tax objectives

(see the illustrations at 1.02, Column C).
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1.01(£)

Investment Strategy

Accommodate optimal investment strategy.
1.01(£) (1)

Challenge to Principal-Income Model

Classic applications of the principal-income model include the following:
Capital
Land
(ii)
Tree
(iii) House
(iv)
Bond
(v)
Stock

Inurement
crop,
fruit,
use,
interest and
dividend.

(i)

The purpose and operation of the principal-income model are subject to challenge.
According to the challenge, the results of the principal-income model often deviate from
the objectives of property owners concerning (i) consumption, (ii) conservation and (iii)
total-return concepts of modern- portfolio theory.
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1.01(f) (2)

Trust Models

Models A, Band C, below, illustrate choices. An ability to enjoy the tax results
of B (or, better, the tax and nontax results of C) rather than those of A depends upon the
design of the trust. The hypothesis is that the planner should design the trust so that
the dispositive provisions will provide for the desired beneficial enjoyment and permit
the designed management and control without precluding the optimal method of investment.

Principal
Interest &
Dividends
Appreciation
Tax Rate

*
**
***

Model A
Pay-AlI-Income
Trust

Model B
Preferred-TaxResult Trust

100,000*

100,000**

Model C
Total-Return
Trust
100,000***

5,000

0

1,000

0

5,000

5,000

40%t

20%t

23+%t

Invested to generate trust-accounting income according to the principalincome model.
Invested to generate capital appreciation.
Invested to optimize total return.
Ignoring possibly temporary reductions.
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1.02 ILLUSTRATIONS OF DRAFTING TO APPROACH BENEFITS (BUT NOT BURDENS) OF OUTRIGHT
OWNERSHIP

c

S

A

Holder of fiduciary powers is independent

Holder of fiduciary powers is

~

l;leneficially interested. trustee

Holder of fiduciary powers is
beneficially interested trustee and
independent trustee

l.a.

Mandatory
distribution
of all income to onB
person (Form 3.2)

l.a.

Mandatory
distribution
of all income to one
person (Form 3.2)

Mandatory
distribution
of all income to one
person (Form 3.2)

OR

OR

OR

Income per
ascertainable
standard, to one
persor., no spray

Income per discretion
of independent
trustee, to one
person or spray
(Pona 3.8 and Form 3.9J

b.

l.a.

Combination of income
per discretion of
independent trustee, to
one person, no spray
(Form 3.8), .!!!S income
per ascertainable
standard, to one person,
no spray (Porm 3.13)

(Form 3.14)

Principal per discretion
of independent trustee,
to one person or spray
(Foxm 3.8 and Form 3.~

b.

principal per
ascertainable
I!I tandard, to one
person, no spray

b.

Combination of A.l.b.
(with one distributee)
and B.l.b. (Porm 3.17)

(Form 3.14)

Nonfiduciary 5 + 5 power

c.

Same as A.l.c.

Same a. A.l.c.

(Form 3.21)
OR

OR

2.a.

Nonfiduciary power
to withdraw unitrust
percentage
(Form 3.31)

2.a.

Same a8 A.2.a.

OR

2.a.

Same as A.2.a.

OR

Mandatory distribution
of uni trust amount to
one person (Form 3.29)
b.

Additional payment.
to unitrust recipient per
discretion of independent
trustee (FOnD 3.8)

b.

Add! tional payments
to uni trust recipient
per ascertainable
standard (Foxm 3.13)

Nonfiduciary, inter
vivos, nongeneral power
of appointment

3.

Same as A.3.

(Form 3.32)

4.

Nonfiduciary,
testamentary,
nongeneral power
of appointment

Combination of A.2.b.
and B.2.b. (Form 3.I7)

AND

AND

3.

b.

3.

Same as A.3.

4.

Same as A.4.

5.

"Back-up" systems l

AND

Same as A.4.

4.

AND

(Form 3.37)

"Back-up" systems:

5.

01version from
sensitive trustee
(Form 14.15 and Form

Same as B.5.a.

14.16)
b.

Addition of
independent trustee
(Porm 14.10)
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b.

Same a. B.5.b.

CHAPTER 2
THE CHIEF UNCERTAINTY

2.01

OVERVIEW OF RULES

Before the end of 2009, in phases, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA") reduces transfer tax rates and increases the estate
tax and generation-skipping tax exemptions. The repeal of the estate tax and generationskipping tax is scheduled to occur at the beginning of 2010. The restoration of these
taxes is scheduled to occur at the beginning of 2011, "as if [, according to the sunset
provision,] the provisions and amendments [of EGTRRA] had never been enacted."
A regime of carryover basis, modified to include limited amounts of bases increases
for certain assets transferred at death, is scheduled to coincide with the repeal of the
estate tax and generation-skipping tax. According to Internal Revenue Code ("Code")
Section 1022(b), bases increases of at least $1,300,000 are available to the extent that
appreciated property passes from a decedent, regardless of the format of the estate plan.
According to Code Section 1022(c), bases increases of at least an additional $3,000,000
are available to the extent that appreciated property passes from a decedent to or in a
QTIP-style trust for the surviving spouse of the decedent.

2.02

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Classification of the changes based upon three periods of time might facilitate
planning. The first is the period during which estate tax and generation-skipping tax
exemptions will increase and transfer tax rates will decline. Generally, subject to
increased vigilance to prevent inadvertent shifting of beneficial enjoyment, the planning
strategies that appear appropriate during the first period are those which were
appropriate before EGTRRA.
The second is the period during which the estate tax and the generation-skipping
tax will not be in effect, a modified system of carryover basis will be in effect and
limited amounts of bases improvements will be available for certain assets transferred at
death. A principal purpose of planning for the second period is to tend to maximize both
(i) bases increases and (ii) sheltering of assets transferred at death.
The third is the period of sunset or restoration during which the regimes of the
estate tax, the generation-skipping tax and new bases at death will reappear.
Planning
strategies that were appropriate for the first period will tend to be appropriate also for
the third period. However, a principal purpose of planning during the first and second
periods will be to produce optimal results during the third period as well.

2.03

MEANING OF SUNSET

Although the prospect of sunset looms heavily upon planning, the sunset provision
is egregiously unclear in its application to the transfer taxes. Determination of the
meaning of sunset is essential to determination of the limits of planning.
2.03(a)

Effect Upon Exempt Property

Literally, but nevertheless incredibly, the sunset provision could undo some or all
of the exemptions that, immediately before the restoration of the estate tax and the
generation-skipping tax, shelter assets from the estate tax, and from the generation-
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skipping tax, in by-pass-type trusts.
Focus, for example, upon property that passed free
of tax to an exemption-shelter trust because of an increase in exemption which occurred
after the enactment of EGTRRA, that reposes in the trust upon restoration of the estate
tax before the death of a surviving spouse and that would have passed, outright or in a
QTIP trust, to or for the surviving spouse if the exemption had not existed. Literally,
the sunset provision could subject this property to estate tax upon the death of the
surviving spouse.
Similarly, focus upon property that, at the time of restoration before
the occurrence of a generation-skipping transfer, reposes in a by-pass-type trust which
has an inclusion ratio of zero because of an increase in GST exemption that occurred after
the enactment of EGTRRA. Literally, the sunset provision could subject this property to
generation-skipping tax. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the expansive language of the
sunset provision, assets that are sheltered, in whole or (in some QTIPs and some
generation-skipping trusts) in part, by exemptions that apply before the sunset probably
will remain sheltered, to the same extent, after the sunset.

2.03(b)

Effect Upon Nonexempt Property

How will the sunset provision apply to the nonexempt portion of "mid-stream"
situations? Specifically, how will the sunset provision apply, upon the death of the
surviving spouse, to the portion of a QTIP trust with respect to which a QTIP election was
made, in whole or in part, upon the death of the predeceasing spouse? The surviving
spouse will not own QTIP assets or, in the case of a QTIP that only can qualify for the
marital deduction according to Code Section 2056(b) (7), possess a general power to appoint
them. Thus, unless the sunset provision will treat a QTIP election, previously made, as
ownership for purposes of the restored tax, the surviving spouse will have no nexus that
will include the property in the gross estate of the surviving spouse or otherwise subject
the property to the restored tax.
Similarly, how will the sunset provision apply, upon
the occurrence of a generation-skipping transfer, to a generation-skipping trust that,
before the repeal of the generation-skipping tax, had an inclusion ratio of more than
zero?
The likely answer is that the sunset will reach the nonexempt portions of these
arrangements. However, if the restoration of the taxes were to result from a repeal of
the sunset provision followed by a reenactment of the repealed taxes, rather than from the
sunset provision, per se, the restoration could grandfather situations that were in
midstream at the time of the reenactment, and not subject them to the restored taxes.

2.03(c)

Is Property Transferred During Repeal nExempt n or

nNonExempt"?

A restoration of the taxes by means of a sunset of repeal probably will not apply
to assets that an owner transferred and attempted to shelter, by means of by-pass-type
trusts, during repeal before the sunset. These assets should have the same status as
assets that are sheltered because of exemptions.
According to EGTRRA, the exemptions increase greatly, in stages, until upon repeal
they effectively become unlimited.
Literal statement of this result in terms of unlimited
exemptions would have required indefinite retention of the structures of the effectively
repealed taxes. Any argument that sheltering which is based upon repeal of the estate tax
and the generation-skipping tax is different, somehow, from sheltering which is based upon
exemptions would seem to rely upon a distinction without a difference. Arguably, the
distinction would violate requirements of substantive due process of law.

2.03(d)

Continuation of By-Pass-Trust Sheltering Until, and Even After, Repeal

The tax advisability of using by-pass-type trusts to shelter exempt transfers of a
property owner from estate tax and generation-skipping tax is a function of the extent to
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which the addition of the transfers to the property of a beneficiary would cause the
transfers of the beneficiary to exceed the exemptions of the beneficiary.
2.03(d) (1)

Risk of Restoration of Taxes

The statutory environment is unsettled and unstable. A not-unlikely scenario is
that periodically Congress might defer the sunset, by means of a series of extensions of
repeal and, with or without any deferral, Congress might modify the sunset to include
"permanent" reductions in rates and permanent increases in exemptions.
The unstable environment poses at least a tax risk, and possibly a tax catastrophe,
to those who fail to shelter exemptions (including those of a possibly temporary repeal
that might exist for one or more years) by means of by-pass-type trusts to such extent (if
any) as is necessary to immunize the assets from estate tax, gift tax and generationskipping tax.
The stakes are high, as tax rates will remain high even as exemptions
increase greatly.
If, as the writer argues below, the costs of a shelter trust are
relatively small compared to the tax savings that a shelter trust might generate, an owner
of wealth that according to any reasonably likely scenario can generate liability for
transfer tax should consider indulging the conservative assumption that the addition of
any of the estate of the owner to the estate of a descendant might generate transfer tax
at the level of the generation of the descendant.
2.03(d) (2)

Risk of Retention in Trust

The property owner must weigh the tax and nontax benefits of by-pass-type trusts
against the tax and nontax disadvantages.
The thesis of the writer is that the advantages
are relatively large and the disadvantages are relatively small.
The typical client for whom the writer drafts multigenerational trusts is an
individual who, but for his or her dialogue with the writer, probably would choose not to
use shelter-type trusts.
Rather, the client probably would choose at the death of the
survivor of the client and the client's spouse to leave his or her estate outright to his
or her surviving descendants, per stirpes, subject to provision of management until one or
more stated ages at which the primary beneficiary is able to manage for himself or
herself.
Most of the by-pass-type trusts that the writer creates are intended to confer upon
the primary beneficiary powers and interests that are as close to outright ownership as
possible without attracting tax burdens of ownership. The trust is designed, to the
extent possible, to permit the primary beneficiary to manage, use, consume and control the
property similarly to how the primary beneficiary could manage, use, consume and control
the property if the primary beneficiary were to own the property outright, without owning
for tax purposes any of the property that the primary beneficiary does not consume.
Often, the client does not care whether anything remains for subsequent generations but
only cares that what (if anything) does remain should pass free of transfer tax. The
configuration that the writer has described is quite different from a configuration which
mandates payment of all income, or a unitrust amount, and which is calculated to provide
only such benefits as can permit the trust to provide the same benefits for each
generation, sequentially, in perpetuity.
The writer often uses the following features to accomplish the purpose:
(i)

(ii)

the ability of the primary beneficiary to serve as the trustee,
a Give-Me-Five, withdrawable-percentage unitrust (i.e., a right-towithdraw unitrust percentage of five percent keyed to Code Section
2041 (b) (2»

,
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(iii)

(iv)

(v)

(vi)

ascertainable-standard-limited powers of the primary beneficiary to
pay the trust estate to himself or herself,
a broadest form of nongeneral power of the primary beneficiary to
appoint during life,
a broadest form of nongeneral power of the primary beneficiary to
appoint at death and
an ability to add an independent trustee that, if added, can
distribute any or all of the trust estate to the primary beneficiary
for any purpose (even to the extent of terminating the trust).

The purpose that the writer has posed enables the writer to avoid agonizing about
the propriety of the unitrust percentage, i.e., five percent, being greater than the
after-inflation productivity of a balanced portfolio.
It also enables the writer to avoid
worrying about whether the production and payment of a stream of distributions will tend
to erode the value of the trust estate.
The view of the writer about the "real" purpose of many clients has implications
not only for trusts of which the primary beneficiary can serve as trustee solely by
himself or herself.
It also has implications for many wide-open, discretionary
arrangements that permit distributions to more than one person at a time.
2.03(d) (3)

The View of the Writer

The experience of the writer is that most clients and advisers wrongly believe that
by-pass-type trusts inherently constrain the primary objects of bounty from controlling
the management and enjoyment of the property, and from enjoying the property, similarly,
as a practical matter, to how the primary objects could control the management and
enjoyment, and could enjoy the property, if the primary objects were to own the property
outright.
Indeed, the writer would argue that, as a practical matter, the only inherent
differences, if any, between outright ownership and ownership in a flexible, by-pass-type
trust are complexity and an increase in involvement with lawyers and accountants.
The writer believes that a properly-conceived, by-pass type of trust is a modest
price to pay for tax savings, actual or potential. At least when the shelter of a bypass-type trust is reasonably likely to reduce tax, the writer presently intends to use
extremely flexible, by-pass-type trusts (or, by means of disclaimer procedures, by-passtype trusts that are as flexible as possible) to shelter exempt amounts including amounts
that effectively are exempt because of repe.al.
2.03(d) (4)

Drafting for Shelter

Tend to provide that if the United States estate tax is not in effect at the death
of a settlor, all of the trust estate shall pass to exemption-shelter trusts or other
exemption-shelter dispositions (~, gifts directly to children or grandchildren) .
However, avoid inadvertently diverting beneficial enjoyment from the surviving spouse.
The diversion is particularly likely when the settlor is married to a second spouse, has
children by a first marriage and wants to benefit the children at his or her death
regardless of whether the spouse survives. The diversion also is particularly likely when
the settlor wants to leave a significant amount to or for descendants upon his or her
death even if his or her first, and only, spouse survives.
Tend to provide that if the United States generation-skipping tax is not in effect
at the death of a settlor, all of the trust estates of shelter trusts shall pass
eventually to one or more exempt-style, generation-skipping trusts for descendants. A
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subtle application of this principle involves property in a QTIP trust with respect to
which the executor of the predeceasing spouse made a QTIP election, but not a reverse-QTIP
election, and which, but for the nonexistence of the estate tax at the death of the
surviving spouse, would be included in the gross estate of the surviving spouse. Except
for the repeal of the estate tax and the generation-skipping tax, the surviving spouse
would own this property, in both an estate tax sense and a generation-skipping tax sense,
at death. Accordingly, if the surviving spouse were to die during repeal, repeal
effectively should exempt the property by creating an exemption that effectively is
unlimited.
This result would require the tax-writing bodies of Congress to perceive something
that is relatively subtle, i.e., that repeal effectively should exempt not only property
that a taxpayer actually owns and property that a taxpayer has a general power to appoint
but also property that, but for the repeal of the estate tax, Code Section 2044 would deem
the taxpayer to own. Consider making available a procedure that can permit the surviving
spouse actually to own the assets at his or her death. One alternative is to permit an
independent trustee to distribute the assets from the QTIP trust to the surviving spouse
before the death of the surviving spouse. Another alternative is mandatorily to divide
the marital trust into a reverse-QTIP portion and an excess portion and to give the
surviving spouse, if he or she survives by fifteen months (i.e., the time at which, as a
practical matter, a decision about a QTIP election is necessary), a power to withdraw all
of the trust estate of the excess marital trust.
Tend to provide that if the United States generation-skipping tax is not in effect
at the death of the settlor, all of the trust estate which upon the death of the settlor
is to benefit descendants shall pass to one or more exempt-style, generation-skipping
trusts for descendants.
Tend to provide that if the United States generation-skipping tax is in effect at
the death of a settlor but is not in effect at the death of the surviving spouse, all of
the trust estate of any marital trust which qualified for the marital deduction upon the
death of the settlor and was not the subject of a reverse-QTIP election according to Code
Section 2652(a) (3) and which upon the death of the surviving spouse is to benefit
descendants shall pass to one or more exempt-style, generation-skipping trusts for
descendants.

2.03(d) (5)

Hedging Against Restoration of Taxes After

Repeal of Sunset

If the taxpayer believes that restoration of the estate tax and the generationskipping tax will result from reenactment of the taxes after a repeal of the sunset
provision, rather than result from a sunset of the repeal of the taxes, consider
allocating all assets, exempt and nonexempt, to by-pass-type trusts (i.e., QTIP trusts
with no rights to withdraw, in the case of marital-deduction transfers, and GST-exemptstyle trusts, in the case of dispositions for descendants) .

2.03(d) (6)

Implications for Pecuniary Gifts and Fractional Shares

Consider (i) reducing the use of exemption-lead arrangements that are expressed as
true pecuniary gifts and (ii) increasing the use of exemption arrangements that are
expressed as fractional shares.
Phased increases in exemptions, resulting ultimately in
repeal and, therefore, in effective exemptions of one hundred percent, will tend to cause
pecuniary gifts of exempt amounts to force recognition of gain upon funding. A marital
disposition that is expressed as a pecuniary amount which is satisfiable in kind at values
at dates of distribution will tend to force recognition of gain if the marital disposition
is large relative to the exemption disposition.
The first-scheduled increases in
exemptions might not change a marital disposition from being a larger disposition, to
being a smaller disposition, relative to the exemption disposition. Accordingly, if a

I

-10

pecuniary marital was inappropriate before EGTRRA, it will tend to remain inappropriate
after EGTRRA.

CHAPTER 3
THE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR PAYMENTS TO BENEFICIARIES

SUBCHAPTER A:
PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES

3A.01

MANDATORY PAYMENTS

Examples of mandatory accumulation and distribution are included for purposes of
orientation and comparison.

*
3A.01(b) (1)

*

*

Examples

Form 3.2: Single Distributee
(1)
annually.

Income.

The Trustee shall pay the net income to my wife quarter-

*
3A.01(b) (2)

*

*

Taxation of Ordinary Income

Subject to the Treasury regulations that became effective on January 2, 2004, with
the effect of changing some principal to income (and some income to principal) according
to Code Section 643(b), all of the ordinary income of the trust, to the extent of
distributable net income, is includable in the gross income for income tax purposes of the
(a) distributee or (b) distributees proportionately. Code §§651 and 652.
3A.01(b) (3)

Taxation of Corpus Income

Generally, subject to the Treasury regulations that became effective on January 2,
2004, with the effect of changing some principal to income (and some income to principal)
according to Code Section 643(b), none of the corpus income of the trust is deductible
from the gross income of the trust for income tax purposes.
Code §§641, 643(a) (3), 651,
652, 661 and 662.

*

*

*

3A.02 DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS:
INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE POSSESSES DISCRETION
3A.02(a)

Examples

Form 3.8: Single Distributee

a

[(2)

Principal]

I
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b
a
b

[(B) Additional Distributions]. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much
or all, if any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.

Form 3.9: Plural Distributees
a
b

a
b

[(2)
Principal]
[(B) Additional Distributions]. The Trustee shall pay to anyone or more
of my wife and my descendants, without any duty of equalization, so much or all, if
any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.

3A.02(b)

Taxation of Ordinary Income

A permissible distributee includes in his or her gross income for income tax
purposes only such ordinary income of the trust as he or she receives.
Code §§661 and
662. The balance of the ordinary income is not deductible from the gross income of the
trust.
Code §§661 and 662.

3A.02(c)

Taxation of Corpus Income

Generally, subject to the Treasury regulations that became effective on January 2,
2004, with the effect of changing some principal to income (and some income to principal)
according to Code Section 643(b), none of the corpus income of the trust is deductible
from the gross income of the trust for income tax purposes. Code §§641, 643(a) (3), 661
and 662.

3A.02(d)

Drafting

According to the forms, the discretion of the trustee is unlimited. The trust does
not contain any standard, ascertainable or otherwise. The trust does not contain any
specification of purpose.
Any limiting standard or specification of purpose tends to impede flexibility.
The
trustee can make such distributions as it believes the grantor, if serving as trustee,
would make, including distribution of the entire trust estate and termination of the
trust. The trustee can include (or not include) the trust estate in the gross estates of
one or more beneficiaries, to such extent as the trustee believes advisable, taking into
account (i) the portion of the trust that is exempt from generation-skipping tax and (ii)
the transfer tax bases of the permissible distributees.
The trustee might avoid multiple
incidence of the generation-skipping tax by means of taxable distributions before the
occurrence of a taxable termination.

Form 3.10: Optional Limitation: Statement of Purpose
Concerning Discretion
(D)

Purpose.

I
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a

b

[Upon my death or upon the death of my wife if my wife survives me, if use of the
trusts provided in this Section did not permit tax savings, I would have directed
the Trustee (i) to allocate the trust estate on a per stirpital basis with respect
to my descendants then living, treating all prior distributions as advancements
without interest, (ii) upon the death of any descendant with respect to whom a
share is allocated, subject to the descendant's exercise of any power of
appointment granted to the descendant in this instrument, to reallocate the
descendant's share with respect to the descendant's then living descendants, per
stirpes, or, if no descendant of the descendant then is living, with respect to the
then living descendants, per stirpes, of the descendant's nearest ancestor who is a
descendant of mine and who then is living or of whom one or more descendants then
are living or, if no descendant of the ancestor then is living, with respect to the
ancestor or, if no ancestor of the descendant is a descendant of mine who then is
living or of whom one or more descendants then are living, with respect to my
descendants then living, per stirpes, treating all prior distributions as
advancements without interest, (iii) from and after the time a child of mine
attains twenty-five years of age, to distribute to the child s? much or all, if
any, of the trust estate of the share allocated with respect to the child, not
before the child attains thirty years of age to exceed in value one-third, and not
before the child attains thirty-five years of age to exceed in value two-thirds, of
the value of the trust estate at the time as of which the right commences, as the
child directs in writing at any time and from time to time, (iv) when any other
descendant with respect to whom a share is allocated attains twenty-one years of
age, to distribute the share to the descendant and (v) subject to the foregoing, to
distribute to the descendant with respect to whom the share is allocated so much or
all, if any, of the share as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time to time, considering or not
considering resources otherwise available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever,
including the termination of the trust.]
My purpose is not to withhold beneficial enjoyment or to preserve the trust estate
or to favor any remainder person. Rather, my primary purpose is to provide a
vehicle that can permit
[(i) management during the times described in clauses (iii) and (iv) of the first
sentence of this paragraph and (ii)]
such retention in trust as will not deprive any descendant with respect to whom the
trust estate of the Family Trust would be allocated if at the particular time it
were allocated to my descendants then living, per stirpes, of any beneficial
enjoyment that the descendant desires and that only an outright distribution can
provide.
I do not limit the discretion granted the Trustee in prior provisions of
this Section, but I request the Trustee to distribute the trust estate outright to
such extent and to such person or persons as the Independent Trustee in its sole
and absolute discretion determines that, based on the foregoing, I if then serving
as the Independent Trustee would direct the distribution of the trust estate, even
to the extent of distributing all of the trust estate.

Form 3.11: Optional Limitation: Precatory Preference for
Specified Person(s)
Each trust is primarily for the benefit of the descendant with respect to whom the
trust is created, and I would approve (but do not direct) the exercise of each
power (determined as if this sentence did not exist) to the maximum extent in favor
of the descendant.

*
3A.02{e)

*

*

Special Drafting for Avoidance of Claims of
Creditors

I
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Transfers by others for the benefit of a debtor have the advantage (compared to
interests that the debtor retains in property that the debtor transfers) of being
structurable so that the creditors of the debtor cannot reach the interests of the debtor.
See Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§57-60. See 3A.04(d) and Form 3.20 for a special
application of this planning.

3A.02(f)

Special Drafting for Disabled Beneficiaries

Although the law is state-specific, the writer believes that a discretionary trust
as a receptacle for transfers by others for the benefit of a disabled person generally
offers the greatest flexibility and protection against creditors. Cf. 760 ILCS 5/15.1,
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities v. Phillips, 114 Ill. 2d 85
(1986), 500 N.E. 2d 29, 102 Ill. Dec. 407, and Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities v. First National Bank, 60 Ill. Dec. 187 (1st Dist. 5th Div.
1982), 432 N.E. 2d 1086. See 3A.04(d) and Form 3.19 for a special application of this
planning.
The preferable format is for the disabled person to be only one of two or more
permissible distributees. The possibility of plural distributees tends both to enhance
protection against creditors and also to address the issue that often the amount of trust
estate which is appropriate for a disabled person is inherently uncertain.

3A.02(g)

Marital-Deduction Planning When Spouse is Disabled
or Insolvent

Marital-deduction planning for the benefit of a spouse with respect to whom assetprotection or disability planning is appropriate presents mostly a dilemma, i.e., forgo
the deduction or create vulnerability. Nevertheless, some alternatives appear better than
others.
Consider using QTIP or an "estate" trust as the vehicle for any marital-deduction
transfer for the insolvent or disabled spouse. QTIP offers the advantage of allowing the
grantor permanently to shield the principal (but not the income) from the creditors of the
insolvent spouse and to control the ultimate disposition. An estate trust offers the
advantage of not requiring current payment of income. However, if the surviving spouse
cannot make a will, an estate trust will cause the property to pass by intestacy.

3A.02(h)

Use of Discretionary Trusts to Avoid Gift Tax

Although EGTRRA increases the exemption from the gift tax to $1,000,000 and reduces
the rates of the gift tax to the nominal levels of the rates of the estate tax, EGTRRA
does not provide for repeal of the gift tax. Nevertheless, from and after his or her
death during repeal of the estate tax and the generation-skipping tax, a property owner
can avoid all of the transfer taxes, including the gift tax. The decedent can use for
this purpose a by-pass-type trust which grants an independent trustee unlimited discretion
to make distributions not only to a primary beneficiary but also to the descendants of the
primary beneficiary. This technique also, of course, is available before repeal but,
however, at the cost of at least one transfer tax.
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3A.03 DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS:
NONINDEPENDENT TRUSTEE POSSESSES DISCRETION
3A.03(a)

Examples

Form 3.13: Single Distributee
a
b
a
b

[(2)
Principal]
[(B) Additional Distributions]. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much
or all, if any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Trustee determines to be necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to provide for her health, education and
support in the manner of living to which accustomed.

Form 3.14: Plural Distributees
a
b

a
b

[(2)
Principal]
[(B) Additional Distributions]. The Trustee shall pay to anyone or more
of my wife and my descendants, without any duty of equalization, so much or all, if
any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Trustee determines to be necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to provide for their respective health,
education and support in the manner of living to which accustomed.

3A.03(b)

Tax Problems

Generally, a person is deemed, for income tax purposes and transfer tax purposes,
to own all property that he or she can pay to himself or herself, even if the power holder
does not exercise the power. Code §§678(a) (1), 2041(a) (2) and 2514(b).
Further, even a nongeneral power of appointment can cause the power holder to make
a taxable gift.
If the exercise of a nongeneral power has the effect of transferring the
beneficial interest of the power holder, the exercise might produce a taxable transfer of
any enjoyment that the power holder forgoes.
Rev. Rul. 79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342, Regester
v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 1 (1984). Contra James C. Self, Jr. v. United States, 142 F.
Supp. 939 (Ct. CI. 1956), 56-2 USTC ~11,613.
Cf. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(g) (2).
A person who can pay property to another, in discharge of his or her legal
obligation, is regarded to that extent as being able to pay the property to himself or
herself and thus as having a general power of appointment.

3A.03(c)

Solutions

3A.03(c) (1)

Preventing (i) Ownership (for Tax Purposes)
Because of Powers To Pay to Self and (ii) Gifts
Because of Powers To Pay to Others:
Ascertainable Standards

Use of an ascertainable standard to limit the power of the power holder is a
potential solution to the first and second problems.
If the ascertainable standard is
described in Code Sections 2041(b) (1) (A) and 2514(C) (1), the power of the power holder to
pay to himself or herself is not a general power of appointment. Also, the power holder
arguably will not be treated as owning the subject income for income tax purposes.
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A judicial gloss supplies the standard for purposes of Code Section 678(a) (1). See
Casner, 3A ESTATE PLANNING §12.9.2 (Little, Brown, Fifth Edition, 1986), Agnes R. May, 8
T.C. 860 (1947), Ruth W. Oppenheimer, 16 T.C. 515 (1951), Townsend v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.
1380 (1945), United States v. DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960), 60-1 USTC ~9430
(involving a legal life estate but decided under Code §678(a) (1) and involving a looselywritten standard including even the "comfort" of the life tenant), United States v.
Smither, 205 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1953), 53-2 USTC ~9482 (also involving a standard
including the "comfort" of the beneficiaries), and Funk v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 127 (3d
Cir. 1950), 50-2 USTC ~9507 (involving payment for the "needs" of the beneficiaries.
"Thus, its use [i. e., the use of the word I needs '] confined the trustee to limits
objectively determinable, and any conduct on [the trustee's] part beyond those limits
would be unreasonable and a breach of trust . . . . " 50-2 USTC ~9507).
But see Falk v.
Commissioner, 189 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1951), 51-1 USTC ~9337 cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861, 72
S. Ct. 89. Cf. Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945), 45-1 USTC ~9134, cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 871, 65 S. Ct. 1017.
If the power is a fiduciary power of a trustee and is limited by an ascertainable
standard described in Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2), the exercise of the
power to pay to other than the power holder property in which the power holder has a
beneficial interest but no general power of appointment is not a taxable gift. This
ascertainable standard relates to one or more persons other than the power holder.
According to Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2),
If a trustee has a beneficial interest in trust property, a
transfer of the property by the trustee is not a taxable
transfer if it is made pursuant to a fiduciary power the
exercise or nonexercise of which is limited by a reasonably
fixed or ascertainable standard which is set forth in the trust
instrument . .
[emphasis added] .
Although some of the important drafting issues relate to the amount of discretion
that is consistent with the exception, others relate to the advisability, for nontax
reasons, of using ascertainable standards in particular configurations.
First, the standard in the forms requires the trustee to consider the resources
otherwise available to the distributee. Required consideration of other resources tends
to limit the ability of the power holder to distribute trust property.
It tends to
require the distributee to exhaust other resources, including any source of support, from
other than the trust.
Therefore, it also tends to cause any distribution that is made
from the trust not to discharge an obligation of another person to the distributee.
Conversely, required nonconsideration of other resources tends to limit the ability
of the power holder not to distribute trust property. The concerns that this formulation
presents are whether it limits sufficiently the access of the power holder to the property
and whether a payment can discharge a legal obligation of someone who is not named as a
beneficiary.
The power holder has the greatest discretion if he or she may, but need not,
consider the resources otherwise available to the distributee. This formulation broadens
the realm within which the power holder may, but need not, distribute the property. The
additional concern that it presents is whether it complies with those Treasury regulations
sections (i.e., 20.2041-1(c) (2) and 25.2511-1(g) (2)) that require the standard to limit
both the exercise and the nonexercise of the power.
Consideration of the other resources of the distributee should be optional for at
least some tax purposes. Whether the power holder must take into account the other
"income" of the distributee is "immaterial" for purposes of determining whether the
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ascertainable standard exception of Code Sections 2041(b) (1) (A) and 2514(c) (1) is
applicable. Treas. Reg. §20.2041-1(c) (2). However, the regulation is unclear whether
"income" is used advisedly or whether it crudely refers to "resources" generally.
The formulation regarding consideration of other resources seems material, in any
event, for purposes of Code Section 678(a) (1). Arguably, the effectiveness of a standard
to prevent attribution according to Code Section 678(a) (1) requires that the standard
prevent the power holder from having the absolute ability to pay and not to pay.
Therefore, "considering or not considering" might dissipate any protection that a
formulation of "considering" might afford.
This writer recommends the conservative approach.
Do require the power holder to
take into account resources that otherwise are available to the distributee.
Second, the mandatory "shall" (rather than the permissive "may") requires the
trustee to exercise the power if the ascertainable event occurs. The issue is whether an
ascertainable standard is sufficient if it limits the extent to which the power is
exercisable but does not control whether and when the power holder must exercise the
power.
See generally Estate of Carpenter v. United States, 80-1 USTC ~13,339 at 84,323
(W.D. Wis. 1980). Is the standard sufficient if it places a "ceiling" upon the exercise
of the power but does not place a "floor" under it?
The answer might depend upon the nature of the power and upon the particular tax
risk that it presents. Certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code appear to describe
the amount of power that a person can possess to benefit himself or herself without owning
the property for estate, gift or income tax purposes. They suggest that the standard need
limit only the extent to which the power is exercisable.
See Code §§ 2041(b) (1) (A),
2514(c) (1) and 678(a) (1).
Cf. Treas. Reg. §20.2041-1(c) (2). Other statutory and
regulatory provisions seem concerned with control or discretion, per se. They suggest
that the standard must limit both the exercise, and the nonexercise, of the power. See
Code §§674(b) (5) (A) and 674(d), Treas. Reg. §§25.2511-1(g) (2) and 20.2041-1(c) (2),
Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947), 47-1 USTC ~10,551, Estate of Budlong, 7
T.C. 756 (1946), and Estate of Carpenter v. United States, 80-1 USTC ~13,339 (W.D. Wis.
1980) .
Again, this writer recommends the conservative approach. Draft the standard
explicitly to limit both (i) the right to exercise the power and (ii) the right not to
exercise it. According to this approach, the right not to exercise the power is
discretionary only to a limited extent and a person who the power can benefit can force
its exercise. Cf. Security - Peoples Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.Supp. 40 (W.D.Pa.
1965), 65-1 USTC ~12,294.
Further, this approach might serve the collateral function of
assuring the creator of the trust and the beneficiaries that the trust will discharge
desired purposes.
Third, an ascertainable standard does not exist according to Treasury regulations
section 25.2511-1(g) (2) if the determination of the trustee regarding exercise or
nonexercise is "conclusive."
Fourth, if a power is exercisable in favor of more than one person, an
ascertainable standard can make the power unwieldy. A mandate to use the power might
force the power holder unsatisfactorily to reconcile the competing interests of the
various beneficiaries. How should the power holder reconcile present and future needs?
How should the power holder reconcile concurrent needs of persons in different
generations?
Fifth, unless each of the permissible distributees has limited resources and is a
person, for example an orphaned child or an unmarried adult, to whom no one owes any
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obligation of support, this writer generally does not recommend a trust that requires each
distribution to comply with an ascertainable standard. Required consideration of
resources otherwise available tends to preclude distributions and, if each distribution is
subject to the standard, impede the usefulness of the trust. Rather, this writer
generally suggests that a useful format is (i) a mandate to pay income (see Form 3.2)
coupled with an ascertainable standard with respect to principal (see Form 3.13), or (ii)
a mandate to pay (see Form 3.30), or a right to withdraw (see Form 3.31), a unitrust
percentage coupled with an ascertainable standard with respect to the balance of the trust
(see Form 3.13) .
3A.03(c) (2)

Preventing General Powers of Appointment
Because of Powers To Pay to Other Than Power
Holder

3A.03(c) (2) (A)

Examples

Form 3.15: Removal of Discretion
(1)
No trustee shall possess, or participate in the exercise of, any power
that, but for this paragraph (1), the trustee would have to make any determination
with respect to any payment which would discharge any legal obligation of the
trustee personally.

Form 3.16: Prohibition of Payment
(1)
The Trustee shall not make (or have any power to make) any payment
which would discharge any legal obligation of any person to whom the Trustee cannot
make payment directly.
3A.03(c) (2) (B)

Purpose

The ability of a trustee to use trust property to discharge his or her legal
obligation seems very unlikely in the context in which it often is asserted to exist.
Consider a trust in which (i) the power holder is not named or described as a permissible
distributee and (ii) the governing instrument does not explicitly permit payments for the
support of any person who is named or described as a permissible distributee.
In this
context, the distribution of trust property in discharge of a personal obligation of the
power holder seems to be solely for the benefit of someone who is not named or described
as a beneficiary.
Therefore, the distribution appears to violate the trust.
However, consider a configuration in which the problem might exist. Assume that a
testator creates a trust that requires the trustee currently to pay income to the child of
the grantor for life and permits the trustee to distribute principal to the child for the
health, education and support of the child, remainder to the descendants, per stirpes, of
the child who survive the child. Assume additionally that the grantor creates the trust
upon the death of the grantor, the spouse of the grantor (the surviving parent of the
child) is the trustee and the child is a minor when the grantor dies. The person serving
as trustee is empowered only to make distributions to other than himself or herself. The
ascertainable standard relates to other than the power holder and permits distributions
for the support of the named or described distributee.
The issue is whether a person who
has a legal obligation to support the named or described distributee can exercise the
power to discharge his or her personal obligation.
This result seems unlikely if the
ascertainable standard includes a requirement that the trustee consider resources
otherwise available to the named or described distributee.
3A. 03 (c) (2) (C)

Drafting
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The draftsperson should assume that an ascertainable standard cannot remove a power
from the category of a general power of appointment unless the standard relates to the
health, education or support of the power holder.
The only ascertainable standards that,
according to applicable statute, cause a power not to be a general power are those that
relate to the health, education or support of Ghe power holder. Code §§2041(b) (1) (A) and
2514(c) (1). The Internal Revenue Service seems to insist upon this construction. Rev.
Rul. 79-154, 1979-1 C.B. 301. Cf. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947), 47-1
USTC ~10,551, Estate of Budlong, 7 T.C. 756 (1946), and Sowell v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d
1564 (lOth Cir. 1983), 83-1 USTC ~13,526.
What strategy, then, is appropriate? The draftsperson absolutely can prohibit any
distribution that would discharge any legal obligation owed by a person who is not named
or described as a permissible distributee. See Form 3.16. Cf. Uoiohn v. United States,
72-2 USTC ~12,888 (W.D. Mich. 1972). However, if the drafting objective is only to
prevent a general power of appointment, the appropriate focus appears to be upon the
particular power relative to the power holder, rather than upon the power, per se.
Therefore, if the drafting objective is only to prevent a general power of appointment, an
absolute prohibition of any distribution that purportedly can discharge a legal obligation
of a person who is not named or described as a permissible distributee of the distribution
seems unnecessary.

3A.04 DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS:
COMBINATION OF (i) NONINDEPENDENT TRUSTEE
POSSESSES SOME DISCRETION AND (ii) INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE POSSESSES OTHER DISCRETION
3A.04(a)

Examples

Form 3.17: Single Distributee

a
b
a
b

a
b

[(2)
Principal]
[(B) Additional Distributions]. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much
or all, if any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Trustee determines to be necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to provide for her health, education and
support .in the manner of living to which accustomed. Additionally, the Trustee
shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of any balance of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.

Form 3.18: Plural Distributees

a
b

a
b

[(2)
Principal]
[(B) Additional Distributions]. The Trustee shall pay to anyone or more
of my wife and my descendants, without any duty of equalization, so much or all, if
any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Trustee determines to be necessary or advisable from time to time,
considering resources otherwise available, to provide for their respective health,
education and support in the manner of living to which accustomed. Additionally,
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a
b

the Trustee shall pay to anyone or more of my wife and my descendants, without any
duty of equalization, so much or all, if any, of any balance of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time, considering or not considering resources otherwise
available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the termination of the
trust.

3A.04(b)

Purpose

This approach is a combination of the approach described at 3A.02 and the approach
described at 3A.03.
It can allow greater flexibility than either of the constituent
approaches alone.

3A.04(c)

Drafting

This hybrid is usable with an independent trustee always serving or an independent
trustee serving only according to a mechanism for the discretionary addition of an
independent trustee.
The writer often uses "two tiers" of dispositive powers, with some but not all of
the powers granted solely to an independent trustee. He particularly uses a variation in
which an independent trustee is not required always to serve and is only a permissible or
mandatory addition, or a required successor, to one or more beneficially interested
trustees.
Even if a beneficially interested person could add an independent trustee, a
difference arguably would exist between (i) an ability to add someone that could exercise
a power and (ii) the possession of the power by oneself. See generally United States v.
Byrum, 72-2 USTC '12,859 (Sup. Ct. 1972), United States v. Winchell, 61-1 USTC '12,015
(9th Cir. 1961), and Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300 (1993).
If an interest holder exercises a power to add an independent trustee and the
addition shifts an interest so that the interest holder relinquishes beneficial enjoyment,
arguably a gift lurks somewhere.
Consider, for example, what happens if a holder of a
mandatory income interest can appoint an independent trustee with the effect of
transforming the mandatory income interest into a discretionary interest. Because of loss
of dominion and control, a gift might occur upon a mere shift of the interest as a result
of the appointment.
If a gift does not occur upon the shift of the interest as a result
of the appointment, a gift (or a transfer for estate tax purposes) probably does occur if
and when, because the holder appoints an independent trustee, the person who previously
had the mandatory income interest receives less than all of the income.
Consider an embellishment to the system. The embellishment would permit a
beneficially interested trustee to possess certain powers exclusively, notwithstanding the
discretionary or mandatory addition of an independent trustee.
See,~, Form 14.13 and
Form 14.14. Absent the embellishment, the discretionary or mandatory addition of an
independent trustee would mean that the beneficially interested trustee would share all
powers with the new, independent trustee, although, of course, the independent trustee
could (but need not) delegate back to the beneficially interested trustee all powers
except those that would be sensitive in the hands of the beneficially interested trustee.
Set forth below are some configurations in which the writer grants one set of
powers to a beneficially-interested trustee and another to an independent trustee, or
grants dispositive powers only to an independent trustee, and contemplates that an
independent trustee will, or will not, serve at all times.
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3A.04(c) (1)

Single Distributee

3A.04(c) (1) (A)

First Configuration

3A. 04 (c) (1) (A) (i)

Facts

An independent trustee has wide-open discretion to pay income to one person, or to
accumulate it, and to pay principal to the same person or not to pay it. Only the
independent trustee can make a distribution. No independent trustee is required to serve.
Any independent person can direct the addition of an independent trustee.

3A.04(c) (1) (A) (ii)

Examples

Examples of this configuration include (i) an irrevocable insurance trust where the
insured has only one descendant, (ii) a wide-open discretionary trust for one distributee,
(iii) a Code Section 2503(c) trust, (iv) a Code Section 2642(c) trust and (v) a Crummey
trust for a non-skip person.

3A. 04 (c) (1) (A) (iii)

Comment

A common denominator among the examples is that the trust might have little
property, and, therefore, no need for distributions, for an extended period. Although
this configuration does not involve the grant of any powers to any beneficially interested
trustee, it presents some of the same issues.

3A.04(c) (1) (B)

Second Configuration

3A.04 (c) (1) (B) (i)

Facts

The governing instrument directs the trustee to pay income currently to one person,
permits a beneficially interested trustee to distribute principal to the income
beneficiary according to an ascertainable standard and accords an independent trustee
wide-open discretion to distribute principal to the income beneficiary. No independent
trustee is required to serve. Any independent person can direct the addition of an
independent trustee.

3A. 04 (c) (1) (B) (ii)

Examples

Examples of this configuration include (i) QTIP, right-to-withdraw and generaltestamentary-power-of-appointment-marital trusts, (ii) a trust for one person for life,
including a credit-shelter trust for the sole benefit of the spouse of the settlor, and
(iii) a trust for one person until the person attains stated age(s).

3A.04(c) (1) (C)

Third Configuration

3A. 04 (c) (1) (C) (i)

Facts

The facts are the same as in the second configuration except, instead of a mandate
concerning income, a beneficially interested trustee either (i) can pay income to himself
or herself, according to an ascertainable standard, or (ii) can pay income to one person
other than himself or herself, according to an ascertainable standard, and in each case an
independent trustee has wide-open discretion to pay income to the person who is the
permissible recipient of income.

3A.04 (c) (1) (C) (ii)

Examples
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Examples of this configuration include (i) a trust for one person for life,
including a credit-shelter trust for the sole benefit of the spouse of the settlor, and
(ii) a trust for one person until the person attains stated age(s).
3A.04(c) (1) (D)

Fourth Configuration

Also included in this classification is the ability of an independent trustee to
grant a general testamentary power of appointment to the person who is described as the
distributee in each of the preceding configurations, or is described as the primary
beneficiary in the seventh configuration.
3A.04(c) (2)

Plural Distributees

3A.04(c) (2) (A)

Fifth Configuration

3A. 04 (c) (2) (A) (i)

Facts

An independent trustee has wide-open discretion to pay income to anyone or more of
a number of persons, or to accumulate it, and to pay principal to anyone or more of the
same persons or not to pay it. Only the independent trustee can make a distribution. No
independent trustee is required to serve. Any independent person can direct the addition
of an independent trustee.
3A.04(c) (2) (A) (ii)

Examples

Examples of this configuration include (i) an irrevocable insurance trust for
multiple descendants of the grantor and (ii) a wide-open discretionary trust for multiple
distributees.
3A.04 (c) (2) (A) (iii)

Comment

A common denominator among the examples is that the trust might have little
property, and, therefore, no need for distributions, for an extended period. Although
this configuration does not involve the grant of any powers to any beneficially interested
trustee, it presents some of the same issues.
3A.04(c) (2) (B)

Sixth Configuration

During the incapacity of the grantor of a revocable trust, a beneficially
interested trustee can pay income and principal according to an ascertainable standard to
the grantor and to any person who is dependent upon the grantor, and an independent
trustee can make gifts and qualified transfers on behalf of the grantor. No independent
trustee is required to serve. Any independent person can direct the addition of an
independent trustee.
3A.04(c) (2) (C)

Seventh Configuration

3A. 04 (c) (2) (C) (i)

Facts

The facts are the same as in the fifth and sixth configurations except that, when
the trust must terminate within a relatively short period of time (for example, a trust
that is created for the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities and must terminate within
twenty-one years), the independent trustee has wide-open discretion to distribute
principal to anyone or more among the primary beneficiary and the descendants of the
primary beneficiary. Only the independent trustee can distribute principal to descendants
of the primary beneficiary. No independent trustee is required to serve. Any independent
person can direct the addition of an independent trustee.
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3A.04 (c) (2) (C) (ii)

Comment

If an independent trustee could distribute any of the trust estate to other than
the primary beneficiary, with the effect of reducing the amount that the primary
beneficiary otherwise would have a right to receive, the primary beneficiary should not
possess, or if he or she possesses should not exercise, any power to add an independent
trustee.
See the eighth configuration.

3A.04(c) (3)

Eighth Configuration

3A.04(c) (3) (A)

Facts

The instrument directs the trustee to pay income currently to one person but
provides that, if an independent trustee is serving, the independent trustee, instead, has
wide-open discretion to pay income and principal to one or more members of the group that
consists of the person who previously was the mandatory beneficiary of income and that
person's descendants.
No independent trustee is required to serve. An independent
trustee serves either as a successor to, or solely at the instance of, the mandatory
beneficiary of income.

3A. 04 (c) (3) (B)

Comment

A problem inheres in the coupling of (il a shift from a mandatory payment of income
to a discretionary interest with (iil the mechanics, described in the preceding sentence,
for initiation of the service of an independent trustee.
Accordingly, do not use this
configuration.

3A.04(d)

Special Drafting for Disabled Beneficiaries and Avoidance of Claims of
Creditors

Consider (il a variation in which an independent trustee can grant an
ascertainable-standard-limited power to a non independent trustee and revoke all or any of
any power so granted and (ii) a variation in which the grantor initially grants an
ascertainable-standard-limited power to a beneficially-interested trustee and authorizes
an independent trustee to revoke and restore all or any of the power.

Form 3.19

(1)

Distributions.

(a)
Bv NonIndeoendent Trustee. The Trustee shall make such payments,
if any, as the NonIndependent Trustee directs according to such powers, if
any, as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion grants
to the Non Independent Trustee pursuant to subsection (i) of this subsection
(B) (1) (a) .

(i)
Except to such extent (if any) as the Independent Trustee
in its sole and absolute discretion has released this authority, the
Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion at any time
and from time to time may grant to the NonIndependent Trustee any
power that is described in subsection (ii) of this subsection
(B) (1) (a) and may revoke all or any of any power so granted, in each
case by means of a signed instrument delivered to the NonIndependent
Trustee.
(ii)

Each power that is described in this subsection (ii)
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(A)
is described in Section 2041(b) (1) (A) of the Code
(to such extent as the power holder is described in Section
2041(b) (1) (A)) or in Section 25.2511-1(g) (2) of the Treasury
Regulations (to such extent as the power holder is described in
Section 25.2511-1 (g) (2) ) ,
applies to such portion or all of the trust estate
(B)
as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines at the time that the Independent Trustee grants the
power,
(C) provides'for payment to such one or more of my
descendants as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines at the time that the Independent Trustee
grants the power and
(D) provides for payments for anyone or more of
health, education, support and maintenance, subject to such
terms, conditions and limitations, if any, and for such period
or periods, as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines at the time that the Independent Trustee
grants the power.
(b)
By Independent Trustee. The Trustee shall pay to anyone or more
of my descendants, without any duty of equalization, so much or all, if any,
of the trust estate as the Independent Trustee in its sole anti absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time to time, considering or not
considering resources otherwise available, for any purpose or reason
whatsoever, including the termination of the trust.
(2) Termination. Unless sooner terminated by distribution or expenditure
according to the foregoing, the trust shall terminate upon the death of my son,
JOHN, and the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of the trust to my
descendants, per stirpes, who then are living; provided, any share thus inuring to
a descendant of mine shall be held in a separate trust (then or previously created
with respect to the descendant under subsection (A) of this Section) to be
administered as provided in subsection (A) of this Section.

Form 3.19 depicts a vehicle in which a sibling of the disabled person can exercise
trustee powers that an independent trustee can grant or revoke.
It exemplifies the first
format.
See Form 14.6 for the definition of "NonIndependent Trustee."
Form 3.20
(A)
Distributions. The Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much or all,
if any, of the trust estate as the Trustee determines to be necessary or advisable
from time to time, considering resources otherwise available, to provide for the
descendant's health, education and support in the manner of living to which
accustomed. Except to such extent (if any) as the Independent Trustee in its sole
and absolute discretion has released this authority, the Independent Trustee in its
sole and absolute discretion at any time and from time to time may revoke or
restore all or any of the power granted according to the preceding sentence.
Additionally, the Trustee shall pay to the descendant so much or all, if any, of
any balance of the trust estate as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time to time, considering or not
considering resources otherwise available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever,
including the termination of the trust. Additionally, the Trustee shall pay so
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much or all, if any, of the trust estate to such one or more appointees, other than
the descendant and the estate, creditors and creditors of the estate of the
descendant, in such amounts and portions and subject to such trusts, terms and
conditions as the descendant directs in writing at any time and from time to time.
Form 3.20 illustrates the second format, a situation in which the grantor gives a
person an ascertainable-standard-limited power to benefit himself or herself, gives an
independent trustee a power to distribute in its discretion and also gives an independent
trustee a power in its discretion to revoke and restore all or any of the ascertainablestandard-limited power and does not direct payment of income, a unitrust amount or an
annuity amount and does not include any right to withdraw.
If a creditor were able to
enforce in favor of itself an ascertainable-standard-limited power that directs payment
for "support," the power of the independent trustee to revoke and restore the
ascertainable-standard-limited power might afford protection by permitting an independent
trustee to leave solely the power to distribute in its discretion.

3A.OS DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS:
PRIMARY BENEFICIARY POSSESSES NONFIDUCIARY DISCRETION (RIGHT TO WITHDRAW):
FIVE-AND-FIVE POWER
The "five-and-five" exception to the general rule concerning the existence of a
general power of appointment permits a person to have extremely flexible access to
property for his or her benefit without the usual tax cost.

3A.OS(a)

Example

Form 3.21: Right to withdraw greater of $5000 and 5%

a
b

a
b

Additionally, if my wife is living immediately before the end of a calendar year,
the Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
, not to exceed in value the greater of five thousand dollars and five percent of
the value of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
as of the end of the year, as my wife last directs in writing before the end of the
year.

3A.OS(b)

Transfer Tax Implications and Planning

The transfer tax implicatiqns are discussed in detail at 3A.08. Suffice it to say
here that a lapse during any calendar year during the life of the power holder is treated
as a transfer for estate tax purposes
only to the extent that the property, which could have been
appointed by exercise of such lapsed powers, exceeded in value,
at the time of such lapse, the greater of the following
amounts:
(A)

$5,000, or

(B)
5 percent of the aggregate value, at the time of
such lapse, of the assets out of which, or the proceeds of
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which, the exercise of the lapsed powers could have been
satisfied. Code §2041(b) (2).
The gift tax rules are similar.
3A.05(c)

See Code §2514(e).

Income Tax Implications and Planning

The most important of the income tax implications is that
causes the power holder to own both (i) all ordinary income that
and (ii) all income, ordinary and other, that is attributable to
subject to the power. Code §678(a) (1).
See generally Code §671
The income tax implications are discussed in detail at 3A.08.

3A.06

the right to withdraw
is subject to the power
the principal that is
and Treas. Reg. §1.671-3.

CHANGES BECAUSE OF PRUDENT INVESTOR
RULE AND MODERN-PORTFOLIO THEORY

The prudent investor rule (the "Rule"), Restatement (Third) of Trusts §§227 et seq.
(1992), is superseding the prudent person rule, Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§227 et
seg. (1959), as the law of investment of private trusts.
3A.06(a)

Prudent Person Rule

The prudent person rule served for more than one hundred fifty years as the
foundation statement of the investment duties of trustees of private trusts. The prudent
person rule originally appeared in Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. (26 Mass.) 446
(1830). According to Harvard College, trustees should
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the
probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital
to be invested.
Id. at 461.
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, published by the American Law Institute in 1935,
included the prudent person rule.
The Restatement Second of the Law of Trusts, published by the American Law
Institute in 1959, included the following statement of the prudent person rule:
§227.

Investments Which a Trustee Can Properly Make

In making investments of trust funds the trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary
(a) in the absence of provisions in the terms of the
trust or of a statute otherwise providing, to make such
investments and only such investments as a prudent man would
make of his own property having in view the preservation of the
estate and the amount and regularity of the income to be
derived;
(b) in the absence of provisions in the terms of the
trust, to conform to the statutes, if any, governing
investments by trustees;
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(c) to conform to the terms of the trust, except as
stated in §§165-168.
3A.06(b)

Prudent Investor Rule

The American Law Institute replaced the prudent person rule with the prudent
investor rule in May of 1990. The Institute in 1992 published a complete revision,
entitled "Restatement of the Law Third (Trusts), Prudent Investor Rule," of the part of
Restatement Second that addressed the same subject. Unless otherwise noted, all
references to the prudent investor rule, and to the Rule, are to the version that appears
in Restatement Third.
According to the Restatement Third,
§227.

General Standard of Prudent Investment

The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to invest and
manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of
the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust.
(a)
This standard requires the exercise of reasonable
care, skill, and caution, and is to be applied to investments
not in isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio and
as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should
incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to
the trust.
(b)
In making and implementing investment decisions,
the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the
trust unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do
so.
(c)

In addition, the trustee must:

(1) conform to fundamental fiduciary duties
of loyalty (§170) and impartiality (§183)i
(2) act with prudence in deciding whether
and how to delegate authority and in the selection
and supervision of agents (§171) i and
(3) incur only costs that are reasonable in
amount and appropriate to the investment
responsibilities of the trusteeship (§188).
(d)
The trustee's duties under this Section are
subject to the rule of §228, dealing primarily with
contrary investment provisions of a trust or statute.
3A.06(c)

Scope

The focus here is upon the changes that the prudent investor rule might produce
compared to the prudent person rule.
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3A.06(d)

Reasons for the Rule

The prudent investor rule is the product of a perception that the manner in which
the prudent person rule had developed was preventing the law from accommodating modernportfolio theory and, therefore, was hindering investment that best served the purposes
for which private trusts were created. Specific rules that were derived from specific
results in specific cases, rather than broad principles, were driving the law.
The
promulgation of the prudent investor rule was more an attempt to restore flexibility than
an attempt to change the foundation statement.

3A.06(d) (1)

Deficiencies of Existing Law

According to the critics, the law, as it had developed according to the prudent
person rule, tended to:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)
(v)

(vi)

3A.06(d) (2)

Focus upon the propriety of each asset in isolation rather than as an
integral part of a portfolio,
Focus upon preservation of nominal value of principal rather than upon
maintenance of purchasing power,
Prohibit certain investments entirely,
Provide a "safe harbor" for certain investments,
Deter the fiduciary from delegating management and
Deter the fiduciary from acquiring new types of investment products.

Evidence of Dissatisfaction

The ferment that ultimately produced the prudent investor rule is reflected also in
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

3A.06(e)

The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, which applies to
funds held by charitable institutions,
Code Section 4944, which prohibits any investment that would prevent a
private foundation from prosecuting its purposes,
Section 404(a) (1) (B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1104(a) and
Reform, usually relatively narrow in scope, in various states.

Accommodation of Modern-Portfolio Theory

The Rule is designed to accommodate modern-portfolio theory.
See qenerallv
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227 Comments, Macey, An Introduction to Modern Financial
Theory (American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Foundation, 2d ed. 1998), Longstreth,
Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (Oxford University Press, 1986) and
Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (Norton, 6th ed. 1996). This accommodation has
vast implications, in turn, for the administration, planning and drafting of trusts.

3A.06(e) (1)

First Principle of The Theory: Risks of
Shortfall According to modern-portfolio theory, the value or price of an
asset is a function of two factors.
The first is the rate of total return
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(i.e., ordinary income and capital appreciation) that the asset is
anticipated to generate. The second is the risk that the actual return will
fall short of the anticipated return.
An analysis of the risk of shortfall of return leads to a focus upon assets as
integral parts of a whole portfolio rather than to a focus upon each asset in isolation.
This focus in turn enhances the importance of the rate of total return.
The analysis leads to the conclusion that determination of whether a trustee has
discharged its duties must focus upon the manner in which the trustee has made investment
decisions. Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227, Comment b. The analysis leads away from
the labeling of any asset as inherently prudent or imprudent, per~. The behavior of the
trustee is judged in relation to circumstances, not in a vacuum.
rd. Because the Rule is
a rule of trustee conduct rather than a rule of portfolio performance, the Rule purports
to diminish the importance of hindsight.
rd.
3A.06(e) (1) (A)

Two Risks of Shortfall

The risk of shortfall of return is divided into two categories. The first is
market risk, sometimes known as systemic, systematic, nondiversifiable or compensated
risk, i.e., the risk that the return in the market in which the asset is situated will
fall short of the anticipated return.
Certain . . . sorts of risks plague all firms more or less
indiscriminately. This sort of risk is called market risk, or
sometimes systematic or undiversifiable risk. The risk
associated with a presidential assassination, or a change in
the monetary policy of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, or a general economic downturn affect all
firms, and are, therefore, examples of market risk. Macey, QP.
cit. 23.
The second is nonmarket risk, sometimes known as diversifiable, specific, unique or
uncompensated risk, i.e., the risk that something which might occur particularly with
respect to the particular asset might increase or decrease its return.
Firm-specific risk, also called unique risk, residual risk,
unsystematic risk, and diversifiable risk, refers to those
elements of risk that are unique to particular companies. The
risk that the chief executive officer of a particular firm will
have a fatal heart attack, or that an earthquake or flood will
render a plant inoperable, or that a firm will suffer a labor
strike all are examples of firm-specific risks because they are
unique to a particular company.
Some sorts of firm-specific
risks, such as the risk that the government will cut the
defense budget are unique to particular classes of firms (i.e.,
contractors), but these sorts of risks are also defined as
firm-specific risks.
rd. at 23.
3A.06(e) (1) (B)

Market Risk

According to modern-portfolio theory, the market (for at least a certain class of
assets, for example, stocks, relative to the market for other assets, for example, bonds)
compensates the investor for market risk (i.e., the first type of risk). Any compensation
for this risk is in the form of an adjustment of the return that inures to the particular
asset (i.e., generally, a higher rate of return corresponds to a higher market risk of a
shortfall). See generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227, Comment g. Because, other
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things being equal, investors seek to avoid volatility, investors attempt to "charge" as a
price for their investment, and the market (for at least some assets relative to the
market for other assets) provides, a return that varies directly with volatility. See
generally Macey, QQ. cit. 15-17, and Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227, Comment e. See,
however, Fama and French, "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns," The Journal of
Finance (June, 1992) 427.
A return that is more volatile because of the market will tend at certain times to
exceed, and at other times to fall short of, the return that inures to assets for which
the return is less volatile. However, additionally, the market (for at least some assets
relative to the market for other assets) will tend to yield to an asset that has a
volatile return a premium return that is directly attributable to volatility.
Some
investors are willing to suffer large losses over a long time in anticipation of
ultimately receiving a higher return. Other investors are willing to forgo higher returns
in exchange for greater stability.
Arguably, the substance of volatility rather than volatility, per~, is what
investors seek to avoid.
The substance of volatility is the likelihood that a failure to
realize a certain return will prevent a beneficiary from having something that the trustee
wants the beneficiary to have at the time that the trustee wants the beneficiary to have
it. See Jeffrey, "A New Paradigm for Portfolio Risk," The Journal of Portfolio Management
(Fall, 1984) 33.
According to the Restatement Third,
Risk tolerance [i.e., tolerance of volatility of return]
largely depends on a combination of the regular distribution
requirements of the trust and any irregular distributions that
may in fact become necessary or appropriate. These obligations
in turn are likely, depending on the terms of the trust, to be
affected by the needs of one or more of the beneficiaries.
Thus, these various distribution requirements facing the
trustee effectively serve to define the consequences of the
volatility risk with respect to a particular trust.
Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227, Comment e.
An investor can regulate market risk by selecting a level of risk and (at least to
some extent) reward and by selecting investments that are consistent with that level. For
example, the investor can select investments that are more, less or as risky as the market
as a whole. Stated differently, an investor might select investments that tend to rise
and fall in value at a rate greater than, less than or the same as the market as a whole,
and the investor can tend to obtain rewards that vary commensurately.

The trustee should attempt to assemble a portfolio that maximizes return at any
level of risk.
Conversely, the trustee should attempt to assemble a portfolio that
minimizes risk at any level of return.
The Restatement Third makes clear that the trustee must regard inflation as a risk.
It implies that, absent special circumstances, selection of a level of reward that will
cause inflation to erode the value of principal breaches the duty of the trustee to use
caution to preserve safety of capital. Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227, Comments c and
e. A trustee usually has a duty to incur what risk is necessary to attempt to preserve
real values.
The trustee should orient itself to the opportunities.
It easily can accomplish a
large part of the orientation by determining both a risk-free return (i.e., the return
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that inures to United States Treasury obligations) and an average-risk return (i.e., the
return that prevails generally in the market) .

3A.06(e) (1) (C)

Nonmarket Risk

Again according to modern-portfolio theory, to the extent that the risk of
shortfall of return is nonmarket risk, i.e., the risk is unique to the particular asset,
the market does not compensate for the risk.
See generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts
§227, Comment g.
Thus, the market does not compensate for the risk that an unanticipated
event, such as the departure of key personnel, might reduce the fortunes of a particular
company.

An investor can protect against nonmarket risk by diversifying, i.e., acquiring
assets that tend to offset the unique risk that attends each asset separately. See
generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227, Comment g.
Therefore, the Rule generally
imposes a duty upon the trustee to eliminate the risk that is unique to each asset, i.e.,
a duty to diversify.
Diversification that is accomplished without pooling of assets can tend to increase
transactional costs. However, pooling among trusts and with other investors, by means,
for example, of mutual funds, can accomplish diversification without increasing
transactional costs.
The duty to diversify for the purpose of eliminating nonmarket risk is a
centerpiece of the Rule. The duty to diversify induces the trustee to focus upon each
asset as an integral part of a portfolio and not in isolation. No asset inherently is
appropriate or inappropriate, per se.

3A.06(e) (1) (D)

Prime Duty

The duty to diversify should solve the problem, and, therefore, reduce the
importance, of nonmarket risk. Correlatively, it should elevate the importance of market
risk and lead to the conclusion that the chief duties of the trustee are to determine and
implement the mix of market risk and reward that is appropriate for the trust.

3A.06(e) (2)

Second Principle of the Theory:
Outperform the Market

Ability to

A second tenet of modern-portfolio theory, expressed in varying degrees of
conviction, is that an investor is not able to outperform the market at whatever mix of
risk and reward the investor is seeking and, therefore, any attempt to do so is futile,
counterproductive and wasteful. See generally, Macey, 20. cit. 37 et. seg., and
Restatement (Third) of Trusts ch. 7 (Introduction, pp. 6-7, and Reporter's Notes, pp. 7576). According to the theory, capital markets are efficient, information is disseminated
and reflected in prices immediately, and, therefore, no asset is relatively overpriced or
underpriced. This principle has important implications for the conduct of trustees.
It
tends to reduce the value of certain types of advisers and advice.
It tends to increase
the value of certain types of investments such as index funds that tend to mimic a market
as a whole. Generally, it tends to sanction the use of certain strategies of passive
investment and to challenge the use of strategies of active investment that produce
inferior returns.
The Rule specifically prohibits the trustee from incurring costs that are not
reasonable in amount. Restatement (Third) of Trusts §227(c) (3). An implication is that
a trustee that uses a strategy of active investment must justify the increased costs in
terms of an increase in expected returns.
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3A.06(f)

Trusts That Are Designed for Diminished
Distinction Between Income and Principal

3A.06(f) (1)

General Principles

The focus of the Prudent Investor Rule upon the integration of each asset into a
portfolio (as opposed to a focus on each asset separately and in isolation from each other
asset) and the focus of the Rule generally on total return from both ordinary income and
capital appreciation (as .opposed to a focus solely on ordinary income, or a focus
separately on ordinary income and capital appreciation) tend to diminish the focus of the
law upon a distinction between income and principal. The most significant implication of
the Rule's diminishment of the distinction between income and principal is that the
diminishment might permit and encourage planners and drafters to prepare dispositive
instruments that do what the Rule does, i.e., reduce or eliminate distinctions between
income and principal and, therefore, reduce the significance of the difference between
ordinary income and capital appreciation. This diminishment signals a revolution in
drafting and administration of private trusts.
Except to such extent as changes in state law permit adjustments between income and
principal or permit the transformation of pay-alI-income trusts into unitrusts, and
changes in income tax law complement the changes in state law, the Rule's reduction of the
significance of the distinction between income and principal will have little effect on
the amount of ordinary income that a trustee must generate when administering a trust
according to a governing instrument that includes a functional distinction between income
and principal. The Rule at least seems to permit trustees of some of these trusts to
focus upon the production of ordinary income by the portfolio rather than asset-by-asset.
However, trustees of other of these trusts, such as trusts that are designed to qualify
for the marital deduction because of a requirement to pay all income to the spouse,
apparently must heed any direction by the surviving spouse to invest, with respect to
productivity of ordinary income, asset-by-asset. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f) (5).
A trust that provides that a particular beneficiary shall receive ordinary income
and that principal shall pass solely to one or more others requires the trustee to
distinguish carefully between income and principal and to make all investment decisions on
the basis of impartiality between income and principal.

Form 3.22
(A)
annually.
(B)

Income.

The Trustee shall pay the net income to my wife quarter-

Principal.

The Trustee shall not distribute principal.

(C) Termination. Upon the death of my wife, the trust shall terminate, and
the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of the trust to my descendants, per
stirpes, who survive my wife.
A trust that permits the trustee to pay principal to the person to whom the trustee
is required to pay income (see Form 3.23) tends to reduce, but not eliminate, the
distinction between income and principal.

Form 3.23
(A)
annually.

Income.

The Trustee shall pay the net income to my wife quarter-
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(B)
Principal. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of
the principal as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the
termination of the trust.
(C) Termination. Unless sooner terminated according to the foregoing, the
trust shall terminate upon the death of my wife, and the Trustee shall distribute
the trust estate of the trust to my descendants, per stirpes, who survive my wife.
A trust that, according to an ascertainable standard (see Form 3.24) or without any
standard (see Form 3.25), permits the trustee to pay income to a person, or to anyone or
more persons in a group of persons, or to accumulate it, and to pay principal to the same
person or persons, tends to eliminate the significance of the distinction between income
and principal and to free the trustee to concentrate upon total return.

Form 3.24
(A)
Income. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of
the net income as the Trustee determines to be necessary or advisable from time to
time, considering resources otherwise available, to provide for her health,
education and support in the manner of living to which accustomed. The Trustee
shall accumulate any net income that it does not pay.
(B)
Principal. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of
the principal as the Trustee determines to be necessary or advisable from time to
time, considering resources otherwise available, to provide for her health,
education and support in the manner of living to which accustomed.
(C) Termination. Unless sooner terminated according to the foregoing, the
trust shall terminate upon the death of my wife, and the Trustee shall distribute
the trust estate of the trust to my descendants, per stirpes, who survive my wife.

Form 3.25
(A)
Income. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of
the net income as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the
termination of the trust. The Trustee shall accumulate any net income that it does
not pay.
(B)
Principal. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of
the principal as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion
determines to be advisable from time to time, considering or not considering
resources otherwise available, for any purpose or reason whatsoever, including the
termination of the trust.
(C)
Termination. Unless sooner terminated according to the foregoing, the
trust shall terminate upon the death of my wife, and the Trustee shall distribute
the trust estate of the trust to my descendants, per stirpes, who survive my wife.
3A.06(f) (2)

Facilitating the Change

Given the decreased importance that the Rule attaches to whether a particular asset
is unproductive or underproductive of trust accounting income, the draftsperson should
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consider (i) eliminating requirements that assets produce a requisite amount of ordinary
income and (ii) waiving the application of statutory and other law concerning property
that fails to produce a requisite amount of ordinary income.
Form 3.26

(1) To retain property in the form and character in which received and to
invest in any kind of property (including common trust funds and securities of any
trustee), w~ether or not income-productive or located in the United States or
authorized for trust investments.
However, contrary to the Rule, the marital-deduction rules seem to focus upon each asset
in isolation from each other asset. Therefore, the draftsperson should not eliminate the
ability of a spouse to insist that the trustee eliminate from a marital trust any asset
that is not productive. See Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f) (5).
Form 3.27

Unproductive property shall not be held for more than a reasonable time in the
trust estate of the Marital Trust without the consent of my wife.
Similarly, when dealing with a trustee that has a beneficial interest in the decision
about retention or acquisition of unproductive or underproductive property and a trust
that mandates the distribution of trust accounting income, so that the investment decision
will affect how much the trustee personally will receive, the draftsperson should not
exonerate the trustee for deviating from any productivity requirements that, absent the
exoneration, the law of the state imposes. See generally Code §§2041 and 2514.

3A.07

MODERN STYLES OF DISTRIBUTIONS:
ANNUITY TRUSTS AND UNITRUSTS

The ability of the trustee, as a matter of law, to concentrate upon total return
seems to enhance the importance of annuity trusts and unitrusts. The underlying reason is
that, even if one assumes the decreasingly accurate proposition that a pay-alI-income
trust adequately can allocate enjoyment when the trustee invests separately for ordinary
income, a new method of allocating enjoyment is necessary when the trustee invests for
total return.
Form 3.28: Annuity Trust Example

a
b

(1)
Annuity Interest. Each year,
[after the descendant has attained thirty years of age,]
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant [X] dollars
[, adjusted to reflect any increase in the consumer price index between the date of
this instrument and the date of the first payment for the year]
The Trustee shall pay the annuity amount in equal quarter-annual installments.
The Trustee shall prorate the annuity amount for any short year.

Form 3.29: Conventional Unitrust Example

a

b

(1)
Unitrust Interest. Each year,
[after the descendant has attained thirty years of age,]
the Trustee shall pay to the descendant a unitrust amount equal to [X] percent of
the
[net fair market value of the trust estate of the trust valued as of the first
business day of the year]
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c

[average of the net fair market values of the trust estate of the trust valued as
of the first business day of the year and of each year of the preceding four]
The Trustee shall pay the unitrust amount in equal quarter-annual installments.
The Trustee shall prorate the unitrust amount for any short year.

3A.07(a)

Rationales and Characteristics

A traditional annuity trust pays a fixed amount of dollars per period of time,
without regard to whether the annuity amount is derived from income or from principal. A
conventional unitrust pays a dollar amount per period of time equal to a fixed percentage
of the total value of the trust estate redetermined each period, also without regard to
whether the unitrust amount is derived from income or from principal.
The traditional type of annuity trust produces a fixed, rigid and unvarying amount
to the annuitant. Attorney William L. Hoisington, commenting to this writer, suggested
the consideration of an "indexed" annuity that fluctuates with changes in price levels and
purchasing power. According to Hoisington, by being able to focus, simply, upon the
number of dollars necessary to accomplish an objective (for example, the support of the
annuitant> and knowing the amount required for this purpose at the time of the creation of
the trust and that the purchasing power will remain constant, a client might understand an
indexed annuity trust better than the client might understand a unitrust.
Whereas a traditional annuity does not change at all and an indexed annuity changes
according to changes in values outside the trust, a unitrust amount is linked to changes
in value of the trust property itself. Therefore, a unitrust amount precisely reflects
changes in the trust but only roughly reflects changes in price levels and purchasing
power. Because the unitrust amount varies directly with changes in value of the trust
property, the number and the timing of valuation dates affect the fluctuation of the
amount. A greater number of dates and a greater time over which they occur tend to
produce a "smoother" flow than a fewer number of dates over a shorter time.
An annuity trust periodically generates an obligation, or debt, in an amount that
is fixed upon the creation of the trust, subject, however, in the case of a trust that
provides an annuity which is indexed to changes in cost of living, only to fluctuation
because of changes in price levels. By comparison, a conventional unitrust periodically
generates an obligation in an amount that is fixed only on the date of determination of
the trust value which fixes the unitrust amount.

Both an annuity trust and a unitrust permit the trustee to focus upon total return.
An annuity trust requires the trustee to seek the total return that best will generate the

annuity and, consistent with payment of the annuity, enhance the assets that can inure to
others upon termination of the annuity. Similarly, a unitrust impels the trustee to seek
the total return that best will enhance both the unitrust interest and the property that
will inure to others upon termination of the unitrust interest.
Because the level of payout is the primary factor that determines the value of the
property that can continue to produce the annuity or unitrust amount and remain when the
annuity or unitrust interest terminates, determination of the investment objectives for
the trust involves a complex analysis of the extent to which payments should decrease the
value, and the extent to which ordinary income and capital appreciation should increase
the value. By contrast, a trust that pays only income might imply, relatively directly,
that the investment objectives of the trustee are to produce a reasonable stream of income
and yet maintain, in real terms, a constant value of principal.
The payout requirement of the conventional unitrust seems to place less pressure
upon the trustee than the payout requirement of a traditional annuity trust, regardless of
whether the distributions are in cash or in kind.
The reason is that in a declining

I

-35

market the payout required from a traditional annuity trust represents an increasing
percentage of a decreasing value, whereas the payout required from a unitrust is an
unvarying percentage of a changing value. Because satisfaction of the required
distribution in kind seems to produce the same economic effect as satisfaction of the
required distribution in cash, the trustee seems unable to relieve the pressure by
satisfying the annuity interest or the unitrust interest in kind.
Special problems confront any attempt to draft a trust that both is to qualify for
the marital deduction and also is to permit the trustee to invest for total return.
Certain annuity trusts might not qualify for the marital deduction.
Code
§§2056(b) (7) (B) (ii), 2056(b) (10), 2523(e) and 2523(f) (3), Treas. Reg. §§20.2056(b)-7(e)
and 25.2523(f)-1(c) (3). A trust that is solely a unitrust might pay less than its income
and, therefore, cannot meet the income requirement of the marital deduction.
Code
§§2056(b) (5) and (b)(7). Cf., however, Treas. Reg. §§20.2056(b)-5(f) (1), 20.2056(b)7(d) (1) and 20.2056(b)-10, which, for taxable years that end after January 2, 2004,
assuming the existence of the required substance of state law, permit a unitrust to
qualify.
A trust that pays the greater of trust accounting income and a unitrust amount must
pay at least its income and, therefore, can meet the income requirement. However, the
important issue is whether this "greater-of" arrangement permits the trustee to focus upon
total return. The possibility that income can exceed the unitrust amount might force the
trustee to continue to concentrate on producing a yield in the form of income for trust
accounting purposes.
If the unitrust percentage that is specified is clearly as high as
the yield of ordinary income that an income beneficiary can demand according to state law,
the "greater-of" arrangement will protect the income beneficiary and, therefore, should
free the trustee to invest for total return.
Cf. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f) (5).
However, the grantor usually has no way to know this amount with certainty. Selection of
a lesser amount can undermine the elimination of the focus upon ordinary income. Although
selection of a greater amount can eliminate the focus on ordinary income, it also can
eliminate a portion of the trust.
Purposely, no form mentions income or principal. The forms contrast in this
respect with most forms of charitable remainder and charitable lead arrangements. See,
~ , Rev. Proc. 89-20, 1989-1 C.B. 841, Rev. Proc. 89-21, 1989-1 C.B. 842, Rev. Proc. 9030, 1990-1 C.B. 534, Rev. Proc. 90-31, 1990-1, C.B. 539, Rev. Proc. 90-32, 1990-1 C.B.
546, and Rev. Proc. 90-33, 1990-1 C.B. 551.
Indeed, the forms also contrast with most
forms, of which this writer is aware, of private annuity trusts and private unitrusts.
Code Sections 661 and 662 govern what the trust is deemed to distribute and what
the annuitant or the unitrust recipient is deemed to receive. The "deeming" generally
appears to occur regardless of any statement in the governing instrument to the effect
that a distribution has a specified complexion.
A notable exception is that provision in the governing instrument can determine the
extent, if any, to which distributable net income includes corpus income, i.e., capital
gains. See Code §643(a) (3) and Treas. Reg. §1.643(a)-3. However, a mandate to pay an
annuity (or, by implication, a unitrust amount) seems not to include capital gains in
distributable net income even when a distribution of principal is necessary to satisfy the
distribution obligation.
See also Rev. Rul. 68-392, 1968-2 C.B. 284. The apparent
rationale is that even though a distribution of principal is necessary, capital gains
still are not" [alllocated to corpus but actually distributed to the beneficiary or
utilized by the fiduciary in determining the amount that is distributed or required to be
distributed to a beneficiary." Treas. Reg. §1. 643 (a) -3 (b) (3) .
An ordering system similar to that which applies (according to Code Section 664(b))
to charitable remainder arrangements would seem, in the context of a private annuity trust
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and a private unitrust, to have no economic substance apart from tax results. Arguably,
therefore, the inclusion in a governing instrument of the ordering system would seem
ineffective to determine the income-tax complexions of distributions from private annuity
trusts and private unitrusts to annuitants and unitrust recipients. Cf. Code §661(b).
Given (i) the apparent difficulty of including capital gains in the distributable
net income of an annuity trust or unitrust and (ii) the apparent lack of other tax
function of the mandate that usually appears in the forms of others to pay the annuity or
the unitrust amount first from income and, to any extent that income is insufficient, from
principal, apparently the only function of the mandate is to mandate a purposeless
separation, and accounting, of income and principal. The reason that this writer does not
include the mandate is to attempt to dispense entirely with separate treatment of income
and principal and to permit accounting simply on the basis of receipts and disbursements.
Because taxation of a given amount of income of any complexion might tend to
generate less tax in the hands of an individual (i.e., an annuitant or a unitrust
recipient) than in the hands of the trustee of a trust, a grantor might want to maximize
distributable net income and, hence, maximize the distributable net income that a
distribution of a given value carries from a trust to a beneficiary. However, movement of
a tax burden from a trust to a beneficiary will tend to reduce the after-tax value of any
distribution and, correspondingly, necessitate a compensating increase in the annuity
amount or unitrust percentage in order to leave the beneficiary with a given amount after
tax.

3A.07(b)

Mandated-Percentage Unitrusts

Consider expressing as a percentage of the trust estate, rather than as a dollar
amount, the unitrust interest that the trustee is required to distribute.
Form 3.30

(1) Unitrust Interest.
If
[, after attaining thirty years of age,]
the descendant is living immediately before the end of a calendar year, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant a [X] fractional share of the trust estate. The
Trustee shall prorate the fractional share for any short year.
3A.07(b) (1)

Rationale and Characteristics

An economic difference exists between a conventional unitrust, in which the
unitrust interest is expressed as a dollar amount, and the mandated-percentage unitrust,
in which the unitrust interest is expressed as a fraction of the trust estate. The former
describes a fixed number of dollars, but the latter describes something that can change in
value until the trustee satisfies it.

More importantly for purposes of this analysis, compared to a conventional unitrust
in which the unitrust interest is expressed as a dollar amount, the mandated-percentage
unitrust enhances flexibility in (i) timing of recognition of gain and (ii) determining
the identity of the taxpayer that recognizes the gain. Unless the trustee elects to the
contrary according to subsection 643(e) of the Code, satisfaction of the percentage in
kind should not produce a deemed sale.
See generally Code §663(a) (1), Treas. Reg.
§§1.661(a)-2(f) (1), 1.1014-4(a) (3) and 1.663(a)-I(b) (1), Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286,
Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940), and Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113
(D.Conn. 1935), affirmed 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied 299 U.S. 573 (1936).
If the satisfaction in kind does not produce a deemed sale, (a) the distributee takes for
income tax purposes the same basis that the trustee had and (b) the distributable net
income that the distribution carries to the beneficiary is the lesser of (i) the basis of
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the property in the hands of the beneficiary and (ii) the fair market value of the
distributed property. Code §643(e). By making or not making the election according to
subsection 643(e) of the Code, the trustee can defer or accelerate recognition of gain and
can determine which, the trustee or the unitrust recipient, shall pay the tax on any gain.
The ability of the trustee to satisfy the percentage in kind (rather than in
dollars) should permit the trustee (but not the unitrust recipient) to avoid the need for
cash. Any distribution of an asset in kind will carry distributable net income from the
trust to the distributee and include it in the gross income of the distributee to the
extent of the lesser of (a) the income tax basis of the distributed asset in the hands of
the beneficiary and (b) the fair market value of the distributed property. Code §§643(e),
661 and 662. Therefore, although the distribution of distributable net income is limited
to the basis of the distributed asset in the hands of the beneficiary, the distribution in
kind nevertheless will tend to require the distributee to obtain cash in order to pay tax.

Use of the concept of a percentage can give the trustee considerable flexibility
about how to satisfy the unitrust interest.
If the governing instrument authorizes the
trustee to make distributions in nonprorata shares, the trustee should have flexibility
that ranges from satisfying the unitrust interest with one asset to satisfying it with a
fractional share of each and every asset including both income and principal.
Absent Code Section 643(e) and the trustee's possession and use of "pick-andchoose" authority to distribute other than the fixed percentage of each and every asset,
the mandated percentage unitrust would seem to carry to the unitrust recipient the fixed
fraction of all ordinary income and capital gain attributable to the trust.
Code Section
643(e) would seem to limit, to the lesser of the bases of the distributed property in the
hands of the beneficiary and the fair market value of the distributed property, the
ordinary-income component of distributable net income that is deemed distributed because
of the distribution in kind.
The more important inquiry for purposes of this analysis is the income-tax effect
of the trustee's use of "pick-and-choose" authority to determine the exact assets to
distribute. Does the use of this authority transform the trust, subject to the mandate
concerning the total amount, into a discretionary trust for income tax purposes?
Alternatively, if the unitrust recipient is the trustee and, therefore, by means of the
pick-and-choose authority, the unitrust recipient has unlimited power to select the exact
assets that are to satisfy the unitrust interest, is the paradigm that of an individual
who, according to Code Section 678, is treated as owning particular assets for income tax
purposes? According to grantor-trust principles under Code Section 678, can the trusteeunitrust recipient own (for income-tax purposes) whatever assets the unitrust recipient in
fact receives? Stated differently, do principles of Code Section 678 "trump" a portion of
the principles of Code Sections 651, 652, 661 and 662 when the recipient has the unlimited
power to select the assets that the recipient shall receive? The writer is not aware of
any application of this theory, notwithstanding that the issue would seem to appear
frequently in the context of nonprorata allocations of assets to dispositions.
Compare with this issue the similar issue that attends a Give-Me-Five withdrawablepercentage unitrust when, in one version, the donee has pick-and-choose authority as a
trustee and, in an alternative version, the donee has pick-and-choose authority both
personally and as a trustee. Whereas in the mandated-percentage unitrust the issue arises
in the context of a potential clash between the distributable net income rules, on the one
hand, and the grantor-trust rules, on the other, in the Give-Me-Five withdrawablepercentage unitrust the issue arguably arises only in the context of the proper
interpretation of Code Section 678.
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3A.08

MODERN-STYLE DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS: PRIMARY BENEFICIARY POSSESSES
NONFIDUCIARY DISCRETION: WITHDRAWABLE-PERCENTAGE
("GIVE-ME-FIVE") UNITRUSTS

Next, instead of requiring the trustee to distribute a unitrust percentage or a
unitrust amount, consider specifying a percentage of the trust estate, not in excess of
five percent (or specifying, alternatively, so much of the trust estate as has a value
equal to the value, at a particular time, of a percentage of the trust estate, not in
excess of five percent) and providing that the unitrust recipient may, but need not,
withdraw all or any of it until the particular time each year. The withdrawablepercentage ("GIVE-ME-FIVE") unitrust is an attractive alternative to (i) a trust that
mandates the current payment of income, (ii) a conventional unitrust in which the unitrust
interest is expressed as a dollar amount and the current payment of the unitrust amount is
mandated and (iii) a unitrust in which the unitrust interest is expressed as a percentage
of the trust estate and the current distribution of the unitrust percentage is mandated.
Form 3.31: Withdrawable-Percentage ("GIVE-ME-FIVE")
Unitrust Example

a

b
c

d

(l) Give-Me-Five.
If
[, after attaining thirty years of age,]
the descendant is living immediately before the end of a calendar year, the Trustee
shall pay to the descendant
[such fractional share (not to exceed one-twentieth), if any, of the trust estate]
[so much, if any, of the trust estate, not to exceed in value five percent of the
value of the trust estate as of the end of the year,]
as the descendant last directs in writing before the end of the year.
[As soon as possible after each taxable year of the descendant, except to such
extent (if any) as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion last
directs in writing before the end of the year, the Trustee shall pay to the
descendant (i) the amount (if any) by which the income tax liability of the
descendant for the year is increased because, as a result of one or more lapses of
rights granted according to the preceding sentence, the descendant is deemed,
according to Subpart E of Subchapter J of Chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Code, to
own any of the trust estate for purposes of determining the United States income
tax of the descendant and (ii) the amount (if any) by which the income tax
liability of the descendant is increased because the Trustee must pay according to
this sentence.]

3A.08{a)

Rationale and Characteristics

The withdrawable-percentage unitrust is particularly attractive when (as in a
credit-shelter or generation-skipping configuration) the trust is exempt from the
generation-skipping tax, the primary beneficiary is a non-skip person (~, the spouse or
child of the grantor), or is a skip person (~, the grandchild of the grantor) who is
assigned to a generation higher than that of another skip person, and the primary
beneficiary might not need, but wants the security of, the beneficial enjoyment that the
trust can provide. The withdrawable-percentage unitrust allows the primary beneficiary to
conserve the resources of the trust that are sheltered from the transfer taxes and, thus,
consume the resources of the beneficiary that, if not consumed, will generate liability
for gift tax, estate tax or generation-skipping tax (or more than one of them).
As an example, instead of forcing the spouse of the grantor to receive all income
from a marital-deduction trust and all income from a credit-shelter trust, a withdrawablepercentage unitrust can permit the spouse of the grantor to receive all income from the
marital-deduction trust and to consume the property of the spouse (or principal of the
marital-deduction trust) in an amount that approximates the income of the credit-shelter
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trust. Thus, the withdrawable-percentage unitrust allows the spouse to conserve the trust
estate of the credit-shelter trust.
As a similar example, instead of forcing the child of the grantor to receive all
income from a trust that has an inclusion ratio of zero for generation-skipping tax
purposes, a withdrawable-percentage unitrust can permit the child of the grantor to
consume the property of the child in an amount that approximates the income of the
generation-skipping trust, or can permit the trustee to distribute property from a trust
that is not exempt from the generation-skipping tax in an amount that approximates the
income of the trust that is exempt from the generation-skipping tax. Thus, the
withdrawable-percentage unitrust allows the child to conserve the trust estate of the
generation-skipping trust.
3A.08(a) (1)

Alternative Versions

One version of the withdrawable-percentage unitrust permits the beneficiary to
withdraw a percentage or fractional share of the trust estate. See variable b of Form
3.31. An alternative version permits the beneficiary to withdraw so much of the trust
estate as has a value equal to the value of a specified fraction of the trust estate as of
the time of lapse of the right to withdraw. See variable c of Form 3.31. Technically,
this aspect of the latter version seems identical to that which appears in a conventional
unitrust. The only economic difference between the versions is that the former version
seems to describe something that can change in value until the trustee satisfies it, but
the latter version seems to impose a ceiling of a fixed number of dollars. At least if a
withdrawal according to the alternative version is not expressed as a dollar amount and
the dollar ceiling in fact does not define the withdrawal, each version should produce
similar income tax results. See generally Treas. Reg. §1.671-3.
The version that permits the beneficiary to withdraw "so much . . . of the trust
estate" might offer greater flexibility than the version that permits the beneficiary to
withdraw a "fractional share." If the governing instrument authorizes the trustee to
distribute nonprorata shares of assets in satisfaction of any withdrawal, the version that
permits the beneficiary to withdraw a "fractional share" should vest in the trustee, and
arguably solely in the trustee, the ability to satisfy a withdrawal with other than a
fractional share of each and every asset. The version that permits the beneficiary to
withdraw "so much . . . of the trust estate," on the other hand, might allow the
beneficiary, himself or herself, to select the assets that are to satisfy any exercise of
the right to withdraw.
3A.08(a) (2)

Advantages

Use of a lapsing right to withdraw, instead of a mandated payment, permits the
unitrust recipient to exclude the trust estate from the gross estate of the recipient for
estate tax purposes and from the gifts of the recipient for gift tax purposes.
The right to withdraw also permits the unitrust recipient to regulate the
efficiency of the trust for generation-skipping tax purposes by determining whether a nonskip person (or a skip person who is in a generation that is higher than that of another
skip person) shall receive distributions. Additionally, the lapsing right to withdraw
permits the power holder to avoid dissipation of GST exemption.
Id.
The unitrust concept eliminates any functional distinction between income and
principal. Therefore, it permits the trustee to take full advantage of the prudent
investor rule and modern-portfolio theory by investing for total return.
Expression of the unitrust interest as a percentage, rather than as a dollar
amount, permits satisfaction of the interest in kind without recognition of gain.
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Similarly, at least if (i) the exercise of the right is expressed as a percentage rather
than as a dollar amount and (ii) the dollar ceiling in fact does not define the
withdrawal, expression of the right to withdraw as so much of the trust estate as has a
value equal to the value of a percentage at the time of the lapse or exercise should
permit satisfaction of the interest in kind without recognition of gain.

Example: Assume a right to withdraw so much of the
trust estate as has a value equal to five percent of the value of the trust estate at the
end of the year. Assume that the donee exercises the right by withdrawing, as an example,
a one-percent fractional share of the trust estate, or, as another example, particular
assets that have an aggregate value at the time of distribution of less than five percent
of the value of the trust estate at the time of the partial exercise and partial lapse
(i.e., immediately before the end of the year) of the right. The portion withdrawn does
not have a fixed value and does fluctuate in value subject to a dollar ceiling. See Rev.
Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286.
The unitrust percentage of five percent assures that the unitrust recipient can
receive approximately the same enjoyment that he or she would receive if he or she were to
receive all income of a trust that owned a balanced portfolio of investments.
The primary beneficiary can serve as the sole trustee of a withdrawable-percentage
unitrust at least as well as he or she can serve as the sole trustee of a mandatedpayment-of-income trust.
The primary beneficiary can serve as the sole trustee of a
withdrawable-percentage unitrust just as well as he or she can serve as the sole trustee
of a conventional unitrust and a mandated-percentage unitrust.
Because, within limits, the unitrust recipient, himself or herself, can determine
the transfer tax results, a withdrawable-percentage unitrust seems more flexible for
transfer tax purposes than (i) a grant of discretion to an independent trustee to make
distributions (see Form 3.8), (ii) a mandate to a trustee to make distributions (see, for
example, Form 3.2) and (iii) a grant of discretion, limited by an ascertainable standard,
to a person to make distributions to himself or herself (see Form 3.13) .

3A.08(a) (3)

Rights of Creditors

According to the laws of some jurisdictions, a Give-Me-Five power might make a
portion of the trust estate vulnerable to creditors of the donee of the power. According
to the theory, a lapse of a right to withdraw has the economic result, and also the
creditor-rights result, of, first, a withdrawal of the subject property and, second, a
contribution of the withdrawn property to the trust.
Pursuing the theory, the donee
becomes the settlor to the extent of the deemed contribution. According to section 58 of
the Restatement Third of Trusts, creditors of a donee who is a deemed contributor can
reach the assets so contributed, to the extent of the interest of the donee in the trust.
According to the Restatement Third, a lapse of a right to withdraw a contribution
to a trust, i.e., a Crummey power, causes the donee to become the settlor with respect to
the subject property and brings the subject property within the rule that is described in
the preceding paragraph. Restatement (Third) of Trusts §58,. Comment f(l) and
Illustration 11. According to Reporters Notes in Restatement Third, the "uniform Trust
Code §505(b) (2) adopted, essentially, a '5 or 5' (estate-and gift-tax type) exception to
its general rule (which is otherwise like the rule of this Comment) on releases and lapses
of withdrawal powers." Reporters Notes on §58, Comments f and f(l).
The deemed-contribution theory does not necessarily prevail in the case of a GiveMe-Five power. Unlike, for example, a Crummey power, which operates with respect to a
contribution to a trust, a Give-Me-Five unitrust power operates solely with respect to
what constituted the trust estate before the power became operative. Conceptually, the
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property that is subject to a Crummey power passes (i) from a donor, (ii) by means of the
Crummey power, to a donee and (iii) by means of a lapse of the Crummey power, from the
donee to the trust.
By contrast, because the property that is subject to a Give-Me-Five
power is property that is part of the trust estate before the right to withdraw becomes
operative, the donee of a Give-Me-Five power arguably does not participate in the transfer
of any property to the trust. This reasoning highlights a distinction, but whether the
distinction supports a difference is another issue.
Even if a lapse of a Give-Me-Five power were to make the subject property
vulnerable to creditors, the vulnerability would appear no more, and possibly less, than
that of a pay-alI-income trust over an economic cycle, a mandate to pay a unitrust amount
of five percent and an exercise of the Give-Me-Five power. Both a mandate to pay all
income and a mandate to pay a unitrust amount "force" property from the trust to the
distributee.
Each of these mandates causes the recipient to own all of each distribution.
Thus, each of these mandates renders all of the distributed assets vulnerable. By
comparison, the lapse of a Give-Me-Five power appears to empower a creditor only to such
extent, if any, as the trustee can distribute the subject property to the donee after the
lapse.
If an ascertainable standard were to limit the property that the trustee could
distribute to the donee after the lapse of the Give-Me-Five power, the empowerment (and
thus the vulnerability) would appear to depend upon the facts and circumstances, including
those of the donee and of the trust, that were material to the application of the
standard.
If, instead, after the lapse the trustee could pay the sUbject property to the
donee without limitation, all of the subject property would appear vulnerable to
creditors.
Regardless of whether and to what extent the lapse of a Give-Me-Five power confers
rights upon creditors, any vulnerability to creditors appears not to undermine any tax
benefits. The Code and applicable regulations seem conclusively so to provide. See Code
§§2041(b) (2) and 2514(e) and Treas. Reg. §§20.2041-3(d) and 25.2514-3(c) (4).
What effect should rights of creditors have upon the use of Give-Me-Five powers?
Arguably, the answer is little or none. Obviously, a Give-Me-Five power (or, for that
matter, any mandate, to pay all income, to pay a unitrust amount, to pay an annuity amount
or to pay anything else, including according to an ascertainable standard) is incompatible
with a dominant objective of asset protection. However, this analysis of rights of
creditors vis-a-vis Give-Me-Five powers appears to support, rather than undermine, the
thesis that a Give-Me-Five power is a flexible means of enabling a certain, but very
common, type of beneficiary to have control and enjoyment similar to outright ownership
but without the transfer-tax burdens.
3A.08(a) (4)

A Problem

Although the withdrawable-percentage unitrust offers superior results for transfer
tax purposes, it poses a problem, fortunately solvable, for income tax purposes. The
right to withdraw includes in the gross income of the power holder all gross income that
is attributable to the subject property. Code §678(a) (1).
If the inclusion is
inadvertent and not desired and the power causes inclusion of more than the income that is
attributable to the property to which the power applies during the taxable year, the
inclusion can present the power holder with an unexpected and unwanted obligation that the
power holder can lack the resources to discharge. A grantor can avoid the issue by
permitting or requiring the trustee to pay to the donee each year at least an amount equal
to the marginal amount of tax increase that the donee incurs because of the existence of
the trust.
See,~, (i) the discretionary power of an independent trustee in Form 3.8
and (ii) variable d of Form 3.31.
Further, as discussed later, the attribution
potentially is desirable.
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The withdrawable-percentage unitrust seems less flexible for income tax purposes
than a power granted to an independent trustee and, arguably, a power to withdraw limited
by an ascertainable standard. However, the more appropriate comparison is probably
between (i) the withdrawable-percentage unitrust and (ii) a mandate to a trustee to
distribute all income.
See, for example, Form 3.2.
3A.08(a} (S)

Transfer Tax Implications and Planning

Generally, the lapse of a general power of appointment is treated as a transfer for
gift and estate tax purposes.
Code §§2041(a) (2) and 2514 (b) . However, a lapse during any
calendar year during the life of the power holder is treated as a transfer for estate tax
purposes only to the extent that the property, which could have been appointed by exercise
of such lapsed powers, exceeded in value, at the time of such lapse, the greater of the
following amounts:
(A)

$5,000, or

(B)
5 percent of the aggregate value, at the time of such
lapse, of the assets out of which, or the proceeds of which, the
exercise of the lapsed powers could have been satisfied.
Code
§2041 (b) (2) .
The gift tax rules are similar.

See Code §2514(e).

A lapse that is within the limits of Code Sections 2041(b) (2) and 2514(e) is not a
gift for gift tax purposes. Treas. Reg. §§20.2041-3(d) (3) and 25.2514-3(c). Similarly,
the lapse is not a transfer with retained enjoyment for estate tax purposes. Treas. Reg.
§20.2041-3 (d) (3) and (4).
possession of the right to withdraw at the death of the power holder does include
in the gross estate of the power holder any property that the power holder could have
withdrawn immediately before death.
Code §204l(b) (1) and Treas. Reg. §20.2041-3(d) (3).
However, confining the existence of the power to immediately before the end of the year
should prevent the power from including any of the trust estate in the gross estate of the
power holder.
Similarly, conditioning the power upon the exhaustion of another trust (for
example, a marital-deduction trust, such as a QTIP or testamentary-power-of-appointment
trust) that the power holder does not have discretion to exhaust prevents the power from
including property in the gross estate of the power holder unless the power holder dies
after the other trust is exhausted. Treas. Reg. §20.2041-3(b).
Cf. Estate of Kurz v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 44 (1993), affirmed 95-2 USTC '60, 215 (7th Cir. 1995).
Except to any extent that the power subjects property to gift tax or estate tax or
the power holder exercises the power, the power does not cause the power holder to become
the transferor for generation-skipping tax purposes. Therefore, the power does not
dissipate the effect of allocation of GST exemption of the original transferor. Code
§2652 (a) .
3A.08(a} (6)

Income Tax Implications and Planning

The most important of the income tax implications is that the right to withdraw
causes the power holder to own both (i) all ordinary income that is subject to the power
and (ii) all income, ordinary and other, that is attributable to the principal that is
subject to the power. Code §678(a) (1).
See generally Code §671 and Treas. Reg. §1.671-3.
For example, a right to withdraw a fractional portion of a trust estate causes the power
holder to own, for income tax purposes, all of the ordinary and other income of the
fractional portion.
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If, as in the alternative version of the Give-Me-Five unitrust in variable c of
Form 3.31, the donee has the unlimited power to select the exact assets that are to
satisfy the right, what portion of the trust is subject to the right, and, thus, what
items of income and deduction, etcetera is the donee deemed to own? Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-241,
1967-2 C.B. 225. According to grantor-trust principles under Code Section 678, does the
donee of the right to withdraw own (for income-tax purposes) whatever assets the donee in
fact uses to satisfy the right? Even if this theory can apply to an exercise of the right
to withdraw, this theory, per se, seems not to offer any guidance to the extent of any
lapse of the right. To such extent (if any) as the Give-Me-Five power is not exercised,
what basis exists for attributing certain assets rather than others? Absent any basis
(and this writer does not know of any), treatment of the Give-Me-Five power as a right to
withdraw a fractional portion (at least except to any extent that any withdrawal exceeds a
fractional portion) would seem most fair.
Similarly, if (as is possible in the case of each alternative of the Give-Me-Five
unitrust) (i) the trustee has an unlimited power (subject in variable c of Form 3.31 to a
similar power in the donee personally) to select the exact assets that are to satisfy the
right and (ii) the donee is the trustee, what portion of the trust is sUbject to the
right, and, thus, what items of income and deductions, etcetera is the donee deemed to
own? Again, according to grantor-trust principles under Code Section 678, can the donee
of the right to withdraw own (for income-tax purposes) whatever assets the donee in fact
uses to satisfy the right? Again, even if this theory can apply to an exercise of the
right to withdraw, this theory, per~, seems not to offer any guidance to the extent of
any lapse of the right. Again, to such extent (if any) as the Give-Me-Five power is not
exercised, what basis exists for attributing certain assets rather than others? Aga~n,
absent any basis (and this writer does not know of any), treatment of the Give-Me-Five
power as a right to withdraw a fractional portion (at least except to any extent that any
withdrawal exceeds a fractional portion) would seem most fair.
The rules that apportion income, for income tax purposes, between a trust and its
beneficiaries based upon the amount of distributable net income that is, or is not,
carried from the trust to the beneficiaries upon distributions of assets from the trust
should not apply to any portion of the trust that, because of the right to withdraw, is
treated as owned by the donee according to Code Section 678. Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2
C.B. 225. Rather, the system should treat the holder of the power as receiving that which
he or she already owns. The holder, for example, of a right to withdraw a fractional
portion is regarded, for income tax purposes, as owning the fractional portion.
Although Revenue Ruling 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225, seems to support the proposition
that the power holder owns, for income tax purposes, that which he or she can withdraw
and, therefore, the distributable net income rules do not apply to any exercise of the
power, the regulations promulgated according to Code Section 665 (Treasury regulations
section 1.665(b)-lA(d), Example 4) clearly assert that the throwback rules do apply to any
exercise of the power.
Subsequent to the promulgation of the regulations, Congress
abolished most of the application of the throwback rules. However, the abolition might
not prevent the reasoning from continuing to apply. See Code §665(c). Although the two
sets of rules seem inconsistent, and arguably the distributable net income rules should
not oust the grantor trust system where the two systems overlap, the planner should
appreciate the possibility that the distributable net income rules might apply to an
exercise.
The Internal Revenue Service asserts that even after the right to withdraw lapses
because the power holder fails to exercise it, except to any extent that the power holder
ceases to be the "grantor" according to the principles of Code Sections 671 through 677,
the power holder owns, for income tax purposes, all of the trust estate that the exercise
of the power would have permitted the power holder to possess. Code §678(a) (2) and Ltr.
Ruls. 200022035, 9034004 and 8701007. This result depends upon (i) the theory that a
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"lapse" is a "release" for purposes of Code Section 678 (a) (2) or (ii) the theory that a
lapse of a right to withdraw has the same economic effect, and should have the same tax
effect, as a withdrawal of property from a trust and a recontribution of the property to
the trust.
See Early, "Income taxation of lapsed powers of withdrawal: Analyzing their
current status," Journal of Taxation (April, 1985) 198.
Neither of the theories mentioned in the preceding paragraph clearly controls.
Code Sections 2041(b) (2) and 2514(e), on the one hand, state that a lapse is treated as a
release except to any extent that a lapse within the limits of the five-and-five rules is
not treated as a release.
Code Section 678(a) (2), on the other hand, does not state that
a lapse ever is treated as a release.
Therefore, according to the argument, a release is
something other than a lapse, for purposes of Code Section 678(a) (2). Nevertheless, for
purposes of planning, this writer assumes that a lapse is equivalent to a release for
purposes of Code Section 678(a) (2).
Assume that a person has a right to withdraw five percent of a trust which has
$1,000 of principal and which generates $50 of ordinary income and $100 of corpus income
ratably during its first year. As a first example of the application of the Service's
position, assume that the power applies during the entire year and lapses at the end of
the year. The power holder is regarded as owning five percent of the trust estate and,
therefore, as owning five percent of the $50 of ordinary income and five percent of the
$100 of corpus income. Even if the power holder never possesses any other power to
withdraw, except to any extent that the power holder ceases to be the "grantor" according
to the principles of Code Sections 671-677, the power holder owns, for income tax
purposes, all of the fractional portion, and thus all of the income of the fractional
portion, both during the year in which the power exists and at all times after the power
lapses.
As a second example, assume that the facts are the same as in the first example
except that the power holder exercises the power. The results are the same as in the
first example for the first year and for as long as the power holder owns the withdrawn
property and the withdrawn property continues to be a fractional share of the aggregate of
what is withdrawn and what remains in the trust.
As a third example, assume that the facts are the same as in the first example
except that the power exists only on the first day of the first year. The results are the
same as in the first example.
As a fourth example, assume that the facts are the same as in the first example
except that (as in the forms) the power exists only immediately before the end of the
year.
The results are the same as in the first example except that in the first year the
power holder arguably does not own, for income tax purposes, any of the trust estate.
As a fifth example, assume that the facts are the same as in the first example
except that the power recurs each year. The Internal Revenue Service might assert that
the power holder becomes the owner, for income tax purposes, of an additional portion of
the trust estate each year.
See Code §678(a) (2) and Ltr. Ruls. 200022035 and 9034004.
The theory of the Service in Letter Rulings 200022035 and 9034004 is that a power to
withdraw five percent each year applies to all of the trust estate (i.e., the same
property) each year and, therefore, the power holder has the right each year to withdraw
both (i) five percent of the portion of the trust estate that the power holder previously
did not own for income tax purposes and (ii) five percent of the portion of the trust
estate that the power holder previously did own for income tax purposes. The effect of
the theory is that each year the power holder additionally becomes the owner for income
tax purposes of five percent of the portion of the trust estate that previously the power
holder did not own. The theory of Letter Rulings 200022035 and 9034004 is not binding.
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According to another theory applied to the fifth example, the power applies each
year to all of the trust estate (i.e., the same as according to the theory of Letter
Rulings 200022035 and 9034004) but the power applies, for income tax purposes, each
subsequent year the same as it applies the first year, so that the portion that the power
holder owns does not increase each year.
According to yet another theory, previously discussed, a lapse is not a release.
Therefore, Code Section 678(a) (2) is not operative and the taxpayer owns only any portion
that the taxpayer presently can withdraw. An implication of this theory is that the
amount of income that the taxpayer owns is a function of the time that the power exists.
Arguably, a power that is exercisable only immediately before the end of the year does not
cause the taxpayer to own any income.
Perhaps a taxpayer can choose any of the theories, if he or she follows the chosen
theory consistently.
If the gross income of the power holder would include all ordinary income of the
trust even if the power were not to exist, the power additionally would include only a
portion of corpus income in the gross income of the power holder.
If, on the other hand,
the gross income of the power holder would not include all ordinary income of the trust if
the power were not to exist, the power additionally would include a portion of ordinary
income and a portion of corpus income in the gross income of the power holder.
The extent to which the addition of the power would alter the tax burden of the
power holder would depend upon whether the power would cause the power holder to own the
same, or an additional, portion of the trust estate each year. The grantor, in any event,
should consider including sufficient flexibility to permit the power holder to receive
from the trust sufficient property to discharge any income tax liability of the power
holder that is attributable to the trust.

An additional implication for income tax purposes is that even if satisfaction in
kind of a right to withdraw a dollar amount would produce a deemed sale of the property
which is distributed, expression of the unitrust interest as a right to withdraw a
fractional (or percentage) portion of the trust estate (or, alternatively, at least if the
exercise of the right is not framed as a withdrawal of a dollar amount and the dollar
ceiling in fact does not define the withdrawal, expression of the right to withdraw as so
much of the trust estate as has a value at the time of distribution equal to the value of
a fractional portion at the time of lapse or exercise of the right) should cause
satisfaction of the right in kind not to produce a deemed sale. Code §663(a) (1), Treas.
Reg. §§1.661(a)-2(f) (1), 1.1014-4 (a) (3) and 1.663(a)-l(b) (1), Rev. Rul. 60-87,1960-1 C.B.
286, Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940), and Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp.
113 (D.Conn. 1935), affirmed 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied 299 U.S. 573
(1936). Cf. Rev. Rul 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225.
Even more comprehensively, an alternative theory might prevent sale or exchange
treatment upon satisfaction in kind of the alternative version of the right to withdraw
which appears at variable c of Form 3.31. According to grantor-trust principles under
Code Section 678, because of how the right to withdraw is expressed, the donee of the
right to withdraw arguably is the owner (for income-tax purposes) of whatever assets in
fact satisfy the right.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 C.B. 225. According to the theory,
any deemed sale is a sale by the trustee to the donee. However, because of grantor-trust
principles, the trust, to this extent, is an alter ego of the donee. A sale by a person
to himself or herself is not cognizable for income-tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 85-13,
1985-1 C.B. 194.
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3A.08(a) (7)
It

Interface Between Income Tax and Transfer Tax Implications, and Planning for

By including income in the gross income of a unitrust recipient who does not
receive the income but who nevertheless pays the income tax upon it and thus preserves it
intact for others, the right to withdraw might enhance the property that a given amount of
transfer (for gift or estate tax purposes) can make available for members of the family of
the power holder. However, with uncertain effect, the Internal Revenue Service might
attempt to treat the power holder's payment of income tax as a contribution to the trust
to any extent that the payment exceeds the amount that the power holder receives from the
trust. The Internal Revenue Service announced this position in Letter Ruling 9444033.
However, the Internal Revenue Service withdrew the position in Letter Ruling 9543049,
which the Service used to modify Letter Ruling 9444033.
Treatment of the payment of tax as a contribution would include the deemed
contribution in the gross estate or transfers for gift tax purposes, or (depending upon
the configuration of the trust) both the gross estate and the transfers for gift tax
purposes, of the power holder.
Code §2511. The power holder can avoid these results by
receiving from the trust, each year, property that has a value at least equal to the
marginal amount of income tax which the right to withdraw causes the power holder to pay.
A grantor can arm the power holder, himself or herself, with the solution to this
transfer-tax issue by giving the power holder a nongeneral power to appoint the trust
estate and a continuing right to withdraw any of the trust estate that, because the power
holder contributed it or is deemed to have contributed it, would be included in the gross
estate of the power holder for estate tax purposes if the power holder were to die.
Alternatively, the grantor can address the issue by giving the power holder a nongeneral
power to appoint the trust estate and, instead of giving the power holder a power to
withdraw the would-be-"included portion," give an independent trustee a discretionary
power to pay the would-be-included portion to the donee of the Give-Me-Five power. As an
additional alternative, perhaps a trustee can address the issue by exercising an
ascertainable-standard-limited power to pay the would-be-included portion to the donee.
Because of the apparent dissipation of the transfer-tax issue as an issue, the
writer now prefers not to include a right to withdraw the included portion but, rather, to
rely upon a discretionary power in the hands of an independent trustee and an
ascertainable-standard-limited power in the hands of any trustee and, if the grantor
wants, to add only a provision that eliminates any income-tax burden which the donee of
the Give-Me-Five power might want not to assume.
The issue of imposition of an unwanted burden to pay income tax appears more
important than the issue of whether a donee's payment of income tax is deemed a
contribution to the trust.
Even if the donee's payment were a contribution, the
contribution would tend not to increase exposure to transfer tax. The same exposure would
exist if the trustee were to return the contribution to the donee. Additionally, an
independent trustee with discretionary power (or perhaps even any trustee pursuant to an
ascertainable-standard-limited power) could avoid the inclusion by distribution to the
donee of any of the trust estate that, but for the distribution, the Give-Me-Five power
would include in the transfer tax base of the donee. By contrast, although an independent
trustee can use a discretionary power (or perhaps even any other trustee can use an
ascertainable-standard-limited power) to eliminate the burden of a donee of a Give-Me-Five
power to pay income tax on income that the donee is deemed to own according to Code
Section 678, the donee might prefer in any event to avoid the insecurity of not knowing
whether the trustee will relieve the burden.
A grantor who is considering eliminating the insecurity confronts a dilemma.
Elimination of the insecurity seems to require inclusion of a mandate in the governing
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instrument. Although a donee can exercise a power of appointment to install or eliminate
the mandate for beneficiaries after the death of the donee, the donee appears unable to
install or eliminate a mandate for the donee.
Inclusion of a mandate will tend to enhance
the security of the donee but, assuming that a donee's payments of income tax are not
deemed contributions, reduce the portion of the trust estate that can escape transfer tax.
Elimination of a mandate will tend to reduce the security of the donee but, assuming that
a donee's payments of income tax are not deemed contributions, increase the portion of the
trust estate that can escape transfer tax.
The solution that the writer currently
endorses is to include the mandate but to permit an independent trustee to remove it.
3A.08(a) (8)

Conclusion

compared to a trust that mandates the current payment of all income, a
withdrawable-percentage unitrust might increase the taxable income of the primary
beneficiary and reduce the taxable income of the trustee. However, the rate that applies
to the taxable income of a trustee reaches the maximum at a lower level of taxable income
than the rate that applies to the taxable income of an individual. Therefore, the
withdrawable-percentage unitrust usually will not increase (and often will decrease) the
aggregate of the income tax. Although the withdrawable-percentage unitrust will tend to
increase the difficulty of determining the income tax,it will tend not to increase the
tax itself. A withdrawable-percentage unitrust that is designed for flexibility can cope
with the additional complexity.
Transfer tax advantages and investment advantages are what make the withdrawablepercentage unitrust an attractive alternative to a trust that mandates the current payment
of income.
Free of transfer tax, the primary beneficiary of the withdrawable-percentage
unitrust can cause the trust to shelter from transfer tax at least all of the trust estate
in excess of the aggregate of the income tax liabilities of the beneficiary, and of the
trustee, with respect to taxable income that is attributable to the trust.
By contrast,
the most that the primary beneficiary can allow to pass free of transfer tax by means of
the pay-alI-income trust is the portion of the trust estate that exceeds the sum of the
trust accounting income and the income tax liability of the trustee.
Stated differently,
this portion consists of the trust accounting principal that remains after the trustee
pays all income tax upon corpus income.
Even assuming that the Internal Revenue Service is correct about a beneficiary
making a contribution to a trust to the extent that the beneficiary's payment of income
tax upon taxable income which is attributable to the trust exceeds what the beneficiary
receives from the trust, (i) all of the trust estate (i.e., trust accounting income plus
trust accounting principal) net of the income tax upon the taxable income that is
attributable to the trust exceeds (ii) the trust accounting principal net of income tax
upon corpus income. The difference is significant.
It consists of the amount by which
trust accounting income exceeds the income tax that is attributable to the trust
accounting income.
Stated differently, this amount is the after-tax income of the trust.

SUBCHAPTER B:
OTHER BENEFICIARIES:
DISCRETIONARY DISTRIBUTIONS:
NONINDEPENDENT PERSON
POSSESSES NONFIDUCIARY DISCRETION
(POWERS OF APPOINTMENT)

3B.Ol
3B.Ol(a)

DURING LIFE OF POWER HOLDER

Nongeneral Power of Appointment
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Form 3.32

a
b
c
d

e

Additionally, the Trustee shall pay so much or all, if any, of the
[principal]
[trust estate]
to such one or more
[members of a group consisting exclusively of my descendants]
[appointees, other than my wife and the estate, creditors and creditors of the
estate of my wife,]
in such amounts and portions and subject to such trusts, terms and conditions as my
wife directs in writing at any time and from time to time.
[Section 4.06. Certain Powers of Appointment. Anything to the contrary
notwithstanding, no power of appointment granted in this instrument with limitation
of permissible appointees shall be exercisable, directly or indirectly, (a) to
discharge any legal obligation of the person given the power or (b) in favor of the
person given the power or the creditors or the estate or the creditors of the
estate of the person given the power. The preceding sentence shall not apply to
any power given a trustee or to any power to withdraw.]

3B.01(a) (1)

Effects of Possession and Exercise

The exercise of a nonfiduciary, nongeneral power of appointment by a power holder
who has a beneficial interest in the subject property is deemed to be a gift to such
extent as the exercise transfers the beneficial interest of the power holder.
Rev. Rul.
79-327, 1979-2 C.B. 342, and Regester v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 1 (1984).
Contra James C.
Self, Jr. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1956), 56-2 USTC '11,613. Because
the power is not a fiduciary power of a trustee, an ascertainable standard is not a
solution.
Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(g) (2).
The mere possession of this power does not
include the property in the transfer tax base of the power holder.

3B.01(a) (2)
Preventing General Power of Appointment Because of Power Holder's Powers To
Pay to Other Than Self
The ability of a person to exercise this power to discharge his or her legal
obligation seems very unlikely.
The power permits payments only to other than the power
holder. Any payment that would discharge a legal obligation of the power holder would
seem to be solely for the benefit of, and, therefore, a payment to, someone to whom the
power does not permit distributions and, therefore, would appear to violate the trust.
Assuming that the issue otherwise would exist, use of variable e in Form 3.32 should avoid
it.

*
3B.02
3B.02(a)

*

*

AFTER DEATH OF POWER HOLDER

Nongeneral Power of Appointment Exercisable by Will

Form 3.37

a
b

(B) Disposition on Death of Survivor. Upon the death of my wife, if my
wife survives me, the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of the Remainder
Trust to such one or more
[members of a group consisting exclusively of my descendants]
[appointees, other than the estate, creditors and creditors of the estate of my
wife, ]
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in such amounts and portions and subject to such trusts, terms and conditions as my
wife may appoint by Will specifically referring to this power. Upon the death of
the survivor of my wife and me, to such extent, if any, as the trust estate of the
Remainder Trust is not effectively appointed, the Trustee shall distribute the
trust estate of the Remainder Trust to the Trustee of the Family Trust under
Section 3.05.
3B.02(a) (1)

Estate and Gift Tax Effects

Neither the possession nor the exercise of a nongeneral power of appointment that
is exercisable by will generates any liability for gift tax or estate tax.

* * *
CHAPTER 4
SHELTERING OF EXEMPTIONS:
METHODS, AMOUNTS AND ADJUSTMENTS

4.01

4.01(a)

OWNERSHIP AND PAYMENT OF ASSETS

Transfer Tax

As estate tax and generation-skipping tax exemptions increase, in phases, according
to the tax law of 2001, increased opportunities will exist for spouses to benefit
themselves and the survivor of the two of them and yet leave assets to or for other
beneficiaries totally free of estate tax and generation-skipping tax. Nevertheless, many
are dying without using even current exemptions, under circumstances in which surviving
spouses will have assets that greatly will exceed their own exemptions. These situations
are wasted opportunities.
The manner in which a spouse owns his or her assets during his or her life and
provides for their payment upon his or her death is critically important.
It will become
even more important as increased exemptions phase into existence. Use of the increased
exemptions of each of two spouses, regardless of which spouse dies first, will require
corresponding adjustments in ownership and payment. Contrary to the use of the marital
deduction, the use of the exemptions of a predeceasing spouse upon his or her death
requires that the predeceasing spouse transfer property in such manner as does not cause
the surviving spouse to own (or be deemed to own) it.
A lawyer can prepare documents that can implement the clients' plan. However, the
clients must arrange the ownership and payment of their assets in such manner as enables
the documents to operate properly.
A first prerequisite to the full use of the exemptions of each of two spouses is
that each spouse must own, in his or her separate name (or in the name of the trustee of
his or her revocable trust) or by means of an interest in an inter vivos QTIP trust,
assets which will not pass outright to the surviving spouse and which have a value equal
to the greater of the unused amount of the estate tax exemption and the unused amount of
the generation-skipping tax exemption.
Even though proper ownership is critically important, it is only a first
prerequisite to the use of the exemptions. A second prerequisite is that assets which are
intended to use exemptions must not be subject to payment arrangements (such as, for
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example, joint tenancy, tenancy by the entireties, community property with right of
survivorship, payable-on-death and beneficiary designation) which "force" the assets
outright to a surviving spouse. These payment arrangements do not use the exemptions.
Indeed, as the exemptions increase, these payment arrangements will tend increasingly to
prevent the use of the exemptions.
Not all (or, in a given case, even necessarily any) assets are available to permit
the use of exemptions.
First, any assets that should pass outright to the surviving
spouse upon the death of the predeceasing spouse are not available. Second, upon the
death of the owner, certain assets, such as interests in qualified plans of deferred
compensation, individual retirement accounts and tax-deferred annuities, produce better
results for income tax purposes if they are payable outright to a surviving spouse rather
than to a trust. Accordingly, absent special circumstances, the writer usually counsels
(i) naming the surviving spouse as first beneficiary of interests in qualified plans of
deferred compensation and individual retirement accounts and (ii) providing for passage to
a trust only to any extent that the spouse disclaims. Thus, usually, these interests are
only conditionally available upon the death of the owner and the use of other assets is
preferable. Third, during the life of the owner, the mere transfer of certain assets
(such as interests in qualified and nonqualified plans of deferred compensation,
individual retirement accounts, tax-deferred annuities and any other assets that include
ordinary income not yet taxed) can accelerate the recognition of income for income tax
purposes. Accordingly, these assets generally are not available for transfer during the
life of the owner. Fourth, because life insurance tends to have relatively little value
until the death of the insured, a given policy of life insurance tends to use the
exemptions much better when the insured is the owner.
Fifth, other considerations,
relating for example to divorce, security, control, management and psychological and
mechanical issues (including debt acceleration and dissipation of title and other
insurance), are potentially valid reasons to avoid or limit lifetime transfers between
spouses.

4.01(b)

Income Tax

The general principle of planning to maximize bases for income tax purposes
regardless of which of two spouses dies first is that each of two spouses should own,
outright, assets that are sufficient to maximize increases in bases (i) if either spouse
dies first (i.e., in 2010, assets that have unrealized appreciation of $1,300,000 plus
$3,000,000 = $4,300,000) and (ii) if either spouse survives the other spouse but the
predeceasing spouse uses a QTIP-style trust to accomplish the spousal increase at his or
her prior death (i.e., in 2010, assets that have unrealized appreciation of $1,300,000).
Deemed ownership by means of an interest in an inter vivos QTIP trust clearly is
sufficient to enable the owner to use his or her exemptions from the estate tax and the
generation-skipping tax. However, deemed ownership by means of an interest in an inter
vivos QTIP trust appears insufficient for purposes of permitting a basis increase
according to Code Section 1022.

4.01(c)

The Reluctant Donor

A property owner often is reluctant to transfer large amounts of property outright
to his or her spouse. Considerations of control, management, security and marital
stability can loom large. A property owner who is reluctant to transfer assets to his or
her spouse but who nevertheless wants to avoid the risk that the prior death of his or her
spouse will waste exemptions can consider two options. They are the inter vivos QTIP
trust mentioned at 4.01(c) (1) and the intraspousal agreement mentioned at 4.01(c) (2).

4.01(c) (1)

Inter Vivos QTIP Trust

I-51

Upon the donor's election, the donee spouse is deemed for transfer tax purposes to
own the trust estate of an inter vivos QTIP trust.
Therefore, the inter vivos QTIP trust
is an alternative to outright ownership to enable a less pecunious spouse to use his or
her exemptions if he or she dies first.
The extent of the flexibility that an inter vivos
QTIP trust might offer is the subject of Chapter 11.
4.01(c) (2)

Intraspousal Agreement

If an outright gift from one spouse to the other becomes the nonmarital property of
the donee, the gift, outright or in trust, can reduce the amount that the donor will
receive in the event of a subsequent divorce. An agreement between the spouses that the
outright gift or (as the case may be) the trust estate shall be marital property after the
transfer might cause the transfer not to reduce the property that the donor will receive
upon dissolution of the marriage.
The only difference between ~he outright transfer and the gift in trust is that, if
the gift is in trust and the donee spouse does not receive the trust estate outright upon
dissolution of the marriage, a court might not "credit" it entirely to the donee as
marital property. The trustee might avoid this problem by terminating the trust upon
dissolution of the marriage and distributing the trust estate to the donee.
Indeed, if
the donor prefers to credit the trust estate to the donee rather than to prevent the
property from passing to a subsequent spouse of the donee, the donor might draft the trust
to require outright distribution to the donee upon any dissolution of the marriage.
Might the characterization of the transferred property as marital property cause
the transferor to be deemed to retain an interest in it? Could an interest thus retained
undermine the arrangement for tax or dispositive purposes? Consider, for example, whether
whatever is deemed retained could prevent the gift from being outright, force
qualification for the marital deduction to depend upon compliance with the format of QTIP
and preclude compliance by depriving the donee of an income interest for life. Arguably,
however, this property would be no different from any other marital property. According
to some state law, the classification of property as marital or nonmarital does not
regulate the respective interests of the spouses in the property during the marriage.
Kujawinski ~ Kujawinski, 17 Ill. Dec. 801 (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382.
If the donor believes that the characterization of the transferred property as
marital property might create some sort of reversionary interest which might jeopardize
the marital deduction for gift tax purposes, the donor might avoid the risk by waiving all
right to receive the transferred property upon any dissolution of the marriage.
If the
donor retains less than fifty percent of the marital property of the spouses, the transfer
coupled with the waiver might reduce the amount that the donor'will receive upon
dissolution of the marriage. However, if the donor retains at least fifty percent of the
marital property of the spouses, the waiver should tend not to reduce the amount that the
donor will receive upon dissolution of the marriage.

4.02

WHY SHELTER RATHER THAN DEDUCT?

Except for gifts that are excluded from taxable gifts, the spouse of the property
owner is the only individual for whose benefit the property owner can choose between
taxable transfers and (by means of the marital deduction) nontaxable transfers. When
transferring property for the benefit of a spouse, to what extent (if any) should a donor
or predeceasing spouse avoid including the transferred property in the transfer tax base
of the other spouse, i.e., not use the marital deduction and instead avoid transfer tax by
using a taxable transfer and a credit against the resulting tax?
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The applicable or unified credit of a taxpayer can "shelter" the transfer of the
"exemption equivalent" from transfer tax not only upon its transfer by the decedent or
donor but also at least at the level of the generation of the decedent or donor. The
amount that can pass free of transfer tax because of the applicable or unified credit and
that, therefore, is equivalent to an amount that is exempt from transfer tax is sometimes
known as the "credit-shelter" or "exemption-equivalent" amount. As to the portion of the
exemption equivalent that is consumed and, thus, is not available for beneficiaries,
"sheltering" refers to using various credits to eliminate tax. A property owner can make
the exemption equivalent (minus such portion of it as is represented by items that are
consumed, ~ , costs of administration that are not deducted for United States estate tax
purposes) available for enjoyment by one or more persons without including in the transfer
tax base of any person any of the property that is not distributed to the person.
The applicable or unified credit (and certain other credits) permanently can
eliminate tax at the level of a particular generation. However, to such extent as it
causes the recipient to have a sum of adjusted taxable gifts and taxable estate greater
than the amount that the applicable or unified credit of the recipient can shelter, the
marital deduction only can defer the tax.

4.03

ALL OR NOTHING AT ALL

Some practitioners apparently intend to use by-pass-type trusts to shelter to the
maximum extent transfers that occur while the estate and generation-skipping taxes exist
and not to use at all these types of trusts to shelter transfers that occur after repeal.
These practitioners would create ever-larger shelters until 2010, and no shelters whatever
after 2009.
Unrefined versions of this planning appear to present inconsistencies. A first
glance might suggest that consistency requires either termination of all shelter vehicles
at the time of repeal, or, alternatively, that it requires continuation of sheltering of
all transfers that occur while the estate and generation-skipping taxes do not exist.
The first glance would appear incomplete, as the variables have different
implications for different situations. As seen from the perspective of a possible
restoration of the taxes after repeal, repeal is simply the upper limit of a progression
of increases in exemptions. As seen from this perspective, the planner would continue to
use the shelter possibilities of repeal, for the same reason that the planner would use
the shelter possibilities of the exemption increases that precede repeal.

4.04

A MORE MEASURED APPROACH

Rejection of planning that would terminate all shelters in all situations at the
same time does not necessarily imply rejection of planning that would terminate some
shelters in some situations at some time.
If some level of exemption is sufficient, per
~, without the use of any trust, to shelter all transfers from tax, the use of trusts to
supplement exemptions might become unnecessary at some level of exemption. Focusing
solely upon estate tax at the level of the generation of a property owner and his or her
spouse, if the aggregate transfers that would be taxable for estate tax purposes would be
less than the exemption, the predeceasing spouse could transfer his or her property any
way he or she wished, outright or otherwise, because no sheltering by means of by-pass
trusts would be necessary to eliminate estate tax at the level of his or her generation.
Focusing again solely upon estate tax at the level of the generation of a property
owner and his or her spouse, if the aggregate transfers that would be taxable for estate
tax purposes would be between one and two times the exemption, some use of by-pass-type
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trusts to shelter the exemption would be indicated upon the death of the predeceasing
spouse in order to eliminate estate tax at the level of the generation of the spouses.
The indicated shelter would range from zero (at the level of aggregate transfers equal to
one exemption) to the entire amount of the unused exemption of the predeceasing spouse (at
the level of aggregate transfers equal to two exemptions) .
Planning for aggregate transfers of more than one but less than two times the
exemption often follows a pattern of using by-pass-type trusts to shelter all of the
exemption of the predeceasing spouse rather than using by-pass-type trusts to shelter only
so much of the exemption as, if the exempt transfers were added to the property of the
surviving spouse, would exceed the unused exemption of the survivor. Assume, for example,
that the exemption is $2,000,000, that a husband has $2,100,000 and that his wife has
zero. The husband can eliminate tax by using a by-pass-type trust to shelter only
$100,000 of the husband's exemption. Thus, the husband can make an outright disposition
of $2,000,000. However, "classical" marital-deduction planning would use a by-pass-type
trust to shelter $2,000,000 and would include a disposition of only $100,000 outright.
Assume that the husband owns most of the income-producing property of the family,
that the value of this property approximates the exemption and that the non incomeproducing property (consisting of a home and tangibles) should pass outright to the
surviving spouse.
Is "classical" planning appropriate? Asked differently, is a shelter
trust an appropriate vehicle for most of the income-producing property of the family?
Because of possible increases in values and decreases in exemptions, any other planning
risks adding too much value to the gross estate of the surviving spouse.
Focusing yet again solely upon estate tax at the level of the generation of a
property owner and his or her spouse, if the aggregate transfers that would be taxable for
estate tax purposes would exceed two times the exemption, use of a by-pass-type trust
would be indicated to shelter all of the property of the predeceasing spouse to the extent
of the unused exemption of the predeceasing spouse.
The unknown variables are, first, the amounts of transfers that will occur and,
second, the amounts of exemptions that will be available when the transfers occur. These
variables will determine the extent to which shelter by means of by-pass-type trusts is
necessary to avoid the taxes.
As concerns the amounts of exemptions, the property owner might plan by assuming
exemptions equal to the exemptions that are in place, or that shortly are to become
effective, as of the time of the planning. A premise is that Congress might repeal
increases that are scheduled for the future. Another premise is that Congress will not
repeal increases that presently exist or that are the first-scheduled to occur.
As concerns the amounts of transfers, the planner might apply procedures similar to
those that the planner used before EGTRRA to determine the propriety of sheltering by
means of by-pass-type trusts. The property owner might project forward from the time of
the planning to the scheduled time of repeal and, on the basis of the owner's view about
the value of the owner's property, the likelihood of the occurrence and continuation of
repeal and the amounts of exemptions that likely will attend a restoration of the taxes,
determine the extent (if any) that shelter by means of a by-pass-type trust is reasonably
likely to save tax.
As a matter of principle, an analysis that compares exemptions and transfers under
the EGTRRA regime is quite similar to, but much more tenuous than, the type of analysis
that a property owner often undertook before EGTRRA to determine the advisability of using
by-pass-type trusts to shelter exempt amounts. A property owner in any event might have
little ability to know whether the shelter of a by-pass-type trust is reasonably likely to
save tax. Often, a property owner will have little ability to predict the net worth of a
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descendant. Among the unknowables are the one or more marriages of the descendant and the
one or more marriages of each ancestor of the descendant who also is a descendant of the
property owner. Uncertainty about the rules and about the time that apparently must pass
before a by-pass-type trust can save tax after repeal compound the difficulty.
Repeal might prove, for many situations, a convenient and otherwise appropriate
juncture at which to stop, or at least to reassess, the use of trusts to supplement
exemptions. The propriety is attributable to the probability that, even if the taxes are
restored, the exemptions greatly will exceed the wealth of many, if not most, individuals
for whom sheltering by means of by-pass-type trusts is standard fare.
The convenience is
attributable to a necessity, in any event, to change dispositions, or at least the
description of dispositions, upon repeal. Standard formulae will tend to function
intelligibly, albeit in some cases increasingly roughly, until repeal. Any attempt to
refine by terminating shelter at a particular level of increased exemption would appear to
present greater risks than those that it would address. A property owner might determine
that repeal is a convenient and appropriate time to stop using by-pass-type trusts to
shelter future transfers but to continue to use by-pass-type trusts to shelter prior
transfers.
Increases in bases according to Code Section 1022(c) are available for dispositions
that are outright or in QTIP-style trusts. Therefore, whether a property owner will use
the format of the QTIP-style trust (i.e., a by-pass-type trust), rather than an outright
gift, can depend solely on transfer tax and nontax, rather than on income tax,
considerations. A property owner whose wealth clearly does not exceed the amount that the
restored taxes would exempt and who is willing to use an outright transfer to a surviving
spouse to maximize bases increases according to Code Section 1022(c) might have no need
for by-pass-trust sheltering upon and after repeal.
Interestingly, the exemptions that will be available before repeal will permit a
property owner to transfer assets to other than a surviving spouse, but the effectively
unlimited exemptions that will be available during repeal will tend to skew dispositions
solely to or for the spouse. The reason is that repeal also will carry with it an
incentive to allocate assets (consisting of such assets as are sufficient to absorb bases
increases of three million dollars or more) in a basis-increase type of trust for the
surviving spouse. The planning implications of this diversion are startling. Even in
situations in which the surviving spouse is wealthy and does not need the beneficial
enjoyment of the assets of the decedent, and persons other than the spouse do need the
beneficial enjoyment of those assets, a decedent who wants to maximize bases might have to
deploy most or all of his or her wealth to or for his or her spouse.
The property owner whose estate clearly exceeds the amounts necessary to increase
bases according to Code Section 1022 can use a formula to allocate to a nonQTIP-style, bypass-type trust the assets that are necessary to increase bases according to Code Section
1022(b), can use the same formula to allocate to a QTIP-style trust the assets that are
necessary to increase bases according to Code Section 1022(c) and can use the same formula
yet again to allocate the balance of the assets to the nonQTIP-style, by-pass-type trust.
The uncertainty and corresponding desire for flexibility and simplicity might cause
a property owner who remains reluctant entirely to forgo sheltering by means of by-passtype trusts to determine, at least, that repeal is a convenient and appropriate time to
shift to the discretionary use of by-pass-type trusts, by means of disclaimers, and to
stop the mandatory use of by-pass-type trusts.
For example, a property owner who
encounters the increasingly likely situation in which only a relatively small amount of
assets will remain for a basis increase according to Code Section 1022(c), after the
amount that can maximize bases according to Code Section 1022(b) is allocated to a
nonQTIP-style, by-pass-type trust, can use a formula to allocate to a nonQTIP-style, bypass-type trust the assets that can maximize basis according to Code Section 1022(b) and
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to allocate the balance outright to the spouse or, to such extent as the spouse disclaims
in order also to shelter some or all of the excess, to a QTIP style of disclaimer
receptacle. Alternatively, a property owner can leave all assets outright to the spouse
or, to such extent (if any) as the spouse disclaims in order to shelter by means of a bypass-type trust, to a QTIP style of disclaimer receptacle.
Alternatively, a property owner who wants to mandate a maximum shelter or for
non tax reasons does not want to use an outright gift to a spouse but nevertheless wants to
respond to uncertainty with relative flexibility and simplicity can allocate all assets to
a QTIP-style trust. This configuration will sacrifice some efficiency of shelter, as, of
course, it will force all income into the hands of the surviving spouse. Accordingly, the
owner who uses this type of vehicle will trade some inefficiency of shelter for some
efficiency of administration.

*
4.07

*

*

PRESERVING THE CHOICE

The alternatives with respect to transfers in excess of the exemption equivalent
are (i) use the marital deduction and defer tax, (ii) forgo the marital deduction and
(iii) forgo the marital deduction and use the credit for tax on prior transfers. The
extent to which use of the marital deduction is advisable might depend upon (i) the
ability of the surviving spouse to benefit from the deferred tax after the death of the
predeceasing spouse and (ii) the availability of the credit for tax on prior transfers.
Each of these is a function, among things, of the length of time that the surviving spouse
survives. Use of the credit for tax on prior transfers often is the most attractive
alternative in terms of minimizing the cost of transferring property to beneficiaries in
lower generations.
The principal object of planning is to preserve the choice as long as possible.
Maximization of flexibility to use or not to use the marital deduction requires (i) making
the deduction available both (a) for the estate of the predeceasing spouse if one spouse
survives the other and (b) for whichever estate for which it will produce the better
result if the spouses die simultaneously and (ii) avoiding dispositive provisions that
force the use of the marital deduction before other rules force the making of a choice.
QTIP is the only marital arrangement that meets these criteria. QTIP is the only
arrangement that need not have dispositive provisions that force the principal into the
gross estate of the surviving spouse. Unlike outright gifts and power-of-appointment
arrangements, the creation, per se, of a QTIP arrangement does not include the principal
in the gross estate of the surviving spouse. A power-of-appointment arrangement can defer
the choice only for the longest time (i.e., six months) that the predeceasing spouse can
require the surviving spouse to survive or, at most, the time within which any disclaimer
is timely (i.e., nine months). However, a QTIP arrangement can defer it at least fifteen
months. The choice between use and nonuse of the marital deduction is required by the due
date (including extensions) for the estate tax return.
The return is due nine months
after the death of the decedent, but an extension of six months automatically is
available.
Preserving the possibility (but nevertheless avoiding the necessity) of qualifying
the arrangement for the marital deduction requires the planner always to consider
providing that the spouse is presumed to survive if the testator and the spouse die under
circumstances that there is no sufficient evidence that they died other than
simultaneously.
If the testator desires to include a general power of appointment over
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any of the trust, condition it upon the spouse's survival by fifteen months, in order, if
the spouse dies before the power becomes operative, to preserve the choice.
The interest of the spouse in a disposition that has the format of QTIP but with
respect to which a QTIP election is not made is measurable according to actuarial
principles. Therefore, a failure to make a QTIP election avoids inclusion of the
principal in the gross estate of the spouse but qualifies the interest for the credit for
tax on prior transfers.

*
4.09

*

*

RECEPTACLES FOR SPOUSAL DISCLAIMERS

A person who wants to make a qualified disclaimer according to Code Section 2518
must not have any power to direct enjoyment of any disclaimed interest in a nontaxable
transfer. Several approaches appear available to produce this result when a trust is to
serve as a receptacle for disclaimed property. The passage of disclaimed property to a
disclaimant who is not the spouse of the decedent prevents the disclaimer from being
qualified. Therefore, any approach that causes the disclaimer to "pass" the property from
one disposition to another and yet to accord the disclaimant an interest or a power is
available only if the disclaimant is the spouse of the decedent.
The disclaimant should consider supplementing each of the approaches by disclaiming
any powers over the disclaimer receptacle that otherwise might permit the disclaimant to
direct the enjoyment of the portion of the trust estate which passes to the disclaimer
receptacle because of the disclaimer. The regulations use a rule of convenience for this
purpose. Treas. Reg. §25.2518-2(e) (5) Ex. (5). The regulations permit the disclaimant to
disclaim such fractional portion of the power(s) as corresponds to the value of the
disclaimed property compared to the value of all of the property including the disclaimed
property.
4.09(a)

Special "Disclaimer" Trust

Form 4.5
(D)
Certain Disclaimers. If my wife disclaims any property that
(absent the disclaimer) would be disposed by the preceding portion of this
Section, the Trustee as of my death shall distribute the property to the
Trustee of the Disclaimer Trust under Section 3.03, without my wife being
deemed to predecease me because of the disclaimer. If my wife disclaims all
interest that (absent the disclaimer) my wife would have in any property
according to Section 3.03, the Trustee as of my death shall distribute the
property as if my wife were to have predeceased me.

a

Section 3.03. Disclaimer Trust. The Trustee shall set apart, in a separate
trust to be known as the "Disclaimer Trust" and to be administered according to
this Section, any property distributed to the Trustee of the Disclaimer Trust.
Anything to the contrary notwithstanding,
[except for a fiduciary power granted in this Section to distribute to my wife
subject to an ascertainable standard,]
my wife shall not possess any power to direct the beneficial enjoyment of the trust
estate of the Disclaimer Trust.
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(A) Disposition During Life of My Wife. During the life of my wife,
the Trustee shall administer the Disclaimer Trust as provided in this
subsection (A). The Disclaimer Trust is primarily for the benefit of my
wife, and I would approve (but do not direct) the exercise of each power
(determined as if this sentence did not exist) to the maximum extent in
favor of my wife.
(1)
Income.
quarter-annually.

The Trustee shall pay the net income to my wife

(2)
Principal. The Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or
all, if any, of the principal as the Trustee determines to be
necessary or advisable from time to time, considering resources
otherwise available, to provide for her health, education and support
in the manner of living to which accustomed. Additionally, the
Trustee shall pay to my wife so much or all, if any, of any balance of
the principal as the Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute
discretion determines to be advisable from time to time, considering
or not considering resources otherwise available, for any purpose or
reason whatsoever, including the termination of the trust.
(B) DisDosition on Death of My Wife. Upon the death of my wife, the
Trustee shall distribute any undistributed or accrued income to her estate
and shall distribute the principal to the Trustee of the Family Trust under
Section 3.05.
4.09(a) (1)

Purpose and Drafting

A first approach, of which Form 4.5 is an example, is to include a trust that
solely is a receptacle for disclaimed property. Although this approach increases the
length of the governing instrument, it avoids uncertainty about the terms of the
disclaimer vehicle. The disclaimer trust might have an uneconomic size if it remains a
separate trust. However, the fiduciary might avoid the problem by consolidating the
disclaimer trust with an identical or similar trust.
If the other trust is similar but
not identical, the fiduciary might accomplish the consolidation by causing certain
features to apply only to a fractional portion of the consolidated trust. This, of
course, is an analogy to the disclaimer of powers that this writer has suggested as a
supplement to each of the approaches.

4.09(b)

Existing Trust

A second approach is to cause the disclaimed property to pass to a trust that is
designed to serve other than solely as a disclaimer receptacle and, therefore, is to be
included in the governing instrument in any event. This arrangement is available only if
an existing trust is a satisfactory vehicle. This approach might tend to cause the
drafter to draft the dual-purpose trust more rigidly than its principal purpose,
considered alone, would require.

4.09(c)

Existing Trust, With Modifications

A third approach is to cause the disclaimed property to pass to a trust that exists
to serve another purpose and to provide additionally that, with respect to the existing
trust, the disclaimant shall not have any power to direct enjoyment which would cause the
disclaimer to be a transfer for transfer tax purposes.
If this approach describes a
vehicle that is similar, but not identical, to the existing trust, it effectively
describes a situation similar to that of the consolidation, discussed above, of trusts
that are similar but not identical. Because this approach tends to be self-executing in
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the sense that it shapes the complexion of the receptacle at least partially by reference
to tax results rather than by reference to specific powers, some draftspersons might
decline to use it. Additionally, this approach is available only if an existing trust is
(with the prescribed modifications) a satisfactory vehicle.

4.09(d)

Special "Disclaimer" Trust, Created by Reference
to Existing Trust

A fourth approach is to create a trust that solely is to serve as a receptacle for
disclaimed property but, unlike the first approach which uses a verbatim statement of all
features of the trust, to create the trust by means of a single paragraph that
incorporates by reference (with modifications) the description of another trust that is
included for a different purpose.
For example, the draftsperson might incorporate by
reference and with specified modifications the description of the trust that is designed
to qualify for the marital deduction, either specifically or by reference to tax results,
or both. This approach is similar to the first.
Compared to the first, it shortens the
instrument. However, the brevity requires difficult drafting and can produce confusion.

4.09(e)

Original Trust

A fifth and different approach is simply to use the original disposition modified
by the deletion of any disclaimed interest. This approach does not cause the property to
pass to another vehicle. Thus, it does not require special drafting. However, if the
governing instrument in any event includes drafting for one of the approaches discussed
above, the disclaimant has a choice. The disclaimant can invoke one approach by
disclaiming one or more "interests" or can invoke the other approach by disclaiming the
"property. "

4.10 ENHANCING THE USE OF SPOUSAL DISCLAIMERS
THAT SALVAGE EXEMPTIONS BUT DO NOT FORGO ENJOYMENT
The purpose of the planning that is discussed in this 4.10 is to permit a surviving
spouse to salvage the estate tax exemption (and, in some cases, also the GST exemption) of
a predeceasing spouse with respect to property which, but for a disclaimer, is destined to
pass outright to the surviving spouse. The planning also is intended to enable the
surviving spouse to avoid the dilemma of including the property in his or her gross estate
or forgoing beneficial enjoyment. This type of planning will become increasingly
important as exemptions increase.

4.10(a)

Outright to Spouse by Joint Tenancy, Beneficiary
Designation or Bequest but, if Spouse Disclaims,
in Sheltered Disposition for Primary Benefit of
Spouse

Form 4.6

Section 2.03. Certain Disclaimers. If my wife disclaims any tangible
personal property that (absent the disclaimer) would pass to my wife outright
(including, without limitation, by bequest, survivorship or beneficiary
designation) because of my death and that (considering the disclaimer but assuming
that this Section were absent) would pass according to this Will, I give the
property as of my death to my wife for her life (with the power, without diverting
value, to sell in fee simple any or all of the property; provided, the life tenant
and remainder persons shall have the same rights and responsibilities with respect
to proceeds of any sale as each, absent the sale, would have had in the property
sold, and any purchaser may pay the proceeds to the life tenant without any duty to
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inquire about her application of them) and, upon the death of my wife (upon her
death any undistributed or accrued income shall be distributed to her estate), in
fee simple to
[the Trustee of the
[Portion Two]
Family Trust created according to the Trust described in Section 2.04]
[my descendants, per stirpes, who survive my wife]
If my wife disclaims all interest that (absent the disclaimer) my wife would
have in any property according to the preceding sentence, I give the property as of
my death as if my wife were to have predeceased me.
If my wife disclaims any
property (other than any tangible personal property) that (absent the disclaimer)
would pass to my wife outright (including, without limitation, by bequest, devise,
survivorship or beneficiary designation) because of my death and that (considering
the disclaimer but assuming that this Section were absent) would pass according to
Section 2.04, I give the property as of my death to the Trustee of the Disclaimer
Trust created according to the Trust described in Section 2.04, without my wife
being deemed to predecease me because of the disclaimer. If my wife disclaims all
interest that (absent the disclaimer) my wife would have in any property according
to the Disclaimer Trust, I give the property as of my death as if my wife were to
have predeceased me.
My Executor shall not take possession of any real property
disposed by this Section.

4.10(a) (1)

Purpose and Drafting

Form 4.6 is intended greatly to increase the assets (and, therefore, the value)
that the surviving spouse can enjoy inside or outside of his or her gross estate and,
correspondingly, include in or exclude from the taxable estate of the predeceasing spouse.
A QTIP election is available to fine-tune tax results. The form offers a "last chance"
for spouses who never have heeded instructions to reconfigure their assets between
themselves or who have failed to adjust ownership from time to time to facilitate
sheltering of increased exemptions. The form applies to property that, but for a
disclaimer, would pass outright to a surviving spouse by bequest or devise or, arguably,
joint tenancy or some types of beneficiary designations.
According to Illinois law, for example, "Unless expressly provided otherwise in an
instrument transferring the property or creating the interest disclaimed, the property,
part or interest disclaimed shall descend or be distributed . . . if a present interest .
in the case of a transfer by reason of the death of any person, as if the disclaimant
had predeceased the decedent . . . . " 755 ILCS 5/2-7(d). As applied to a joint tenancy,
the critical question is whether a will is "an instrument transferring the property . . .
disclaimed . . . . " Although the "transferring" according to the will occurs only after
(and not before) the disclaimer, the answer appears affirmative. Whether the statute
originally was intended to apply to the disclaimer of the accretive portion of a joint
tenancy appears immaterial, as no reason (including that of public policy) is apparent why
a disclaimant of an accretive portion is required, but a disclaimant of a bequest is not
required, to be deemed to predecease his or her spouse because of the disclaimer.
Commonly, a beneficiary designation provides that the property passes to a
subsequent designee if the primary designee (the spouse of the property owner, in this
case) fails to survive the owner. This type of designation "trumps" Form 4.6. However,
Form 4.6 appears to control in the limited situation in which the beneficiary designation
includes an ultimate, contingent disposition to the estate of the property owner and
either all intermediate designees disclaim their interests or the beneficiary designation
does not include any intermediate designee. Whether and to what extent an intermediate
designee who is not the spouse of the owner can disclaim a present interest but accept a
future interest, consisting of a remainder interest in a disclaimer vehicle, appears
unclear. Therefore, a preferred method of accomplishing the desired planning is to avoid
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the intermediate designation entirely and to plan instead (as in Form 4.7) for a
disclaimer as an adjunct of the primary designation.
Arguably, a legal life estate is the receptacle of choice in the case of a
disclaimer of tangible personal property. A legal life estate permits the surviving
spouse to have relatively unimpeded use of tangibles, such as paintings and antiques,
until death. The legal life estate for these tangibles is relatively unintrusive for
nontax purposes. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for tax purposes.
Some tangibles, such as jewelry, can have significant value but not much "use" to a
surviving spouse. By disclaiming both the outright gift and the legal life estate of a
particular asset, the surviving spouse can cause the asset to pass outright to children
according to a contingent gift to children conditioned upon nonsurvival of the spouse.
Relative flexibility makes a trust the disclaimer receptacle of choice for
intangibles and at least some realty. Although some of the "use" characteristics of
residences are similar to those of paintings and antiques and, therefore, relatively
easily can lend themselves to the configuration of a legal life estate, residences tend to
have greater values than tangibles and the greater values can present greater needs for
sales and for investment and management of proceeds.
By precluding a surviving spouse from retaining any ability to direct beneficial
enjoyment, including by means of powers of appointment exercisable during life and at
death, a disclaimer "ossifies" the disposition that begins upon the death of the surviving
spouse, perhaps many years after the disclaimer. Thus, a high incentive exists at the
drafting stage to fashion a disclaimer vehicle that will tend to obsolesce least over
time.
Perhaps, simpler is better. Because tax laws and trust designs change more
frequently than the feelings of owners about the objects of their bounties, a disposition,
for example, "to my descendants, per stirpes, who survive my wife," seems likely to
obsolesce less than a disposition to a perpetual trust or, even, a disposition to
management trusts for descendants until staged ages. However, because simpler is not
necessarily better from a tax perspective, this reasoning seems most persuasive in the
case of tangibles, less in the case of realty and least in the case of intangibles.
Further, because an owner can transform property of any category into property of any
other category, a receptacle that is appropriate only for one type of property is exposed
to a risk of a change. Additionally, if a surviving spouse must rely on disclaimers to
"fill" the GST exemption of the predeceasing spouse, use of the exemption will tend to
require continuing trusts for descendants as receptacles for the disclaimed assets.
Arguably, a trust that is appropriate for the entire life of a person in a younger
generation is appropriate also, in the event of a disclaimer, for the remaining life of
the disclaimant plus the life of a person in a younger generation.
If spouses are unsure at the planning stage about whether the survivor should own a
particular asset, such as a home, outright, or instead should enjoy the asset as a
beneficiary of a disclaimer vehicle, the spouses should consider whether to retain the
asset in joint tenancy or, instead, title the asset solely in the name of one of them
and provide specifically by will that the asset shall pass outright to the other if the
other survives. According to the former arrangement one-half, and according to the latter
all, of the asset can pass to a disclaimer vehicle according to Form 4.6. Although in a
given situation ownership in the name of one spouse or the other might maximize the
property with respect to which the disclaimer planning can operate, in some situations
joint ownership might hedge against the inability to know in advance which spouse will die
first and whether a need will exist to enhance the taxable estate of the predeceasing
spouse whomever it is. Also, spouses might have a reluctance to change title of certain
assets, such as a home, from joint tenancy to one of the spouses during the marriage.
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Before they transfer ownership of a home, spouses should confirm with the mortgagee
that they can transfer ownership without accelerating mortgage debt and they should ask
the title insurer whether the transfer will dissipate the insurance and, if it will,
whether they can retain the insurance by purchasing an endorsement. Also, they should
engage the insurers of the home and its contents to cause the insurance properly to apply
after any change of ownership of the home or any other asset.
The inclusion of certain assets in a trust or legal life estate presents special
issues.
Inclusion of a home, for example, in a trust might (i) make unavailable a
homestead exemption for real estate tax purposes, (ii) prevent the surviving spouse from
excluding from taxable income any amount by which the home appreciates in value between
the death of the predeceasing spouse and the sale of the home and (iii) induce the
surviving spouse, for income tax reasons, to purchase or rent the home from the trust.
However, the issues arise only if the assets are to pass outright to the surviving spouse
upon the death of the predeceasing spouse and the surviving spouse disclaims the outright
gift. Therefore, a surviving spouse can review the issues, and accept or avoid them, at
the death of the predeceasing spouse.
A remainder interest that follows a legal life estate in a personal residence or
farm can qualify for the charitable deduction.
Code §§170(f) (3) (B) and 2055(e) (2).
If
the legal life estate-charitable remainder version is intended to qualify for both the
marital deduction and the charitable deduction upon the death of the predeceasing spouse,
rather than qualify as QTIP for the marital deduction upon the death of the predeceasing
spouse and qualify for the charitable deduction upon the death of the surviving spouse,
delete the power of sale.
See Code §2056(b) (8).
4.10(b) Gift of Interest in IRA or Qualified Plan Outright to Spouse but, if Spouse
Disclaims, in Sheltered Disposition for Primary Benefit of Spouse
Form 4.7
FIRST -

4.10 (b) (1)

If my spouse, JANE A. SMITH, survives me, to my spouse.
Notwithstanding the preceding portion of this beneficiary designation,
if my spouse disclaims any property that (absent the disclaimer) would
be disposed by the preceding portion of this beneficiary designation,
the property shall pass as of my death to the Trustee of the
Disclaimer Trust created according to my Declaration of Trust dated
November 25, 2002, without my spouse being deemed to predecease me
because of the disclaimer. If my spouse disclaims all interest that
(absent the disclaimer) my spouse would have in any property according
to the Disclaimer Trust, the property shall pass as of my death as if
my spouse were to have predeceased me.

Purpose

The purpose of this provision is similar to the purpose of the disclaimer planning
that is implicit in Form 4.6.
4.10(c)

Effect of Disclaimer upon Sizes of Marital and

Credit-Shelter
Dispositions

Form 4.8
For purposes of determining the numerator, the United States estate tax payable
because of my death shall be computed as if:

*

*

*
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(ii)
All of the trust estate (and all property that because of a disclaimer
is not part of the trust estate) of the Marital Trust (and of any other trust the
name of which is or includes Marital Trust but does not include Remainder) were to
qualify for the marital deduction, and no election according to Section 2056(b) (7)
(other than, to the extent possible, a deemed election described in Section
2056(b) (7) (C»
of the Code were to qualify other property for the marital
deduction.
4.10(c) (1)

Purpose

The draftsperson of a formula-marital or exemption-shelter disposition should
consider whether a disclaimer, either solely of property that absent the disclaimer would
(but because of the disclaimer would not) fund the formula-marital disposition or,
alternatively, of any property, shall cause the marital formula to enhance the marital
disposition to the size that the marital disposition would have been if the surviving
spouse had not made any disclaimer, or cause the exemption-shelter formula to reduce the
exemption-shelter disposition so that the taxable estate is the size that it would have
been absent the disclaimer, i.e., effectively, the formula shall ignore the disclaimer.
According to Form 4.5, Form 4.6 and Form 4.7, depending upon the extent of any QTIP
elections, the disclaimer can transform the transfer of the disclaimed assets from a
deductible transfer to the surviving spouse into a taxable transfer to a disclaimer
vehicle. Assume, for purposes of analysis of this 4.10(c) (1) that Form 4.8 is part of the
formula-marital disposition.
Assume in this paragraph that absent the disclaimer the disclaimed assets would
have funded the formula-marital disposition.
Even if the transfers to the disclaimer
vehicle are taxable and the sum of the values of the disclaimed assets and the taxable
estate absent the disclaimer would have exceeded the United States estate tax exemption,
the inclusion of Form 4.8 causes the disclaimer not to "oust" any property from the
credit-shelter disposition and not to replace in the formula-marital disposition property
with a value equal to the value that the disclaimer removed from the formula-marital
disposition.
The reason is that inclusion of Form 4.8 in the formula which produces the
formula-marital disposition and the credit-shelter disposition causes the formula to
ignore the disclaimer of any assets which, but for the disclaimer, would have funded the
formula-marital disposition, i.e., the formula includes assumptions that this disclaimer,
as opposed to the disclaimer that is described in Form 4.6 or Form 4.7, did not occur.
Assume in this and the next paragraph that absent the disclaimer the disclaimed
assets would have passed outright to the surviving spouse by joint tenancy, beneficiary
designation, devise or nonformula bequest, i.e., absent the disclaimer the disclaimed
assets would have funded a nonformula-marital disposition and would not have funded the
formula-marital disposition that is described in the first and second paragraphs of this
4.10(c) (1). Taxable transfers of the disclaimed assets to the disclaimer vehicle appear
first to "fill" the taxable estate of the predeceasing spouse to the extent of the estate
tax exemption and second to "oust" from the credit-shelter disposition (but not from the
disclaimer vehicle itself, i.e., the disclaimer does not oust from the disclaimer vehicle
any of the disclaimed assets themselves) any amount by which the taxable estate exceeds
the exemption and shift the amount to the formula-marital disposition. The reason is that
Form 4.8 does not cause the formula which produces the formula-marital disposition and the
credit-shelter disposition to ignore the effects of these disclaimers, i.e., it does not
include the assumption that these disclaimers did not occur.
Reversal of the result that is described in the preceding paragraph would require
either (i) broadening of the language of Form 4.8 to cause the formula to ignore all
disclaimers by the surviving spouse or (ii) special provision in the disclaimer itself.
Is a reversal desirable, by means of provision in the formula? Alternatively, is a
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reversal desirable by means of ad hoc provision in the disclaimer itself? Reversal in the
formula would appear in certain situations to foreclose, in advance, a means of "escape"
from a taxable estate that, because of unanticipated increases in the value of what would
have constituted the taxable estate absent the disclaimer, or because of unanticipated
increases in the value of the assets that are disclaimed, unexpectedly exceeds the
exemption. Broadening the language of the formula would limit the extent of the
disclaimer. The alternative of adding to the disclaimer itself would tend to increase the
extent of the disclaimer. Whether to reverse the result that is described in the
preceding paragraph should invite scrutiny on a case-by-case basis, as the reversal can
deprive the surviving spouse of any estate tax that the reversal generates. Thus, the
reversal also can deprive the disclaimant of desired enjoyment or flexibility.
4.10(d)

Effect of Disclaimer Upon Size and Inclusion Ratio
of GST-Exemption Disposition

4.10(d) (1)

Examples

Form 4.9
(C)
Disclaimer Trusts I and 2.
this Section:
(1)

Notwithstanding the preceding portion of

Creation.

(a)
The Trustee as of my death shall set apart, in a separate
trust to be known as "Disclaimer Trust Number 1," such fractional
share or all, if any, of the trust estate of the Disclaimer Trust as
has a numerator equal to the amount (if any) by which (I) my GST
exemption unallocated immediately before my death exceeds (II) the sum
of the values (for purposes of determining the United States estate
tax payable because of my death) of the trust estates of all other
trusts the names of which include Number 1 and which are created
according to this instrument, and a denominator equal to the value
(for such purposes) of the trust estate of the Disclaimer Trust.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, if the United States
generation-skipping tax is not in effect at my death, the Trustee as
of my death shall set apart, in a separate trust to be known as
"Disclaimer Trust Number 1," all of the trust estate of the Disclaimer
Trust.
(b) The Trustee as of my death shall set apart, in a separate
trust to be known as "Disclaimer Trust Number 2," the balance of the
trust estate of the Disclaimer Trust.
(2) Administration. The Trustee shall administer Disclaimer Trust
Number 1 and Disclaimer Trust Number 2 as if each, separately, were the
Disclaimer Trust; provided, the Trustee shall pay principal to my wife
pursuant to subsection (A) (2) of this Section solely from the trust estate
of Disclaimer Trust Number 2 until the trust estate of Disclaimer Trust
Number 2 is exhausted.
Form 4.10
(C)
Disclaimer Trusts 1 and 2.
this Section:
(1)

Notwithstanding the preceding portion of

Creation.
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(a) The Trustee as of my death shall designate as "Disclaimer
Trust Fractional Share Number 1" such fractional share or all, if any,
of the trust estate of the Disclaimer Trust as has a numerator equal
to the amount (if any) by which (I) my GST exemption unallocated
immediately before my death exceeds (II) the sum of the values (for
purposes of determining the United States estate tax payable because
of my death) of the trust estates of all trusts (and other fractional
shares) the names of which include Number 1 and which are created
according to this instrument, and a denominator equal to the value
(for such purposes) of the trust estate of the Disclaimer Trust.
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, if the United States
generation-skipping tax is not in effect at my death, the Trustee as
of my death shall set apart, in a separate trust to be known as
"Disclaimer Trust Number 1," all of the trust estate of the Disclaimer
Trust.
(b) The Trustee as of my death shall designate as "Disclaimer
Trust Fractional Share Number 2" the balance of the trust estate of
the Disclaimer Trust.
(2) Administration. The Trustee at any time may, and in any event no
later than upon the death of my wife the Trustee shall, divide the trust
estate of the Disclaimer Trust into separate trusts consisting,
respectively, of Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share Number 1 and Disclaimer
Trust Fractional Share Number 2, and from and after the division the
separate trust that is attributable to Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share
Number 1 shall be known as "Disclaimer Trust Number 1" and the separate
trust that is attributable to Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share Number 2
shall be known as "Disclaimer Trust Number 2." The Trustee shall administer
Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share (or, as the case may be, Disclaimer Trust)
Number 1 and Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share (or, as the case may be,
Disclaimer Trust) Number 2 as if each, separately, were the Disclaimer
Trust; provided, until the division of Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share
Number 1 and Fractional Share Number 2 into separate trusts, the Trustee
shall pay principal to my wife pursuant to subsection (A) (2) of this Section
prorata from the trust estate of Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share Number 1
and the trust estate of Disclaimer Trust Fractional Share Number 2, and from
and after the division the Trustee shall pay principal to my wife pursuant
to subsection (A) (2) of this Section solely from the trust estate of
Disclaimer Trust Number 2 until the trust estate of Disclaimer Trust Number
2 is exhausted.

Form 4.11
(c) Portion One additionally shall consist of such of the trust estate of
the Family Trust as is attributable to the largest fractional portion of the trust
estate of the Disclaimer Trust, of which I am the transferor for generationskipping tax purposes, that can have an inclusion ratio of zero for generationskipping tax purposes given the assumption that upon my death my personal
representative allocated to the Disclaimer Trust the amount (if any) by which my
GST exemption unallocated immediately before my death exceeded the sum of the
values (for purposes of determining the United States estate tax payable because of
my death) of the trust estates of all trusts the names of which included Number 1.
4.10(d) (2)

Purpose
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The purpose of expressing a disposition in terms of the GST exemption that is
unallocated immediately before the death of the transferor ("unallocated-GST-exemption
disposition") is to create a generation-skipping disposition that exactly can absorb all
unallocated GST exemption of the transferor and have an inclusion ratio of zero.
If the
transferor is the predeceasing spouse and the subject property is to benefit the surviving
spouse in a marital-deduction or credit-shelter disposition (so that the generationskipping aspect is not to occur until the death of the surviving spouse), the predeceasing
spouse must create the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition (or the components of the
disposition) upon the death of the predeceasing spouse and should segregate the
disposition (or the components) until the death of the surviving spouse and channel the
disposition (or the components) to the ultimate disposition upon the death of the
surviving spouse. The Code requires the allocation of a GST exemption no later than upon
the date prescribed for filing the estate tax return of the transferor.
Code §2632(a) (1).
4.10(d) (3)

Drafting

How can the language that creates the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition upon
the death of the predeceasing spouse allocate to the disposition not only any property
that remains in the disposition after the surviving spouse disclaims property "from" it
but also such additional property, from the disclaimer vehicle (Form 4.5), as is necessary
to permit the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition exactly to absorb all unallocated GST
exemption of the predeceasing spouse and have an inclusion ratio of zero? Absent a
disclaimer of the benefits of the disclaimer vehicle itself, the disclaimer vehicle can
include assets that the formula-marital disposition additionally would have included
absent the disclaimer. Additionally, if Form 4.6 and Form 4.7 are used in conjunction
with Form 4.5, the disclaimer vehicle will include any assets that absent the disclaimer
would have passed outright to the surviving spouse by beneficiary designation, joint
tenancy, bequest or devise but that because of the disclaimer pass instead to the
disclaimer vehicle for the benefit of the surviving spouse.
Consider two models.
Model #1 creates a reverse-QTIP-marital trust (i.e., Marital
Trust Number 1) with a value equal to "the amount (if any) by which (i) my GST exemption
unallocated immediately before my death exceeds (ii) the sum of the values (for purposes
of determining the United States estate tax payable because of my death) of (a) the trust
estate of Remainder Trust Number 1 [i.e., the GST-exempt-credit-shelter trust] and (b) all
property that because of a disclaimer by my wife is not part of the trust estate of
Remainder Trust Number I." Upon the death of the surviving spouse, Model #1 routes to the
unallocated-GST-exemption disposition "such of the trust estate of the Family Trust as is
(or but for a disclaimer by my wife would be) attributable to the trust estate of a trust
the name of which includes Number 1 [i.e., the reverse-QTIP-marital trust and the GSTexempt-credit-shelter trust]." According to a variation, Model #1 additionally channels
to the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition such of the trust estate of the Family Trust
as "but for my outright gift to my wife and the disclaimer of the gift by my wife" would
have been attributable to a trust the name of which includes Number 1.
Model #2 creates a reverse-QTIP-marital trust (i.e., Marital Trust Number 1) with a
value equal, simply, to "the amount (if any) by which (i) my GST exemption unallocated
immediately before my death exceeds (ii) the value (for purposes of determining the United
States estate tax payable because of my death) of the trust estate of Remainder Trust
Number 1 [i.e., the GST-exempt-credit-shelter trust]." According to different variations
(i.e., Form 4.9, Form 4.10 and Form 4.11), fractional shares are created upon the death of
the predeceasing spouse (Form 4.9 and Form 4.10) or upon the death of the surviving spouse
(Form 4.11) and, in the case of the variations that create fractional shares upon the
death of the predeceasing spouse, the fractional shares are severed into separate trusts
either upon the death of the predeceasing spouse (Form 4.9) or no later than upon the
death of the surviving spouse (Form 4.10).
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Upon the death of the surviving spouse, Model #2 does not allocate specifically to
the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition the assets that absent the disclaimer would have
been, but because of the disclaimer are not, part of the reverse-QTIP-marital trust (i.e.,
Marital Trust Number 1) or the GST-exempt-credit-shelter trust (i.e., Remainder Trust
Number 1). Rather, upon the death of the surviving spouse, according to the variations
that create the fractional shares upon the death of the predeceasing spouse (Form 4.9 and
Form 4.10), Model #2 specifically allocates to the disposition each fund (as, for example,
a reverse-QTIP-marital trust, i.e., Marital Trust Number 1, the GST-exempt-credit-shelter
trust, i.e., Remainder Trust Number 1, and a fractional portion of the disclaimer vehicle,
i.e., Disclaimer Trust Number 1) that exists for the purpose of segregating GST-exempt
property during the survival of the surviving spouse and funding the unallocated-GST
exemption disposition at the death of the surviving spouse. According to a variation that
creates the fractional shares upon the death of the surviving spouse (Form 4.11), (i)
Model #2 specifically allocates to the disposition each fund (as, for example, a reverseQTIP-marital trust, i.e., Marital Trust Number 1, and the GST-exempt-credit-shelter trust,
i.e., Remainder Trust Number 1) that exists for the purpose of segregating GST-exempt
property during the survival of the surviving spouse and funding the unallocated-GSTexemption disposition at the death of the surviving spouse and (ii) by formula (Form
4.11), Model #2 allocates to the disposition the largest fractional share of the
disclaimer vehicle, of which the predeceasing spouse is the transferor, that upon the
death of the surviving spouse can have an inclusion ratio of zero assuming that the
executor of the predeceasing spouse allocated GST exemption to the disclaimer vehicle in
an amount equal to the amount (if any) by which (i) the unallocated GST exemption of the
predeceasing spouse exceeded (ii) the sum of the original values (for purposes of
determining the United States estate tax payable because of the death of the predeceasing
spouse) of the funds that specifically are allocated.
Do the models permit the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition exactly to absorb
all of the unallocated GST exemption of the predeceasing spouse and have an inclusion
ratio of zero? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each model and variation?
Unless the unallocated GST exemption of the predeceasing spouse exceeds the value
(for purposes of determining the United States estate tax payable because of the death of
the predeceasing spouse) of the property of which the predeceasing spouse is (or, with a
reverse-QTIP election, can be) the transferor for generation-skipping tax purposes, and,
therefore, the trust estate of a disclaimer vehicle inherently will have an inclusion
ratio of zero, accomplishment of the purpose will require either (i) creation of separate
disclaimer vehicles, each with an inclusion ratio of zero or one, upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse, or (ii) reliance upon severing a disclaimer vehicle, upon the death
of the surviving spouse, into separate trusts, one with an inclusion ratio of zero and the
other with an inclusion ratio of one, in a "qualified severance" according to Code Section
2642(a) (3). Also, regardless of which of the two alternatives is used, accomplishment of
the purpose will require a mechanism to add the trust estate of a trust with an inclusion
ratio of zero to the generation-skipping disposition and to add the trust estate of a
trust with an inclusion ratio of one to another disposition.
Model #1 can permit accomplishment of the purpose. However, compared to Model #2,
Model #1 can apply relatively inefficiently.
If accomplishment of the purposes requires
extension of the reach of Model #1 to property that absent a disclaimer would have passed
outright to the surviving spouse by joint tenancy, beneficiary designation, bequest or
devise, Model #1 will present an issue. The extension will require the use of the
variation of Model #1, and the variation will require the tracking of each asset that the
spouse disclaims and that absent the outright gift to the surviving spouse and the
disclaimer would have funded the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition.
If the only
assets that pass to the disclaimer vehicle are those which absent the disclaimer would
have funded the unallocated-GST-exemption disposition, the disclaimer vehicle can consist
of a single trust with an inclusion ratio of zero. However, if any other assets (or
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undivided portions) also pass to the disclaimer vehicle, accomplishment of the purpose
will require division of the disclaimer vehicle into separate trusts upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse, no fewer than two and perhaps as many as are necessary to segregate
disclaimed assets or, even, to segregate undivided portions of disclaimed assets.
Unlike Model #1, Model #2 does not track particular assets. Rather, Model #2
focuses upon a single receptacle, a disclaimer vehicle, and upon fractional shares of the
receptacle. The latter approach appears easier to conceptualize and to manage.
It uses
only two shares each of which is a fractional share of the whole. The severance of the
fractional shares into separate trusts permits one of the shares to have an inclusion
ratio of zero and the other of the shares to have an inclusion ratio of one. By limiting
the disclaimer to the minimum that allows the trust estate of the disclaimer vehicle fully
to absorb the unallocated-GST exemption of the predeceasing spouse, the surviving spouse
can avoid the need for an additional vehicle or portion. Usually, no need will exist for
a greater disclaimer, as usually, but not always, a disclaimer that is the minimum
necessary to exhaust the GST exemption of the predeceasing spouse is also sufficient to
exhaust any otherwise-unused-estate-tax exemption of the predeceasing spouse.
The availability of a "qualified severance" can permit deferral of a severance
until the death of the surviving spouse.
It also can enhance flexibility and minimize
proliferation of trusts upon the death of the predeceasing spouse. Code Section
2642(a) (3), added in 2001, authorizes a "qualified severance." As is material to this
analysis, a qualified severance is a severance, "on a fractional basis," "made at any
time," of a single trust, with an inclusion ratio of more than zero and less than one,
into two trusts, one with an inclusion ratio of zero and the other with an inclusion ratio
of one, under circumstances in which "the terms of the new trusts, in the aggregate,
provide for the same succession of interests of beneficiaries as are provided in the
original trust." If any severance that is not a "qualified severance" is to create two
trusts from a single pool and one of the two is to have an inclusion ratio of zero and the
other is to have an inclusion ratio of one, the severance must occur upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse before the GST exemption of the predeceasing spouse is allocated.
Model #2 appears to permit severance of the fractional shares in a qualified
severance. Model #1, on the other hand, generally appears not to permit a qualified
severance. However, Model #1 appears generally to require separate vehicles from the
outset. The reason is that the focus of Model #1 upon particular assets seems generally
incompatible with the concept of a severance "on a fractional basis."
If, pursuant to a mandate or discretion, the trustee of Model #2 were to sever the
fractional shares into separate trusts upon the death of the predeceasing spouse rather
than during the survival or upon the death of the surviving spouse, the trustee could hold
the separate trusts "in solido" as owners in common. After the severance, depending upon
the terms of the governing instrument, the trustee could make any discretionary
distributions from each of the separate trusts proportionately, or could make
distributions disproportionately and adjust appropriately the respective fractions of
ownership. This method would protect against the need for, and possible unavailability
of, a qualified severance. Also, it might economize the time and cost required for
administration.
Assuming that discretionary distributions are possible during the survival of the
surviving spouse, the variation of Model #2 that creates separate trusts upon the death of
the predeceasing spouse (Form 4.9) is the most efficient for purposes of the
generation-skipping tax.
It is the only system that will retain inclusion ratios of zero
and one, respectively, regardless of whether and to what extent discretionary
distributions are made nonprorata from the two trusts.
It also is the only system that
will maximize the value of the separate trust that has an inclusion ratio of zero,
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assuming that the trustee makes all discretionary distributions from the separate trust
that is intended to have an inclusion ratio of one.
A variation of Model #2 that creates fractional shares upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse but that does not sever the shares into separate trusts until later
will produce inclusion ratios of zero and one, respectively, only if all discretionary
distributions during the survival of the surviving spouse before the severance of the
shares into separate trusts are made prorata from each share. By contrast, the variation
that creates the shares upon the death of the predeceasing spouse but also immediately
transforms the shares into separate trusts (Form 4.9) avoids an important problem that
attends the variation that creates fractional shares, unsevered, upon the death of the
predeceasing spouse (Form 4.10). The reason is that regardless of whether for fiduciary
accounting purposes the trustee of the last-described variation charges a discretionary
distribution to a particular share, the distribution effectively is chargeable
proportionately to both shares for GST-exemption purposes. See the chart, below, entitled
"Three Variations of Model #2 Showing Effects of Different Times of Creation and Severance
of Shares."
If a severance of fractional shares is not a qualified severance and, therefore,
each of the severed trusts has the same inclusion ratio, greater than zero and less than
one, as the disclaimer vehicle before the severance, or if for any other reason a trust
with an inclusion ratio greater than zero is destined for addition to the unallocated-GSTexemption disposition, the trustee still might minimize the effect of the taint. The
trustee might retain the tainted trust in a disposition parallel to the unallocated-GSTexemption disposition and invade the tainted, parallel disposition, to the extent
possible, for nons kip persons.
Notwithstanding the complexity of the generation-skipping-tax planning that can
attend spousal disclaimers, enhancement of spousal disclaimers for the purpose of
salvaging exemptions appears critical and destined to become increasingly critical. A
property owner who entirely wants to avoid the generation-skipping-tax planning can
"disconnect" the disclaimer receptacle from the unall,?cated-GST-exemption disposition and
instead can route the trust estate of the disclaimer vehicle entirely to another
disposition, as, for example, "to my descendants, per stirpes, who survive my wife."
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Three Variations of Model #2 Showing Effects of Different Times of Creation and Severance of Shares

Values of Shares Upon Death of
Predeceasing Spouse

System of Allocation of Propel

.2

.1
a
"reatlon orrractlOnal snares
upon death of surviving
1)
spouse (severance upon
death of surviving spouse)
Greallon Of fractional shares
upon death of predeceasing
2)
spouse (severance upon
death of surviving spouse)
Creation or separate trusts
upon death of predeceasing
3) spouse (severance upon
death of predeceasing
spouse)
"reation of Tractional snares
upon death of surviving
4)
spouse (severance upon
death of surviving spouse)
Creation of fractional shares
upon death of predeceasing
5)
spouse (severance upon
death of surviving spouse)
Creation OT separate trusts
upon death of predeceasing
6) spouse (severance upon
death of predeceasing
spouse)
CreatIon of fractional shares
upon death of surviving
7)
spouse (severance upon
death of surviving spouse)
vreallon oflTactional shares
upon death of predeceasing
8)
spouse (severance upon
death of surviving spouse)
Creation of separate trusts
upon death of predeceasing
9) spouse (severance upon
death of predeceasing
spouse)

c

D

Inclusion Ratios Upon
Death of Predeceasing
Spouse

Total

.1

a

e

lJ2

Values of Shares Upon Death of Survlvh
Spouse

Total
g

.1

lJ2

h

I

Maximum
Inclusion Ratlo~
Value of Shan of Shares Upon
System of Obtainln,
.1 That Can
Death of
Final Inclusion Ratlc
Have Inclusior
Surviving
Ratio of 0
Spouse

.1

Total
K

.2
m

n

$

100,000.00

N/A

N/A

0.3

$

140,000.00 $ 60,000.00

$200,000.00 $

140,000.00

0

1

Qualified severance
per IRC 2642(a)(3)

$ 70,000.00 $ 30,000.00 $

100,000.00

N/A

N/A

0.3

$

140,000.00 $ 60,000.00

$200,000.00 $

140,000.00

0

1

Qualified severance
per IRC 2642(a)(3)

N/A

N/A

100,000.00

0

1

N/A

$

140,000.00 $ 60,000.00

$200,000.00 $

140,000.00

0

1

Preservation of
original allocations
and ratios

$

100,000.00

N/A

N/A

0.3

$

122,500.00 $ 52,500.00

$175,000.00 $

122,500.00

0

1

Qualified severance
per IRC 2642(a)(3)

$ 70,000.00 $ 30,000.00 $

100,000.00

N/A

N/A

0.3

$

122,500.00 $ 52,500.00

$175,000.00 $

122,500.00

0

1

Qualified severance
per IRC 2642(a)(3)

$ 70,000.00 $ 30,000.00 $

N/A

N/A

100,000.00

0

1

N/A

$

122,500.00 $ 52,500.00

$175,000.00 $

122,500.00

0

1

Preservation of
original allocations
and ratios

$

100,000.00

N/A

N/A

0.3

$

122,500.00 $ 52,500.00

$175,000.00 $

122,500.00

0

1

Qualified severance
per IRC 2642(a)(3)

$ 70,000.00 $ 30,000.00 $

100,000.00

N/A

N/A

0.3

$

140,000.00 $ 35,000.00

$175,000.00 $ 122,500.00

0.1250

1

Qualified severance
per IRC 2642(a)(3)

1

Preservation of
original allocations
and ratios

$ 70,000.00 $ 30,000.00 $

N/A

N/A

$ 70,000.00 $ 30,000.00 $

100,000.00

0

1

N/A

$

140,000.00 $ 35,000.00

$175,000.00 $

140,000.00

0

Assume in all cases that values double during the survival of the surviving spouse. Assume in cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 that upon the death of the predeceasing spouse $70,01
unallocated GST exemption is allocated to the Disclaimer Trust. Assume in cases 3, 6 and 9 that upon the death of the predeceasing spouse $70,000 of unallocated GST exe
allocated to Disclaimer Trust Number 1 and $0 of unallocated GST exemption is allocated to Disclaimer Trust Number 2. Assume in cases 1, 2 and 3 that no discretionary dis'
made. Assume in cases 4, 5 and 6 that all discretionary distributions are made prorata from the portion the name of which includes Number 1 and the portion the name of whi
Number 2. Assume in cases 7, 8 and 9 that all discretionary distributions are made from the portion the name of which includes Number 2, thus altering the ratios of values be
Fractional Share or Trust Number 1, on the one hand, and Fractional Share or Trust Number 2, on the other.

4.11
4.11(a)

QUALIFIED TERMINABLE INTEREST PROPERTY

Partial Elections

Form 4.12

a ai

aii

My personal representative shall elect according to the principles of Section
2056(b) (7) of the Code to qualify the trust estate of the Marital Trust for the
marital deduction,
[[at least to such extent (if any) as is necessary to
minimize the United States estate tax payable because of my death, except that, to
such extent (if any) as my wife requests my personal representative to elect to
qualify a lesser portion]
[except that, to such extent, if any, as my wife requests my personal
representative not to elect]
, my personal representative shall elect]

I -70

to such extent, if any, as my personal representative determines to be advisable.
If less than all of the trust estate of the Marital Trust qualifies for the marital
deduction, the portion that qualifies shall be known as the "Marital Portion," the
portion that does not qualify shall be known as the "NonMarital Portion," and the
Trustee (i) shall charge any payment of principal according to subsection (A) (2) of
this Section to the Marital Portion until the Marital Portion is exhausted and (ii)
at any time during the life of my wife before the end of the administration of my
estate may divide the trust estate of the Marital Trust into separate trusts
consisting, respectively, of the Marital Portion and the NonMarital Portion.
4.11(a) (1)

Exception

Particularly if estate tax were equitably apportioned to nonelected QTIP and a
failure to elect would maximize assets that would pass to descendants but reduce the QTIP
by the amount of the tax, variable a would protect a second spouse against a decision of
the executor of the deceased spouse not to elect. Use variable ai if (i) the spouse is a
second spouse and (ii) the marital trust can consist of a larger-than-optimal amount (as,
for example, when a nonformula, pecuniary gift is used). Use variable aii if (i) the
spouse is a second spouse and (ii) the marital trust consists of the optimal marital
amount or fraction.
4.11(a) (2)

Allocation of Charges; Severance of Portions

If a partial election is made to qualify a disposition as QTIP, the disposition
will have a marital portion and a nonmarital portion. Optimally, any distribution to the
spouse should consist solely of the marital portion, to cause each distribution to reduce
the marital portion (and perhaps the amount that is includable in the gross estate of the
spouse) pro tanto.
The regulations permit the governing instrument to charge
distributions to a particular portion of the trust. Treas. Reg. §§20.2044-1(d) (3) and (e)
Example (4) and 20.2056(b)-7(h) Example (9). The regulations also permit a separation of
the two portions into separate trusts. The governing instrument or local law must require
the fiduciary to make the separation according to the fair market value of each portion
(i.e., the fraction of the whole represented by each portion, multiplied by the fair
market value of the whole) at the time of the separation. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)7(b) (2) (ii) (el, and (hl Example (14). Separation into two trusts will facilitate
administration of the two portions and permit separate investments.
4.11(b)

Alternative Means of "Fine-tuning" the Election

Alternative methods are available to preserve tax flexibility and yet avoid
charging distributions to a particular portion. Each involves causing a particular trust
wholly to qualify for the marital deduction or wholly not to qualify for it.
First, consider creating more than one trust, each to be funded by a specified
fraction of the optimum marital amount, and to elect that each, in toto, does or does not
qualify for the marital deduction.
Each arguably is a separate interest that is subject
to a separate election.
Second, consider creating more than one trust, each to be funded by one or more
specific items of property, and to elect that each does or does not qualify for the
marital deduction.
See TAM 8603007.
Third, consider severing a trust fractionally into separate, identical marital and
nonmarital trusts. See Treas. Reg. §§20.2044-1(d) and (e) Example (4),
20.2056(b)-7(b) and 20.2056(b)-7(h) Example (9).
Either the governing instrument or state
law must require the fiduciary to make the division on the basis of the fair market values
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of the assets at the time of division.
The severance must occur before the end of the
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse.
Fourth, consider creating separate and identical marital and nonmarital trusts at
the outset and allocating to each a fractional portion of all property that is available
for allocation.
Fifth, consider creating separate and identical marital and nonmarital trusts at
the outset and providing that all property with respect to which the executor makes the
election shall be allocated to one and all other property shall be allocated to the other.
Technical Advice Memorandum 8603007 specifically approved this arrangement in the
particular case, notwithstanding that it enabled the executor to obtain tax benefits by
failing to elect and thus allocating to the nonmarital trust the property that most had
appreciated in value before the executor was required to make the election.
Sixth, consider qualifying the entire trust but relying upon a disclaimer by the
surviving spouse to control its size, including the size of any portion that is subject to
a right to withdraw which applies to a specified fraction of the trust.
Additionally, according to Treasury regulations section 20.2056(b)-7(d) (3) (i) and
example (6) at Treasury regUlations section 20.2056(b)-7(h), a property owner can
establish a trust and provide that his or her spouse is entitled to receive the income
from any portion of the trust which the executor elects to treat as qualified terminable
interest property. This type of arrangement is known informally as a "Clayton QTIP," as
the planning is similar to planning that appeared in Clayton v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 327
(1991), reversed, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992).

4.11(c)

Using "Clayton QTIPS" to Defer Decoupled State
Death Taxes

During the four-year period beginning with 2002, EGTRRA eliminates the credit of
Code Section 2011 against United States estate tax for payments of state death taxes.
Also, in phases, EGTRRA includes modest reductions of rates and drastic increases of
exemptions. These changes portend large reductions of revenue to states. Reacting to the
impending reductions, and perhaps also to begin to fill the vacuum that any elimination or
drastic reduction of the United States estate tax will leave, many states have "decoupled"
their estate taxes from the United States estate tax. The primary methods are to ignore
some or all of the applicable or unified credit (i.e., estate tax exemption) and to ignore
some or all of the reductions of the credit for state death tax.
By permitting a QTIP election to qualify more for the marital deduction than the
amount that is necessary to reduce United States estate tax to zero, a married person can
permit his or her executor to defer at least some of the increases of state death taxes
until the death of the surviving spouse.
Deferral of the increases is not necessarily desirable.
First, if the election
cannot apply for state purposes unless the election also applies for United States
purposes, the deferral of the state increases can increase United States estate tax much
more than the deferral can reduce state death taxes. Second, even if an election is
possible exclusively for state purposes, any election solely for state purposes will tend
to involve complexity.
The best result can depend upon facts that are impossible to know in advance. The
unknowables include the actual and anticipated complexions of the laws at and after the
death of the predeceasing spouse, including whether qualification for purposes of state
death taxes requires qualification, also, for purposes of United States estate tax. The
unknowables also include the life expectancy of the surviving spouse. The apparent
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solution of choice is to attempt to permit deferral of increases and also to attempt to
permit deferral of decisions about deferral.
The QTIP format best permits both types of deferrals. However, QTIP is not
necessarily the dispositive method of choice for property that is not to qualify for the
marital deduction.
Particularly, QTIP is not necessarily the format of choice for
property that the executor would not qualify for United States purposes if the executor
were not seeking to qualify for state purposes. What is needed is a system that has the
format of QTIP to any extent that a QTIP election is made but that does not have the
format of QTIP to any extent that a QTIP election is not made. This arrangement describes
the Clayton QTIP, which is based upon Treasury regulations section 20.2056(b)-7(d) (3) (i)
and example 6 at Treasury regulations section 20.2056(b)-7(h).

An alternative technique could consist of an outright bequest to a surviving spouse
with the spouse having the ability, by means of a disclaimer, to transform the bequest
into an interest in a disclaimer vehicle, outside the gross estate of the disclaimant but
nevertheless for the benefit of the disclaimant. Compared to the Clayton QTIP, the
disclaimer vehicle would seem both rigid and prone to being ignored by surviving spouses.
See 4.09 and 4.10 with respect to the disclaimer technique. See Form 4.13 with respect to
the Clayton QTIP.
4.11(c) (1)

"Clayton QTIP"

Form 4.13

a

(C)
Remainder Marital Trust. Notwithstanding the preceding portion of this
Section, if my wife survives me or there is no sufficient evidence that we died
other than simultaneously (in which event my wife conclusively shall be presumed to
have survived me), the Trustee as of my death shall set apart, in a separate trust
to be known as the "Remainder Marital Trust" and to be administered as provided in
this subsection (C), so much or all, if any, of what absent this subsection (C)
would be the trust estate of the Remainder Trust as my personal representative
elects to qualify for the marital deduction for purposes of determining any estate
tax payable because of my death. My personal representative shall make such
election, if any, with respect to so much or all, if any, of what absent this
subsection (C) would be the trust estate of the Remainder Trust as the Independent
Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion directs. The Remainder Marital Trust
shall be identical to the Remainder Trust, except that (i) subsection (A) of
Section 6.02 shall apply, (ii)
[subsection (A) (1) of this Section shall not apply and instead]
the Trustee shall pay the net income to my wife quarter-annually, (iii) upon the
death of my wife the Trustee shall distribute any undistributed or accrued income
to her estate and (iv) the Trustee shall not pay any of the trust estate to other
than my wife during her life.

*

*

*

(12)
To exercise tax elections; provided, in the case of what absent the
election would be the trust estate of the Remainder Trust created according to the
Trust described in Section 2.04, my Executor shall elect to qualify for the marital
deduction for purposes of determining any estate tax payable because of my death so
much or all, if any (and only so much or all, if any), as the Independent Trustee
directs according to authority explicitly granted to the Independent Trustee in the
Trust.
A surviving spouse who as the executor of the will of the predeceasing spouse has
an unfettered ability to constitute property in the format of QTIP by making a QTIP
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election appears to possess and thus (by forgoing the election) to have the ability to
release a general power to appoint an income interest. Therefore, no person who possesses
a beneficial interest should have the ability to constitute property in the format of QTIP
by means of a QTIP election. Rather, only an independent fiduciary should possess this
type of election discretion. The method that the writer selects is to vest the election
discretion in an independent trustee, rather than in an independent executor, and to
direct the executor to comply with any direction of the independent trustee.
The reason
for this mechanism is that the trust includes an elaborate mechanism for the appointment
and service of an independent trustee and the writer prefers to avoid repeating it in the
will. The first paragraph of Form 4.13 creates the Clayton QTIP in the trust instrument.
The second paragraph of Form 4.13 creates the mandate in the will.
Notwithstanding that for United States purposes any partial election must relate to
a fractional or percentile share of the property and that the Treasury regulations refer
to a "portion," the quantum of property with respect to which the QTIP is created in Form
4.13 is expressed, in the idiom that the writer uses for other purposes, as "so much or
all, if any," not as "such portion or all, if any," of the trust estate as my personal
representative elects. See Treas. Reg. §§20.2056(b)-7(b), 20.2056(b)-7(d) (3) (i) and
20.2056(b)-7(h) Example 6. Even though any election must adhere to the "portion" concept
for United States purposes, the requirement is not a governing instrument requirement.
Use variable a in order to omit from the Clayton QTIP any Give-Me-Five, unitrust or
annuity interest that is included in the trust to which reference is directed.

CHAPTER 5
INCREASE OF BASIS DURING REPEAL

During the repeal of the estate tax, Code Section 1022 will permit bases
improvements for income tax purposes.

5.01

CODE SECTION 1022(b) INCREASE

Code Section 1022(b) will permit bases improvements of $1,300,000 for property
which passes from a taxpayer at death. The chief requirement is that the value of the
property at the death of the taxpayer must exceed the bases by at least as much as the
permissible increase, i.e., $1,300,000.

5.02

CODE SECTION 1022(c) INCREASE

Code Section 1022(c) will permit additional improvements of $3,000,000 in bases for
property which passes from a taxpayer outright to, or in a QTIP-style trust for the
benefit of, the surviving spouse of the taxpayer.

5.03

SHADES OF MARITAL DEDUCTION?

Bases improvements according to Code Section 1022(c) might require that the
disposition benefit the surviving spouse similarly to how property which qualifies for the
marital deduction must benefit a surviving spouse. Among other things, this requirement
might invoke Revenue Procedure 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682.

I -74

\

5.04

QUESTIONABLE POLICY

Bases improvements according to Code Section 1022(c) appear to reflect highly
questionable policy. The marital deduction tends to permit a married person to defer tax.
The marital deduction also tends to permit a married couple to use exemptions that, but
for the marriage, the less wealthy spouse might have insufficient assets to use. By
contrast, the basis increase according to Code Section 1022(c) is a permanent saving of
tax and is available only for assets that pass to, or in certain trusts for, the spouse of
a married person. Therefore, marriage immediately before death is the sine qua non of a
very large and permanent saving of tax.

5.05

DRAFT NOW FOR CODE SECTION 1022

To protect against incapacity, inertia and (in plans in which the exemption shelter
benefits anyone other than the surviving spouse) distortion, consider drafting all
dispositive documents to include mechanisms for bases increases according to Code Section
1022, notwithstanding that the increases are available only for taxpayers who die after
2009.

5.06

CODE SECTION 1022(b} IS PREFERABLE
TO CODE SECTION 1022(c}

The dispositive instrument usually should fund dispositions that use all of the
1022(b) increase before the instrument funds any disposition that uses any of the 1022(c)
increase.
The basis increase according to Code Section 1022(b) will not, but the basis
increase according to Code Section 1022(c) will, require a particular format for the
disposition.
The required format, consisting of an outright gift or a QTIP-style trust,
inherently forces property (i.e., the income) into the hands of the surviving spouse and,
therefore, is inferior to other formats from the perspective of efficiency of shelter of
the property for transfer tax purposes.
If the taxpayer has an insufficient amount of
appreciation to use both the 1022(c) increase and the 1022(b) increase, use of formats
that produce Code Section 1022(b) increases in full before use of any format that is
necessary to produce Code Section 1022(c) increases at all (i) will minimize a disposition
the only reason for which is to maximize increases in bases and (ii) will maximize a
disposition which is favored dispositively.

5.07

DRAFTING FOR BASES INCREASES

The drafting of dispositions for the primary purpose of facilitating bases
increases is challenging.
Perhaps the first step is to abandon certain mindsets that
accompany drafting of formulae for the marital deduction.

5.07(a}

Basis-Increase QTIP per Code Section 1022

Form 5.1

If (i) my wife survives me or there is no sufficient evidence that we died other
than simultaneously (in which event my wife conclusively shall be presumed for
purposes of this Section to have survived me) and (ii) the United States estate tax
is not in effect at my death, the Trustee as of my death shall set apart, in a
separate trust to be known as the "Marital Trust" and to be administered as
provided in this Section,
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A

[[#A] of the trust estate that remains after satisfaction of all dispositions and
payments under prior provisions of this instrument.]
B
[the Permissible Property that at my death had the smallest value sufficient to
maximize the basis increase according to Section 1022 of the Code because of my
death
BI
[, after excluding the Permissible Property that at my death had the smallest value
sufficient to maximize the basis increase according to Section 1022(b) of the Code
because of my death] .]
C
[Permissible Property which
CI
[the Independent Trustee selects, which]
is sufficient to maximize the basis increase according to Section 1022
CII
[(c)]
of the Code because of my death and which at the respective dates of distribution
to the Marital Trust has an aggregate value of no less than, and to the extent
practicable no more than, the
CIII[amount (if any) by which (a) the]
value at my death of the Permissible Property that at my death had the smallest
value sufficient to maximize the basis increase according to Section 1022 of the
Code because of my death
CIV
[exceeds (b) the value at my death of the Permissible Property that at my death had
the smallest value sufficient to maximize the basis increase according to Section
1022(b) of the Code because of my death].]
D
[npermissible Propertyn shall mean such property (or its proceeds) in the trust
estate as is not specifically given according to prior provisions and, if allocated
to the Marital Trust, would permit a basis increase according to Section 1022
DI
[(c)]
of the Code
DII
[but, except to such extent (if any) as is necessary to enable the increase, shall
not include [#B]].]
5.07(a) (1)

Purpose and Drafting

Use variable A if the assets needed to maximize a basis increase according to Code
Section l022(c) will leave a small residue or no residue or if the Marital Trust is to
consist in any event of a fixed fraction less than "all."
Variable B produces a specific gift determined by a formula. Add variable BI to
minimize this disposition by passing the Code Section l022(b) portion to the residue.
Delete variable BI to cause the Marital Trust to serve as a receptacle according to both
Code Section l022(c) and Code Section l022(b).
Variable C produces a "minimum-worth, specific gift, collective-assets type. Add
variables CII, CIII and CIV to minimize this disposition by passing the Code Section
l022(b) portion to the residue. Delete these variables to cause the Marital Trust to
serve as a receptacle according to both Code Section l022(c) and Code Section l022(b).
Use variable D if variable B or variable C is used. Use variable DI if variable BI
or variable CII is used. Variable DII is usable to exclude specific assets.
5.07(b)

Specific Gift of Appreciated Assets

Consider using a specific gift of assets that are defined in the governing
instrument as the appreciated assets which in the aggregate have the smallest value which
can maximize the basis increase. See variables Band D in Form 5.1. The gift will not
produce any gain upon funding.
The gift will rise and fall in value during the period of
administration prior to funding.
Unlike a gift of a pecuniary amount, which will define
an amount but not assure that the most appreciated property that had this value at the

I -76

death of the taxpayer can satisfy it, and unlike a gift of a fractional share, which will
tend not to use the property that at the death of the taxpayer was the most appreciated,
this type of gift will minimize the probable value and also will maximize the basis
increase. The great disadvantage of this type of gift is that it appears quite
inflexible.
5.07(c)

Minimum-Worth Gift

Perhaps a more attractive vehicle is a "minimum-worth" gift, collective assets
type.
See variables C and D in Form 5.1. This type of gift is more flexible than the
specific gift described above.
This type of gift will require the least value, and permit
but not require more than the least value, that at the time of allocation can maximize the
basis increase according to Code Section 1022(c). Compared to the specific gift described
above, this type of gift grants discretion to a fiduciary to determine the assets to
allocate. By its terms, the gift might have to require funding with assets that both (i)
enable the maximization of basis and (ii) assure the surviving spouse a requisite amount
of value. Arguably, no gain occurs upon funding.
Loss appears reckoned only upon
complete funding.
This type of gift presents the problem of a fiduciary's duty to limit
value.
5.07(d)

Do Not Use Pecuniary Gift

Do not use a true pecuniary gift, i.e., a gift that is expressed in terms of the
smallest number of dollars that if satisfied in kind with the most appreciated assets at
death will maximize the basis increase but that is satisfiable in kind at values current
at dates of satisfaction.
Indeed, a pecuniary gift in this context is an apparent
misnomer. A basis increase according to Code Section 1022 requires that the gift consist
solely of appreciated assets, not, for example, cash. Therefore, the pecuniary amount
determines only the value at the time of allocation of the assets that are allocated in
kind.
More importantly, a true pecuniary gift (i.e., a pecuniary gift which is satisfied
in kind at values current at dates of distribution) appears incapable of assuring both
maximization of basis and the use of the smallest amount of date-of-death value to
accomplish the maximization.
If the assets that determine the pecuniary amount depreciate
after the death of the taxpayer and before the satisfaction of the pecuniary amount, the
assets that at the date of allocation have the requisite appreciation will not have
sufficient value to satisfy the pecuniary amount. Therefore, the gift might require an
infusion of additional assets (but not an infusion of an addition of pre-death excess of
value over basis). Contrariwise, if the assets that determine the pecuniary amount
appreciate after the death of the taxpayer and before the satisfaction of the pecuniary
amount, the assets that at the date of allocation have the requisite value will not have
the requisite appreciation. Therefore, the assets that satisfy the gift will not permit a
maximum increase in basis.
5.07(e)

Tend Not to Use Fractional-Share Gift

Tend not to craft a basis-increase disposition in terms of a fractional share of
residue. A fractional share does seem capable of enabling a maximum increase in basis.
However, if, as generally is true, the fraction applies to some assets that at the death
of the taxpayer had less excess of value over basis than other assets, this method will
not minimize the value that is allocable to this disposition.

CHAPTER 8
SPECIAL DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS
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*
8.03

*

*

GIFTS DURING INCAPACITY

Form 8.10
(C)

a
b

Gifts.

(1)
During the time described in subsection (B) of this Section, the
Trustee shall pay to anyone or more of my wife and my descendants, without
any duty of equalization, so much or all, if any, of the trust estate as the
Independent Trustee in its sole and absolute discretion determines to be
advisable from time to time for me to make
[gifts. ]
[(i) gifts that are (or, if split between my wife and me according to
Section 25l3(a) of the Code, would be) excludable (because of Section
2503(b) of the Code including, without limitation, because of Section
2503(c) of the Code and rights to withdraw) from the total amount of my
gifts under the Code or deductible (because of the marital deduction
according to Section 2523 of the Code) for purposes of computing my taxable
gifts under the Code and (ii) gifts that because of Section 2503(e) of the
Code are not treated as transfers by gift for purposes of Chapter 12 of the
Code. If the United States gift tax is not in effect, the preceding
sentence shall apply as if the United States gift tax as it last existed
were in effect.]
(2)
If on or after the date of this instrument I create a power of
attorney, the Trustee shall pay to the attorney in fact so much or all, if
any, of the trust estate as the attorney in fact determines for me to make
gifts according to specific authority in the power of attorney.

*

c

*

*

15. To give to anyone or more of my wife and my descendants, without
any duty of equalization, regardless of whether a donee is serving, alone or with
anyone or more others, as the Attorney, so much or all, if any, of my estate as
the Attorney in its sole and absolute discretion determines to be advisable from
time to time for me to make (i) gifts that are (or, except in the case of any
unmarried donee who is serving alone or with anyone or more others as the
Attorney, if split between my spouse and me according to Section 25l3(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), would be) excludable (because of Section 2503(b) of
the Code including, without limitation, because of Section 2503(c) of the Code and
rights to withdraw) from the total amount of my gifts under the Code and (ii)
except on behalf or in discharge of any legal obligation of any individual who is
serving alone or with anyone or more others as the Attorney, gifts that because of
Section 2503(e) of the Code are not treated as transfers by gift for purposes of
Chapter 12 of the Code.
[Notwithstanding the preceding portion of this paragraph, no individual shall
possess, or participate in the exercise of, any power that absent this sentence
would cause the individual to possess a general power of appointment (as defined in
Section 2041 or Section 2514 of the Code) to any extent that (assuming that gifts
are split between spouses to the maximum extent according to Section 25l3(a) of the
Code) the release during the life of the individual would constitute a gift (other
than a gift that would be excluded according to Section 2503(b) of the Code) for
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d

8.03(a)

United States gift tax purposes, or a transfer for United States estate tax
purposes, by the individual.]
If the United States gift tax is not in effect, the preceding portion of this
paragraph shall apply as if the United States gift tax as it last existed were in
effect.
[I specifically authorize the Attorney to require the Trustee of the Trust to pay
to the Attorney so much (if any) of the trust estate of the Trust as is necessary
to permit the Attorney to make gifts and qualified transfers according to this
paragraph. ]
Purpose and Drafting

State law often precludes agents and trustees from making gifts on behalf of their
grantors and principals absent specific authority in the governing instruments. The form
illustrates a gift-giving system that includes specific authority and the integration of a
revocable trust and a power of attorney. The ability of agents ana trustees to make gifts
can present issues of tax sensitivity. The issues can arise if a power holder can use the
authority (i) to benefit himself or herself personally or (ii) to transfer property to
another under circumstances in which absent the transfer the property would or could
benefit the power holder personally.
The first paragraph of the form avoids the tax issues that are discussed in the
balance of this 8.03(a).
It gives the gift-giving power to an independent person who has
no beneficial interest and cannot use the power to benefit himself or herself. Use
variable a and delete variable b to give the independent trustee unlimited authority.
Delete variable a and use variable b to limit the authority.
The second paragraph of the form is designed to facilitate gifts according to a
power of attorney under circumstances in which the attorney in fact might hold
insufficient funds to make the described gifts according to the power of attorney but the
trustee of the trust might hold sufficient funds according to the trust.
The portion of the form that appears below the asterisks is intended for inclusion
in the power of attorney.
It is designed to prevent or at least mitigate tax sensitivity
if a beneficiary serves as attorney in fact and a gift-giving power is regarded as a
general power of appointment or as a power that Treasury regulations section 25.2511l(g) (2) implies is taxable. Variable c is a savings clause.
It might not accomplish its
purpose.
See,~, Commissioner v. Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944),
44-1 USTC ~10,110, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944). Also, it might facilitate
contention about the validity of certain gifts. Although it applies directly to the issue
of the existence of a general power of appointment, it applies only indirectly (by
purporting to reduce the "beneficial interest" of the holder) to the issue of a gift
according to Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2). The last sentence specifically
authorizes the agent to "call" upon the trust to the extent provided in the power of
attorney. State law might require a grant of specific authority to enable the agent to
"call" upon the trust.
See,~, 755 ILCS 45/2-9.
However, consider whether the second
paragraph of the form, which specifically directs the trustee to comply with the "call" by
the agent, might eliminate the need for the specific authority.
Can a power of a beneficially-interested agent to make gifts for his or her
principal constitute a general power of appointment or a power to make gifts according to
Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2)? A first (and arguably sufficient) response
to an argument that an attorney in fact who has authority to make gifts for his or her
principal has a tax-sensitive power is that the ability of the principal to revoke,
coupled with inclusion in the transfer tax base of the principal, prevents prior inclusion
in the transfer tax base of anyone other than the principal. See Boeving v. United
States, 81-2 USTC ~13,415 (8th Cir. 1981), and Gilchrist v. Commissioner,
80-2 USTC
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~13,378 (5th Cir. 1980).
According to the theory of these cases, the principal always
should be regarded as possessing a power to revoke, even if the principal is
incapacitated. Even if the power otherwise were a general power of appointment, an
ability of the principal to revoke would appear to classify the power within Code Section
2041(b) (1) (C) and, therefore, as not a general power.

If the power were a general power of appointment, any release of the power arguably
would constitute a present-interest gift to the principal.
If the general power of
appointment were to consist of the ability of the power holder to pay annual-exclusion
gifts to the power holder from the assets of the principal, at least one-half and,
depending upon the availability to the power holder of the gift-splitting rules of Code
Section 2513(a), possibly all, of the release arguably would qualify for an annual
exclusion. Even if the release of the power were to constitute a release of the subject
property to the grantor-principal subject to the trust and the agency, the release
arguably would constitute an outright transfer, and thus a gift of a present interest, to
the grantor-principal for gift tax purposes. The deemed ability of the grantor-principal
to revoke the trust and the agency arguably would transform any gift into a gift of a
present interest.
If the agent were the spouse of the principal, the release might
qualify for the marital deduction. However, note the possible absence of an income
interest for life.
See Estate of Mackie v. Commissioner, 545 F. 2d 833 (4th Cir. 1976),
and Estate of Neugass v. Commissioner, 77-1 USTC ~13,192 (2d Cir. 1977).
Also, again if the power were a general power of appointment, the five-percent
"leg" of the "5+5" rule of Code Section 2514(e) arguably would compare the lapse to the
pool of assets from which the agent could have satisfied the gift. Thus, the rule would
tend to prevent a gift from occurring upon a lapse of a power to make an annual-exclusion
gift to oneself.
Can the exercise of the power constitute a gift according to the theory of Treasury
regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2)? This issue relates to the payment by a power holder
to another person of property in which the power holder has a beneficial interest. Thus,
although the analyses appear similar, this issue is not the same as whether the power
holder possesses a general power of appointment. Arguably, the deemed ability of the
principal to revoke attenuates the relationship between the holder of the power and the
property sufficiently so that the power holder does not possess a "beneficial interest"
and, therefore, the answer to the posited question is no. Also, as a matter of concept,
can a gift by a principal do double duty by also constituting, at the same time, a gift by
another according to Treasury regulations. section 25.2511-1(g) (2)?
A gift according to Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2) requires an
exercise of the power. Mere possession is insufficient. Therefore, a person always can
avoid the 25.2511-1(g) (2) problem by limiting his or her exercise or by declining entirely
to serve. Contrariwise, mere possession of a requisite type of power is sufficient to
cause a general power of appointment to exist. However, the power of the attorney in fact
arguably is not the requisite power. Even if it is, the limitations that appear in the
form arguably preclude most releases from constituting transfers for gift tax and estate
tax purposes.
Assume, for purposes of analysis, that the power of the agent to make gifts on
behalf of the principal does cause the agent to possess a general power of appointment for
gift and estate tax purposes and does constitute a power to make gifts for gift tax
purposes according to the theory of Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2). What
are the amounts of gifts that the power enables the agent personally to make?
The amount that the agent can pay to himself or herself by means of the exercise of
the power limits both the general power of appointment and the amount of release.
The
form limits these amounts to the annual-exclusion gift that the principal could give to
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the agent by means of the agency.
If (but only if) both the principal and the agent are
married, the form provides for determination of this amount according to the giftsplitting rules of Code Section 2513(a). The amount of the taxable gift that the agent
could make by means of a lapse of the power appears to depend upon (i) whether the gift
upon release would be a gift of a present interest and (ii) the amount (if any) of any
other annual-exclusion gifts by the agent to the principal during the year.
Arguably (and only arguably), at any particular time, the "beneficial interest" of
the agent within the meaning of Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2) cannot exceed
the amount that the agent then can pay to himself or herself. Arguably, this amount is
the limit of the gift that the agent can make by exercising the power in favor of other
than himself or herself. Conceivably, however, the beneficial interest also could include
amounts that the agent could pay to himself or herself in future years or even amounts
that he or she could receive upon or after the death of the principal.

*
8.08
8.08(a)

*

*

RESIDENCES

Outright Gift

Form 8.18

a
b

c
d
e

Section 2.02. Real Property. I give
[all real property used by my wife and me as a residence]
[[#X))

(including all improvements, appurtenances and related insurance), subject to any
mortgage indebtedness and unpaid real estate taxes and assessments,
[to my Executor]
[to my wife if she survives me] .
[My Executor shall not take possession of any real property disposed by this
Section.]

8.08(a) (1)

Drafting

A reference to "real property used by [the testator or the testator and the
testator's spouse] as a residence" is not particularly clear. See variable a of Form
8.18.
However, a more specific description might require frequent rewriting of the will
or fail to dispose the real property that the testator wishes to dispose. See variable b
of Form 8.18.

8.08(a) (2)

Income Tax Results

Various income tax results are available. The draftsperson purposely should seek
desired results and not accept less desirable results by default.
If title to the real
property passes to the executor according to state law, the satisfaction of a residuary
devise will, but the satisfaction of a specific devise will not, carry distributable net
income from the estate to the devisee.
Code §§661, 662 and 663(a) (1). However, if title
passes directly to the devisee according to state law, the satisfaction of the devise
(whether specific or residuary) will require the executor to relinquish possession but not
to "distribute" the property itself. Therefore, the satisfaction will not carry
distributable net income from the estate to the devisee.
The draftsperson can avoid this
result by using a specific devise to the executor and a residuary devise to the ultimate
taker. See variable c of Form 8.18. A specific devise to the executor will pass title to
the executor, and the executor's satisfaction of the residuary gift will require the
executor to "distribute" the real property rather than merely relinquish possession of it.
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Income for income tax purposes inures to the entity that possesses the real
property when the income is received. According to 755 ILCS 5/20-1(a), unless the testator
varies the rule, possession of all of the real property, except any real property in which
the devisee resides, passes to the executor. By depriving the executor of possession and
granting possession instead to the devisee to whom title passes as a matter of law, the
testator can cause income (and expense) for income tax purposes to inure to the devisee.
See variable e of Form 8.18.

8.08(b)

Retention in Trust

Form 8.19

a

Section 4.07. Residence.
[Upon my death, if the Trustee owns any interest in a residence of a beneficiary
who has attained thirty years of age and I have not provided otherwise, the Trustee
shall allocate the interest, based upon fair market values at the time of the
allocation, to anyone or more of any outright disposition to the beneficiary and
the trust estates of anyone or more trusts of which, at the time of the
allocation, the beneficiary is the only person to whom the Trustee can pay any of
the trust estate.]
If, at the time of a direction described in this sentence, the Trustee owns any
interest in a residence of a beneficiary who has attained thirty years of age and
the beneficiary is the only person to whom the Trustee can pay any of the trust
estate, the Trustee shall sell the interest, apply proceeds to a replacement and
sell any replacement, all at fair market value, as the beneficiary directs. The
beneficiary shall have the right, to the extent of the beneficial interest of the
beneficiary in the trust, determined according to other provisions of this
instrument, to occupy the residence free of rent.

8.08(b) (1)

Purpose and Drafting

Use variable a only in a revocable trust.
Concerning the principles that are
invoked to control the allocation of a residence to a particular disposition, see Revenue
Procedure 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682, Treasury regulations section 20.2056(b)-7(b) (2) (C) and
the pick-and-choose-asset-allocation provision of the trust.

8.08(b) (1) (A)

Accommodation of Residence in (i)
Pay-AlI-Income Trust, (ii) Discretionary Trust,
Standard Trust and (iv) Give-He-Five Unitrust

(iii) Ascertainable-

A right to the use of a residence appears to be an analogue to a right to receive
all of the income of a trust of which the only asset is the residence. Accordingly, if a
residence is allocated to a trust that mandates the current payment of all income to the
primary beneficiary, the primary beneficiary should possess the right to the rent-free use
of the residence. Nevertheless, to avoid the beneficiary having to pay rent which
recycles through the trust and back to the beneficiary (and into the gross income of the
trust and the beneficiary), the draftsperson should include authority (described in the
last sentence of the form) for the trustee to allow the beneficiary to use the residence
rent-free to such extent (if any) as is consistent with the beneficial interest of the
beneficiary granted according to the dispositive provisions of the governing instrument.
The authority should relieve the trustee, to this extent, of any obligation to rent or
sell. Thus, the authority and the dispositive provisions should resolve the nontax issue
of the extent (if any) to which the trustee is obliged to charge, and the beneficiary is
obliged to pay, rent. They also should resolve the tax issue of the extent (if any) to
which rent is includible in the gross income of the trust and perhaps, in turn, also in
the gross income of the beneficiary. Cf. Code §7872.
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What mechanisms are available to avoid the charging and paying of rent in the case
of a trust that does not mandate the current payment of income?
1.
If an independent trustee has broad discretion to distribute any or all
of the trust estate to the primary beneficiary or to a pay-alI-income trust for the
primary benefit of the primary beneficiary, the independent trustee might transform
the situation into a pay-alI-income format or its equivalent (i) by directing that
the primary beneficiary shall have the right to use the residence without paying
rent or (ii) by conveying the residence to the pay-alI-income trust.
2. Similarly, any trustee (including the primary beneficiary himself or
herself) who has a power to pay the trust estate to the primary beneficiary for the
support of the primary beneficiary might have an ability to direct that the primary
beneficiary shall have the right to use the residence without paying rent.
3. Assume that during a calendar year the donee of the alternative version
of a Give-Me-Five power (see variable c of Form 3.31) incurs an obligation to pay
rent for the use of a residence which is part of the trust estate of the trust and
that the donee exercises the power by withdrawing the obligation to the extent that
the power permits.
If, as arguably is the case, the payer and the payee (or, more
accurately, the obligor and the obligee) are the same, this scenario should not
generate any income. Can recognition of income occur when the trust "transfers"
the receivable to the obligor upon the exercise of the Give-Me-Five power?
Arguably, the transferee already owned the portion of the obligation that the donee
received and, therefore, the answer is no. The apparent limitation upon this
planning is that the power probably is insufficient to accommodate all of the
obligation.
8.08(b) (1) (B)

Rental Value as Income

Arguably, the value that a beneficiary receives from his or her rent-free occupancy
of a residence which is part of a trust estate is not income for income tax purposes under
circumstances in which the beneficial interest includes the rent-free use of the
residence. The view of the writer is that Commissioner v. Plant, 76 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1935); Hillman v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1934); Alfred I. duPont Testamentary
Trust v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 761 (1976), affirmed per curiam, 574 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.
1978); and Sparrow v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1 (1929), enlighten but do not conclusively
resolve the position that is asserted in the preceding sentence. The issue appears to
have only academic importance, in any event, in two situations that occur, or can occur,
frequently.
First, if the residence is the only asset of the trust, the trustee has no
income to distribute. Second, if the trust mandates the current payment of all income to
the person who occupies the residence, the beneficiary receives all of the income
regardless of whether, in other circumstances, the rent-free use of a residence would
constitute an indirect distribution that would carry distributable net income to the
beneficiary.
8.08(b) (1) (e)

Marital Deduction

Neither permission for, nor direction to, a trustee to retain or purchase a
residence for a surviving spouse should disqualify for the marital deduction any trust
that would qualify absent the direction or permission. Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5(f) (4).
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8.08(b) (1) (D)

Effect Upon Mortgage Debt

According to 12 USC §1701-j3(d) (8),
With respect to a real property loan secured by a lien on
residential real property containing less than five dwelling
units, including a lien on the stock allocated to a dwelling
unit in a cooperative housing corporation, or on a residential
manufactured home, a lender may not exercise its option
pursuant to a due-on-sale clause upon -- . . . a transfer into
an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and remains a
beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of rights
of occupancy in the property . . . .

*

*

*

CHAPTER 10
ACCOMMODATION OF SPECIAL ASSETS

SUBCHAPTER A:
CODE SECTIONS 2032A AND 2057

10A.Ol

THE ISSUE

Any property that is to qualify for special use valuation must pass to one or more
qualified heirs.
Treasury regulations section 20.2032A-8(a) (2) applies this rule to
successive interests by stating that the property must not be able, in any event or under
any circumstance, to pass to or for any person who is not a qualified heir, before the
property passes to a qualified heir or is subject to inclusion in the gross estate for
estate tax purposes of a qualified heir.
Code Section 2057 imposes a similar requirement.
Code §2057(b) (2). See Code §§2032A(b) (1) (A) (ii), 2032A(b) (1) (B) and 2032A(g), Treas. Reg.
§20.2032A-8(a) (2), Rev. Rul. 81-220, 1981-2 C.B. 175, Rev. Rul 82-140, 1982-2 C.B. 208,
Ltr. Rul. 8146020, Ltr. Rul. 8209004 and Ltr. Rul. 8203011.
Cf. Treas. Reg. §20.2032A3(c) and Ltr. Rul. 8020011. However, a number of cases have held Treasury regulations
section 20.2032A-8(a) (2) invalid. Generally, they enunciate a "wait-and-see" approach
according to which a mere possibility of passage of a successive interest to other than a
qualified heir before the property is included in the gross estate of a qualified heir
does not preclude eligibility but actual passage within the period during which tax
savings are subject to recapture does trigger recapture.
Smoot v. United States, 90-1
USTC '60,002 (7th Cir. 1989), Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 864 F. 2d 1128 (4th Cir.
1989), Kunze v. United States, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16642 (Dist. KS 1988), Estate of
Clinard v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1180 (1986), Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.
1156 (1986), and Pliske v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-311 (1986). The Internal Revenue
Service never has acquiesced in these decisions. Although it did not find the regulation
invalid, TAM 8643005 held that the mere remote possibility of passage to other than a
qualified heir did not preclude eligibility. As a practical matter, current law possibly
consists of the "wait-and-see" approach. The wait-and-see approach is workable and
supports the policy that underlies the statute.

10A.02

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
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Usually, a nonmarital trust that is well-drafted will not vest any interest unless
and until the interest becomes possessory. Therefore, the orthodox nonmarital trust
usually will present at least some possibility that the property will pass to a person who
is not a qualified heir.

Form 10.1

a

b

c

Section 4.08. Code Section
[s 2032A and]
2057.
nSpecial Propertyn shall mean all property that, if the property were
Special Property to which subsections (A) and (B) of this Section would apply,
would be eligible for application of
[either or each of Section 2032A of the Code and]
Section 2057 of the Code for purposes of determining the United States estate tax
payable because of my death or the death of my wife. Notwithstanding any provision
of this instrument to the contrary,
[if (but only if), before the filing of the return of United States estate tax
payable because of my death (or, as the case may be, the death of my wife), legal
counsel (other than any person who is not an Independent Person) for my personal
representative (or, in the case of the death of my wife, the personal
representative of my wife) so directs, subsections (A) and (B) (or, in the case of
the death of my wife, only (A) and (B) (2»
of this Section shall apply.]
(A) No power of appointment granted in this instrument shall be
exercisable, directly or indirectly, to appoint Special Property in any
manner that could permit the property to benefit any person who is not a
qualified heir with respect to the property, as defined in Section
2032A(e) (1) of the Code, before the property passes to or otherwise is
subject to inclusion in the gross estate (for estate tax purposes) of a
qualified heir with respect to the property.
(B)

d di

[[(1)]

If my wife survives me and either my wife survives all of my
descendants or there is no sufficient evidence that my wife and the
survivor of my descendants died other than simultaneously, upon the
death of the survivor of my descendants (or upon my death if no
descendant of mine survives me) the Trustee shall distribute all
Special Property to my wife.]
e ei

eii

10A.02(a)

[[(2)]
Any of the Special Property that is not distributable according to the
prior provisions of this instrument,
[including subsection (1) of this subsection (B) but]
excluding Section 4.03, shall be distributed to the estate of my lastsurviving descendant who is living after my death or, if no descendant
of mine is living after my death, according to Section 4.03.]

First Problem

Assume the existence of a trust that mandates the current payment of all income to
the surviving spouse of the testator during the life of the surviving spouse, remainder
either (i) to the descendants, per stirpes, of the testator who survive the survivor of
the testator and the spouse of the testator or (ii) as provided in the Second Problem.
If
no descendant survives the spouse, the property might pass to other than a qualified heir.
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lOA.02(b)

Possible Solution

If the client is unwilling to risk the existence of the wait-and-see test, a
possible solution to the First Problem is to provide that the property shall pass outright
to the spouse if no descendant survives the spouse.
This solution will permit the spouse
to enjoy outright ownership of the property during any time that no descendant is living.
After the death of the survivor of the testator and the last-surviving descendant of the
testator, usually no overwhelming reason will exist to avoid including the property in the
gross estate of the spouse of the testator. This solution will permit the spouse, rather
than, for example (as in the Second Problem), a last-surviving descendant (probably a
child), to dispose of the property. The spouse might dispose of the property similarly to
how the testator might have disposed of it. A deceased descendant, on the other hand,
probably will leave the property to his or her spouse, and the spouse of the descendant
probably will dispose of it randomly (as far as the testator is concerned) .

lOA.02(c)

Second Problem

Assume that upon the death of the testator or upon the termination of the trust for
the benefit of the surviving spouse described in the First Problem, the testator allocates
the property with respect to the descendants of the testator then living, per stirpes,
with a separate trust for each child until the child attains a stated age or sooner dies,
with the share of any deceased child to pass to the descendants of the child then living,
per stirpes, or, if none, to the descendants of the testator then living, per stirpes, or,
if none, to some person or charity that is not a qualified heir.
If any child survives
the testator or, as the case may be, the survivor of the testator and the spouse of the
testator but no descendant of the testator survives the termination of a trust for a
child, the property might pass to other than a qualified heir.

lOA.02(d)

Possible Solution

If the client is unwilling to risk the existence of the wait-and-see test, a
possible solution to the Second Problem is to provide that, in lieu of the gift to some
person or charity that is not a qualified heir, the trust estate of the trust of a
deceased child shall pass to the estate of the last-surviving descendant of the testator.

lOA.02(e)

Third Problem

Assume that the spouse of the testator in the First Problem, or the child of the
testator in the Second Problem, has a nongeneral power of appointment which permits the
donee to appoint to other than a qualified heir. Treas. Reg. §20.2032A-8(a) (2).
See Rev.
Rul. 82-140, 1982-2 C.B. 208, and Ltr. Rul. 8146020. However, Smoot v. United States, 901 USTC ~60,002 (7th Cir. 1989), Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 864 F. 2d 1128 (4th
Cir. 1989), Kunze v. United States, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16642 (Dist. KS 1988), and
Estate of Clinard v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1180 (1986), have held Treasury regulations
section 20.2032A-8(a) (2) to be invalid to the extent that the mere existence (as opposed
to the use) of a nongeneral power of appointment of a qualified heir would prevent special
use valuation.

10A.02(f)

Drafting

If an election according to Code Section 2032A or Code Section 2057 might be
attractive, consider the necessity of assuring that each contingent remainder will pass to
a qualified heir and not to someone who is not a qualified heir.
According to Treasury regulations section 20.2056(b)-7(d) (3), promulgated because
of Clayton v. Commissioner, 92-2 USTC ~60,121 (5th Cir. 1992), property that has the
format of qualified terminable interest property only if a QTIP election is made can
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qualify for the marital deduction.
By analogy, can Code Section 2032A and Code Section
2057 apply to property that, because of Form 10.1, passes to a qualified heir only if a
person so directs after the death of the testator and before the delivery of the election?
Variable c is usable only if the answer is affirmative.
If the required passage to a
qualified heir were conditioned upon an actual election, a beneficially interested person
who would possess the power to elect might possess a general power of appointment and, by
failing to elect, release the power and make a gift for gift tax purposes. Variable c
addresses this issue by conditioning the passage to a qualified heir upon the exercise of
discretion to direct and by vesting the discretion in an independent person. Even if the
service of an independent person were optional and a beneficiary were able to prevent the
service of an independent person, the beneficiary would not possess the power that the
independent person, if appointed, would possess. Because only a direction, not a failure
to direct, can increase the interest of the beneficiary (by adding a remainder interest),
a power to prevent the direction by preventing the service of an independent person, under
circumstances in which the beneficiary could not force an independent person to direct,
would not seem sensitive.
Cf. United Staces v. Winchell, 61-1 USTC ~12,015 (9th Cir.
1961). According to Code Section 2041{b) (I) (C) (ii), a power that a person only can
exercise with the concurrence of a person who has an adverse interest is not a general
power of appointment. However, even if Form 10.1 were written so that passage to a
qualified heir were conditioned upon an actual election, the protection of this rule would
seem unavailable. Arguably, the persons who actually sign a 2032A agreement are not
adverse.
Use variable d to vest in the spouse of the settlor if any marital disposition is
not outright and the spouse survives or dies simultaneously with the last-surviving
descendant of the settlor.
Use variable e to vest in the last-surviving descendant of the settlor if (i)
variable d is used and a descendant survives the spouse and otherwise the plan does not
provide for outright disposition to a descendant at the death of the spouse or (ii)
variable d is not used and the trust estate does not pass entirely outright to a
descendant at the death of the settlor. Use variable eii if variable d is used.
"Appointive Portion" in subsection (A) of Form 10.1 is a reference to a general
power of appointment that is installed for the purpose of avoiding a generation-skipping
transfer.

*

*

*

CHAPTER 13
PERPETUITIES AND POWER-OF-APPOINTMENT ISSUES

The presence and absence of rules against perpetuities create opportunities and
pitfalls.
First, even if the jurisdiction that governs the governing instrument has no rule
against perpetuities, the rule of a jurisdiction in which real property is located can
govern the disposition of the real property. Accordingly, the draftsperson should
consider using a savings clause that can accommodate multiple regimes.
Second, the absence of a rule against perpetuities might cause an unintentional
fall into the "Delaware Tax Trap." According to Code Section 2041{a) (3), a nongeneral
power of appointment that is exercised to create a power of appointment which is
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exercisable without reference to the date of the creation of the exercised power is
treated as a general power of appointment. Therefore, the Delaware Tax Trap presents the
potential pitfall of unnecessary exposure to estate tax. However, the Delaware Tax Trap
also presents the potential benefit of subjection of property to an estate tax at a lower
rate rather than to a generation-skipping tax at a higher rate. Accordingly, the donee
should use the Trap purposefully rather than inadvertently.
Each of Form 13.1, Form 13.2 and Form 13.3 appears usable if, except for an
intentional invocation of the Delaware Tax Trap, each power and trust is subject to the
same, or no, period of rule against perpetuities.
If, except for an intentional
invocation of Code Section 2041(a) (3), any power or trust is to have a different
(including no) limitation (from any other power or trust) because the settlor is
exercising a power of appointment, (i) install in the document of exercise (see Form 13.8)
protection against Code Section 2041(a) (3) and (ii) use Form 13.4 (rather than Form 13.1,
Form 13.2 and Form 13.3) in order to acknowledge (and, if necessary, to permit) the
difference.

13.01

COMMON-LAW RULE

Form 13.1

a

b
c
d

Section 4.02. Limitation of Duration. Anything to the contrary
notwithstanding, each trust
[(other than the Charitable Trust under Section 3.02)]
that is created by this instrument (or, directly or indirectly, by exercise of any
power of appointment granted in this instrument, other than any exercise that
commences a new period of applicable rule against perpetuities) and not sooner
terminated shall terminate twenty-one years after the death of the last to die of
[the beneficiaries in being at my death]
[me, my wife and the beneficiaries in being at the death of the first to die of my
wife and me]
[me and the beneficiaries in being at the date of this instrument]
, and the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of the trust according to the
terms of the trust or, to any extent the terms do not provide for distribution upon
the termination, to the members of the group that consists exclusively of the
persons to whom, immediately before the termination, the Trustee must or may pay
income, in proportion to those interests or, to any extent indefinite, in equal
shares.

l3.0l(a)

Drafting

Use variable a with trusts for charitable objects. The "other than" clause that
follows variable a and precedes variable b is designed to permit invocation of Code
Section 2041(a) (3). Use variable b in a revocable trust. Variable c facilitates
consolidation of identical trusts established by spouses. Use variable d in an
irrevocable trust.

13.02

"ELECT-OUT" JURISDICTION

Form 13.2

Section 4.02. Limitation of Duration. The rule against perpetuities does
not and shall not, and (to the maximum extent possible) all other rules of law
limiting the duration of trusts do not and shall not, apply to any trust that is
created by this instrument or, directly or indirectly, by exercise of any power of
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a
b
c

appointment granted in this instrument. Without limiting the generality of the
preceding sentence, the Trustee (or other person to whom the power properly is
granted or delegated) has the power to sell, lease and mortgage property for any
period of time beyond the period of the rule against perpetuities and (to the
maximum extent possible) beyond the period of the limitation of all other rules of
law limiting the duration of trusts. Each trust that is created by this instrument
or, directly or indirectly, by exercise of any power of appointment granted in this
instrument is a qualified perpetual trust (within the meaning of the Statute
Concerning Perpetuities (765 ILCS 305». Solely to such extent (if any) as,
notwithstanding the preceding portion of this Section, applicable law limits the
duration of any trust that is created by this instrument (or, directly or
indirectly, by exercise of any power of appointment granted in this instrument) and
that is not terminated before the end of the period of the limitation, the trust
shall terminate at the end of the period of the limitation, and the Trustee shall
distribute the trust estate of the trust according to the terms of the trust or, to
any extent the terms do not provide for distribution upon the termination, to the
members of the group that consists exclusively of the persons to whom, immediately
before the termination, the Trustee must or may pay income, in proportion to those
interests or, to any extent indefinite, in equal shares, and if the period of the
limitation is measured in whole or in part by the lives of individuals living at a
particular time, the measuring lives shall consist (to such extent as the law
permits) of
[the beneficiaries in being at my death]
[me, my wife and the beneficiaries in being at the death of the first to die of my
wife and me]
[me and the beneficiaries in being at the date of this instrument].
Nothing in this Section shall prevent the exercise of any power of appointment from
limiting the duration of any power, interest or trust.

13.02(a)

Drafting

Some jurisdictions, such as Illinois, permit the settlor to elect that no rule
applies. Use variable a in a revocable trust. Variable b facilitates consolidation of
identical trusts established by spouses. Use variable c in an irrevocable trust.

13.03

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Form 13.3
Section 4.02. Limitation of Duration. To the maximum extent possible,
rules of law limiting the duration of trusts including without limitation the rule
against perpetuities do not and shall not apply to any trust that is created by
this instrument or, directly or indirectly, by exercise of any power of appointment
granted in this instrument. Without limiting the generality of the preceding
sentence, the Trustee (or other person to whom the power properly is granted or
delegated) has the power to sell, lease and mortgage property for any period of
time beyond the period of the rule against perpetuities and (to the maximum extent
possible) beyond the period of the limitation of all other rules of law limiting
the duration of trusts. Solely to such extent (if any) as, notwithstanding the
preceding portion of this Section, applicable law limits the duration of any trust
that is created by this instrument (or, directly or indirectly, by exercise of any
power of appointment granted in this instrument) and that is not terminated before
the end of the period of the limitation, the trust shall terminate at the end of
the period of the limitation, and the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of
the trust according to the terms of the trust or, to any extent the terms do not
provide for distribution upon the termination, to the members of the group that
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a
b
c

consists exclusively of the persons to whom, immediately before the termination,
the Trustee must or may pay income, in proportion to those interests or, to any
extent indefinite, in equal shares, and if the period of the limitation is measured
in whole or in part by the lives of individuals living at a particular time, the
measuring lives shall consist (to such extent as the law permits) of
[the beneficiaries in being at my death]
[me, my wife and the beneficiaries in being at the death of the first to die of my
wife and me]
[me and the beneficiaries in being at the date of this instrument].
Nothing in this Section shall prevent the exercise of any power of appointment from
limiting the duration of any power, interest or trust.

13.03(a)

Drafting

Use variable a in a revocable trust. Variable b facilitates consolidation of
identical trusts established by spouses. Use variable c in an irrevocable trust.

13.04

SAVINGS CLAUSE FOR DIFFERENT PERIODS

Form 13.4
(A) Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, each trust that is created by
this instrument (or, directly or indirectly, by exercise of any power of
appointment granted in this instrument) with respect to property (or proceeds of
property) that, according to my Will, I appointed to the Trustee of the Portion
Three Family Trust, and with respect to property (or proceeds of property) that,
according to my Will, I appointed to the Trustee of the Portion Four Family Trust,
and not sooner terminated, shall terminate twenty-one years after the death of the
last to die of me and the beneficiaries in being at the death of my father, JOHN H.
SMITH, on January 15, 1990, and the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of
the trust according to the terms of the trust or, to any extent the terms do not
provide for distribution upon the termination, to the members of the group that
consists exclusively of the persons to whom, immediately before the termination,
the Trustee must or may pay income, in proportion to those interests or, to any
extent indefinite, in equal shares.
(B) Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, except as provided in
subsection (A) of this Section,
[continue with conventional savings clause,
13.3]
13.04(a)

~,

Form 13.1, Form 13.2 or Form

Purpose

Form 13.4 is intended to apply to powers and trusts that are created according to
the same instrument but that as a matter of law are subject to different periods of rule
against perpetuities (including none).
Form 13.4 is an alternative to a provision in the
will of the donee. Whenever possible, use this provision in the trust of the donee rather
than in the will of the donee.

13.05 SAVINGS CLAUSE FOR APPOINTIVE
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO GENERAL POWER
TO APPOINT BY WILL

Form 13.5
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(A) Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, each trust that is created by
this instrument (or, directly or indirectly, by exercise of any power of
appointment granted in this instrument) and not sooner terminated, to such extent
(if any) as the trust estate of the trust consists of property (or proceeds of
property) distributed to the Trustee under this instrument pursuant to my exercise
at Section 2.03 of my Will of the power of appointment granted to me in the Will of
my husband, JOHN H. SMITH, shall terminate twenty-one years after the death of the
last to die of me and the beneficiaries in being at the death of JOHN H. SMITH on
January 15, 1990, and the Trustee shall distribute the trust estate of any
terminated portion of the trust according to the terms of the trust or, to any
extent the terms do not provide for distribution upon the termination, to the
members of the group that consists exclusively of the persons to whom, immediately
before the termination, the Trustee must or may pay income, in proportion to those
interests or, to any extent indefinite, in equal shares.
13.05(a)

Purpose and Drafting

Form 13.5 is includable in the trust document of the donee of the power.
Form 13.5
is usable in lieu of subsection (A) of Form 13.4 for appointed property which (a) was
subject to a testamentary general power of appointment and remains subject to a
preexisting rule against perpetuities and (b) is not segregated into a separate trust.
The period of the rule against perpetuities with respect to this type of power continues
to date from the creation of the power.
See Northern Trust Company v. Porter, 13 N.E.2d
487 (Ill. 1938). Normally, segregation would interfere with the normal, tax-oriented
operation of the trust document, such as in the application of a marital formula.
Nonsegregation presents the issue of the dilution of the effect of GST exemption by
shortening the potential duration of the portion of the trust to which the GST exemption
is applied. However, if the subject property is no more important than any other property
to retain in trust, the use of pick-and-choose authority to divert this property from the
exempt portion seems a possible answer.

13.06 SEPARATE RECEPTACLES FOR APPOINTIVE
PROPERTY SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT PERIODS
Form 13.6

a

(A) Allocation to Portions. The Trustee shall allocate the trust estate of
the Family Trust, and other assets, to four portions, to be known, respectively, as
"Portion One," "Portion Two," "Portion Three" and "Portion Four," according to this
subsection (A).
[If any property passes to the Trustee of the Family Trust upon the death of the
survivor of my wife and me or upon the occurrence of any other event other than my
death, the Trustee shall allocate it among "Portion One," "Portion Two," "Portion
Three" and "Portion Four" by taking into account all prior allocations.]

*

*

*

(3)
Portion Three. Portion Three shall consist of all property
distributed to the Trustee of the Portion Three Family Trust pursuant to my
exercise at Section 2.05 of my Will of the power of appointment granted to
me at Section 3.06 of the Declaration of Trust of JOHN H. SMITH dated
January 15, 1989.
(4)
Portion Four. Portion Four shall consist of all property
distributed to the Trustee of the Portion Four Family Trust pursuant to my
exercise at Section 2.05 of my Will of the power of appointment granted to
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me at Section 3.07 of the Declaration of Trust of JOHN H. SMITH dated
January 15, 1989.

*

*

*

(B) Administration of Portions. The Trustee shall administer Portion One
as provided in Section 3.06. The Trustee shall administer Portion Two as provided
in Section 3.07. The Trustee shall administer Portion Three as provided in Section
3.08. The Trustee shall administer Portion Four as provided in Section 3.09.

*

*

*

Section 3.07. Portion Three Family Trust. The Trustee shall set apart, in
a separate trust to be known as the ·Portion Three Family Trust" and to be
administered as provided in this Section, (i) all property distributed to the
Trustee of the Portion Three Family Trust pursuant to my exercise at Section 2.05
of my Will of the power of appointment granted to me at Section 3.06 of the
Declaration of Trust of JOHN H. SMITH dated January 15, 1989, and (ii) all property
distributed to the Trustee of the Portion Three Family Trust pursuant to Section
3.08 of this instrument.

*

*

*

Section 3.08. Portion Four Family Trust. The Trustee shall set apart, in a
separate trust to be known as the "Portion Four Family Trust" and to be
administered as provided in this Section, all property distributed to the Trustee
of the Portion Four Family Trust pursuant to my exercise at Section 2.05 of my Will
of the power of appointment granted to me at Section 3.07 of the Declaration of
Trust of JOHN H. SMITH dated January 15, 1989. The Trustee shall distribute to the
Trustee of the Portion Three Family Trust created according to Section 3.07 a
fractional portion of the trust estate of the Portion Four Family Trust. The
numerator of the fraction is the amount (if any) by which my GST exemption that is
unallocated immediately before my death exceeds the value (for purposes of
determining the United States estate tax payable because of my death) of the trust
estate of the Portion One Family Trust. The denominator is the value (for purposes
of determining the United States estate tax payable because of my death) of the
trust estate of the Portion Four Family Trust. Notwithstanding the preceding
portion of this Section, if the United States generation-skipping tax is not in
effect at my death, the Trustee shall distribute to the Trustee of the Portion
Three Family Trust created according to Section 3.07 all of the trust estate of the
Portion Four Family Trust. The succeeding portion of this Section is subject to
the preceding portion.
13.06(a) Purpose
The purpose of Form 13.6 is to create receptacles for GST-significant assets with
respect to which a power of appointment is exercised.
Portion Four "pours" to Portion
Three any property, such as, for example, the trust estate of a GST-nonexempt-maritaldeduction trust, that the GST exemption of the donee of the power can exempt. The purpose
of the last sentence of Form 13.6 is to "convert" to a full shelter if the generationskipping tax is not in effect when the exercise of the power becomes effective.
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13.07

CONTINGENT DISPOSITION OF APPOINTED
PROPERTY

Form 13.7
Any of the trust estate of the Portion Three Family Trust, and any of the trust
estate of the Portion Four Family Trust, that is not distributable according to the
prior provisions of this instrument and that consists of property (or proceeds of
property) with respect to which I exercised a power of appointment granted to me by
JOHN H. SMITH shall be distributed according to the instrument that created the
power. Any balance
[continue with usual contingent disposition clause]
13.07(a)

Purpose

Form 13.7 is includable in the trust of the donee of the power at the beginning of
the contingent disposition claUse. The scope of the exercised power defines the exercise,
but in Massachusetts (see 191 M.G.L. §lB) and Illinois (~755 ILCS 5/4-2 and 765 ILCS
320/1) the scope of the exercised power does not limit the scope of any new power that the
exercised power creates. However, the contingent disposition that appears in the will or
trust of the donee of the original power does not result from the exercise of the new
power. Rather, the contingent disposition occurs only because of a failure to exercise
the new power. Therefore, the contingent disposition seems governed by the creator, and
not the donee, of the original power.
Stated differently, by exercise, the donee of the
new power, but not the donee of the original power, seems able to create a contingent
disposition.

13.08

EXERCISE OF POWER

Form 13.8

a

b

Section 2.05. Property Subject to Certain Powers of Appointment. I am
granted a power of appointment ("First Power") at Section 3.06 of the Declaration
of Trust of JOHN H. SMITH dated January 15, 1989, with respect to the trust estate
of the Portion One Family Trust named for me.
I am granted a power of appointment
("Second Power") at Section 3.07 of the Declaration of Trust of JOHN H. SMITH dated
January 15, 1989, with respect to the trust estate of the Portion Two Family Trust
named for me.
If any descendant of John H. Smith survives me, I exercise the First
Power by directing that, upon my death, all property subject to the First Power
shall be distributed to the Trustee of the Portion Three Family Trust created
according to Section 3.08 of the Trust described in Section 2.04 of this Will. If
any descendant of John H. Smith survives me, I exercise the Second Power by
directing that, upon my death, all property subject to the Second Power shall be
distributed to the Trustee of the Portion Four Family Trust created according to
Section 3.09 of the Trust described in Section 2.04 of this Will. Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary, if my exercise of any power of appointment ("exercised
power")
[, other than the power of appointment granted to me at [#A] of [#B],]
creates another power of appointment ("other power"), the other power shall not be
exercisable or exercised, directly or indirectly, to postpone the vesting of any
estate or interest in, or suspend the absolute ownership or power of alienation of,
any property (or any proceeds of any property) with respect to which I exercised
the exercised power, for longer than twenty-one years after the death of the last
to die of me and the beneficiaries in being at the creation of the exercised power
[; provided, (1) if (a) no rule against perpetuities would apply absent my exercise
of the exercised power and (b) any period of years that begins with the creation of
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bi
bii

the exercised power and continues for more than one hundred ten is not regarded,
for purposes of determining United States estate tax immediately before my death,
as a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the
exercised power, I substitute for the period described in the portion of this
sentence that precedes this provisory clause the shorter of (a)
[three hundred sixty]
[one thousand]
years after the creation of the exercised power and (b) the longest period of years
that begins with the creation of the exercised power and is not regarded, for
purposes of determining the United States estate tax payable because of my death,
as a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the
exercised power and (2) the preceding portion of this sentence shall not limit the
other power with respect to any property (or any proceeds of any property) that is
includable in my gross estate (for purposes of determining the United States estate
tax payable because of my death) without regard to whether I exercised the
exercised power] .

l3.08(a)

Purpose and Drafting

Form 13.8 is includable in the will of the donee of the power.
The last sentence is a savings provision that is designed to avoid the Delaware Tax
Trap of Code Section 2041(a) (3) by avoiding the creation of a power which is exercisable
without regard to the date of the creation of the exercised power. The problem that the
last sentence addresses can occur if (i) the donee of a nongeneral power of appointment
exercises the power to create a presently exercisable general power of appointment ("PEG
power") that is not limited by any rule against perpetuities or that is limited by a new
period of rule against perpetuities or (ii) the donee exercises a nongeneral power of
appointment that itself is not limited by any rule against perpetuities to create a new
power that similarly is not limited.
A person who wants to exercise an existing power that is not limited by the common
law rule confronts the risks that imposition of the common law rule unnecessarily limits
the duration of the new power, that invocation (in the style of recent legislation in
Florida, Alaska, Utah and Wyoming) of a limit of a period of years in gross that begins
with the date of the creation of the exercised power is unproven and that declination to
exercise the power is probably unnecessary and inappropriate. A donee of an existing
power who is considering using Form 13.8 should consider the effect of Commissioner v.
Procter, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944), 44-1 USTC ~10,110, certiorari denied, 323 U.S. 756
(1944), and related authority.
Use variable a to identify any power that the testator affirmatively wants to
exercise to create a PEG power and to flunk the Code Section 2041(a) (3) test.
Arguably, deletion of variable b brings the exercise within the "safe harbor" of
the common law rule. Delete variable b if (i) the common law rule controls absent
variable b or (ii) the common law rule does not control absent variable b and the safe
harbor of the common law rule is sought.
Arguably, variable b with variable bi included and variable bii deleted brings the
exercise within the "safe harbor" of Florida. Generally use variable bi if no rule
against perpetuities applied to the exercised power.
Arguably, variable b with variable bii included and variable bi deleted brings the
exercise within the "safe harbor" of Alaska, Utah and Wyoming.
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CHAPTER 14
TRUST MANAGEMENT

SUBCHAPTER A:
GENERAL LIMITATIONS

14A.Ol

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

If the exercise of a power permits the power holder to shift beneficial enjoyment
to or from himself or herself, the power can present tax issues, even if the power is
labelled as an administrative power.
One concern is that the mere existence of the power
can be a general power of appointment or a power exercisable solely by the power holder to
vest income or corpus in himself or herself.
Code §678(a) (1) and Treas. Reg. §§20.2041l(b) (1), 25.2514-1(b) (1), 20.2056(b)-5(f) and 25.2523(e)-I(f). Another concern is that
the exercise or lapse of the power in favor of other than the power holder can produce a
taxable gift. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(g) (2) and Code §2514.
Particularly capable of permitting shifts of enjoyment are powers:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)
(iv)
(v)

(vi)
(vii)

(viii)

to retain, dispose and invest property when particular types of income
are allocated to particular beneficiaries,
to retain or invest in unproductive or underproductive property
(especially if the governing instrument waives the application of
state law that otherwise requires adjustments in favor of income),
to allocate receipts and expenses between income and principal,
to lend without adequate security or interest,
to exchange property with the trustee,
to release a trustee or accept the trustee's account,
to distribute in nonprorata shares without regard to unrealized gain
for tax purposes and
to pay (or cause payment of) death costs (i.e., debts, costs of
administration and taxes) from one fund rather than another.

An administrative power seems not to present any problem unless the administrative
power permits the holder to change the amount that the holder will receive. The ability
of a holder of an administrative power to use it to this effect depends upon the
complexions of both (i) the administrative power and (ii) the dispositive arrangement.
For example, if a fiduciary has a power to pay (or cause payment of) death costs from
either the residuary estate of a decedent or a trust to which all of the residuary estate
"pours over," the power seems not to permit the fiduciary to shift beneficial enjoyment.
However, if a fractional share of the residuary estate passes to the trust from which the
fiduciary can pay (or direct payment) and the balance of the residuary estate passes
elsewhere, the power might enable the fiduciary to enhance or to reduce the beneficial
interest that he or she possesses personally.

14A.02

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
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First, if the administrative power is not coupled with any dispositive provision
that mandates the distribution of income or principal, the drafting of dispositive powers
in accordance with the analysis in Chapter 3 should eliminate all tax vulnerability. To
such extent as an ascertainable standard limits a dispositive power that is exercisable in
favor of a holder of an administrative power or in favor of another distributee, the
ascertainable standard also limits the extent to which a holder of an administrative power
can use the administrative power to benefit the power holder or the other person.
If all
ability to distribute property to the power holder is described in Code Sections
2041(b) (1) (A) and 2514(c) (1) and all ability to distribute property to other than the
power holder is described in Treasury regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2) and the power
holder cannot distribute trust property in discharge of his or her legal obligation, these
limitations should prevent (i) any administrative power from being a general power of
appointment and (ii) the exercise of, or the failure to exercise, any administrative power
from being a taxable gift of the beneficial interest of the power .holder.
Second, if the administrative power is coupled with a dispositive provision that
mandates the distribution of income or principal, the draftsperson might have to eliminate
or limit the administrative power. Whereas administrative powers that are coupled with
discretionary powers to distribute seem to command orthodox solutions previously
discussed, a power of administration that is coupled with a dispositive provision that
mandates a distribution seems capable, absent sufficient limitation, of being a
dispositive power.
If, for example, the governing instrument requires the trustee to pay
income currently to the power holder or another person, an administrative power to retain
or to invest in unproductive or underproductive property might enable the power holder,
unlimited as provided in Code Sections 2041(b) (1) (A) and 2514(c) (1) and Treasury
regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2), to increase or reduce the stream of income to the
distributee.
If the power holder is the income beneficiary, the concern is that the power
holder might possess and release a general power of appointment over any forgone income.
If the power holder is a remainder person rather than the income beneficiary and the power
holder maximizes income and thus reduces the potential value of the remainder, the concern
is that the power holder might be deemed to give the forgone value to the income
beneficiary.
If each holder of an administrative power has a beneficial interest and the
administrative power is coupled with a dispositive provision that mandates a distribution,
general precautions are appropriate to prevent the use of the administrative power for
dispositive purposes. The governing instrument clearly should cause all administrative
powers to be fiduciary powers. The draftsperson should design all administrative powers
cautiously and conservatively. The draftsperson should avoid exculpatory clauses and
should eliminate any discretion that arguably is sensitive.
Consider reposing any
otherwise-sensitive power jointly in more than one holder.
Code §§678(a) (1),
2041 (b) (1) (C) (ii) and 2514 (c) (3) (B) .
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SUBCHAPTER B:
SELECTION AND SUCCESSION OF TRUSTEES

l4B.Ol

POWER TO RESUME OFFICE AFTER RESIGNATION

Form 14.1
During any time my wife is unable or unwilling to serve, my brother, ROBERT, shall
serve. My wife and my brother, Robert, if at any time or from time to time unable
or unwilling to serve, may, when able and willing, assume or (as the case may be)
resume office, in lieu of any trustee for which this Section prescribes a tenure
consisting of any period of inability or unwillingness.
l4B.Ol(a)

Purpose

Most governing instruments do not permit a person to interrupt and resume service
as trustee. Accordingly, they present an all-or-nothing-at-all decision:
(i) relinquish
the trusteeship permanently or (ii) retain it.
The power to resume office provides an
additional possibility.
It seems particularly useful in the hands of family members.

l4B.02

POWER TO REMOVE TRUSTEE

Form 14.2: Alternative #1
At any time and from time to time, the Holder of the Power of Removal may remove
any trustee that is an Independent Person, by written instrument delivered to the
trustee to be removed.
The Individual Trustee shall be the Holder of the Power of
Removal. No one shall have any responsibility for any failure to exercise any
authority granted in this subsection (E).
The powers of the Holder of the Power of
Removal are, and shall be exercised as, fiduciary powers subject to all the
restrictions and limitations to which the Trustee would be subject if the Trustee
possessed the powers.

Form 14.3: Alternative #2
At any time and from time to time, the Holder of the Power of Removal may remove
any trustee, by written instrument delivered to the trustee to be removed. The
Holder of the Power of Removal at any particular time shall consist of the majority
in interest, or, if indefinite, in number, of the persons to whom the Trustee then
must or may pay any of the trust estate. No one shall have any responsibility for
any failure to exercise any authority granted in this subsection (E). The powers
of the Holder of the Power of Removal are, and shall be exercised as, fiduciary
powers subject to all the restrictions and limitations to which the Trustee would
be subject if the Trustee possessed the powers.

Form 14.4: Alternative #3
At any time and from time to time, the Holder of the Power of Removal may remove
any trustee that is an Independent Person, by written instrument delivered to the
trustee to be removed. The Holder of the Power of Removal at all times shall be an
Independent Person that is not serving as a trustee. The Holder of the Power of
Removal at any particular time shall consist of the Holder of the Power of Removal
that then is serving.
If no Holder of the Power of Removal then is serving, the
Holder of the Power of Removal (if any) shall consist of such eligible appointee as
the Holder of the Power of Removal most recently selected, for future effect, or,
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if no Holder of the Power of Removal so is appointed, such eligible appointee as
the Nonlndependent Trustee selects (or most recently selected, for future effect),
or, if no Holder of the Power of Removal so is appointed, such eligible appointee
as the majority in interest, or, if indefinite, in number, of the persons to whom
at the time of the appointment the Trustee must or may pay any of the trust estate
selects, or, if no Holder of the Power of Removal so is appointed, such eligible
appointee as a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the application of any person
having any interest, after such notice to the party or parties in interest (except
such as may not be sui juris) as the court shall deem necessary or proper, selects.
An individual's inability to serve may be determined by the written certification
of the individual's personal physician. No one shall have any responsibility for
any failure to exercise any authority granted in this subsection (E). The powers
of the Holder of the Power of Removal are, and shall be exercised as, fiduciary
powers subject to all the restrictions and limitations to which the Trustee would
be subject if the Trustee possessed the powers.
14B.02(a)

Problems and Solutions

Revenue Ruling 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191, revoked Revenue Ruling 79-353, 1979-2 C.B.
325, and Revenue Ruling 81-51, 1981-1 C.B. 458. According to Revenue RUling 79-353,
modified by Revenue Ruling 81-51, the power of a grantor to remove and replace a trustee
caused the grantor to be deemed to possess the powers that the trustee actually possessed.
In Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300 (1993), the Tax Court disagreed with Revenue Ruling
79-353 and refused to apply it.
If the powers of the trustee to distribute or accumulate income and to distribute
principal were not ascertainable-standard-limited and the grantor had a power to remove
and replace the trustee, Revenue Ruling 79-353 would have attributed to the grantor a
retained power described in Code Sections 2036{a) (2) and 2038{a) (1).
Similarly, if the
trustee had a power to discharge a legal obligation of the grantor and the grantor had a
power to remove and replace the trustee, Revenue Ruling 79-353 would have attributed to
the grantor a retained power described in Code Section 2036{a) (1).
If, on the other hand,
the powers of the trustee to distribute or accumulate income and to distribute principal
were ascertainable-standard-limited, the grantor would not have had a power described in
Code Section 2036{a) (2) or Code Section 2038{a) (1). See Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74
(2d Cir. 1947), 47-1 USTC ~10,551.
Similarly, if the trustee did not have any power to
discharge any legal obligation of the grantor, the grantor would not have had a power
described in Code Section 2036{a) (1).
According to an extension of the theory of Revenue Ruling 79-353, any person who
could remove and replace a trustee was deemed to possess the powers that the trustee
actually possessed. Accordingly, if the discretion of the trustee to distribute or
accumulate income or to distribute principal were not limited by an ascertainable standard
described in Code Section 2041{b) (1) (A), Revenue Ruling 79-353 would have attributed a
general power of appointment to any permissible distributee who had a power to remove and
replace the trustee.
Similarly, if the trustee could have discharged (according to a
power that would not have been within Code Section 2041{b) (1) (A) if the obligor were to
have possessed the power) the legal obligation of a person who had a power to remove and
replace the trustee, Revenue Ruling 79-353 would have attributed a general power of
appointment to the person.
Revenue Ruling 95-58 not only revoked Revenue Ruling 79-353.
It also stated that
if the holder of a power of removal cannot replace the trustee with a related or
subordinate party (within the meaning of Code Section 672{c», the power of removal will
not cause attribution of any power of the trustee.
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If (i) the trustee cannot discharge any legal obligation of any person who can
remove and replace the trustee, and the trustee cannot make any distribution, other than
according to an ascertainable standard, to any person who can remove and replace the
trustee, or (ii) no holder of the power of removal can replace the trustee with a related
or subordinate party, each of the three alternatives, depicted in the forms, is
appropriate.
If (i) any holder of the power of removal can replace the trustee with a
related or subordinate party and (ii) either (a) the powers of the trustee to make
distributions to the holder of the power to remove and replace are not ascertainablestandard-limited or (b) the trustee can discharge a legal obligation of the holder of the
power to remove and replace, or both (a) and (b), the first and second alternatives are
inappropriate and the third alternative is appropriate. The third alternative uses a
portion of the definition of Independent Trustee to invest the removal power in an
independent person. See Form 14.6. Because, according to the form, the removal power is
a fiduciary power, this writer has some concern that, but for the sentence that exonerates
the holder of the power from responsibility for failure to exercise the power, the holder
of the power might have a duty to initiate a removal and, therefore, a duty to observe the
administration of the trust.
See Form 14.6 for the definition of "NonIndependent
Trustee."

14B.03

DEFERRED NAMING OF INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE

Form 14.5: Alternative #1

a

"Corporate Trustee" shall mean the Trustee but shall not include any trustee that
is neither a corporation nor a limited liability company
[and shall not include any trustee that does not have more than $100,000,000 of
trust assets under its supervision].
"Independent Trustee" shall mean the Corporate Trustee.

Form 14.6: Alternative #2

a
ai

a

(D) Trustee.
"Trustee" with respect to any trust shall mean the one or
more trustees of the trust.
"Individual Trustee" shall mean the Trustee but shall
not include any trustee that is not an individual.
["Corporate Trustee" shall mean the Trustee but shall not include any trustee that
is neither a corporation nor a limited liability company
[and shall not include any trustee that does not have more than $100,000,000 of
trust assets under its supervision].]
"Independent Trustee" shall mean the
[Corporate]
Trustee but shall not include any trustee that is not an Independent Person.
"NonIndependent Trustee" shall mean the Trustee but shall not include any trustee
that is an Independent Person.
"Independent Person" at any particular time with
respect to any trust shall mean any person that
(i) has no beneficial interest (other than as a potential appointee
under a power of appointment held by another), present or future, vested or
contingent, direct or indirect, in the trust,
(ii) cannot be benefitted, to any extent gratuitously, by the exercise
or nonexercise of any power given a trustee by this instrument or by law,
(iii) is not (a) a contributor, (b) a beneficiary, (c) a spouse,
former spouse, ancestor, descendant, sibling or employee of a contributor or
beneficiary (or of a spouse or former spouse of a contributor or
beneficiary), (d) a corporation or other person, or an employee of a
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corporation or other person, in which the stock or other holdings of a
contributor (or beneficiary, or a spouse or former spouse of a contributor
or beneficiary) and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting
or other control, (e) a subordinate employee of a corporation or other
person in which a contributor or beneficiary (or a spouse or former spouse
of a contributor or beneficiary) is an executive or (f) any party, not
described in (a) through (e) of this clause (iii), that is, or, if
nonadverse (within the meaning of Section 672(b) of the Code), would be, a
"related or subordinate party," with respect to a contributor or a
beneficiary (as if the beneficiary were a contributor), within the meaning
of Section 672(c) (after application of Section 672(e»
of the Code,
(iv) is not controlled, directly or indirectly, within the
contemplation of income or any transfer tax, by any person that, according
to the portion of this sentence preceding this clause (iv), is ineligible to
be an Independent Person and
(v) under the United States internal revenue laws in effect at such
time can alone (as though the only trustee), to such extent as some person
(described in the portion of this sentence preceding this clause (v»
could
alone (as though the only trustee), possess and exercise each power given a
trustee by this instrument or by law
(a) without causing any attribution of the trust estate of the
trust to any person (whether personally or as deemed transferor or
otherwise) for purposes of income or any transfer (including without
limitation gift, estate and generation-skipping) tax before the person
becomes entitled to receive it outright (or, because of a power
granted in or according to this instrument to the person as a
beneficiary, the person becomes entitled to pay it to the person or
the estate, creditors or creditors of the estate of the person) or it
is paid to, or for the benefit of, the person,
(b) without otherwise causing any generation-skipping transfer
and
(c) without causing any deemed sale or exchange, or transfer to
a foreign trust, of any of the trust estate.
14B.03(a)

Problems and Solutions

The decision that seems most to prevent, or at least delay, the signing of trust
arrangements is the selection of an independent trustee.
This decision is paramount if
the trust arrangement requires the service of an independent trustee at some time.
It is
important, if not paramount, even if the independent trustee is to be only a contingent
successor or addition.
Providing for selection of an independent trustee according to a formula can avoid
the necessity of selecting the trustee unless and until the need for its service occurs.
Therefore, it can facilitate the creation of the trust and can permit selection based upon
considerations at the time an independent trustee is needed or wanted. The formula can
define "Independent Trustee," state when an Independent Trustee is permitted or required
and provide an appointment procedure.
If the governing instrument requires the
independent trustee always to be a corporation, the definition can use the concept of a
corporation of a requisite, specified size, larger than the client (or any beneficiary)
can control. See Form 14.5.
If the governing instrument permits the independent trustee
to be other than a corporation (or requires it to be a corporation but the gross estate of
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the client or any beneficiary is very substantial), the definition can use the concept of
a person (human or not) that (i) has no beneficial interest, (ii) cannot exercise any
power to benefit itself, (iii) is not related or subordinate to any contributor or
beneficiary, (iv) is not sUbject to the control of anyone that is not an independent
person and (v) does not, for purposes of income or any transfer tax, cause attribution of
any property to any person before the person receives (or becomes entitled to receive) the
property.
See Form 14.6.

14B.04

DIFFERENT TRUSTEES FOR DIFFERENT TRUSTS

Form 14.7

Section 6.03.

Trustee.

(A) Number. The Trustee of each trust may but need not be the same and
shall consist of such trustees, not less than one or more than four, as are
appointed from time to time according to this Section, applied separately to each
trust.
14B.04(a)

Problems

The use of different trustees for different trusts created according to a single
document increases the complexity of drafting and administration. The governing
instrument must provide for the appointment, removal and succession of each trustee of
each trust, separately. Use of different trustees creates the possibility of
disintegrated management.

14B.04(b)

Purposes

Permissive (rather than required) use of different trustees facilitates customized
administration of each trust. A power of a trustee to create new trusts from an existing
trust might complement the use of different trustees for different trusts. The permissive
use of different trustees can facilitate separate investment strategies and permit
creation of separate trusts solely for investment reasons.

14B.05 PRIMARY BENEFICIARY CAN SERVE;
TRUSTEE CAN APPOINT SUCCESSOR; TRUSTEE IN
DEFAULT OF CONTRARY DESIGNATION CONSISTS OF INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR BENEFICIARIES
Form 14.8

(C)
Succession; Selection of Additional Trustee. During any time my
descendant with respect to whom the trust is created is unable or unwilling to
serve, such eligible appointee as the Trustee most recently selected, for future
effect, shall serve.
If a successor trustee is required and no successor is
appointed according to the preceding portion of this subsection (C), an Independent
Trustee shall serve; provided, if my descendant with respect to whom the trust is
created is deceased and any descendant of mine with respect to whom a succeeding
trust is created is able and willing to serve, each descendant of mine with respect
to whom a succeeding trust is created, who is able and willing, shall serve.

SUBCHAPTER C:
ALLOCATION OF POWERS AMONG TRUSTEES

I
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l4C.Ol

DELEGATION

Form 14.9

a
b
a

(1) At any time and from time to time, any trustee
[who is an individual]
may delegate to any
[other]
trustee
[that is a corporation]
, by written instrument, any or all of the trustee's powers (except those, if any,
not exercisable by the other trustee). Any person dealing in good faith with any
trustee may rely without inquiry upon its certificate with respect to any
delegation.

l4C.Ol(a)

Purpose

This provision permits trustees freely to delegate powers among themselves subject
only to other provisions of the governing instrument that preclude a particular trustee
from possessing a particular power.

l4C.02

ADDITION OF INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE

As mentioned in 3A.04(c), the writer often uses "two tiers" of dispositive powers,
with some but not all of the powers granted solely to an independent trustee, and he
particularly uses a variation in which an independent trustee is not required always to
serve and is only a permissible or mandatory addition, or a required successor, to one or
more beneficially interested trustees. See the drafting issues that are discussed at
3A. 04 (c) .

Form 14.10

a

(A) Number. The Trustee of each trust may but need not be the same and
shall consist of such trustees, not less than one or more than three, as are
appointed from time to time according to this Section, applied separately to each
trust.
[The Trustee shall include an Independent Trustee during any time in which, if no
Independent Trustee were serving, applicable law or a limitation set forth in
Section 6.02 would cause no trustee to possess a particular power (other than a
power that this instrument explicitly grants exclusively to the Independent
Trustee) that the Independent Trustee, if serving, would possess.]
(B)

Initial Appointment; Additional Trustee.
(1)

a

b

Initial Appointment.

My wife initially shall be the Trustee.

(2)
Additional Trustee.
[If at any time an Independent Trustee is required according to subsection
(A) of this Section but no Independent Trustee is serving and no Independent
Trustee is to commence to serve according to subsection (C) of this Section,
an Independent Trustee (to be selected according to subsection (C) of this
Section) shall be added.]
[If at any time no Independent Trustee is serving and no Independent Trustee
is required to serve, any Independent Person may direct the addition of an
Independent Trustee (to be selected according to subsection (C) of this
Section) .]
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l4C.02(a)

Drafting

Use variable a to provide for the mandatory addition of an independent trustee.
Use variable b to provide for the discretionary addition of an independent trustee. Use
variable a and variable b, together, to include both systems.

l4C.02(b)

Purpose

Provision for the discretionary addition of an independent trustee creates an
additional option. The non independent trustee can serve alone. The nonindependent
trustee can resign and cause succession. A person who has discretion to add an
independent trustee can direct the addition of a co-trustee.
A power of a beneficially interested person to direct the addition of an
independent trustee permits the beneficially interested person to activate powers that
only the independent trustee can possess.
If a person to whom the independent trustee, ii
serving, can d~stribute trust property can direct the addition of an independent trustee
and, thus, can activate any powers that only the independent trustee can possess, but
cannot require any increase in the amount he or she will receive and cannot require or
permit any decrease in the amount that, absent the addition, he or she will receive,
neither the existence nor the exercise of the power should present any problem. The
appointment mechanism illustrated in Form 14.10 should avoid the problem in any event.
Provision for the mandatory addition of an independent trustee might be useful if
the governing instrument permits one or more beneficially interested persons to serve
alone as trustee(s).
If the mandatory addition is used with a provision such as Form
14.15 and Form 14.16, that extinguishes a power in the hands of a person in whose hands
the power would be sensitive, the mandatory addition allocates the power to a person in
whose hands the power will not be sensitive.
If a particular power would be tax-sensitive in the hands of each beneficially
interested trustee and the governing instrument provides that no beneficially interested
trustee will possess it, either (i) the power (and thus the corresponding interest) will
not exist or (ii) the governing instrument must provide for the addition of an independent
trustee to possess the power. To require the addition of an independent trustee when the
tax sensitivity is inadvertent probably will serve the intentions of the grantor better
than to cause the sensitive powers (and thus the corresponding interests) not to exist.
Additionally, this approach will avoid the risks that might inhere in some shifting
interests.
See Horn, Whom Do You Trust: Planning, Drafting and Administering Self and
Beneficiary-Trusteed Trusts, 20th Ann. Inst. Est. PIg. ~507.1 (Matthew Bender, 1986).
Further, co-trustees can use delegation authority to mitigate the effect of the addition
of an independent trustee. Although an independent trustee is added, the independent
trustee can delegate to the beneficially interested trustee all powers that are not taxsensitive.
See 3A.04(c), Form 14.13 and Form 14.14 concerning a system embellishment that
would permit a beneficially interested trustee to possess certain powers exclusively,
notwithstanding the discretionary or mandatory addition of an independent trustee.
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14C.03
14C.03{a)

ALLOCATION TO INDEPENDENT TRUSTEE

Always

Form 14.11

(1)
Only the Independent Trustee shall possess, and participate in the
exercise of, any discretion that, but for this sentence, a trustee would have to
pay any of the trust estate to or for any beneficiary, pursuant to this instrument,
as if each grant of the discretion were exclusively to the Independent Trustee.
14C.03{a) (1)

Drafting

Generally, the writer does not rely solely upon Form 14.11 to allocate dispositive
powers. Rather, the writer couples Form 14.11 with a specific grant of each sensitive
power solely to the independent trustee in the dispositive part of the instrument.

14C.03{a) (2)

Purpose

Form 14.11 is usable when (i) a trustee that is not an independent trustee (as
defined in Form 14.5 or Form 14.6) might serve and (ii) no nonindependent trustee ever is
to possess any dispositive power. Will and trust forms distributed by banks often use a
variation of this approach. They effectively invest all dispositive powers solely in the
independent trustee.
Typically, they accomplish this by providing that no person serving
as a trustee shall possess or participate in the exercise of any discretion to affect his
or her interest or the interest of any person to whom he or she is legally obligated. The
bank-supplied forms, of course, contemplate trusts as to which the bank (i.e., independent
trustee) always will serve (at least when the grantor is not serving). Cf. Form 14.12.
When allocating powers for these reasons, the writer prefers to allocate the powers
directly, rather than by reference to the effect of any power in the hands of a particular
person.

*
14C.04

*

*

ALLOCATION TO NONINDEPENDENT TRUSTEE

Form 14.13

(1) During any time that the Trustee includes both an Independent Trustee
and a NonIndependent Trustee, except to any extent the NonIndependent Trustee
notifies the Independent Trustee in writing to the contrary, only the
NonIndependent Trustee shall possess, and participate in the exercise of, any
powers that the NonIndependent Trustee possesses pursuant to this instrument, as if
each grant of those powers were exclusively to the NonIndependent Trustee. During
any time that because of the preceding sentence any power reposes solely in the
NonIndependent Trustee, the Independent Trustee shall have only such duties and
responsibilities, if any, as correspond to and coincide with any powers that,
notwithstanding the preceding sentence or because of a notification according to
the preceding sentence, the Independent Trustee does possess.
Form 14.14

(1) A majority of the trustees that possess a power shall control the
exercise and nonexercise of the power; provided, if at any time the Independent
Trustee and the NonIndependent Trustee disagree, the NonIndependent Trustee shall
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control. A dissenting trustee shall assist to implement, but shall have no
responsibility for, any exercise or nonexercise from which the trustee dissents.
See Form 14.6 for the definition of "Nonlndependent Trustee."

l4C.05

DIVERSION OF "SENSITIVE" POWERS

Form 14.15
(2)
If at any particular time under the United States internal revenue laws
in effect at such time any trustee cannot alone (as though the only trustee), but
an Independent Person could alone (as though the only trustee), possess and
exercise a particular power given a trustee by this instrument or by law with
respect to any trust
(a) without causing any attribution of the trust estate of the trust
to any person (whether personally or as deemed transferor or otherwise) for
purposes of income or any transfer (including without limitation gift,
estate and generation-skipping) tax before the person becomes entitled to
receive it outright (or, because of a power granted in or according to this
instrument to the person as a beneficiary, the person becomes entitled to
pay it to the person or the estate, creditors or creditors of the estate of
the person) or it is paid to, or for the benefit of, the person,
(b) without otherwise causing any generation-skipping transfer and
(c) without causing any deemed sale or exchange, or transfer to a
foreign trust, of any of the trust estate,
the trustee shall not possess the power or participate in its exercise.
14C.05(a)

Powers Described in Code Section 2041(b) (1) (A)
and Treasury Regulations Section 25.25ll-1(g) (2)

Form 14.16
(1) No trustee shall possess, or participate in the exercise of, any power
that, but for this paragraph (1), the trustee would have to make any determination
with respect to
(a) any payment which would discharge any legal obligation of the
trustee personally or
(b) any payment to, or for the benefit of, the trustee personally
(neither the preceding portion of this paragraph (1) nor any otherwiseapplicable rule of law shall limit the trustee's possession or participation
in the exercise of any power (or severable portion of any power) granted in
this instrument to the trustee to consume, invade or appropriate property
for the benefit of the trustee personally which is limited by an
ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, support or
maintenance of the trustee personally) or
(c) any power to pay to, or for the benefit of, the estate or the
creditors of the estate of the trustee personally or
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(d) any payment to, or for the benefit of, other than the trustee
personally of any property in which the trustee personally has any
beneficial interest (neither this subparagraph (d) nor any otherwiseapplicable rule of law shall limit the trustee's possession or participation
in the exercise of any fiduciary power (or severable portion of any
fiduciary power) granted in this instrument to the trustee to make any
payment to, or for the benefit of, other than the trustee personally the
exercise or nonexercise of which is limited by a reasonably fixed or
ascertainable standard which is set forth in this instrument).
As used in this paragraph (1), "trustee personally" includes any person who because
of control over the trustee is deemed for purposes of any transfer tax to possess
any power of the trustee.
14C.05(a) (1)

Purpose

Form 14.16 does not grant any power. Rather, it only limits powers that are
granted elsewhere. The limitations are the least necessary to assure that (i) a general
power of appointment does not exist because of the ability of a person to discharge a
legal obligation by paying property to another person, (ii) a general power of appointment
does not exist because of the ability of a person to pay property to himself or herself,
(iii) a general power of appointment does not exist because of the ability of a person to
pay property to his or her estate and (iv) a taxable gift does not occur because of a
trustee's payment to another of property in which the trustee personally has a beneficial
interest. See 3A.03.
Subparagraph (a) of the form effectuates the planning discussed at 3A.03(c) (2).
Subparagraph (b) of the form permits the power holder to have a power, granted elsewhere
in the instrument and described in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) of the form, if
the power is described in Code Section 2041(b) (1) (A).
Subparagraph (c) of the form
prevents the power holder from having a power, granted elsewhere in the instrument, to
grant himself or herself a general power to appoint by will.
Subparagraph (d) of the form
permits the power holder to have a power, granted elsewhere in the instrument and
described in subparagraph (d) of the form, if the power is described in Treasury
regulations section 25.2511-1(g) (2).
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INTRODUCTION

As in all phases of civil litigation, mediation is becoming more and more common in
disputes arising from or related to estate or will matters. The value of mediation in estate
disputes is no less than that in other matters, advancing the interests of economical resolution of
disputes, preservation of family relationships, (or at least the avoidance of such grievous wounds
as would destroy any possibility of future family harmony), saving the costs of litigation and
removing the cloud of litigation over the emotional and mental health of all those involved. In
these respects, it is difficult to delineate or distinguish mediation in the estate context from
mediation in any other context. However, clearly, mediation of estate disputes does pose some
unique challenges.
This paper will attempt first, to address the legal background and basis for mediation
generally. Next it will address mediation techniques both generally and with respect to specific
types of common estate disputes, and finally make some suggestions regarding possible benefits
of mediation in other settings, such as estate planning, trust administration, and others not
generally considered as subjects of mediation.
I. Legal Background for Mediation

Technically no specific authorization is required for mediation of any dispute which the
parties agree to attempt to resolve thereby. Since mediation is therefore a voluntary process, and
one in which settlement is only achieved by mutual agreement, not by imposition by the
mediator, there has never been any legal restriction upon the ability of the parties to mediate
disputes.
The exponential increase in mediation has occurred, first of all because the rising cost
and delay of litigation has compelled more and more litigants in that direction, and secondly

J-l

because trial courts, similarly struggling with congested dockets, have adopted rules, procedures
and occasionally standing orders strongly encouraging, if not requiring, mediation.
In Jefferson County, the Circuit and District Courts collectively have adopted specific
provisions as a portion of the Local Rules of Court. These are found as Rule 14, "Alternative
Dispute Resolution." Rule 14.03 specifically authorizes the court on its own motion or on
motion of any party to refer a case for mediation. It also provides certain criteria which the court
shall consider in determining whether to do so. These include the stage of the litigation, the
extent of discovery, the nature of the issues, the willingness to mediate and whether the parties
have attempted to settle the

cas~

or otherwise resolve their disputes.

Mediation does not

effectuate a stay of the proceedings so that discovery or other pre-trial action may continue.
However, as a practical matter, parties normally suspend such activities pending mediation.
The Jefferson County Rules further provide general guidelines for the appointment and
compensation of the mediator, the procedures at mediation, confidentiality issues and the
preparation of an appropriate settlement agreement if reached. Rule 14.10 requires the mediator
to report the results of the mediation to the court.
In Fayette County, Local Rule 29 "Mediation" makes similar provisions. The Fayette
Coun~

Rules are, if anything, somewhat more mandatory than the Jefferson County Rules in

that Rule 29 B( 1) specifically authorizes the court to order mediation even without the consent of
the parties. Rules are also provided for confidentiality and for reporting to the Court.
Boone, Campbell, Gallatin and Kenton Counties have adopted uniform Local Rules
which also contain provisions regarding alternative dispute resolution. However the process
provided for in those Rules is denominated "arbitration." The circuit court may order any case to
be heard by a "Board of Arbitration" of not more than three members of the Northern Kentucky
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Bar Association. Specific provisions are provided for those taking exception to the arbitration or
the selection of the arbitrators. Hearings are held at which the arbitration board receives sworn
testimony and documentary evidence. The arbitrators are authorized to issue subpoenas and
require production of documents. The actions of the arbitrators remain subject to supervision of
the court with respect to the proceedings. After the hearing, the arbitrators are to file a report and
award. In other words, unlike traditional mediation, the arbitrators actually decide the case. In
all the foregoing respects, the Northern Kentucky procedures are quite similar to arbitration in
the usual sense rather than mediation. The significant difference however, is that unlike most
arbitrated matters, a right of appeal is provided for persons aggrieved by the decision. In the
event of an appeal, the case is essentially tried de novo, by the court, with or without a jury. In
essence, therefore, the Northern Kentucky procedure functions something like a mock trial. But
the net effect is still basically voluntary, like mediation, in that in any event in which a party does
not wish to settle their case (and loses at arbitration), they may still obtain a trial by the court.
Thus, local variations on the central theme of mediation abound. However, one of the
best things about mediation is that parties to a dispute, even in cases which are not yet in
litigation, may set their own rules and mediate in any fashion which meets their mutual approval.
In other words, there are no set ground rules. The Rules of Court cited above are enabling, but

not mandatory. Obviously the parties may agree on a mechanism to resolve their differences at
any time and in any manner. The effectiveness of mediation, therefore, lies as much in its
flexibility as in any other aspect.
II. Mediation Techniques

For those who have participated in mediation, the usual format is probably well known.
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However, for the benefit of those who may not have participated, the standard format which
most mediators employ involves something like this, in a chronological sequence:
1. Agreement to mediation and selection of mediator.
2. Agreement as to the time and place of mediation.
3. Preparation and service upon the mediator of a pre-hearing or position statement
setting forth in summary form the facts of the dispute, the issues involved, the status of any
previous settlement discussions and the points which the parties expect to discuss at mediation.
(Please note that the mediation statements are not always exchanged with opposing parties so
that the parties can be as candid as possible in their communications with the mediator before the
session has even begun. The exchange of position statements is however, normally a matter
which the parties, rather than the mediator, dictate).
4. The mediation session itself. The session usually begins with a joint meeting at
which the mediator explains and reiterates to the opposing parties the rationale for mediation, the
mediator's role and a general outline of the process. The mediator then invites the parties or
their counsel to make opening statements. If the mediator has questions which he believes are
beneficially discussed at the joint session, he may inquire. The parties then normally break into
separate groups. The mediator begins discussing the case with each group separately. At some
point, the mediator will encourage one of the parties to make an offer to settle the matter. He
will then convey it to the adverse party and encourage a counter-proposal. The session continues
in this fashion with the mediator essentially engaging in "shuttle diplomacy" until either
settlement is reached or the parties are at an impasse.
5. At the conclusion of the mediation session, the mediator, with the assistance and
input of the settling parties drafts a settlement agreement which is signed by all parties and their
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unwaveringly in their own positions. The mediator is often unable to do little more than spend a
few hours in order to inform the parties that they have irreconcilable differences. However, the
purely neutral mediator may also be more effective in cases which are not clear cut and in cases
in which the parties are anxious to settle, and are willing to admit to themselves the uncertainty
of their position. It may be unwise for the mediator to inject personal assessments in such
situations.
The more authoritarian style of mediation has the obvious advantage of frequently
placing sufficient pressure on the parties that they feel almost obligated to settle.

The

disadvantage of the authoritarian style is that if the opinion of the mediator is off the mark, it
may become more difficult to settle the case because counsel will be advising the client that the
mediator is simply wrong. Obviously this runs the risk of destroying the mediator's credibility,
and thus spoiling the mediation session altogether.
Of course no mediator acts purely in one mode or the other. Most mediators adopt a
hybrid approach, usually beginning on a purely neutral basis in both the initial joint session and
the first few individual sessions, but as the parties draw closer, (and therefore, possibly more
entrenched), moving to a more authoritarian style. The rationale is that the first half of the
mediation is devoted to letting the parties ventilate their feelings; the second half is devoted to
persuasively informing them of the desirability of settlement, the relative merits of their claims,
and the likely outcomes in the event of trial.
Whatever style is pursued by a mediator, neutral, authoritarian or a hybrid, it is fair to say
that the results of mediation are often surprising, both to the parties, their attorneys and even to
the mediator. It is not uncommon for one or both of the lawyers to indicate prior to mediation
their belief that because of hard feelings, great differences or other reasons, the case will
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counsel. If the case is not settled, the mediator simply informs the court (assuming litigation is
in process at that point), ofthe failure to settle.
The nuts and bolts of mediation is of course as varied as individual mediators. Personal
style and the personal experience of the mediator will largely dictate how he/she conducts the
sessions. For purposes of this paper, discussion is limited to the activities of the usual mediator
from a legal background, i.e., an attorney or retired Judge with possibly formal training, or at
least, experience is settlement negotiations. There are two basic styles of mediation, but with
numerous other permutations or hybrids.
The first style is that of a purely neutral intermediary. This describes a mediator who
never takes a position about the relative merits of the case or the validity ofthe parties' positions.
Such a mediator relies primarily upon hislher authority as an impeccably neutral person and, at
most, encourages parties to review their own positions and the likely outcome of litigation if the
case is not settled.
The other broad category of mediator style is that of the active commentator or "Dutch
uncle."

This type of mediator while still maintaining neutrality, will much more candidly

express opinions about the merits of the case, its likely outcome and the validity of the parties'
positions. In most legal settings, and in the case of most attorneys and retired Judges, this is the
style of choice. That is because a mediator with a strong legal background is deemed more of an
authority figure by opposing parties and even by their counsel. While the mediator will not have
any real power, hislher persuasive status will greatly influence the ability ofthe parties to modify
their positions so as to reach a compromise settlement.
Both basic styles have both advantages and drawbacks. In the case of the absolutely
neutral mediator, little is usually accomplished when parties have dug in their heels, believing
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probably will not be settled. Nevertheless, mediation frequently settles those cases. Similarly,
any experienced mediator can likewise cite examples where the parties initially express optimism
that the mediation will undoubtedly succeed, and yet it fails.
In other words, the outcome of mediation is usually unpredictable. There are certain
elements which enhance the likelihood of success or failure in the mediation process.
Some of the circumstances which tend to prevent success in mediation are as follows:
1. Personality problems, i.e., a person whose character and temperament simply will not
admit of compromise, self-criticism or the ability to discard fixed ideas. The same is true for
people who view their lawsuit as a moral crusade.
2. Asymmetry in settlement proposals, i.e., where one side simply refuses to budge from
an opening position or budge only nominally.
3. Asymmetry in information or inadequate pre-trial discovery.
4. Addition or insertion of new issues at mediation.
5. Just plain stubbornness.
It is substantially more difficult to cite the factors which enhance the chances of a

successful mediation, but the primary factor is simply adequate preparation by counsel. Where
the attorneys know their case, the legal issues and the factual background mediation is almost
always successful.
Of course mediation is designed to overcome those obstacles where possible. It does so
in a remarkable percentage of cases. That is its essential beauty.
III. Mediation in Estate Disputes

At the present time, nearly all mediations involving estate related issues take place in the
context of a pending legal proceeding, either a motion over which the Probate Court has
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jurisdiction, or an action pending or threatened in the Circuit Court such as will construction
case, will contest case, claim against an estate, claim for removal of a fiduciary, claim for
damages against a fiduciary or disputed claim of ownership of property. Each of these tends to
have its own set of issues or problems. For example, the mediation of will contest cases has
become somewhat more difficult because of the strongly pro-defense attitude expressed in the
Supreme Court case of Bye v. Mattingly, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 451 (1998). That is, defense counsel
and defendants in such cases are assuming that they have close to a pat hand and are therefore
less likely to want to settle. Plaintiffs may be more willing to risk trial than settle cheaply.
Will construction cases are also frequently difficult to settle because of the inherent
ambiguity in the instrument which gave rise to the litigation in the first place. It becomes
extremely difficult to assess or evaluate the likelihood that the court will adopt interpretation A
of a given clause, as opposed to interpretation B. In other words, cases which are primarily
about legal, as opposed to factual, issues are harder to settle.
Disputes over tangible personal property are also difficult because of sentimental
attachments and personal issues which frequently accompany these sorts of disputes. It is easier
to compromise claims for money than for claims to unique or irreplaceable items. Unfortunately,
estate disputes over tangible personal property are distressingly like domestic cases.
Claims for removal of fiduciaries are also difficult to resolve, because it is hard to
compromise. A suggestion that one should resign as fiduciary to settle a case seems, despite any
exculpatory language in the possible settlement agreement, to be an admission of wrongdoing
which many parties are loath to agree to.
Another complicating factor in many estate disputes is the effect of death taxes. For
example, in a situation in which the children of a first marriage are disputing the entitlement of
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the surviving spouse in an estate large enough to be subject to federal estate tax, the spouse
usually holds the upper hand because every dollar paid to the spouse is deductible, whereas every
dollar paid to a child or children may actually represent only fifty cents on the dollar after taxes.
A frequent problem in mediation is if one of the two sides has failed to consider the estate tax
implications of settlement or only begins to do so at the session itself. Such a situation, at best,
frequently results in an adjournment until the unenlightened side has an opportunity to review tax
consequences. In a worst case scenario, the lack of tax consideration may simply result in either
a bad settlement or no settlement at all.
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that estate disputes will be on the rise. A vast
quantity of wealth will pass between generations over the next few decades. A scholarly study
has estimated that between 1998 and 2052, assets ranging from a low figure of 41 trillion dollars
to a high figure of 136 trillion dollars will pass by inheritance. l Even if only a tiny fraction of
that sum passes through Kentucky estates and, in tum, even if only a small percentage of all
Kentucky estates are contested, the litigation will involve billions of dollars. For example, if
only one hundredth of one percent of the lower range figure represents the value of contested
Kentucky estates, the amount in controversy would still be some 4.1 billion dollars.
With that much on the table, estate disputes are going to increase, which necessary means
that mediation of these disputes will likewise increase, thereby providing even more impetus for
a reasonably quick and reasonably inexpensive means of settling them short of full-blown
litigation.

I Havens and Schervish, "Millionaires and the Millenium: New Estimates of the Forthcoming Wealth Transfer and
the Prospects for a Golden Age of Philanthropy", Boston College Social Welfare Research Institute, 1999. (swri508
@bc.edu).
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IV. Mediation of Non-Traditional Issues

Mediation normally implies a pending lawsuit, or at least a seriously threatened lawsuit,
as discussed in the preceding section of this paper.
However, there are a number of other contexts in which disputes arise which have not
traditionally been considered as viable for mediation.

There is, however, no reason why

mediation cannot be expanded into these areas. Indeed, some of the literature currently available
on mediation suggests that mediation will become a common method for resolving such disputes.
A few ofthese unorthodox contexts are discussed below.
Trustees and beneficiaries often become at odds over administration of trusts. These
types of disputes often involve disagreements over investment policy, disputes over the exercise
or non-exercise of encroachment powers, trustee compensation or other trust expense issues,
demands for the trustee to resign and occasionally even over the assignment to the trust account
of a trust officer whose personality the beneficiary deems incompatible with his or her own.
Normally these disputes are resolved at the discussion level, but occasionally there is enough
involved to warrant, or at least threaten, litigation. However, mediation may represent a method
of resolving both large and small disputes of this nature without litigation.

See generally,

Trustee-Beneficiary Mediation: Less Litigation and Better Trustee Image, Trusts and Estates,
November 2000.

It has also been suggested that differences of opinion involving family

businesses, succession planning and the like, (far removed from outright litigation) may also be
appropriate subjects for mediation. The mediator may serve a function as a truly neutral party in
such disputes. This may be significant because even valued advisors such as corporate counsel,
CPAs and non-family members of company management may be perceived as favoring one
group or individual against others in the family. Mediation is also beneficial in allowing the
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parties to express in the context of mediation, resentments or other emotional beliefs which they
may be reluctant to share with other family members or professional advisors. The ability to
express such resentments, in any mediation situation, is frequently a large factor in a successful
resolution.

See Estate Planning and Family Business Mediation, Bachle, available on the

Internet at mediate.com.
It has even been suggested that mediation may have a place in the estate planning process

itself. See The CPA in Mediation and Arbitration, Gromala, The CPA Journal, September 2001.
While the involvement of potentially disappointed beneficiaries in estate planning would seem
an alien concept to most attorneys, Gromala stresses (very obviously and correctly) that such
meetings should take place only with the approval of the clients. Realistically, estate planning
by mediation still appears to be somewhat of a stretch, but in the right situation, it may have
possibilities.
If mediation works in these situations, there would appear to be no reason why it could
not be adopted in other somewhat related areas.
With the increase in prenuptial agreements, and the occasional impasse which results
during their negotiation, mediation would appear to be a reasonable alternative.
Similarly, succession planning, even outside the family context, would appear to have
merit to the same degree as discussed above with respect to the intra-family company.
It may also be possible to preclude or avert estate disputes which can be foreseen, such as

claims for services which are expected to be made against the estate of a person who is still
living, and possibly even Will contests themselves.
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There is no clear reason why conservatorship disputes, claims of breach of duty by
attorneys-in-fact, and the validity of gifts by impaired, but not adjudicated, persons should not be
appropriate for mediation.
Again, that is the beauty of mediation. No matter what the nature of a dispute may be, as
long as parties wish to resolve them, mediation will prove a useful tool, regardless of whether the
dispute represents a currently justiciable issue or a currently pending lawsuit.
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1.

INTRODUCTION.
A.

HISTORICAL APPROACH TO PLANNING FOR STATE DEATH
TAXES. Prior to the enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of2001, P.L. 107-16 (June 7, 2001) ("EGTRRA"),
most states had passed death tax laws which were based on the amount of
the state death tax credit permitted on the Federal estate tax return. In
these states, the amount of the state estate tax was equal to the maximum
state death tax credit available to the estate and these taxes were variously
called ''pick-up taxes" or "sop taxes." Because pick-up taxes were fully
coordinated with the Federal estate tax regime, little or no additional
planning generally was necessary to take them into account - the primary
focus of death tax planning was the Federal estate tax and planning for the
use of the unified credit.

B.

HISTORICAL APPROACH TO MARITAL DEDUCTION/CREDIT
SHELTER ESTATE PLANNING. Since 1981, estate planners have used
straightforward formulas for determining the amount of the credit shelter
and marital portions of an estate. The issues they had to deal with
concerned primarily what funding methods to use, the form in which to
put the marital share, the structure of the credit shelter trust, and whether
to suggest paying gift tax on inter vivos transfers or estate tax in the estate
of the first spouse to die. For clients with moderately sized estates,
planners needed to attend to whether clients had sufficient assets to
warrant carving the credit shelter amount out of the marital share and how
husbands and wives structured the ownership of assets between them. For
high net worth clients, planners frequently developed plans which used all
of the clients' applicable exclusion amount during life. Although at the
time it may have seemed as though there were many unknown factors in
developing estate plans, generally developing a plan for a client was
manageable because ofthe relative certainty regarding the amount of the
applicable exclusion and the rates of tax. Occasionally, planners resorted
to the use of disclaimers and partial QTIP elections to preserve flexibility
at the death of the first spouse, but this was generally the exception, rather
than the rule. As most states moved to a "pick-up" or "sop" tax, the
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impact of the state death tax credit was substantially reduced. Even after
the applicable exclusion amount began creeping up from $600,000 to $1
million, for moderately sized and high net worth individuals the choices
were fairly simple. Then came EGTRRA.

C.

STATE DEATH TAX CONSEQUENCES OF EGTRRA. Under
EGTRRA, the state death tax credit is phased out and replaced by a
deduction. As a result, either by legislative acts or by technical structure
of their laws, many states now impose a state death tax which is not
coordinated with the federal tax structure. Accordingly, it is once again
necessary in many states to take state death taxes into account when
developing estate plans.

D.

A CONSTANTLY MOVING TARGET. EGTRRA has added more
uncertainty to the transfer tax system than may have been believed
possible prior to its enactment. Putting aside the difficulty ofplanning for
a single year of estate and GST tax repeal and the subsequent
reinstatement ofboth in the following year at rates equal to those prior to
the enactment ofEGTRRA, just assisting clients with planning for the
changing rates and credits is a daunting task. The usual uncertainties of not
knowing the year in which a client will die, which of her family members
will survive her, the value and character of her assets at the time of her
death and so forth are exacerbated by not knowing the rates of estate tax
that will be in effect at the time of her death (or at the time of the death of
her survivors, even if they do not survive her by many years), the amount
of the applicable exclusion amount at the time of her death, the amount of
the generation-skipping transfer ("GST") tax exemption at the time of her
death, whether it is prudent to pay state estate tax at the death of the first
spouse to die, or even whether there will be an estate tax or GST tax at the
time of her death or the death of her spouse.

E.

LEGISLATIVE UNCERTAINTY. Many Congressional elections and two
presidential elections will occur during the phase in of the provisions of
EGTRRA and its subsequent sunset. Under the Byrd Amendment (the
rule which requires a law that will cause a net revenue loss beyond the 10
years typically covered in a budget resolution to be passed by at least 60
Senators), the Senate has failed to obtain the required vote to make the
provisions ofEGTRRA permanent. However, the likelihood that a law
repealing the estate tax and then reinstating it after one year will actually
take effect is very low. The unpopularity and impracticality of such a
scenario should prevent it from occurring. The question is whether the
law will be changed by eliminating the repeal of the estate tax, making the
repeal of the estate tax permanent (because the votes necessary to meet the
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Byrd Amendment requirement can be obtained), extending the years of
repeal for a few additional years (e.g., through 2013), freezing the law as it
exists at some point during the phase-in ofEGTRRA (e.g., in the year
2005 if a new President takes office), or passing some altogether different
law to replace EGTRRA.
F.

CHANGE IN FOCUS OF ESTATE PLANNING.
1.

After the initial flurry of shock following the enactment of
EGTRRA, many estate planners decided that the likelihood of
repeal of the estate tax followed by its subsequent sunset was so
low and the potential repeal so far in the future, that they would
adopt a ''wait and see" approach with regard to drafting for this
eventuality. Estate planners acknowledged that their job had been
altered, however, from developing estate plans to clearly
implement the client's wishes in the most tax efficient manner to
trying to create estate plans that will permit choices to be made
after the client's death. Such choices must be based on the client's
wishes, of course, under a variety of different scenarios which
could be extant at the time of the client's death. This has meant,
among other things, that many decisions which the client would
normally make crystal clear in her Will or revocable trust now
must be left in the hands of others to make following her death,
taking into account the tax considerations at her death, if the
flexibility to postpone the decisions can be built into her estate
plan. In addition, for healthy clients, it is hard to recommend the
making of taxable gifts that require gift tax to be paid since those
assets might otherwise pass free of transfer tax if the client dies.
Finally, the decision of whether to recommend that some state or
Federal estate tax be paid in the estate of the first spouse to die is
really a shot in the dark and, even if such a payment appears
advisable, it may be difficult (and inadvisable) to persuade clients
to take the risk.

2.

Now, however, time has passed, the law is no more certain than it
was, 2010 and 2011 are ever closer and many states' estate tax
regimes do not permit full use of the Federal applicable credit
without the payment of some state estate tax. Now it is time, even
for the "wait and see" contingent, to take a serious look at their
standard approaches to marital deduction/credit shelter planning
and their standard forms to take into account the decoupling of the
Federal and state estate taxes in the years prior to repeal and also to
consider whether to incorporate a few provisions in the estate plans
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currently being prepared to at least give a nod to the possibility that
repeal under EGTRRA will occur.

II.

CHANGES IN ESTATE, GIFT AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER
TAX RATES, APPLICABLE EXCLUSION AMOUNT, GENERATIONSKIPPING TRANSFER TAX EXEMPTION AMOUNT AND STATE DEATH
TAX CREDIT.
A.

GIFT, ESTATE AND GST TAX RATES AND APPLICABLE
EXCLUSION AMOUNT. Beginning in 2002, the maximum estate, gift
and GST tax rates began declining each year for 5 years and the applicable
exclusion amount began increasing irregularly and sometimes dramatically
through the year 2009.
1.

Reduction in Rates of Tax.
a.

Maximum estate tax rates. Under EGTRRA, the maximum
estate tax rate gradually decreases over six years.
Maximum Rate
55%1
50%
49%
48%
47%
46%
45%
45%
45%

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
b.

Generation-skipping transfer tax rate. Although historically
the GST tax was referred to as a flat 55% tax, in fact it is
imposed at the maximum estate tax rate in effect at the time
ofthe GST transfer, whether direct skip, taxable distribution
or taxable termination. IRC § 2641(b).2

For estates in excess of$1O million, an additional 5% tax applied to
amounts between $10 million and $17,184,000 to recapture the effect of the graduated
rates of tax and the unified credit. This tax "bubble" was repealed by EGTRRA.
All references herein to "IRC" sections and to the "Code" are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless otherwise provided.
2
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c.

2.

Gift tax rate. The gift tax rate continues to be the same as
the estate tax rate through the year 2009. In 2010, when the
estate tax is repealed, the gift tax is NOT repealed and, in
effect, becomes a flat tax of 35%. In reality, the gift tax
rates continue to be graduated but the applicable credit of $1
million will protect all taxable transfers at rates lower than
the maximum rate of35%.
(1)

The legislative history of EGTRRA explains the use
of the 35% maximum gift tax rate as equal to the top
income tax rate then in effect, but the statutory
language does not tie the gift tax rate to the
maximum income tax rate.

(2)

The relationship between the gift tax and the income
tax rate was of some concern during the drafting of
EGTRRA due to the possibility that a substantial
portion of the tax on income and capital gain on
assets could be reduced or eliminated by transferring
assets to individuals in lower tax brackets and having
those individuals then pay the income or proceeds
from sale back to the donor ifno gift tax applied to
the transfers.

(3)

In addition, the imposition of the gift tax on transfers
in 20 I0 will prevent the anticipated tidal wave of
transfers in that year to take advantage of what is
currently no more than a very narrow window of
opportunity.

Applicable Exclusion Amount through the Year 2009.
a.

The applicable exclusion amount for years 200 I through
2009 is:
Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Applicable Exclusion Amount
$ 675,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
3,500,000
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b.

3.

Note, however, that under section 52l(b) ofEGTRRA, the
applicable exclusion amount for gift tax purposes increased
to $1 million in 2002 and remains at that level thereafter,
including the year 2010. The amount of gift tax exclusion
used during life still reduces the amount of applicable
exclusion available at death, but beginning this year, 2004,
the amount of the applicable exclusion (other than for gift
tax purposes) exceeds $1 million and some portion of it will
be available at death because it cannot be used during life.
In effect, for 2004 through 2009, the applicable exclusion
amount is limited to $1 million during life and an additional
applicable exclusion amount (from $500,000 to $2.5
million) is available at death.

GST Tax Exemption through the Year 2009.
a.

In general. Section 521 ofEGTRRA modified the amount
of the GST tax exemption to equal that of the applicable
exclusion amount for generation-skipping transfers made
after December 31, 2003. IRC § 263 1(a) and (c). Beginning
this year, the amount of the GST tax exemption is $1.5
million.

b.

Coordination with exemption for gift tax purposes.
(1)

Although GST tax planning could have been
simplified because the amount of the GST tax
exemption and the applicable exclusion amount are
finally coordinated in 2004, this is not the case since
the estate and gift taxes are no longer fully unified.

(2)

Testamentary GST tax planning may be simplified
for decedents who die in the years 2004 through
2009 (if one can say that any planning which requires
that one identify the year in which a taxpayer will die
is simplified) because the applicable exclusion
amount is adequate to protect the full amount of the
GST tax exemption (subject to reduction for lifetime
transfers of up to $1 million). However, gift tax (but
not GST tax) will be due on inter vivos generation
skipping transfers in excess of $1 million (aggregated
for all lifetime transfers, whether or not they are
generation skipping transfers) made in the years 2004
through 2009. Thus, to avoid payment of transfer
taxes on transfers to members of skip generations,
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transfers of up to $1 million can be made during life,
and testamentary generation skipping transfers ofthe
excess of the applicable exclusion amount over $1
million can be made to take advantage of the
remaining available GST exemption.
B.

STATE DEATH TAX CREDIT.
1.

Section 2011. Section 20 11 (a) allows a credit against the federal
estate tax for "estate, inheritance, legacy or succession taxes actually
paid to any State or the District of Columbia, in respect of any
property included in the gross estate." The amount ofthe credit is
calculated by the use of a graduated rate table in §20l1(b), which
refers to the "adjusted taxable estate."

2.

Phase-Out of Credit.

3.

a.

As a result of EGTRRA, the amount of the maximum
available state death tax credit is reduced from the otherwise
applicable §20 11 (b) table amount by 25% for estates of
decedents dying in 2002, by 50% for estates of decedents
dying in 2003 and by 75% for estates ofdecedents dying in
2004. IRC §2011 (b)(2).

b.

This means the maximum federal credit for state death taxes
decreased to 12% of a decedent's adjusted taxable estate for
decedents dying in 2002, to 8% in 2003 and to 4% in 2004.

c.

For estates of decedents dying in 2005 through 2009, the
state death tax credit is eliminated. IRC §2011(f).

New Deduction for State Death Taxes Paid Under §2058.
a.

In place of the credit, there will be a deduction for state
death taxes paid with respect to decedents dying after
December 31,2004, under §2058. The deduction contains
many of the same requirements as the credit under §2011.
For example, the state death taxes must be actually paid to
the state (or D.C.) within four years of the filing of the
federal estate tax return (with certain exceptions applying in
cases of notices of deficiency, claims for refunds, or
extensions oftime to pay tax under §§6161 or 6166.
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4.

b.

The deduction is unlimited. The statute does not place any
dollar limitation on the amount of the state death taxes that
may be deducted.

c.

The §2058 deduction is not as valuable as the pre-EGTRRA
credit for state death taxes. However, because the credit is
reduced to 25% ofpre-EGTRRA amount in 2004, the
deduction in 2005 will actually be more valuable than the
credit in 2004.

d.

A deductible state estate tax will reduce the taxable estate
for federal tax purposes and therefore will not use up a
portion of the applicable exclusion amount. Consequently, a
credit shelter trust could equal the full applicable exclusion
amount even though state death taxes are imposed.

The significance for marital/credit shelter planning of this change in
the structure of the state death tax credit is not so much the effect of
the reduction in rates, but more the impact of the amount of credit
shelter protection afforded under various state laws. As a result of
the change in the federal law, many states no longer mirror the
amount of the federal protection and this decoupling ofthe federal
and state tax systems may create a situation where the full use of the
federal credit will require payment of state estate tax.
a.

For states like New York whose sop tax is tied to the federal
law in effect in 1998, this is the first year in which the state
credit protection will be limited to $1 million even though
the federal applicable exclusion amount will be $1.5
million. 3

b.

Two state death tax statutes impose a state tax equal to the
amount of the "credit or deduction" allowed for state death
taxes by the federal government. Because the deduction
under §2058 is unlimited, the literal language of these states'
statutes could be read to impose a state death tax equal to the
value of the taxable estate.4

See NY Tax Law §§ 95l(a) and 952.
4

See Code of Alabama §40-15-2 and Miss. Code §27-9-5.
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5.

Patterns of State Death Tax Regimes. 5
a.

Coupled.
In these states, the state estate tax remains a true "pick up"
tax. The state estate tax is equal to the amount of the federal
credit for state death taxes in effect in the year of death and
this incorporates any change to the federa11aw. For
decedents dying in 2005, under current federa11aw there will
be no federal state death tax credit and consequently coupled
states will have no state estate tax after 2005 and until 2011.
There are 26 states in this category:

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia

Hawaii
Idaho
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico

b.

North Carolina
North Dakota
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming

Coupled with Separate Inheritance Tax.
In these states, the state estate tax remains a true "pick up"
tax, but the state also imposes a separate estate or
inheritance tax on some transfers at death. The estate or
inheritance tax regimes vary from state to state, but no state
currently imposes any estate or inheritance tax on transfers
to a surviving spouse, provided the state requirements for
qualification for the marital deduction are met. There are
currently 8 states in this category:

For ease of reference, the author has created easily discernible categories
of state death tax regimes. However, in reality, the states do not divide quite so tidily.
For example, the statute in Atkansas provides that state estate tax equals the federal credit
allowable under the federal estate tax laws in effect on January 1, 2002; no state estate tax
is imposed ifno federal tax is imposed; and the statute is not operative for estates of
decedents dying on or after January 1,2005. A.C.A. §§ 26-59-106 and 26-59-103.
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Kentucky
Louisiana.
Oklahoma

Connecticut
Indiana
Iowa

c.

Pennsylvania
Tennessee

Decoupled.
In these states, the estate tax regime is not a true "pick up"
tax, because the state estate tax is not exactly equal to the
amount of the federal credit for state death taxes for the year
of death. In these cases, the state estate tax is equal to the
state death tax credit as it would have been calculated in a
prior year and the state statute has in effect "frozen" the
reference to federal law by reference to the federal law in
effect in a specific year. The word "decoupled" implies this
derivative relationship. Because most "decoupled" states
impose an estate tax equal to the federal credit for state death
taxes as computed in a prior year, the maximum state estate
tax rate in these states is generally 16% which was the
maximum federal credit for state death taxes pre-EGTRRA.
The amount of the applicable exclusion amount in decoupled
states varies, however. Some states adopt EGTRRA's
scheduled increases in the applicable exclusion amount,
others apply the increases that were scheduled pre-EGTRRA
(i.e., under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997) and still others
provide a fixed applicable exclusion amount. There are
currently 12 states in this category:

Washington, D.C.
Illinois
Maine
Massachusetts

d.

Minnesota
New York
Oregon
Vermont

Rhode Island
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

Decoupled with Separate Inheritance Tax.
In these states, the state estate tax is decoupled from the
federal estate tax regime in one of the three ways described
above and the state also imposes a separate estate or
inheritance tax on transfers at death to certain beneficiaries.
There are currently 5 states in this category:
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Kansas
Maryland

C.

Nebraska
New Jersey

Ohio

CARRYOVER BASIS. Under EGTRRA, during repeal of the estate tax,
the basis adjustment to property subject to the estate tax generally available
under current law is also repealed and beneficiaries will inherit property
with the lesser of the decedent's adjusted basis or the fair market value of
the property, subject to a few adjustments. An exhaustive explanation of
these carryover basis provisions is beyond the scope of this outline.
However, those provisions which estate planners may want to begin to
consider in their current drafting are summarized below.
1.

Limited Increase in Basis Allocated by Executor. Under new IRC §
1022, $1.3 million of basis increase is available for assets owned by
and passing from the decedent and is allocated by the executor to
specific assets in the decedent's estate. In addition, $3 million of
basis increase is available for assets passing to the surviving spouse.
Planning for foreign spouses continues to be treated separately to
protect the fisc and thus increases to basis for nonresident foreign
spouses is limited to $60,000. All.ofthese amounts are indexed for
inflation after 2009.
a.

Note that this concept requires an entirely new view of the
decedent's assets because it refers not to the value of the
property, but to the increase from the decedent's basis to the
property's fair market value at the time of the decedent's
death. Thus, although the provision specifies the amount of
basis increase available, the value of the property to which it
applies may be substantially larger and will vary widely from
one decedent's estate to another.

b.

In effect, the provision provides for $1.3 million shelter from
capital gains tax in the hands of the beneficiaries (plus $3
million shelter for spouses). Thus, a married individual who
owned $4.3 million of property at death, all of which had a
zero basis, could take advantage of the entire available
increase, whereas, another individual who owned $10
million of property, all of which had a high basis at her
death, might not be able to take full advantage of the entire
increase.
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2.

III.

Property to Which Basis Increase Can Be Allocated.
a.

Property must be "owned" by the decedent to be eligible for
basis increase. This includes property which is jointlyowned, property held in a revocable trust and property over
which the decedent retained the right to control the
beneficial enjoyment or the power to alter, amend or revoke
the trust holding the property. Note that the decedent will
not "own" property solely because the decedent held a
special or general power of appointment over the property.

b.

The special spousal increase in basis adjustment is available
for property passing to the spouse outright or passing to a
trust for the spouse which is structured similarly to a QTIP
trust. Note that this means that property passing to a QTIP
trust can receive basis increase, but property passingfrom a
QTIP trust at the surviving spouse's death will not be
eligible to receive increase in basis allocation by the
surviving spouse's executor. The spouse must have assets
outside of the QTIP to take advantage of the basis increase.

WHY PLANNING IS MORE DIFFICULT UNDER EGTRRA.
A.

CREDIT SHELTER AMOUNT.
1.

Two categories of issues arise in dealing with the credit shelter
amount in the current planning environment.
a.

Uncertainty as to amount. Under EGTRRA, the uncertainty
in the amount of the applicable exclusion amount which will
be available to the estate of the first spouse to die and to the
estate of the second spouse to die makes determining the
structure of the division of the estate between the marital and
credit shelter shares extremely difficult. Potentially, these
amounts range from $2 million ifboth spouses die in years
after 2010 to $7 million if both spouses die in the year 2009,
with a wide variety of permutations in between, depending
on the particular years in which each spouse dies. This, of
course, does not take into account the possibility that one
spouse could die in the year 2010. Many combined estates
fall into the range between $2 million and $7 million. In
addition, a variety of proposed bills have suggested
increasing the credit amount to even larger amounts for each
spouse in lieu of repeal.
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b.

2.

The effect of the increases in the applicable exclusion
amount on formulas. Historically, the best way to deal with
the fact that the amount of the applicable exclusion amount
was unknown was to draft by formula. This accommodated
not only the possibility that clients would use a portion of
the credit during life, but also changes in the amount of the
credit under the law. However, these formulas may have
drastically undesirable effects as the amount of the exclusion
increases or in the event of repeal. Thus, not only is it
difficult to know whether credit shelter planning may be
necessary in the estate of the first spouse to die, but also,
under the traditional formulas, the property may not end up
where expected.

These issues are difficult in unified first marriage families. They are
even more troubling in the complex multiple marriage families of
many clients.

B.

GST EXEMPTION AMOUNT. To the extent that GST tax planning is
coordinated with the use of the applicable exclusion amount and/or the
QTIP trust, similar problems exist in planning for use of the GST exclusion
amount.

C.

STATE DECOUPLING ISSUES.
1.

Applicable Exclusion Amount. To the extent that full use of the
federal applicable exclusion amount will require payment of state
estate tax, and given that it is impossible to know how much federal
applicable exclusion amount will be available to the estate of the
surviving spouse, for many estates it is difficult to determine
whether full use of the federal credit in the estate of the first spouse
to die will be advantageous. Even if flexible planning permits
deferral of this decision until the death of the first spouse, the
decision may not be any clearer then. Unlike the federal scheme,
nonpayment of state estate tax at the death of the first spouse to die
may not be deferral of the tax, but actual avoidance: surviving
spouses may flock to Florida and other states which impose no state
estate tax.

2.

GST Tax Exemption and Taxes. As a result of decoupling, it is
important to work through what happens under state GST tax
regimes when the federal GST tax exemption amounts increase and
the rates of GST tax are decreased.
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D.

IV.

REPEAL OF THE ESTATE TAX.
1.

Carryover Basis. The planning necessary to take advantage of the
permissible increases in basis under the carryover basis regime
during repeal is inconsistent with the traditional planning necessary
to take advantage of the marital deduction and applicable exclusion
amount.

2.

Formulas. Some protection to ensure that formulas used to take
advantage of the applicable credit and marital deduction do not
disrupt the entire estate plan under repeal seems warranted.

3.

Use of Trusts. Planners disagree on the best strategy with regard to
the use of trusts in the event of repeal: one school favors
terminating trusts if the estate tax is repealed and the other favors
so-called dynasty trusts to ensure that assets will not be subject to
the estate tax if it returns.

4.

Cost and Complexity of the Plan. Finally, despite the wisdom of
including provisions to address the possibility of repeal in current
estate planning documents, clients have only so much tolerance for
complexity and are willing to pay only so much to guard against an
event which may never occur. The question remains nevertheless to
what extent these provisions are necessary to guard against the
possibility that the client may be incompetent and unable to revise
her estate plan in the event of a major overhaul of the transfer tax
system, potentially including permanent repeal.

MARITAL DEDUCTION/CREDIT SHELTER PLANNING.
A.

ESTATE PLANNING GOALS. Generally, the goals for estate planning
can be broadly stated to include: implementing the client's goals to use her
assets to provide for her loved ones and others, anticipating difficulties in
the administration of the plan and incorporating techniques to eliminate or
minimize them and doing all of this with the lowest possible federal and
state death tax consequences. Estate planning generally encompasses two
categories of techniques: lifetime giving and testamentary bequests.
Although historically, lifetime giving has provided the most powerful
method for reducing total transfer taxes imposed on a client's estate, the
current deunification of the estate and gift tax regimes (with the attendant
disincentive to make taxable lifetime gifts in excess of $1 million) has
changed that picture. In addition, many clients do not wish to give their
assets away during life or do not have estates of sufficient size to warrant
substantial lifetime gifting programs. This section focuses on the backbone
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of testamentary estate planning to minimize estate tax - the combination of
the marital deduction (IRC § 2056) and the applicable credit (formerly
known as the unified credit)(IRC § 2010).6 It should be noted that bequests
to a surviving spouse who is not a U.S. Citizen, the unlimited marital
deduction is available for bequests to the spouse only ifhis bequest is held
in a "QDOT," a special marital trust designed to preserve the government's
ability to collect estate tax on the assets at the death of the surviving spouse.
See IRC § 2056(d)(2).
B.

COMBINING MARITAL DEDUCTION AND APPLICABLE
EXCLUSION AMOUNT PROVISIONS. Marital deduction and credit
shelter planning takes advantage of two entirely unrelated provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code, the marital deduction and the applicable exclusion
amount. By combining these two provisions in one of several ways, it is
possible to preserve the maximum wealth for both the surviving spouse
and, at his death, the client's children or other beneficiaries. Needless to
say, this technique is available only to married couples since only married
couples can take advantage of the marital deduction. For simplicity in
discussing this technique, the outline assumes that planning is being done
for a married couple who wish to benefit each other and children (either
theirs combined or from prior marriages). However, it can also be used to
preserve wealth for beneficiaries other than children.

C.

THE SIMPLE MARITAL DEDUCTION/CREDIT SHELTER PLAN.
1.

In general. In its simplest form, the marital deduction/credit shelter
plan carves out the amount of the client's available applicable
exclusion amount and bequeaths it to a trust for the benefit of the
surviving spouse and children. The trust can be structured in a
variety of ways, the most flexible of which permits discretionary
distributions of income and principal among the surviving spouse
and children, and, at the death of the surviving spouse, passes to the
couple's issue, per stirpes. The balance of the estate passes to or for
the benefit of the surviving spouse in a manner that qualifies for the
marital deduction (e.g., an outright bequest or a bequest to a

6
Section 2010 remains titled "Unified Credit Against Estate Tax" even
though the credit is no longer "unified" and even though the text ofIRC § 2010 no longer
refers to the unified credit and instead refers to the "applicable credit amount" and the
"applicable exclusion amount." Note that the term "applicable credit amount" refers to
the actual amount of the credit against tax (the former unified credit). The "applicable
exclusion amount" is the value of property which will be protected from tax by the
applicable credit amount. See discussion below.
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Qualified Terminable Interest Property ("QTIP") trust.? At the
death of the first spouse to die, no estate tax is due because a portion
of the estate is protected by the applicable credit and the balance is
protected by the marital deduction. At the death of the surviving
spouse, the credit shelter trust is not includible in the surviving
spouse's estate (assuming he has no rights in the trust which would
make it includible in his estate) and the surviving spouses' available
applicable credit amount protects as much as possible of the
surviving spouse's assets and, if a marital trust was used, the marital
trust. Thus, the children receive the benefit of both spouse's
applicable credits.

2.

a.

Because it is impossible to know how much applicable
credit amount a client will have at the time of her death, both
because she may have used some of it making taxable gifts
during her life and because, as in the current climate, the
amount of the credit may have changed since the plan was
designed, it is prudent to express this bequest as a formula,
rather than an exact number.

b.

Marital deduction/credit shelter planning can be structured in
one of three ways:
Preresiduary (pecuniary) credit shelter trust with the
residue to the spouse or a marital trust;

(2)

Preresiduary (pecuniary) marital bequest (outright or
to a marital trust) with the residue to a credit shelter
trust; or

(3)

Division ofthe residue into two fractional shares,
one of which is the size of the decedent's available
applicable exclusion amount which passes to a credit
shelter trust and the other of which is the balance
which passes to the spouse or a marital trust.

Marital Deduction Funding Methods.
a.

7

(1)

Generally, the factors involved in choosing which funding
method to use are not materially affected by the uncertainties
ofEGTRRA However, where the pecuniary formula
method is used, it is usually preferable for the smaller of the

See IRe § 2056(b)(7).
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credit shelter amount and the marital bequest to be the
preresiduary (pecuniary) bequest to minimize recognition of
any capital gain on funding. Where the applicable exclusion
amount increases so substantially under EGTRRA, the
relative size ofthese two shares may reverse over the next
few years. For example, in an estate of $5 million, the credit
shelter bequest will be smaller than the marital bequest from
2004 through 2008 and will be the larger amount in the year
2009. Since it is not practical to draft a Will to take this
change into account, it may be advisable to consider
avoiding the use of formulas except in very large estates and
instead to use one of the techniques described below.

v.

ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES TO PERMIT FLEXIBILITY: PREMORTEM PLANNING FOR POST-MORTEM PLANNING
A.

CAPPING THE CREDIT.

1.

Issues Related to the Size of the Estate.
a.

Due to the substantial increases scheduled to occur in the
applicable exclusion amount under EGTRRA, using the
formulas described above may result in a client's entire
estate passing to the credit shelter trust. Such a result may
effectively disinherit the spouse requiring him to elect
against the Will. Even where the surviving spouse is the
sole beneficiary of the credit shelter trust, a client may be
uncomfortable leaving no assets outright to the surviving
spouse (thus potentially requiring the spouse to rely heavily
on the trustee for his support). In a ''mixed marriage"
situation, if the surviving spouse and children from the
decedent's prior marriage are all beneficiaries of a single
sprinkle trust, dissension may be unavoidable.

b.

Moreover, as the amount of the credit increases, it may
outstrip the size of the combined estates of the wife and
husband to the point where the surviving spouse's credit
could protect most, if not all of their assets. Under these
circumstances, the client may want to modify the marital
deduction/credit shelter formula to make the bequest to the
credit shelter trust equal to the lesser of her available
applicable exclusion amount or a particular dollar amount
(e.g., $1.5 million).
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c.

The cap can be expressed as a dollar amount or as a
percentage or fraction of the value of the estate, e.g., the
amount of the available applicable exclusion amount at the
time of the decedent's death, but in no event to exceed $2
million (or in no event to exceed 60% of the value of the
estate as finally determined for federal estate tax purposes).
These techniques can be used in combination to provide,
e.g., that the cap is the lesser (or greater) of $2 million or
60% of the value of the estate.

d.

A disadvantage of this plan is that it requires frequent review
to ensure that it remains adequate to protect the client's
assets from estate tax as the value of the client's and client's
spouse's assets fluctuate and changes in the law occur.
Note also that in smaller estates which use a preresiduary
credit shelter plan, as the value of the applicable exclusion
amount increases, an estate may end up with no residuary
estate. Since estate expenses are generally paid from the
residuary, under these circumstances it is prudent to include
a provision in the Will directing where the expenses will be
paid from in the event that the residuary is inadequate to
cover them.

e.

f.

2.

Because the use of a cap does not really enhance postmortem flexibility, it will not usually be the technique of
choice in a first marriage/no conflict of interest family, but it
may be a critical factor in the estate plan of a client whose
spouse and children do not have a unity of interest.

Capping the Credit to Address Decoupling Issues.
a.

Regardless of the size of the estate, it maybe prudent to
make the default credit shelter formula one which caps the
amount passing to the credit shelter trust to avoid automatic
payment of state estate tax, e.g., that amount which can pass
free ofjederaI and state estate tax by reason ofthe
applicable exclusion amount, taking into account adjusted
taxable gifts, other bequests under the Will, etc.

b.

Additional provisions to permit the flexibility to decide
whether to increase the amount passing to the credit shelter
trust then should be included in the Will or revocable trust to
permit a determination of whether to pay state estate tax at
the death of the first spouse to die. Alternatively, a few
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states recognize a state QTIP election for qualifying bequests
even when a federal QTlP election has not been made8 and a
bequest to a trust for the surviving spouse which qualifies
for the state QTIP election but which is protected from the
federal estate tax by the applicable credit amount should be
considered. In such an estate, two trusts would qualify as
credit shelter trusts (the typical "family trust" and a trust for
the benefit of the surviving spouse). The balance ofthe
estate could then be protected from federal and state estate
tax by the marital deduction.
B.

DISCLAIMERS. Although disclaimers have long been used to "fix up" an
estate plan following a decedent's death and have been used as a planning
technique in limited circumstances, the current situation is likely to make
the use of disclaimers more important and more frequent than ever before.
On the one hand, there is little new in the world of disclaimers: following
the issuance of final regulations addressing disclaimers ofjointly-held
property on December 30, 1997, there have been no new statutory or
regulatory developments. On the other hand, because disclaimers are so
fact specific, the body of law in private letter rulings and cases continues to
grow, indicating that this apparently simple technique may not be so simple
to apply.
1.

In general. Disclaimers are utilized to permit all or part of a bequest
or other disposition to pass as though the designated beneficiary had
predeceased the decedent. From a tax perspective, this permits the
transfer of the disclaimed assets to someone other than the initial
beneficiary without imposition of gift tax on the disclaiming
beneficiary. To obtain this benefit for federal tax purposes, a
disclaimer must be effective under state law, so state law
requirements must always be considered first. Assuming state law
requirements are met, federal law also imposes a series of
requirements, as outlined below.

2.

Federal Requirements for Qualified Disclaimers Vary Depending on
When the Interest Being Disclaimed was Created.
a.

For interests created before January 1, 1977, the rules are
determined under case law, primarily Jewett v. Comm 'r., 455
U.S. 305 (1982), and
v. Irvine, 114 S. Ct. 1473 (1994).
Under Jewett, a disclaimer of a pre-1977 interest must be made

u.s.

For example, Massachusetts, Ohio, Indiana and Tennessee petmit state
QTIP elections to be made even when a federal QTlP election has not been made.
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within a "reasonable" time of knowledge of the transfer which
the created interest Therefore, except for minors who come of
age, it is probably too late to disclaim any pre-1977 interests.
b.

3.

For interests created thereafter, the rules of Code § 2518 apply
to avoid taxable gift treatment of the transfer:

Requirements of Code § 2518. 9 There are four requirements which
must be met in order for a disclaimer to be a qualified disclaimer for
federal transfer tax purposes. Note that a disclaimer may be effective
under state law to transfer property away from the disclaimant, but not
qualify for the federal tax benefits of a qualified disclaimer. Each test
will be discussed separately below.
a.

No acceptance of benefits. This is usually the most difficult
and troubling of the disclaimer requirements. A disclaimer
must precede any acceptance of any benefit from the property.
(1)

(2)

Acts of acceptance include:
(a)

Use of the disclaimed property.

(b)

Accepting dividends, interest, rents or other
income from the property.

(c)

Treating the property as though owned by the
disclaimant, e.g., directing others to take certain
action with respect to the property, voting the
stock, in the case of shares of stock, and
withdrawing funds from a joint account.

(d)

Receiving any consideration in return for the
disclaimer.

Note that when the disclaimant is the executor of the
decedent's Will, actions taken as the executor do not
constitute acceptance of the property to be disclaimed.

Be aware of possible additional requirements under state law for a
disclaimer is to be effective for state law purposes. See, e.g., New York's requirements in
EPTL 2-1.11.
9
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(3)

To help prevent the situation in which a surviving
spouse will be treated as having accepted the benefits of
property which is planned to be disclaimed, it may be
prudent to include a preresiduary cash bequest to a
surviving spouse to relieve any immediate need for
cash. See, however, Reg. § 25-25 18-3(d), Example 17,
allowing a partial disclaimer after acceptance of a
partial distribution.

b.

Written refusal. A disclaimer must be in writing. The writing
must state that the disclaimer is an irrevocable, unqualified
refusal to accept the interest in the property to be disclaimed.
The interest to be disclaimed must be adequately described.
The documents must be dated and should include an
acknowledgment of receipt by the proper party.

c.

Nine month requirement. The disclaimer must be delivered to
the transferor, legal representative or holder of title of the
property to be disclaimed within nine months after the later of
creation of the interest -- in most cases death of the testator -- or
age 21.

(1)

Lack of knowledge of the interest to be disclaimed does
not extend the time limit.

(2)

In the case of a remainderman under a general power of
appointment marital trust, the nine-month period runs
from the death of the surviving spouse, but in the case
of the remainderman under a QTIP marital trust, the
nine-month period runs from the death of the first
spouse. Reg. § 25.25l8-2(c)(3).

d.

No direction requirement. Two separate rules apply under the
"no direction" test.
(1)

First, the disclaimant must not direct to whom the
disclaimed property will pass or hold the power to
determine to whom it will pass after the disclaimer is
executed. The property must simply pass as it would
have if the disclaimant had not been alive at the time of
the transfer to the disclaimant or otherwise if so provided
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by the testator in the Will (or revocable trust) and state
law so pennits. 1O

(2)

(a)

Thus, under a Will or revocable trust, unless the
testator specifies otherwise, the property must
pass to whomever would have taken the property
if the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent.

(b)

In addition, this means that the disclaimant
cannot serve as the trustee of a trust to which the
disclaimed property will pass if the trustee holds
any discretionary powers to make distributions
from the trust. If the disclaimed property will
pass to a foundation of which the disclaimant is a
trustee or director, a similar issue arises, and the
more prudent course may be for the disclaimant
to resign from the position in the foundation.

(c)

A common mistake made is that the surviving
spouse who disclaims property that then passes to
a credit shelter trust is given a special power of
appointment over the trust property.

In addition, except in the case of the decedent's spouse,
the disclaimed interest must pass to someone other than
the disclaimant.
(a)

Thus, the surviving spouse can disclaim all or a
portion of his interest in the marital trust created
for his benefit, and if the Will or revocable trust
so provides and state law pennits direction of the
disclaimed property under the Will or revocable
trust, the property can thereby be shifted to the

See, e.g., under New York law, EPTL § 2-1.11(c) which provides
"[u]nless the creator ofthe disposition has otherwise provided, the filing ofa
10

renunciation, as provided in this section, has the same effect with respect to the
renounced interest as though the renouncing person had predeceased the creator or the
decedent or, if the renounced interest is a future estate, as though the renouncing person
had died at the time of filing or just prior to its becoming an estate in possession,
whichever is earlier in time, and shall have the effect of accelerating the possession and
enjoyment of subsequent interests, but shall have no effect upon the vesting of a future
estate which by the terms of the disposition is limited upon a preceding estate other than
the renounced interest." (Emphasis added).
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credit shelter trust. The spouse can continue to be
the income beneficiary of that trust, but cannot
retain any power of appointment over the trust.
(Note: An otherwise disqualifying power of
appointment can be disclaimed.)
(b)

4.

5.

This requirement makes it critical to track exactly
where property will pass if it is disclaimed to
ensure that the property will, in fact, end up
where it is intended; a disclaimant (other than a
spouse) may also need to disclaim her interest in
an entity to which the property will then pass
(including her intestate share) to effect a qualified
disclaimer.

Who Can Disclaim
a.

Generally, any individual may refuse to accept a gift. Some
states, however, may limit the power of the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust to disclaim.

b.

Many states, including New York, allow a guardian of an
incompetent or executor of the will of a decedent to disclaim,
often after obtaining court approval.

Partial Disclaimers. Reg. § 25.2518-3 allows disclaimers of partial
interests in property. Among the types of partial interests which may be
disclaimed:
a.

Severable property,

b.

Powers of appointment,

c.

Undivided fractional interests, and

d.

Pecuniary amounts. Reg. § 25.2518-3(c) creates a trap for the
unwary and requires that, following a disclaimer of a pecuniary
amount, "the amount disclaimed and any income attributable to
such amount must be segregated from the portion of the gift or
bequest that was not disclaimed. Such segregation must be made
on the basis of the fair market value of the assets on the date of
the disclaimer or on a basis that is fairly representative of value
changes between the date of transfer and the date of the
disclaimer."
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6.

7.

8.

c.

Successive Disclaimers.
a.

In order to ensure that a disclaimer is qualified and that no part of
the disclaimed interest passes to the disclaimant (if the
disclaimant is not the spouse), it may be necessary for the
disclaimant to disclaim several successive interests under the
Will and ultimately under intestacy.

b.

Consider whether a plan for successive disclaimers by a
surviving spouse may be designed under the Will to provide
several alternatives under the instrument for the disposition of the
disclaimed property. For example, the Will could provide that
the residuary passes to the spouse or, to the extent he disclaims
this outright bequest, to a QTIP trust, or, to the extent he
disclaims his interest in the QTIP trust, to a credit shelter trust.

Difference Between Planned and Remedial Disclaimers.
a.

An estate plan that includes disclaimer planning as an intended
form of post-mortem flexibility is very different from an estate
plan which was not adequately planned to begin with and which
must be "fixed up" through the use of disclaimers.

b.

Without minimizing the power of disclaimers to make a silk
purse out of a sow's ear, often a disclaimer plan not contemplated
in the instrument will require cooperation of several generations
of beneficiaries and may have unintended results.

Rules to Live By.
a.

Never disclaim until it is certain to whom the property will pass
after the disclaimer. Assume nothing!

b.

Estate plans based on post-mortem disclaimers require that the
client's family be educated about the requirements for a
disclaimer and the "no acceptance of benefits" rule.

PARTIAL QTIP ELECTIONS.
1.

QTIP Trusts - One Exception to the Terminable Interest Property Rule. 11

A number of exceptions to the terminable interest property rule exist.
Trusts which qualify for the marital deduction are: estate trusts in which a trust for the
surviving spouse pours into his estate at his death (Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1)), general
II
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2.

a.

The tenninable interest property rule. In general, the unlimited
marital deduction is available only for property passing from the
decedent to her surviving spouse. IRC § 2056(a). The marital
deduction acts as a deferral of estate tax until the death of the
surviving spouse and is based on the premise that the assets for
which the marital deduction was taken in the estate of the first
spouse to die will be subject to estate tax in the estate of the
surviving spouse. No marital deduction is allowed for bequests
to a surviving spouse which may terminate or fail upon the
passage of time or the occurrence of an event or which may
benefit someone other than the surviving spouse. IRC §
2056(b)(1). Such interests, known as tenninable interest property
interests, generally include bequests to trusts for the surviving
spouse.

b.

Exceptions to the terminable interest property rule. In
recognition of the many legitimate reasons a taxpayer may wish
to leave property for her spouse in trust, Congress created
exceptions to the tenninable interest property rule, all of which
ensure that the benefit of the property will accrue solely to the
surviving spouse during his life (Congress did not want an
interest to get the benefit of the marital deduction unless it truly
was a bequest for the surviving spouse) and will be includible in
the surviving spouse's estate at his death. One of these
exceptions is the QTIP trust.

QTIP Trust - IRC § 2056(b)(7).
a.

QTIP trusts were created specifically to address the problem that
married testators, particularly those with children from a prior
marriage, should not be faced with the dilemma of providing
either for the surviving spouse who might not leave the property
to the testator's children or for the children leaving the surviving
spouse without maximum financial security.12 Congress
acknowledged that the first spouse to die may have a legitimate
concern that the surviving spouse would exercise his power to
dispose of the marital trust assets in a manner inconsistent with
her estate plan, particularly in the case of second marriages where

power of appointment trusts (IRC § 2056(b)(5)), and QTIP trusts (IRC § 2056(b)(7)).
12

See, e.g., H. Rep. No. 97-201, 97 th Cong., 1st Sess., at 159-60.
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the surviving spouse has children from a fIrst marriage.
However, without a general power of appointment, the trust
assets would not be includible in the surviving spouse's estate.
Thus, Congress created a special category of trusts as an
exception to the terminable interest property rule - qualifIed
terminable interest property trusts. If a trust meets the
requirements for a QTIP trust, the bequest to the trust will qualify
for the marital deduction and is required to be included in the
surviving spouse's estate under IRC § 2044.
(1)

3.

Requirements for a QTIP trust.
(a)

The property must pass from the decedent.

(b)

All of the income must be paid to the surviving
spouse at least annually for his life. In addition,
the spouse must have the right to make nonincome producing property productive. Regs. §§
20.2056(b)-7(d)(2) and 20.2056(b)-5(1)(4).

(c)

No one, with or without the consent of the
surviving spouse, can receive a distribution from
the trust other than the surviving spouse during
the surviving spouse's lifetime. See Regs. §§
20.2056(b)-7(d)(1) and 20.2056(b)-7(d)(6).

(d)

An irrevocable election to qualify the trust must
be made by the executor on the estate tax return.
IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B)(v).13

Partial Election.
a.

QTIP trusts offer an opportunity not available to any other fonn
ofmarital bequest: an executor may elect to qualify only a
portion of the bequest for marital deduction treatment. The
elected part must be a fractional or percentile share ofthe trust.
The balance remains in trust for the surviving spouse, but is

13
To reduce the number of returns on which the executor failed to "check
the box" on Schedule M of Form 706, the IRS has administratively reversed the
presumption of the election, and a trust which qualifIes as "QTIP-able" listed on Schedule
M for which a marital deduction is taken qualifIes as a QTIP trust "unless the executor
specifIcally identifIes the trust (all or a fractional portion or percentage)... to be excluded
from the election." See Form 706, Schedule M.
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subject to estate tax in the estate of the first spouse to die and not
in the estate of the surviving spouse.

14

b.

The advantage of this flexibility is that it permits an executor to
determine how large a marital deduction to take without changing
the value of the assets passing from the estate for the surviving
spouse's benefit The executor can make an election which
optimizes the marital deduction and takes full advantage of the
applicable credit amount to protect the non-elected portion of the
marital trust from estate tax. Alternatively, the executor can also
decide whether it may be more advantageous to pay a portion of
the estate tax that will be due on the combined estates of the wife
and husband from each estate and thus take advantage of the
lower tax bracket which may be available if all of the assets are
not taxed in a single estate. Also, in an estate plan which
includes a credit shelter bequest that is designed to avoid
automatic payment of state estate tax if the federal credit is larger
than that available under state law, the executor can determine
whether it may be beneficial to take advantage of the larger
federal credit and pay some state estate tax. This is possible
because a trust which meets all of the requirements of a QTIP
trust does not include any term which would make the trust
includible in the surviving spouse's estate unless the election is
made. Thus, any portion of a trust designed to be a QTIP trust for
which no election is made will not be includible in the surviving
spouse's estate. The use of a partial QTIP election to implement
credit shelter planning also has substantial disadvantages, as
described below.

c.

Just as the division between the marital share and the credit
shelter share may be defmed by formula as described above, it is
advantageous to make the partial QTIP election by formula. The
formula should be expressed as a fraction of the total value of the
trust, e.g., "the numerator of the fraction is the amount of
deduction necessary to reduce the Federal estate tax to zero
(taking into account final estate tax values) and the denominator
of the fraction is the final estate tax value of the residuary trust
(taking into account any specific bequests or liabilities of the
e~tate paid out of the residuary estate)".14 In this event, if values
of assets in the estate are adjusted on audit, the amount passing to
the marital deduction portion of the trust for the benefit ofthe
surviving spouse will self-adjust to obtain the desired tax result.

Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(h), Example 7.
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Alternatively, if the QTIP election is not made for a fractional
share or is made for a percentage of the trust for the benefit of the
surviving spouse, changes in values on audit may result in estate
tax being due.
4.

The regulations permit the marital trust to be divided into two trusts if
authorized by the instrument or governing law: one which qualifies for
the estate tax marital deduction and one which does not. Reg. §
20.2056(b)-7(b)(2)(ii)(A). The trusts are identical in every respect except
that the trust which is not elected to receive QTIP treatment is not
includible in the surviving spouse's estate. This division facilitates
accounting for the separate shares of the marital trust in the event that
distributions from principal are made only from the portion of the trust
that is includible in the surviving spouse's estate. Whenever a QTIP trust
is included in the estate plan, the Will or revocable trust should include a
provision authorizing division of the trust if a partial QTIP election is
made.

5.

Partial QTIP elections are also useful if it appears likely that the
surviving spouse may die within a short time after the first spouse of if he
in fact does die shortly after the first spouse to die. Under these
circumstances, the executor can elect to qualify a smaller portion of the
marital trust for QTIP treatment, pay estate tax in the estate ofthe first
spouse to die and take advantage of the credit for tax paid on prior
transfers under IRC § 2013 for the actuarially determined value of the
surviving spouse's interest in the nonqualified portion of the marital trust
even though the trust is not includible in the surviving spouse's estate.
For this reason, it is generally a prudent practice to put the estate tax
return on extension when a QTIP trust is utilized so that the executor has
15 months, rather than only nine months, to determine whether this credit
will be available in the estate of the surviving spouse. The full amount of
the credit is allowed if the surviving spouse dies within two years of the
first spouse to die. Thereafter, the credit is reduced by 20% every two
years, until it is exhausted at the end often years. Note that the value of
the surviving spouse's interest is determined under IRC § 7520 which
prohibits use of the valuation tables if the surviving spouse was
terminally ill at the death of the first spouse.

6.

The primary disadvantage of estate plans using partial QTIP elections is
that all of the income from the non-elected trust must be distributed to
the surviving spouse, thereby increasing his taxable estate and subjecting
that income to estate tax before it passes to the children. Also, there can
be no discretion to make distributions to children and other family
members.

K- 28

D.

CLAYTON (OR CONTINGENT INCOME) TRUSTS.
1.

These trusts, in many ways, utilize and combine the advantages of
disclaimer credit shelter trusts and partial QTIP trusts.

2.

A Clayton trust is a trust which starts life as a qualified trust for which a
QTIP election could be made, but to the extent that the executor does not
make the QTIP election, the non-elected portion becomes a separate trust
which is not required to have terms identical to the QTIP trust and is not
required to meet the definition of a QTIP trust. 15
a.

Initially, the government was hostile to the concept of a trust
designed to make the requirement that all of the income be paid
to the surviving spouse contingent on whether the QTIP election
was made. 16
(1)

For many years, the Service challenged this type of estate
planning and the Tax Court supported the government's
position.

(2)

JnEstate ofClayton v. Comm 'r., 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.
1992), the government argued that the marital deduction
was not available for the QTIP trust, despite the
executor's proper and timely QTIP election on the
estate's federal estate tax return, because the executor's
power to divert assets from the trust qualifying for the
marital deduction constituted an impermissible power to
appoint property away from the spouse. Under the facts
ofthis case, the decedent was survived by his second
wife and four children from a prior marriage. The
decedent's Will created a credit shelter trust and a marital

Conceptually, for drafting purposes, there is no reason why the trust could
not start out as family sprinkle trust which, if a QTIP election is made, becomes a marital
trust for the spouse which meets all of the QTIP requirements. For ease of discussion, the
author will assume the Clayton Trust is drafted as a marital trust which becomes a family
trust.
IS

16
In TAM 8631005, the Service ruled that a marital deduction was available
where the surviving spouse served as executor for an estate which included a QTIP-able
trust which poured over to a nonQTIP-able trust because the election was in the hands of
the surviving spouse. However, this position was reversed in subsequent rulings and
audits and Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3) took the position that such a trust did not qualify for
the marital deduction.
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trust. Under the terms of the Will, if the executors failed
to make a QTIP election for the marital trust, any portion
for which the election was not made would pass to the
credit shelter trust. The Will also provided that, to the
extent the surviving spouse disclaimed any portion of the
marital trust, that portion would pass to a third trust with
terms similar to the credit shelter trust. 17 The spouse
elected to qualify an undivided interest in specified
bonds, notes and cash as terminable interest property. In
a carefully reasoned and thorough opinion, the Fifth
Circuit held that from both a statutory analysis and a
public policy analysis, such a power did not affect the
deductibility ofthe value of any portion of the trust for
which a QTIP election was made because (i) the property
to which the statute applies is only the property for which
an election is made, not all property for which an election
could be made, and (ii) the election relates back to the
decedent's death.
(3)

After both the Sixth Circuit18 and the Eighth Circuit19 also
reversed the Tax Court on this issue, the Tax Court, but
not the Service, acceded to the decisions ofthe Courts of
Appeal in Estate 0/ Clack v. Comm'r., 106 T.C. 131
(1996).

b.

Ultimately, the government abandoned its position and reissued
Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3) to provide that an income interest
which is contingent on the election ofthe executor will not fail to
be a qualifying income interest for purposes ofthe marital
deduction.

c.

The non-marital alternative of the Clayton trust does not need to
require that all ofthe income from the trust be distributed to the
surviving spouse and can include income beneficiaries other than
the surviving spouse. Indeed, the surviving spouse need not be a
beneficiary ofthe non-marital portion ofthe Clayton trust.

Note that the surviving spouse was appointed co-executor with a bank,
which, in an effort to bolster the estate's position, did not take office as executor until
after the Form 706 was filed.
17

18

Estate o/Spencer v. Comm 'r., 43 F.3d 226 (6 th Cir. 1995).

19

Estate o/Robertson v. Comm'r., 15 F.3d 779 (8 th Cir. 1994).
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3.

Tenninology.
a.

Clayton trust. Because a Clayton trust is a chameleon of sorts, it
is important to clarify the language used to refer to it in order to
clarify exactly which aspect of it is being discussed. For
purposes of this outline, a "Clayton trust" refers to the entire
mutable entity of a QTIP-able trust which, to the extent that a
QTIP election is not made, becomes a trust which contains
provisions that would disqualify it as a QTIP trust. This second
feature of a Clayton trust introduces a time element into the
nature of the trust during which it has all of the features necessary
to qualify as a QTIP trust but also includes latent features which
would disqualify it if the QTIP election is not made.
(1)

Marital component. In a sense, the "fIrst" component of
the trust provides that if the spouse survives the testator,
the spouse will have a mandatory income interest and no
one other than the surviving spouse will have the right to
receive anything from the trust during the surviving
spouse's lifetime (including through the exercise of a
power of appointment). This QTIP-able component of
the Clayton trust mayor may not provide that the
surviving spouse can receive distributions of principal.
Not that the ancient laws of property are crystal clear, but
perhaps it is helpful to think of the spouse's interest in the
marital component of the Clayton trust as in place,
subject to divestment by the failure to make the QTIP
election.

(2)

Non-marital or family component. Although usually
drafted as a "separate" trust under the instrument to
which the assets of the Clayton trust will flow to the
extent that a QTIP election is not made, in fact this
second trust which usually benefIts the children and may
or may not include the surviving spouse as a benefIciary
is conceptually part of the Clayton trust. During the
period when a QTIP election could but might not be
made, this component of the Clayton trust has as much
viability as the marital component, although it appears to
be "waiting in the wings."

(3)

Either the marital or non-marital component of a Clayton
trust may never actually become operational, depending
on the election that the executor makes. Alternatively, in
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the case of a partial QTIP election, they will both be
funded.
b.

Clayton election. One hears reference to the making of the
Clayton election. This is a misnomer since the only formal
election involved in a Clayton trust is the QTIP election which, to
the extent made, eliminates the non-marital component of the
Clayton trust. The "election" which gives life to the non-marital
component of a Clayton trust is actually the absence of a QTIP
election and, in that sense, is not an affirmative act.
Nevertheless, in some cases it is helpful to use the term "Clayton
election" to refer to the decision not to QTIP and the filing of the
return without the QTIP election.

4.

Prior to the passage of EGTRRA, few estate planners utilized Clayton
trust planning, preferring simply to rely on the traditional credit
shelter/marital bequest (outright or in a marital trust) plan.

5.

On first blush, the Clayton trust structure may seem identical to that of a
bequest to a marital trust which provides that if the surviving spouse
disclaims, the disclaimed portion will flow to a credit shelter or other
family trust, except that the executor, rather than the spouse, makes the
decision. However, in the case of a disclaimer structure, the surviving
spouse's interest in the marital trust is fixed or complete. It may be
changed by the surviving spouse's act of disclaiming, but no further act is
necessary to vest the surviving spouse's interest in the marital trust. In a
Clayton trust, the spouse's interest in the marital trust is contingent upon
a final act which has not yet occurred, the making of the QTIP election.

6.

The interesting challenge presented in drafting a Clayton trust is that it is
created upon the nonoccurrence of an event. While the making of a
QTIP election itself is irrevocable, the nonelection cannot always be said
to have occurred with the same definiteness.
a.

The issue raised here is that under Regs. §§ 20.2056(b)-7(b)(4)
and (5), a QTIP election may be made or modified on a return
until the final due date for the return, including extensions
actually granted, or on the first late return.

b.

Presumably, if the drafting language refers to a failure or refusal
of the executor to elect the marital deduction for some portion (or
all) of the marital trust under IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(V) on the
last federal estate tax return filed for the estate on or before the
due date of the return, including extensions, or if a timely return
is not filed, the first estate tax return filed by the executor after
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the due date, as the triggering event for an alternate bequest to the
credit shelter trust or some other bequest, this should be
sufficient.
(1)

The question arises, however, as to the status of the
"Clayton election" where no timely federal estate return
is filed.

(2)

Query whether it is advantageous (and permissible) to
obtain certainty as to the beneficiaries of the trust by
providing in the Will that the trust will remain solely for
the benefit of the surviving spouse if the election is or is
not made within a specified time limit after the
decedent's death. For example, perhaps the provision
requiring any non-elected portion of the trust to pourover
into a non-qualified trust should expire if not resolved
within 15 months after the decedent's death. This would
still permit a partial QTIP election to be made on a late
filed return but would provide certainty as to the terms of
the trust.

c.

In this, as in all matters related to division of assets between
marital and non-marital shares, consider making the election as a
fractional formula to preserve the intended tax consequences in
the event of revaluation of or newly discovered assets.

d.

One disadvantage of the non-marital portion of the Clayton trust,
as compared to the non-marital portion of a traditional partial
QTIP trust, is that, if persons other than the surviving spouse are
discretionary beneficiaries, the surviving spouse is unlikely to
have an interest in the trust capable of actuarial valuation and no
credit for tax paid on prior transfers will be available. However,
this disadvantage is no greater than that of the traditional marital
deduction/credit shelter plan which includes a discretionary credit
shelter trust.

e.

It is unclear whether a surviving spouse who serves as the sole
executor of the estate may have adverse gift tax consequences as
a result of his power to direct property away from himself
without actually meeting the qualified disclaimer requirements.
Arguably he is exercising his power to redirect trust assets as a
fiduciary of the estate, but it is also true that he is directing assets
away from himself for the benefit of others. Until some guidance
has been issued, it may be more prudent not to name the
surviving spouse as the sole executor of an estate where a
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Clayton trust is included and to provide that an independent
executor make the decision regarding the QTIP election. In most
cases a co-executor could be appointed who would have no
responsibility other than making or not making the QTIP
election.
f.

E.

F.

Use of a Clayton trust may be preferable to a disclaimer trust
because (a) the executor has fifteen months instead of only nine
months to make his decision and (b) the surviving spouse can
have a special power of appointment over the non-elected trust.

TAX APPORTIONMENT ISSUES.
1.

In a well thought-out marital deduction/credit shelter plan which uses a
disclaimer of a portion of the residuary marital trust or residuary Clayton
trust to take advantage of the decedent's applicable exclusion amount, the
tax apportionment clause should include a provision to apportion any
death tax due (e.g., state estate tax) to the credit shelter trust or nonmarital portion of the Clayton trust.

2.

In the absence of such a provision, it may be necessary to take the
payment of such death taxes into account in calculating the amount of the
disclaimer or Clayton election to gross up the marital share for any death
taxes to be paid from it.

OTHER ELECTIONS.
1.

GST Tax Planning.
a.

Generally, for wealthier clients, full use of the client's GST tax
exemption has long been recommended. The biggest benefit
from this type of planning for a client who could afford it was
best accomplished through lifetime gifts which removed the
future appreciation in the gifted assets from the donor's estate.
Since the GST tax exemption has been larger than the applicable
credit amount, clients often would make gifts of the full amount
of the GST tax exemption and pay gift tax on the excess over the
applicable exclusion amount.

b.

Now that the amount of applicable exclusion available for
lifetime giving has been limited to $1 million, it is less attractive
to suggest that clients make taxable gifts and pay gift tax.

c.

Consider that beginning this year, 2004, most clients will have
both applicable credit and GST tax exemption available to use at
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death, even those clients who had intended to use their full GST
exemption making lifetime gifts. For this reason, many of these
clients currently have no GST planning in their Wills or
revocable trusts. For the foreseeable future, testamentary
planning for clients who are motivated to reduce total transfer tax
costs should be sure to include testamentary GST planning as a
matter of course.
d.

G.

Generally, GST planning should be done by formula - "I
bequeath the amount of my available GST exemption to ..." but this now raises the same concerns as formula bequests to
credit shelter trusts. In 2009, the GST exemption will be $3.5
million (if the law is not changed) and may be more than the
client wants to pass to grandchildren and may leave the children
with very little. Indeed, depending on the size of the estate, the
$2 million GST exemption which takes effect in 2006 may be
more than a client feels comfortable leaving to grandchildren.

TECHNIQUES RELATED TO PLANNING FOR REPEAL.
1.

Use of Revocable Trusts to Increase Flexibility.
a.

A revocable trust is a trust which the grantor creates during her
lifetime and over which the grantor retains the right, exercisable
alone or in conjunction with another person, to amend or revoke
the trust. The assets can be distributed to the grantor's
beneficiaries as the grantor directs in the revocable trust (acting
as a Will substitute) and probate is avoided.

b.

Sometimes the trust is not funded (or only partially funded)
during the grantor's life and, at her death, her Will directs her
executor to transfer her assets to the trustee of her revocable trust.
The trust acts, in effect, as a Will substitute although probate is
not avoided.

c.

A revocable trust does not have any income or estate tax
consequences during the grantor's lifetime because the grantor is
treated as the owner of the trust for both income and estate tax
purposes. If the revocable trust is properly drafted, it also should
not have any gift tax consequences during the grantor's lifetime.

d.

Most importantly in the post-EGTRRA world, use of a revocable
trust may safeguard the ability to modify a client's estate plan to
take whatever changes may occur in the tax laws into account in
the event that the client becomes incapacitated prior to a
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significant change in the law. Generally, if a client becomes
incapacitated, no one can modify her Will, not even her attomeyin-fact. However, under a revocable trust, depending on state
law, it is possible for the grantor to give her trustee or another
independent person the power to amend her trust, consistent with
her testamentary plan, to take advantage of changes in the tax
law. This is an extremely broad power and not one to be granted
lightly. Nevertheless, assuming a client can identify someone
whom she trusts with this power, it is a critical element of
preserving a client's ability to respond to changes in the tax laws.
Needless to say, the older the client, the more important it may
be. Depending on state laws, it may also be possible for such
revisions to a revocable trust to be made pursuant to a properly
drafted power of attorney.
e.

Issues raised by giving a third party the power to amend a
revocable trust.
(1)

Obviously, the most significant issue in granting the
power to amend a revocable trust to someone other than
the grantor is an issue of trust. If a client is not
comfortable with giving this power to someone, then it
should not be done. She may be the rare client who
wishes to have her Will or revocable trust drafted to
respond to all of the different tax environments currently
possible under EGTRRA. However, the client should be
made aware that if EGTRRA is replaced, as expected,
with a different set of transfer tax laws, her Will or
revocable trust may not "work" under the new regime.

(2)

Assuming the grantor wants to give the power to amend
her revocable trust to someone, several safeguards can be
used.
(a)

Require two people to agree unanimously on any
changes to the trust.

(b)

Specifically provide that changes may be made
solely for the purpose of maximizing benefit as a
result of changes in the tax law within the context
of the grantor's existing estate plan and
dispositive trust provisions.

(c)

Give the power to amend to a person in her
individual capacity, not as a trustee, so that if that
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individual ceases to serve as trustee, the power
does not automatically pass to someone else.
(d)

Limit the exercise of the power so that the person
holding the power cannot benefit herself
(mandatory) or her family (ifpossible).

2.

Correction of Formula Bequests. For estate plans using formula bequests
of the applicable exclusion amount, after repeal, the results under the
formula may be uncertain. For example, a formula using the language,
"the maximum amount which can pass free of federal estate tax by
reason of the applicable credit amount," may yield nothing passing to the
credit shelter trust because there is no applicable credit amount or
everything because nothing is subject to the estate tax. Prudence dictates
inclusion of a provision which provides that, notwithstanding anything
else in the Will (or revocable trust), in the event there is no estate tax
applicable to the estate at the decedent's death by reason of its repeal, the
balance of the estate after specific bequests will pass to the residuary,
either outright or in further trust, depending on the client's preference.
See discussion oflong-term trusts below. Note that a reference to the
period "after the estate tax is repealed" would be inadvisable since, under
current law, in the year 2011, the estate tax will apply to the estate even
though the decedent will have died after repeal.

3.

Design Trusts to Permit Use of Basis Adjustments.
a.

Although in some cases, clients may prefer not to give trustees
the power to make discretionary distributions of principal to the
beneficiaries of the trust for any purpose (particularly the
surviving second spouse), it may be time to begin including a
provision in trusts which permits the trustee to distribute
principal to be sure that beneficiaries can take advantage of the
increase in basis available at their deaths during the period of
repeal. This is particularly important in the case of a QTlP trust
where the surviving spouse does not have substantial assets of his
own. Note that the amount the trustee should be permitted to
distribute is NOT the $3 million of basis allocation available to
the surviving spouse's estate, but property sufficient to permit the
surviving spouse to take advantage of$3 million of basis
increase. The most flexible provision would not specify the
amount the trustee can distribute, but rather include this purpose
as one ofthe purposes for which the trustee can make
distributions. Even in the case of trusts that permit totally
discretionary distributions of principal, some reference to this
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purpose may be wise, if for no other reason than to flag the issue
for the trustee.
b.

4.

Inclusion of such a provision may make it inadvisable for the
surviving spouse to be the sole trustee of such a trust since the
distribution power may not qualify as an ascertainable standard.
The power, if held by the spouse, might in fact be construed as a
general power, which would prevent the trust from qualifying for
QTIP treatment.

Consider Use of Long-Tenn Trusts.
a.

Commentators disagree about whether the specter of repeal
means that (i) trusts should be designed to terminate (or not be
created) if the estate tax is repealed or (ii) all of the decedent's
property should be placed in trust so that it will not be subject to
estate tax if the tax returns.

b.

In either event, planning should take into account the fact that
increases in basis are available only for property the decedent
"owns" and attempt to ensure that this relief from capital gain tax
is adequately addressed, balanced against the fact that the estate
tax, if applicable, will probably be imposed at a rate much higher
than the capital gain tax. This would suggest a general practice
of planning to allocate basis to the lowest basis assets possible to
minimize the total amount of property an individual must own to
take advantage of the maximum permissible increase.

c.

Generally, if the client is not uncomfortable with the selection of
trustee and control issues, the ideal plan would maximize the
amount passing in trust for the maximum period and give the
trustee the powers to terminate trusts if this appears advisable and
to make distributions of principal to take advantage of the
beneficiary's basis increase, where appropriate. Long-term trusts
raise many issues of their own, however, since it is very difficult
to foresee the myriad of family, economic, tax and other legal
issues which could arise over hundreds (never mind thousands)
of years. Such trusts should always be drafted with the
maximum possible flexibility. The powers suggested above are
generally consistent with the flexibility which is desirable
whenever long-term trusts are considered. Even where the client
is comfortable with long-term trusts, the instrument should
provide for the creation of a QTIP trust in an amount sufficient to
permit full use of the decedent's $3 million basis adjustment.
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VI.

APPLICATION OF TECHNIQUES TO PERMIT FLEXIBLE POST-MORTEM
PLANNING.
A.

CAPPING THE CREDIT SHELTER BEQUEST. Whenever the client has
chosen to limit the maximum amount to be protected by the applicable credit
amount, it is generally good practice to provide additional flexibility in the estate
plan to permit taking advantage of the applicable exclusion amount in excess of
the cap, particularly where the cap is the amount protected from both federal and
state estate tax in a decoupled state. This can be done by using a disclaimer
provision, a partial QTIP election or a Clayton trust.

B.

DISCLAIMERS.
1.

Simple Credit Shelter Trust Disclaimer.
a.

The following scenario illustrates a typical use of a disclaimer to
effectuate a post-EGTRRA estate plan. The client, who has an
estate valued at $4,000,000, currently has a standard credit
shelter-based Will, that is, the exclusion amount passes to a
discretionary trust for husband and issue, with the balance
outright to husband, protected from estate tax by the marital
deduction. The client is satisfied with how this plan worked and
with a $1,000,000 exclusion amount, and perhaps even with a
$1,500,000 exclusion amount, but she is concerned that with a
larger exclusion amount (or estate tax repeal) the amount of the
credit shelter trust might be disproportionate to the marital
bequest.

b.

Although a ceiling could be placed on the amount of the credit
shelter bequest, this approach is inflexible with regard to future
changes in financial circumstances. On the other hand, leaving
the entire estate to the client's husband, with a provision in the
Will or revocable trust that, in the event he disclaims any portion
of his bequest, the disclaimed amount passes into the credit
shelter trust, is a far more flexible plan. The husband can make a
decision about how much should pass to the credit shelter trust
based on the tax law and the financial circumstances applicable at
the time of the client's death.

c.

Note that utilizing a disclaimer trust approach will prohibit the
client from giving her surviving husband a power of appointment
or other control over the disposition of the trust. Note also that
this sort of disclaimer planning is probably inappropriate when
the client's surviving spouse and children do not have a unity of
interest
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d.

The primary weakness of this technique is that a surviving spouse
may prefer not to have his assets held in trust and may choose not
to disclaim. This distaste for trusts may not have been voiced
during the planning process (or the spouse may not have realized
he would feel this way). The decision whether to disclaim
property for the purpose of saving taxes after the client's death
rests entirely in the hands of the surviving spouse. Obviously,
this problem is exacerbated if the remainder beneficiaries of the
credit shelter trust are not the children of the surviving spouse.

e.

Another difficulty with this technique is that clients often do not
realize the significance of their actions and do things that
constitute the acceptance of the property they plan to disclaim.
Thereafter, those assets generally cannot be disclaimed, although
a partial disclaimer may, under certain circumstances, still be
possible. Even clients who have been educated during the estate
planning process about not accepting benefits of the assets still
take actions which prevent a qualified disclaimer. For couples
who engage in disclaimer credit shelter trust planning, it is
imperative that the surviving spouse seek legal assistance in
administering the deceased spouse's estate as quickly as possible
and not take any action with regard to assets owned by the
deceased spouse or jointly with the deceased spouse until he has
done so.

f.

A third issue (which can get fairly technical but should not be
overlooked) is that a pecuniary disclaimer, that is a disclaimer of
a specific amount, likely will cause capital gain to be recognized
in the assets transferred as a result of the disclaimer.
(1)

Use of formula disclaimers is often advisable in order to
ensure that the credit shelter amount is not over- or
underfunded in the event that assets are revalued on audit.
The formulas used in marital deduction/credit shelter
disclaimers are the same as those used in drafting
marital/credit shelter bequests in the Will. Generally, the
disclaimer would be phrased as a preresiduary credit
shelter amount, funded on a true worth or fairly
representative basis, or as a fractional share of the
residuary. The same advantages and disadvantages
described above when drafting credit shelter/marital
bequests in a Will apply to formula disclaimers.
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(2)

C.

Since disclaimers to a credit shelter trust may be
pecuniary disclaimers even if they are made by formula,
it is generally good practice not to delay too long in
making the decision to disclaim, particularly in a rising
market. And remember to segregate the assets following
the disclaimer if the disclaimer is of a pecuniary amount.

PARTIALQTIP ELECTION.
1.

Mechanics of Partial OTIP Election. To use a partial QTIP election
instead of a disclaimer to a credit shelter trust, the Will or revocable trust
bequeaths the residuary to a trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse
(which meets the requirements for a QTIP election) rather than outright
to him. The executor then makes a determination of the amount of the
decedent's applicable credit to use, based on the values of the decedent's
estate, the surviving spouse's estate and the applicable tax law in effect at
the decedent's death. She may also make a determination about whether
to pay some federal estate tax or some state estate tax. The executor
makes a QTIP election on the decedent's federal estate tax return only for
the portion of the estate which she determines to protect from estate tax
with the marital deduction.

2.

Advantages.
a.

Depending on whom the decedent has named as executor, this
decision need not be left to the control of the surviving spouse.
Thus, in a situation where the decedent's children are not the
children of the surviving spouse, the executor can be someone
other than the surviving spouse and can make this decision based
on a more objective analysis of the economic factors relevant at
the decedent's death.

b.

Even where the surviving spouse is named as the executor, the
spouse is choosing between two alternatives, both of which hold
the property in trust for him. Thus, any preference to own the
assets outright is not a factor in determining how much should
pass to a trust protected by the decedent's applicable credit.

c.

There is no danger that the use of the decedent's applicable credit
will be barred because the surviving spouse has inadvertently
accepted the benefits of the property he planned to disclaim.

d.

If the surviving spouse dies within 15 months of the decedent's
death, the executor can maximize the benefit of the credit for
previously taxed property under IRC § 2013 in the surviving

,
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spouse's estate by making a smaller (or no) QTIP election in the
decedent's estate.

3.

4.

e.

The decedent can be assured that, to the extent principal is not
distributed to the surviving spouse, it will pass as she has
directed, rather than to whomever the surviving spouse may
determine (e.g., his new wife).

f.

The trust can be divided into two separate trusts, one includible
in the surviving spouse's estate and the other not, to optimize taxmotivated administration of the trust. No gain or loss will be
recognized when the two trusts are funded.

Disadvantages.
a.

The two trusts for the benefit of the surviving spouse will be
identical. Both will require distribution of all of the income from
the trusts to the surviving spouse, thus unnecessarily subjecting
income earned in the credit shelter trust to estate tax in the estate
ofthe surviving spouse. The decedent's children will not be
included as income beneficiaries of either trust.

b.

When the two trusts are divided, all of the assets used to fund
them must be divided on a fractional or percentage basis. Thus,
it is not possible to select assets which are expected to appreciate
to fund the credit shelter trust and assets which are not expected
to appreciate to fund the marital trust.

Disclaimer of Outright Bequest to QTIP Trust.
a.

Consider combining the disclaimer method with the partial QTIP
method to permit the surviving spouse to disclaim an outright
bequest to a QTIP trust instead of a credit shelter trust. The Will
could provide that, ifthe surviving spouse disclaims, the
disclaimed portion of the bequest will pass to a marital trust
designed to qualify for the marital deduction.
(1)

This could provide the executor with additional time, up
to six months after the original due date of the return, to
determine whether taking full or partial advantage of the
marital deduction is advisable for the estate. The
executor would then make or not make the QTIP election
or not, based on an informed analysis regarding how
large the marital deduction should be.
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D.

(2)

In addition, if the decedent did not fully use her GST
exemption, and if the trust were properly drafted, a
reverse QTIP election could be made.

(3)

Finally, If it appears advisable, the executor could make a
partial QTIP election, qualifying only a portion of the
disclaimed property for QTIP treatment, thus making the
credit for previously taxed property available to the estate
of the surviving spouse without including the assets of
the trust for his benefit in his estate. Obviously, this
benefit is not available if assets are owned directly by the
surviving spouse.

CLAYTON TRUSTS.
1.

Advantages.
a.

Clayton trust planning has all the advantages of partial QTIP
planning:
(1)

Control is in the hands of the executor, who should not
be the surviving spouse.

(2)

There is no danger that the plan will be jeopardized by
accidental acceptance of benefits by the surviving spouse
of assets which were intended to be disclaimed.

(3)

Income need not be distributed to the surviving spouse
from the non-marital portion, thus avoiding unnecessarily
enlarging his estate.

(4)

No gain or loss is recognized on funding the trust.

b.

In addition, the Clayton trust can be structured as a sprinkling
credit shelter trust, just as with disclaimer credit shelter trusts,
and can be held for the benefit of the surviving spouse and the
decedent's children, with discretionary income and principal
distributions to any of them.

c.

The surviving spouse can have a special power of appointment
over the trust.
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2.

E.

Disadvantages.
a.

Just as with a partial QTIP election, the assets must be divided
between the two trusts on a fractional share basis.

b.

If the two spouses die within a short period of time of each other,
the estate of the surviving spouse will not qualify for the credit
for previously taxed property under IRC § 2013. This is because
a Clayton trust which does not require that the income from the
non-marital portion be distributed to the surviving spouse (or
which permits distributions to other people) does not give the
surviving spouse an interest in the trust which is capable of being
valued actuarially.

c.

Note that the choices between structuring the estate plan to use a
partial QTIP election or a Clayton trust are mutually exclusive
because they are both triggered by the same event - it is not
possible to draft a single marital trust which is QTIP-able and
provide that, if an election to qualify the trust for the marital
deduction is not made for any portion of the trust, then that
portion may either stay as a nonqualified trust for the spouse or
be distributed to a Clayton trust (but see section G below).

d.

Query whether it would be possible to structure the disposition of
the non-elected portion by providing in the Will that the first
specified dollar amount or formula fraction ofthe trust for which
the election was not made would pass to a sprinkle trust and any
portion in excess of that amount for which an election was not
made would remain in a non-qualified marital trust. Such a plan
would permit taking full advantage of the decedent's available
applicable exclusion amount, if desirable, in a discretionary
sprinkle trust, and then permit use of the credit for previously
taxed property for any amount in excess of that, if desirable. This
could provide a compromise when the executor must decide
between the attractiveness ofthe flexibility permitted in the credit
shelter trust and the desirability of preserving the availability of
the prior transfer credit in the event of both deaths within a short
period of time.

PARTIAL MARITAL DISCLAIMER AND PARTIAL CLAYTON
ALTERNATNE.
1.

Although it is often tempting to design estate plans that maximize tax
planning results, a significant portion of the job of the successful estate
planner is also to factor in how the parties who survive the decedent will
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react to the plan and build in provisions to account for these reactions.
Consider how the surviving spouse may feel when the decision about
whether he will receive the full benefit of the marital trust or not is placed
in someone else's hands.
2.

F.

A possible solution to this potential difficulty in larger estates may be to
leave a portion of the assets outright to the surviving spouse and a portion
in a marital trust. This may make the surviving spouse more comfortable
with the concept of the marital trust. The Will would provide that if the
surviving spouse disclaims any portion of his outright bequest, it will
pass to a credit shelter type trust (but without a special power of
appointment) and that if the executor does not elect to qualify the entire
marital trust for QTIP treatment, the non-elected portion would pass to
the credit shelter trust which could include a special power of
appointment. Under these circumstances, the surviving spouse would be
included in the analysis of how much federal applicable exclusion
amount to use in the estate of the first spouse to die and he can influence
the decision about whether he would rather take advantage of the asset
protection feature afforded by having assets in the marital trust or rather
have assets he owns directly. In addition, if the surviving spouse prefers
to hold a special power of appointment over the redirected assets, he can
allow the executor to make the Clayton election, rather than disclaiming.
Thus the surviving spouse is involved in the decision, but the choice as to
whether to take full advantage of the decedent's applicable exclusion
amount is not left solely to his discretion.

DISCLAIMER IN COMBINATION WITH PARTIAL QTIP ELECTION.
1.

In the case of older clients, one way of structuring the estate plan to
permit use of a credit shelter-type trust and preserve the possibility of
taking advantage of the credit for tax paid on previously taxed property is
to bequeath the spousal share to a residuary marital trust that qualifies for
QTIP treatment and provide that any portion of the trust disclaimed by
the surviving spouse will pass to a credit shelter trust (without a special
power of appointment). If the surviving spouse is alive and has a normal
life expectancy as of nine months after the decedent's death, he could
disclaim an amount adequate to take advantage of all or a portion of the
decedent's applicable exclusion amount. Ifhe has died (or is in poor
health) at the nine month date (but was healthy enough at the decedent's
death to have his interest in the marital trust valued under the tables), no
disclaimer to a credit shelter trust will be made, and the executor (who
may be the surviving spouse, if still alive) could elect to qualify only a
portion of the marital trust for marital deduction treatment when making
a QTIP election to take advantage of the credit for the tax paid on the
non-elected portion of the marital trust at the death of the surviving
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spouse. To increase the value of the surviving spouse's interest in the
trust, the spouse should ordinarily be given a "5 & 5" withdrawal power
over the trust, whereby the surviving spouse is permitted each year to
withdraw $5,000 or five percent of the value of the trust.
2.

G.

Note that this plan leaves the possibility of funding the family-oriented
credit shelter trust in the hands of the surviving spouse and thus may be
inappropriate where the spouse and the remainder beneficiaries do not
have a unity of interest.

DISCLAIMER IN COMBINATION WITH CLAYTON TRUST AND
PARTIALQTIP ELECTION.
1.

Query whether another technique may make it possible to take advantage
of either a partial QTIP election or a Clayton election, depending on the
circumstances at the decedent's death: structuring the Will so that the
property can be directed to different trusts either by disclaimer or by
Clayton election. For example, the decedent leaves his estate to a
residuary Clayton trust, so that if the executor makes a partial (or no)
QTIP election for the property in this trust, the non-elected portion would
pass to a credit shelter-type trust. The Will also provides that, if the
spouse disclaims his interest in any portion of the Clayton trust, that
portion of the trust would pass to a traditional QTIP trust which does not
make the spouse's income interest contingent on the QTIP election. A
partial QTIP election applied to this traditional QTIP trust would result in
the surviving spouse receiving the income from both the marital and nonmarital portions of the trust and the credit for tax paid on prior transfers
would be available in the estate of the surviving spouse if he has died or
dies within a few years. Needless to say, this gives the surviving spouse
the power to defeat the Clayton trust and take all of the income for
himself- even though he would not be making the election himself.
Regardless of the executor's opinion about whether or not to qualify the
full value of the Clayton trust for QTIP treatment, the spouse would be in
a position to determine whether he would have all of the income interest
from the trust or not through his power to disclaim. Note that a
disadvantage of this plan would be that the determination of how much
of the trust is subject to the Clayton election, and thus eligible to be
passed to the credit shelter-type trust, must be made within nine months
of the decedent's death, instead of 15 months.

2.

On its face, this plan is similar to the preceding one involving a
disclaimer from a QTIP trust to a credit shelter trust, but raises some
fascinating issues not involved in the former structure.
a.

Can a surviving spouse disclaim from a Clayton trust?
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(1)

The nature ofthe surviving spouse's interest in a Clayton
trust is similar to, but different from, a surviving spouse's
interest in a traditional QTIP trust for which a partial
QTIP election can be made. In the case of the partial
QTIP, the surviving spouse has the same interest in the
trust, whether or not the election is made. In the case of a
Clayton trust, the surviving spouse might not even be a
beneficiary of the non-marital portion of the trust.
(a)

This question raises the issue of the essential
nature of the potential beneficiaries' interests in
the respective portions of a Clayton trust. On the
one hand, the interests of the potential
beneficiaries of the non-marital portion cannot be
said to have a present interest in the Clayton trust
because that would disqualify it for QTIP
treatment. On the other hand, the spouse's
interest in the Clayton trust, although described as
current to qualify for the QTIP election, is not
actually possessory and may never materialize.
The court in Clayton based its analysis that the
marital deduction is available for the portion of
the trust for which an election is made on the fact
that the QTIP rules apply only to the portion for
which the election is made. The election itself is
one of the requirements necessary to permit the
marital deduction to apply. The fact that the
balance of the Clayton trust does not meet the
requirements for the marital deduction does not
"contaminate" the entire trust because the rules
apply only to the portion for which the election is
made.

(b)

Points in favor of permitting a spousal disclaimer
from a Clayton trust.
i)
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The creation of the Clayton trust is
predicated on the spouse's survival. lfthe
spouse does not survive the testator, these
provisions of the instrument would never
become active. The fact that state laws
permit the testator to direct the flow of
property if the surviving spouse disclaims
his interest in the Clayton trust should

permit the testator's intention to be
effective.
ii)

(c)

20

Although the spouse's interest in the
marital component of a Clayton trust is
contingent on the QTIP election being
made, the actual bequest under the
instrument is to the marital component of
Clayton trust. This must be the case in
order for the executor to be in a position
to make a QTIP election for the trust that
otherwise qualifies for QTIP treatment.
Thus, at the time that the spouse
disclaims, only the marital component of
the Clayton trust is "active." As the court
in Clayton noted, "the election element of
the definition is viewed in the past tense,
i.e., that although the effect of the election
is tested as of the instant of the testator's
death, the defInitional eligibility of the
separate terminable interest under
examination is tested as though the QTIP
election had already been made.,,20

Troubling issues in permitting a surviving spouse
to disclaim from a Clayton trust.
i)

Unlike a disclaimer from a QTIP trust, a
disclaimer from a Clayton trust may
disenfranchise other potential current
beneficiaries and may not be considered a
permissible disclaimer or renunciation
under applicable state law.

ii)

By analogy, this could be viewed as
similar to a disclaimer provision in a
credit shelter trust. Suppose the spouse is
a discretionary beneficiary with the
testator's children and the disclaimer
provision provides that if the spouse
disclaims, the property would flow to a

Estate ofClayton v. Comm 'r., 976 F.2d at 1497.
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QTIP trust solely for the benefit of the
surviving spouse. Should this work?
(2)

b.

Possibility of the disclaimer being recharacterized as a
special power of appointment. If the surviving spouse's
interest in the marital component of the Clayton trust is
considered to be as tenuous as those of the potential
current beneficiaries of the non-marital component of the
Clayton trust, one must ask what interest it is that the
spouse is disclaiming. A disclaimer is a release of an
interest If the spouse does not have a substantial interest
in the non-marital component of the Clayton trust, his
ability to redirect the trust through a disclaimer could be
viewed to be a narrow special power of appointment to
appoint the trust property. If this were the case, it is
possible that no part of the Clayton trust would qualify as
a QTIP trust because the surviving spouse would have a
power to appoint property to someone other than
•
himself. 21

Timing issues.
(1)

Arguably, if the surviving spouse disclaims all or a
portion ofthe Clayton trust, that disclaimer would take

21
Note that it was the government's argument and the Tax Court's holding
in Estate ofClayton v. Comm 'r., 97 T.C.327 (1991), rev'd 976 F.2d 1486 (5 th Cir. 1992),
Estate ofRobertson v. Comm 'r., 98 T.C. 678, rev'd 15 F.3d 779 (8 th Cir. 1994) and Estate
ofSpencer v. Comm 'r., T.C. Memo 1992-579, rev'd 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995) that, "the
surviving spouse did not have a qualifying income interest for life because the passage of
an income interest in the property to the surviving spouse was contingent upon the
executor's QTIP election as to such property and was therefore subject to the executor's
power to appoint the property to someone other than the surviving spouse," Estate of
Clackv. Comm'r., 106 T.C. 131, 138 (1996). In reversing the Tax Court in these cases,
the appellate courts focused upon the requirement of IRC § 2056(b)(7)(BXi) that
qualified terminable interest property is property, inter alia, for which an election has
been made. Estate ofClack v. Comm'r., 106 T.C. at 140-41. As the court in Clayton
stated, "No reasonable reading or construction of the Will or the statute can validate the
position of the Commissioner, as endorsed by the Tax Court, that the Independent
Executrix's QTIP election itself is 'tantamount' to a power of appointment to the
testator's children." Estate ofClayton v. Comm 'r., 976 F.2d at 1497. This reasoning,
however, would not apply to whether a surviving spouse's power to disclaim should be
considered "tantamount" to a power to appoint the property.
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priority over the subsequent fmality of the election by the
executor to qualifY (or non-election not to qualify) any
portion of the Clayton trust for QTIP treatment. The
disclaimer must occur within nine months of the
decedent's death. Given that the QTIP election (or lack
thereof) is revocable until the due date of the federal
estate tax return, due nine months after the decedent's
death if no requests for extensions are made, the
disclaimer will have occurred prior to (or at best
simultaneously with) the filing of the federal estate tax
return. 22 If the disclaimer effectively directs the assets
that would otherwise have flowed to the Clayton trust
elsewhere, it is hard to see how the executor could make
an election over assets no longer subject to the terms of
the Clayton trust.
(2)

It may be tempting to provide that the spouse's disclaimer
could be contingent on the executor's election ofQTIP
treatment to ensure that the surviving spouse has a
"disclaimable" interest in the Clayton trust (e.g., the
spouse disclaims his interest in any portion of the trust for
which the executor makes the QTIP election). However,
on a practical level, it is difficult to figure out how an
estate tax return could be filed which lists the assets of
the Clayton trust on Schedule M of the Form 706, makes
a QTIP election for those assets qualifYing them for the
marital deduction and also indicates that the assets are in
fact held in a separate trust protected from tax by the
applicable credit amount (or subject to tax ifthe amount
exceeds the amount of the available applicable credit
amount). Alternatively, if the surviving spouse disclaims
his interest without reference to whether the QTIP
election is made and the executor believes the assets are
no longer subject to the Clayton trust, the executor will
not make a QTIP election for assets not in the Clayton
trust. No QTIP election for the disclaimed assets would

22
Although IRC § 2518(b)(2) provides that, to be qualified, a disclaimer
must be made, inter alia, "not later than the date which is 9 months after the later of- (A)
the date on which the transfer creating the interest in such person is made, or (B) the day
on which such person attains age 21," the likelihood of the disclaiming surviving spouse
being under the age of21 is presumably small, making this provision of one of extremely
rare applicability.
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ever be made and the spouse's interest in the marital
portion of Clayton trust would never be complete.
c.

3.

H.

Gift Issues. Under the transaction described above, the surviving
spouse has a greater interest in the disclaimer QTIP trust than in
the Clayton trust, because the spouse has a secure income interest
in the disclaimerQTIP as opposed to the Clayton trust. Query
whether under a Dickman23 analysis, the surviving spouse's
failure to make a disclaimer, particularly if the executor then
failed to make QTIP election, could be considered a gift from the
surviving spouse to the other beneficiaries ofthe non-marital
portion ofthe Clayton trust.

The bottom line is that it is not entirely clear what the tax result of
including a disclaimer in a Clayton trust might be and the inclusion of
such a provision in a Clayton trust should probably be reserved for those
of your clients who have high risk tolerance, have aggressive tax
personalities, and may be prepared to make law, if the numbers involved
are large enough to warrant it. Fortunately, a similar benefit to that
described through this technique could be obtained in other ways (e.g.,
reverse the order of the trusts and disclaim from a traditional QTIP to a
Clayton trust).

GST PLANNING.
1.

Capping the Amount of the Exemption. Just as with credit shelter trusts,
the amount of the GST bequest can be capped at a particular number if
the client prefers, although this is an inflexible solution which will fail to
take into account the client's assets and existing law at the time of her
death.

2.

Use of Disclaimers, Partial QTIPs and Clayton Trusts. Alternatively, it
may be possible to structure the funding ofthe GST bequest through the
use of disclaimers, partial QTIP elections and Clayton trusts.
(1)

For example, a client's Will or revocable trust could
include a bequest to a "reverse QTIP trust" in the full
amount ofthe client's available GST exemption. This is
a marital trust which meets the requirements for making
the QTIP election, but permits a special election for GST
purposes which will treat the decedent as the transferor

Dickman v. Comm 'r., 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (holding that foregone interest
on interest-free loans to decedent's children were gifts).
23
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rather than the surviving spouse, even though the trust
will be included in the surviving spouse's estate at his
death. The remainder of this trust would pass to
grandchildren. The decedent's GST exemption would be
allocated to the trust to protect it from GST tax. If the
surviving spouse disclaims a portion of the reverse QTIP
trust, the amount disclaimed can then pass to the
"regular" QTIP trust which has the children as
beneficiaries. The marital deduction would be available
for both trusts. Needless to say, the spouse could not
have a special power of appointment over the regular
QTIP trust.
(2)

A simpler approach, however, assuming any unallocated
GST exemption would otherwise not be used, would
simply be to give the spouse a special power of
appointment over the reverse QTIP trust to permit him to
appoint between children and grandchildren. The
executor would then allocate the decedent's entire unused
GST exemption to the trust. If the spouse determines that
a portion of the trust should pass to children, the GST
exemption allocated to that portion will be wasted. But if
the GST exemption was a larger percentage of the estate
than seemed fair to give to grandchildren, there is no
harm. The danger with this approach is that the surviving
spouse may fail (or be unable) to redo his Will to exercise
the special power of appointment prior to his death.

(3)

Alternatively, in situations where it is not appropriate to
give the surviving spouse the power to determine the size
of the GST bequest, it is possible to link the GST bequest
with a Clayton election made by the executor. In this
case, the Clayton trust would use the decedent's available
applicable credit, could be for the benefit of
grandchildren and could have GST tax exemption
allocated to it. The remaining portion of the marital trust
would pass to children at the death of the surviving
spouse. The difficulty with this approach is that it
requires coordination of the use of the applicable credit
with the use of the GST exemption to protect the trust
from both estate and GST tax.

(4)

A disadvantage of all of these approaches is that they
require the existence of a surviving spouse. If there is no
surviving spouse, the Will may simply contain a GST
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bequest of the maximum amount and no elections or
disclaimers will be possible unless the grandchildren
themselves wish to disclaim. Under these circumstances,
it may be prudent to make the bequest to a sprinkling
trust for descendants, allocate the decedent's GST
exemption to it, and give the trustee broad discretion to
make distributions to children and grandchildren. Keep
in mind that a trustee may be reluctant to make
distributions to children from such a trust because it will
waste GST tax exemption and the trustee may fear
accusations to that effect from the grandchildren.
Precatory language in the Will making the testator's
intentions clear may be helpful here.

VII. CONCLUSION.
The techniques presented in this outline are focused on delaying the ultimate decisions
regarding the disposition of a client's estate until after her death. Under normal
circumstances, this is not a recommended approach to estate planning. Assuming that
the law stabilizes to some extent in the not so distant future, the author recommends
reducing the flexibility ofthe typical estate plan to some extent to ensure that a client can
expect her estate plan to be administered as she designed it. In the meantime, it is a
disservice to clients not to try to preserve the maximum flexibility possible in her estate
plan. Even if the federal law does stabilize in the not too distant future, there is no
guarantee states will change their laws to conform to it. Accordingly, for planning where
state decoupling is an issue, deferring the decision on whether or not to pay state estate
tax is always worth considering.

K - 53

"BEYOND PRIVITY:
WHERE NO KENTUCKY ESTATE PLANNING
LAWYER HAS GONE BEFORE LIABILITY TO NON-CLIENTS"

Carolyn S. Bratt

w.L. Matthews Professor ofLaw
University ofKentucky College ofLaw
Lexington, Kentucky

Copyright 2004.

All Rights Reserved.

SECTIONL

"BEYOND PRIVITY:
WHERE NO KENTUCKY ESTATE PLANNING LAWYER
HAS GONE BEFORE - LIABILITY TO NON-CLIENTS"

I.

INTRODUCTION

L-l

II.

CLIENT CAUSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE FOR ATTORNEY
WRONGDOING

L-l

A.
B.
C.
D.

L-l
L-2
L-2
L-3

III.

IV.

V.

Professional Negligence
Breach Of Fiduciary Duty
Breach Of Contract
Breach Of Rules Of Professional Conduct

PRO'S AND CON'S OF EXTENDING LIABILITY TO
NON-CLIENTS FOR WRONGDOING BY ESTATE PLANNING
ATTORNEYS

L-3

A.
B.

L-3
L-4

Pro's
Con's

NON-CLIENT CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ATTORNEY
WRONGDOING

L-5

A.
B.
C.
D.

L-5
L-7
L-8
L-8

Professional Negligence
Breach Of Contract - Third Party Beneficiary Theory
Breach Of Fiduciary Duty
Breach Of Rules Of Professional Conduct

KENTUCKY CASES CONCERNING ATTORNEY
LIABILITY TO NON-CLIENTS ...............•..•..................... L-8
A.
B.
C.

D.
E.

Williams v. Osborne
American Continental Insurance Co. v. Weber & Rose
Seigel v. Jasper
Hill v. Willmott
Rose v. Davis

SECTIONL

L-8
L-9
L-9

L-IO
L-IO

VI.

APHORISMS FOR AVOIDING LIABILITY TO NON-CLIENTS
(AS WELL AS TO CLIENTS)
A.

B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.

Don't Be A Know-It-All
If You Sleep, You'll Weep
By The Book
Haste Makes Waste
Things Aren't Always As They Seem
No Will Has A Sibling, Let Alone A Twin
First-In-Time Doesn't Necessarily Make It Right
Mark A Trail With Bread Crumbs
Play Well With Others

SECTIONL

L-ll

L-ll
L-ll
L-12
L-12
L-12
L-13
L-13
L-13
L-14

"Beyond Privity: Where No Kentucky Estate Planning Lawyer
Has Gone Before - Liability to Non-Clients"©
31 st Annual MidwestlMidsouth Estate Planning Institute
University of Kentucky Office of Continuing Legal Education
by
Carolyn S. Bratt
W.L. Matthews Professor of Law
University of Kentucky College of Law
July 17, 2004

I.

II.

Introduction
•

Malpractice claims in the area of estate, probate and trust practice
(including claims arising from gift and estate tax matters) ranked 7th
among the 25 practice areas tracked by the ABA. See, ABA Standing
Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Legal Malpractice Claims in
the 1990's.

•

The estate, probate and trust practice area experienced the sixth highest
increase in the number of malpractice claims during the study period. Id.

•

More than half of the malpractice complaints involved allegations of
improper "document preparation" (40%) and "legal advice." Jd.

•

Less than 1% of the complaints resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff, but
an additional 21 % of the complaints settled before a suit was filed and
27% more settled after the filing of a lawsuit. Id.

•

Of the claims paid, 64% were less than $1,000; 12.4% were between
$1,001 and $5,000; 6.5% were between $5,001 and $10,000; 8.1% were
between $10,001 and $25,000; 4.6% were between $25,001 and
$50,000; 2.7% were between $50,001 and $100,000; and 1.8% were over
$100,000. Id.

•

Sixty-one per cent (61%) of the claims were against firms with five
attorneys or fewer. Id.

Client Causes of Action Available for Attorney Wrongdoing

A.

Professional Negligence
1.

A violation of the standard of care owed by an attorney to a client.

2.

Elements of the cause of action:
a.

Lawyer owed a duty of care and skill to the client (privity);
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B.

b.

Lawyer failed to exercise the ordinary care of a reasonably
competent attorney acting in the same or similar
circumstances; and

c.

Lawyer's failure to exercise ordinary care and skill was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by the client.
Marrs v. Kelly, 95 S.W.3 rd 856 (Ky. 2003); Daugherty v.
Runner, Ky.App., 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (1978); and Stephens
v. Denison, 64 S.W.3d 297 (Ky.App. 2001).

Breach of Fiduciary Duty
1.

A violation of the standard of conduct owed by an attorney to a
client (fiduciary relationship).

2.

Elements of the cause of action:
a.

3.

C.

Lawyer owed fiduciary duties to a client;
i.

Loyalty

ii.

Confidentiality

b.

Lawyer failed to exercise the most scrupulous honor, good
faith and fidelity to the plaintiff's interests (See, Daugherty
v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. 1979); and

c.

Lawyer's failure to comply with a fiduciary obligation is the
proximate cause of harm suffered by the plaintiff. "The
Fiduciary Obligations - In General" in Mallen & Smith,
Legal Malpractice Ch. 14 (West 2000).

Irrespective of whether a breach of fiduciary duty owed to a client
caused the client actual damages, the lawyer may be required to
forfeit all or part of h/er fee. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.
1999).

Breach of Contract
1.

A violation of an express term of the contract between an attorney
and the client.
a.

In Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 716 P.2d 575 (Kan.
1986) the court held that a client could maintain an action
in contract for an attorney's wrongdoing only "[w]here the
act complained of is a breach of specific terms of the
contract without any reference to the legal duties imposed
by law upon the relationship created ...." See, also Hall v.
Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901 (W.Va. 1990).
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2.

D.

III.

b.

Some jurisdictions imply a promise to use due care and
skill in every agreement to provide legal services. Roehl v.
Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1935). The test used for
determining professional negligence is used to determine
whether a breach of such an implied promise has
occurred. Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice §8.5 (West
2000).

c.

In Kentucky, whether a civil action arising out of any act or
omission in the rendering, or failing to render, professional
services is brought in tort or contract, it is subject to the
same statute of limitations (one year from the date of the
occurrence or from the date when the cause of action was,
or reasonably should have been, discovered).
KRS
§413.245.

Elements of the cause of action:
a.

Lawyer undertook a specific performance obligation or
warranted a particular level of performance; and

b.

Lawyer did not fulfill that contractual obligation. Anderson
& Steele, Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on
the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. Rev. 235 (1994).

Breach of Rules of Professional Conduct
1.

A violation of an ethical or disciplinary rule or statute regulating
lawyer's conduct.

2.

The sole method of remedying a violation of the Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct is the imposition of disciplinary measures by
the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association. The
Rules of Professional Conduct do not, in and of themselves,
create a private cause of action for civil liability. Hill v. Willmott,
561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1978)

3.

However, since rules of professional conduct do establish
standards of conduct for lawyers, a lawyer's violation of an ethical
rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of
conduct. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6 th Cir. 1979).
Restatement Third, The Law Governing Lawyers §52 (2000).

Pro's and Con's of Extending Liability to Non-Clients for Wrongdoing by Estate
Planning Attorneys

A.

Pro's
1.

Beginning almost 100 years ago, the defense of lack of privity has
See,
been rejected in almost all other areas of tort liability.
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.V. 382 (1916)(products
liability case). It was first rejected as a defense in a professional
negligence lawsuit in the estate planning context in 1961. Lucas
v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). Kentucky's highest court
eliminated the privity requirement in a professional negligence
lawsuit by a prospective purchaser of land against the lawyer who
negligently conducted a title search for the lender-client. Siegle v.
Jasper, 867 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1993).
2.

B.

Disallowing a cause of action to non-clients (intended
beneficiaries or disappointed heirs) effectively results in a grant of
immunity to estate planning attorneys for their wrongdoing.
a.

In all likelihood, the client will not be able to maintain a
cause of action because s/he will be dead when the
wrongful act or omission is discovered.

b.

If the misfeasance or malfeasance causes damage to the
intended beneficiaries or disappointed heirs, but not to the
client's estate (e.g., improper will execution causes the
client to die intestate), then there is no cause of action to
which the client's estate may succeed because the estate
has suffered no damages. Espinosa v. Sparber, 586 SO.2d
1221 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1991).

3.

Disallowing a cause of action to non-clients (intended will
beneficiaries or disappointed heirs) violates the basic principle of
tort law that losses should be allocated in accordance with the
parties' negligence. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.
1996)(Cornyn & Abbott dissenting). The innocent beneficiary
bears the loss.

4.

The possibility of liability to intended will beneficiaries or
disappointed heirs encourages estate planning attorneys to be
more careful thereby improving the quality of representation
provided by estate planning lawyers. Auric v. Continental Cas.
Co., 331 N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983).

5.

Estate planning lawyers are engaged in transactional work not
litigation. Therefore, a different set of rules, expanding liability to
some non-clients, may be appropriate. Hazard, "The Privity
Requirement Reconsidered," 37 S.Tex. Law Rev. 967 (1996).

Con's
1.

A duty of care running to the client's adversary is fundamentally at
odds with the nature of the objects of legal representation. The
practice of law is adversarial and injury to a non-client is often the
intended outcome of the representation.
Curtis, "Changing
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Standards of Third-Party Liability in Estate Planning," 66 U. of
Missouri-KC Law Rev. 863, 866 (1998).

IV.

2.

Non-client liability would result in the imposition of indeterminate
liability on estate planning lawyers thereby imposing an undue
burden on the profession. Id.

3.

Non-client liability creates a potential for dividing the attorney's
loyalties between the client and intended will beneficiaries or
disappointed heirs. Pizel v. Suspann, 705 P.2d 42 (Kan. 1990).

4.

Non-client beneficiaries and heirs become hidden participants in
the attorney-client relationship even though their interests may not
be co-terminus with the testator's interests.
Fogel, "Estate
Planning Malpractice," 17 Prop. & Prob. Journal 20 (July/Aug.
2003).

5.

Potential liability to non-client beneficiaries and heirs creates a
perverse incentive for attorneys to propose estate plans that are
most beneficial to the beneficiaries. Id.

Non-Client Causes of Action for Attorney Wrongdoing

A.

Professional Negligence
1.

Majority Rule - Privity Not Required
i.

See cases collected in 'What Constitutes Negligence
Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other That
Immediate Client," 61 A.L.R.4 th 464 (2004); and Mallen &
Smith, 4 Legal Malpractice §32.4, n. 15 (2000).

ii.

Multi-factor Balancing Test Approach - Lucas v. Hamm,
364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962)

iii.

a)

the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff;

b)

the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;

c)

the degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury;
and

d)

the policy of preventing future harm.

Florida-Iowa Rule - Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo,
Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 SO.2d 1378 (Fla. 1993) and
Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1987).
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2.

a)

A non-client has a cause of action only if the
testator's intent as expressed in the will is thwarted
by the attorney's professional negligence.

b)

Only execution errors are actionable.

c)

Followed in Michigan and Colorado. See, Miera v.
DeBona, 550 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. 1996) and Glover
v. Southard, 894 P.2 21 (Colo.Ct.App. 1994).

d)

Rationale: The rule is consistent with generally
applicable rules that prohibit the introduction of
extrinsic evidence to vary the intention of the
testator as expressed within the 4-corners of the
will.

Minority - Strict Privity Required
i.

Alabama - Peterson v. Anderson, 719 SO.2d 216 (Ala.App.
1997)(action by residuary beneficiaries alleging breach of
fiduciary duty owed by attorney to testator based on claims
that testator lacked testamentary capacity and was under
undue influence of others at time of will execution).

ii.

Maryland - Noble v. Bruce, 709 A.2d 164 (Md.
1998)(action by disappointed will beneficiary who lost a will
gift because an heir successfully challenged the will on the
grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary
capacity).

iii.

Nebraska - Lilyhorn v. Dier, 335 N.W.2d 554 (Neb.
1983)(action by disappointed will beneficiary who was left
a devise of land in which testator had only a life estate);
and St. Mary's Church v. Tomek, 325 N.W.2d 164
(1982)(action by disappointed will beneficiary who did not
receive the entire residuary estate because the residuary
clause was ambiguous).

iv.

New York - Viscardi v.
(App.Div.2d 1986)(action
beneficiary who received
provision granting the entire

v.

Ohio - Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio
1987)(action by disappointed will beneficiary who received
a smaller bequest when the surviving spouse was
permitted to take under both an antenuptial agreement and
a will provision that did not expressly state that it was in
satisfaction of the antenuptial agreement).
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Lerner, 510 N.Y.S.2d 183
by disappointed residuary
nothing because of a will
estate to the testator's wife).

3.

vi.

Texas - Guest v. Cochran, 993 S.W.2d 397 (Tex.App.
1999)(action by disappointed will beneficiaries who
received a smaller inheritance because the will did not
employ certain available tax saving mechanisms).

vii.

Virginia - Copenhaver v. Rogers, 384 S.E.2d 593 (Va.
1989)(action by disappointed will beneficiaries who
received a small inheritance because of allegedly negligent
tax advice given by attorney to their grandparents)

Restatement (Third), The Law Governing Lawyers §51 (West
2000).
i.

ii.

iii.

B.

Section 51 (3) - A lawyer owes a duty to use due care to a
non-client when and to the extent that:
a)

The lawyer knows that a client intends as one of
the primary objectives of the representation that the
lawyer's services benefit the non-client;

b)

Such a duty would not significantly impair the
lawyer's performance of obligations to the client;
and

c)

The absence of such duty would make enforcement
of those obligations to the client unlikely.

Comment f - Non-client claiming a different intent than one
actually expressed in the will.
a)

Non-client must meet a higher level of proof to be
successful.

b)

Non-client must produce "clear and convincing"
evidence that the attorney's client communicated to
the attorney an intent that is different than the one
actually expressed in the will.

If an attorney is held liable to a non-client as outlined
above, the Restatement suggests that "applicable
principles of law may provide that Lawyer may recover
from the unintended recipients the estate assets that
should have gone to Nonclient." Jd. at 362.

Breach of Contract - Third Party Beneficiary Theory
1.

A few states create an exception to the no-cause-of-actionbecause-of-Iack-of-privity rule for a non-client who qualifies as a
third-party beneficiary of the contract of representation between
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the attorney and the client. See, e.g., McLane v. Russell, 546
N.E.2d 499 (III. 1989); Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987);
and Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983).

C.

D.

V.

2.

If "the primary or direct purpose" of the attorney-client contract
was to benefit the non-client, the non-client may recover damages
from the attorney for breach of the implied promise to use
reasonable care and skill. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96
(III. 1982).

3.

The multi-factor balancing test, supra at IV.A.1.ii., and the third
party beneficiary test are practically indistinguishable because the
primary focus of inquiry is on the testator's purpose for entering
into an attorney-client relationship. Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080
(Wash. 1994).

Breach of Fiduciary Duty
1.

The erosion or elimination of the privity requirement resulting in
liability for estate planning lawyers to non-clients for professional
negligence and/or breach of contract has not resulted in the
creation of a cause of action for non-clients based on alleged
breaches of fiduciary obligations owed by the attorney to the
client. Mallen & Smith, 2 Legal Malpractice §14.3 (5th ed. 2000).
See, also, Restatment (3 rd ), The Law Governing Lawvers §§48 51. (West 2000)

2.

To hold otherwise could interfere with the attorney's performance
of the fiduciary duties that the attorney owes to the client in order
to avoid liability to a non-client. See, American Continental
Insurance Co. v. Weber & Rose, 997 S.W.2d 12 (Ky.App. 1999).

Breach of Rules of Professional Conduct
1.

Violation of an ethics rule by an attorney does not create a private
cause of action for the client. Supra at II. D.

2.

Therefore, a breach of a disciplinary rule does not create a private
cause of action for a non-client.

Kentucky Cases Concerning Attorney Liability to Non-Clients
A.

Williams v. Osborne, 2003 WL 22927708 (Ky.App. 2003)(unpublished).

1.

Father, who posted bail for his son, sued son's attorney for breach
of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duty in defending the son.
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2.

B.

C.

As the attorney-client relationship existed only between the son
and his attorney, the father's complaint was dismissed. He could
not predicate a cause of action based on alleged breaches of
duties owed by the attorney to his son.

American Continental Insurance Co. v. Weber & Rose, 997 S.W.2d 12
(Ky.App. 1999).

1.

Excess liability insurer could not recover for the alleged
professional negligence of an attorney who represented the
insured based upon the theory of equitable sUbrogation.

2.

The Court found that recognizing a direct duty owed by the
insured's attorney to the excess insurer would be "tantamount to
saying that insurance defense attorneys do not owe their duty of
loyalty and zealous representation to the insured client alone." Id.
at 14 (quoting American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Medical
Protective Co., 419 N.W.2d 447 (1987».

3.

The Court also rejected the insurer's argument that it was
intended to benefit from the attorney's services.

Seigel v. Jasper, 867 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.App. 1993).

1.

Property purchasers who paid the lender's attorney to prepare a
title examination could maintain a cause of action for alleged
professional negligence of the attorney in its preparation.

2.

The Court acknowledged that there were no published Kentucky
cases concerning an attorney's liability to parties who did not
stand in privity of contract with a title abstractor.

3.

In finding that the abstractor's duty to exercise ordinary care in the
performance of the title examination extended to the purchasers,
the Court accepted the holding in First American Title Insurance
Co. v. First Title Service Co., 457 So.2d 467, 473 (F1. 1984) that:
"Where the abstractor knows, or should know that his customer
wants the abstract for the use of a prospective purchaser, and the
prospect purchases the land relying on the abstract, the
abstractor's duty of care runs ... not only to his [sic] customer but
to the purchaser. Moreover, others involved in the transaction
through their relationship to the purchaser - such as lendermortgagees, tenants and title insurers - will also be protected
where the purchaser's reliance was known or should have been
known to the abstracter. But a party into whose hands the
abstract falls in connection with a subsequent transaction is not
among those to whom the abstracter owes a duty of care."
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D.

E.

Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1978).

1.

The Court expressly stated that Kentucky's law is accurately
summarized in Donald v. Garry, 97 Cal.Rptr. 191 (Cal. 191), that:
"An attorney may be liable for damage caused by his [sic]
negligence to a person intended to be benefited by his [sic]
performance irrespective of any lack of privity ...."

2.

However, the trial court's dismissal of the action by a non-client
physician against an attorney alleging that the lawyer was
negligent in instituting a malpractice action against the physician
on behalf of the attorney's client was sustained. The Court found
that the physician was not the intended beneficiary of the
attorney's services.

3.

The Court also held that an alleged violation by the attorney of a
rule of professional responsibility could not provide an
independent basis for a finding that the attorney owed a "duty" to
the non-client physician. The sole remedy for unethical conduct is
the imposition of disciplinary measures by the Board of Governors
of the Kentucky Bar Association.

4.

The Court stated that the non-client physician could only attempt
to vindicate the alleged wrong by bringing an action for malicious
prosecution against the attorney.

Rose v. Davis, 157 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 1941).

1.

The non-client plaintiff sued the attorney who represent his wife in
a divorce proceeding to recover the amount the plaintiff had paid
as alimony pursuant to judgment granting the husband and wife a
divorce from bed and board. That judgment was reversed on
appeal on the grounds that the marriage was bigamous and void
as the "wife" had a living husband at the time of her purported
marriage to plaintiff.

2.

In affirming the trial court's decision dismissing the non-client's
lawsuit, the Court said: "An attorney is not ordinarily liable to third
persons for his acts committed in representing a client. It is only
where his acts are fraudulent or tortuous and result in injury to
third persons that he is liable."

3.

The Court reasoned that to hold an attorney responsible for the
damages caused by an erroneous judicial order obtained by the
attorney without fraud or malice "would make the practice of law
one of such financial hazard that few men [sic] would care to incur
the risk of its practice."
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NB:

VI.

th

Sparks v. Craft, 75 F.3d 257 (6 Cir. 1996)

1.

The mother of a motorist who died in an automobile accident had
standing to bring a professional negligence action, in her
individual capacity, against the attorney who allowed the statute of
limitations to run on the child's estate's cause of action against the
other driver.

2.

Despite stating that Kentucky does not have a privity requirement
for legal malpractice actions, the Court's holding was predicated
on its finding that the mother, individually, and the son's estate
were both clients of the attorney.

Aphorisms for Avoiding Liability to Non-Clients (as well as to Clients)1

A.

B.

Don't Be A Know-It-All
1.

Estate, trust and probate law is commonly recognized as a
specialty area of practice. An attorney should know and respect
the limits of h/er legal knowledge.

2.

An attorney who engages in estate planning (even for so-called
"small" estates) must be knowledgeable about the laws
concerning wills, property, future interests, trust, probate and
taxation. These laws vary widely from state to state.

3.

The lawyer's knowledge of the relevant
complemented by strong drafting skills.

4.

Clients with issues outside of the attorney's area of expertise
should be referred to a lawyer with the appropriate degree of
knowledge and level of skill.

law

must

be

If You Sleep, You'll Weep
1.

Attorneys have an almost absolute responsibility to education
themselves about legal propositions that are considered settled.
See, Berman v. Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802 (Ga.App. 1976).

2.

A legal proposition is considered settled if it is clearly defined and
published so that it is generally known to the profession. Jd.

3.

A principle is generally known to the legal profession if it can be
found in textbooks, published court decisions, statutes, orin
general legal literature. Hill v. Mynatt, 59 S.W. 163 (Tenn.Ch.App.
1900).

1 See, Pennell, "Ethics, Professionalism, and Malpractice Issues in Estate Planning and
Administration," SH092 ALI-ABA Course of Study 1063 (2003); and Fogel, "Estate Planning
Malpractice, 17 Prop. & Prob. Journal 20 (July/Aug. 2003).
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4.

C.

D.

E.

Attorneys practicing in the area of estate planning must regularly
update their knowledge base.

By The Book
1.

Establish (and follow) procedures for recurring matters such as
client
in-take,
conflicts
checks,
engagement
letters,
communications to and from client, will execution ritual, etc..

2.

A will should be executed in a form that satisfies the most
stringent execution requirement even if the state has a laxer one.
For example, even though the jurisdiction only requires the
testator to "sign" the will, the testator's signature should be affixed
at the "end" of the will.

3.

All wills should be made self-proving.

4.

After execution, review the document one more time. A mistake
detected while the testator is still alive may be embarrassing to
admit, but it can be remedied.

Haste Makes Waste
1.

Don't wait until the last minute to draft a client's will, trust and/or
other estate planning documents.

2.

Provide a draft to your client for review prior to meeting to discuss
it.

3.

Proofread all documents prior to execution to guard against errors
caused by malfunctioning technology (e.g., printer error that
causes the omission of an sentence, paragraph or page).

Things Aren't Always As They Seem
1.

If possible, have another attorney review the final draft of a will,
trust or other estate planning document (e.g., antenuptial
agreement) to determine if it actually says what the drafter
intended it to say. This is particularly important if the document
contains any unusual or complex provisions.

2.

If review by another attorney isn't possible, put the draft aside for
a sufficient period of time so that the drafter can return to it with a
fresh set of eyes.

3.

Check the final draft against the notes during meetings (in-person,
over the phone or bye-mail) with the client to insure that all of the
client's directions have been included in the document.
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F.

G.

H.

4.

Make sure that the terms of the document cover all the possible
ways that events can play out. For example, if the survivorship is
required to a particular point in time, include an alternative
disposition in case the requirement is not met.

5.

Check, and check again, that all documents relevant to the client's
estate plan are integrated and compatible so that provisions in
one do not contradict provisions in another.

No Will Has a Sibling, Let Alone A Twin
1.

Don't just copy, cut and paste to create an estate planning
document.

2.

All material from outside sources (e.g., firm forms, other wills,
practice guides) should be tailored to accomplish the particular
client's objectives.

3.

Pay attention to the words used in the source document. For
example, the words "children" and "issue" are not synonymous.

4.

If you don't know the purpose of a provision that appears in
another document, don't include it in the one you're drafting.

First-In-Time Doesn't Necessarily Make It Right
1.

Proposals of new methods for avoiding or reducing tax liability
should be viewed with some degree of skepticism.

2.

Initial explanations of the meaning of recently enacted changes in
any body of law (but, particularly tax law) should be taken with a
grain of salt.

Mark a Trail with Bread Crumbs
1.

Document, document, document.

2.

When taking notes concerning the client's intentions, make sure
the notes clearly indicate the final (as opposed to tentative)
instructions of the client.

3.

Communicate in writing with your client explaining the proposed
estate plan. The degree of detail and depth of explanation should
be determined in light of the circumstances of the particular client.

4.

Use a protective letter to confirm the choices actually made by the
client.

L -13

I.

\

Play Well With Others

1.

Don't forget this lesson taught in kindergarten.

2.

Attorneys who are prompt in the delivery of their services as well
as responsive and polite to their clients are less likely to be sued
for professional negligence that those attorneys who are not.
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